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t is said that it takes a village to bring up a child. This particular book has 
had so many aunts and uncles that to count would not be simple. I’ll start 
from my adolescence—Moscow of the late 1960s, a decade after Pasternak’s 
death.
 In my parents’ three-room apartment I was introduced to Doctor Zhivago. 
The novel came to us in the form of a thick carbon copy, typed from a text 
that had been published in the West and distributed in Russia by samizdat. 
I cannot remember the name of the young gentleman who typed the novel, 
but I can see him distinctly. Of a Dostoevskian rather than Pasternakian 
appearance, in his small room he typed while lying down on a sofa; he made a 
special wooden contraption that permitted him to place the typewriter on his 
stomach; an ashtray resided on an adjacent chair. As he typed three or even 
four copies at once, he registered in brackets his own, always quite eccentric, 
views of particular scenes. This manuscript stayed in our family for a whole 
week (we were to pass it on to Valentin Turchin, one of Moscow’s leading 
physicists, and to his wife Tatiana). In our apartment the individual chapters 
travelled from my father to my step-mother Marina, and then to me.
 Our friends discussed the merits of the novel for hours around our dinner 
table. Most said that Pasternak was unquestionably a great poet, but a weak 
prose-writer. Some loved the novel, and some, Valentin Turchin among them, 
argued that this text was a key to all that was happening to us—we, the dissident 
circles of the sixties, were not meant to win, but to perish fighting. Among 
these ideas and conversations—and pondering the typist’s cryptic insertions—





text. As we like to say today, this book definitely came surrounded by meta-
texts, full of ruptures and contradictions.
 Within the next few years most of the people gathered around my father’s 
table left Russia and emigrated to the West. It seemed to me then that the 
decisions stirred by the text of Doctor Zhivago were not only about how to 
read, but how to live. And yet for me caught in the middle of these cataclysms, 
it remained very much a question of reading. I grappled with the text’s 
transparent simplicity; I felt that I had come upon a complexity that had been 
carefully erased, and I stumbled every time I tried to identify it. And, thus, my 
first deep gratitude is to the faces of my childhood and early youth—to their 
passionate approach to the written word, to the excitement of their vision, and 
to the integrity of their lives—to my beloved parents, my father Yuri Glazov 
and my step-mother Marina, and to their friends. It was among them that I 
first understood what I wanted to be.
 Then there were our years in Canada—my parents’ new home, my 
university training, and our first academic jobs. I want to acknowledge the 
influence of Hilary Armstrong who taught me Greek philosophy and Plato, 
and Lubomir Doležel who accepted the fact that after two years of working 
with Pasternak I was simply unable to write a Ph.D. dissertation elucidating 
his prose. I also want to mention the kindness and support of the then-Chair 
of the Comparative Literature Department at the University of Toronto, Peter 
Nesselroth. My friendship with Victor Yampolsky, enriched by his clear-
sighted understanding about the connection between Alexander Scriabin 
and Pasternak, also started then. And I cannot pass over that time in Canada 
without recollecting the generous hospitality of Margot King and her children 
Sarah, Bernard, and David, Ernie McCullough and his wife Sue, and the 
welcome of my family by our very close friends Roswitha and John Hardenne.
 I returned to Pasternak after I came to Emory University, to teach Russian 
Literature and Culture. Maria Lunk, a much loved instructor of Russian 
language and culture, died unexpectedly in January of 2010. I remember her 
with particular gratitude. I also want to thank my colleagues, Juliette Stapanian 
Apkarian, Mikhail Epstein, Vera and Oleg Proskurin, for their intellectual 
energy, friendship, advice and support. Melissa Miller and Tony Brinkley, who 
so quickly became my friend, were the first editors of this work. Thank you.
 No book on Pasternak could be written in these last many decades without 
the help and advice of Lazar Fleishman, Angela Livingstone, Konstantin 
Polivanov, Yevgeny Borisovich and Yelena Vasilievna Pasternak. Whether 
or not these scholars agreed with my conclusions, I am deeply grateful for 
their help. The death of Yevgeny Pasternak is the end of an era, but it is 
also a personal loss for so many of us, Pasternak scholars, whom Yevgeny 
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he principal aim of this book is to expand and redefine an area in Slavic 
Studies that has, quite inexplicably, suffered from critical neglect for 
at least a quarter of a century—the innovative art of Boris Pasternak’s early 
prose, interdisciplinary to its core. Completed by the end of 1918, only three 
of these early fictional works—“The Mark of Apelles,” “Letters from Tula,” and 
The Childhood of Luvers—found a publisher. These narratives represent, how-
ever, a much more extensive corpus of work that Pasternak wrote after he had 
abandoned his philosophical career, which, as he had himself reported, could 
have kept him in Germany as a university professor, working side by side 
with the much-respected Hermann Cohen. While my primary focus will be 
the three published stories, their investigation will necessarily involve Paster-
nak’s other writings, including his earlier philosophical notes and his fictional, 
critical, and autobiographical works. The relation between poetry and prose 
requires, in my view, a somewhat different study, and for this reason the dis-
cussion of Pasternak’s poetry, though important, will be kept to a minimum. 
Already as a young poet, Pasternak dreamt about writing prose, and my inves-
tigation aims to capture and elucidate his thought in this regard.
 The creative explosion of Pasternak’s fictional writing, so soon after his 
farewell to philosophy, promises a feast of thought and exploration, yet this 
promise somehow evades the investigator’s grasp. The notorious complexity 





thy toward their experimental and puzzling artistry, effectively broke Paster-
nak’s prose world into two discrete periods: the early avant-garde Pasternak, 
and the later Pasternak of Doctor Zhivago and other works. This division, 
however, has hurt the study of both periods; it makes the Pasternak of Zhivago 
appear today, after the political storms of his own time have subsided, almost 
banal in the eyes of the elite postmodern cognoscenti, while the enigmatic 
quality of his early vision remains curiously isolated from the rest of his writ-
ing. This book takes up the challenge of Pasternak’s early philosophical fic-
tion and links it to the seemingly straightforward and spare prose of his later 
years.
 How critical is this quest for a new reading of his works? On the one hand, 
the scarcity of new interpretative approaches has not been accompanied by a 
lack of fame or popularity on either side of the Atlantic. Half a century after 
his death, Boris Pasternak is read widely around the world and remains one 
of the handful of twentieth-century Russian writers who have become part of 
English-speaking culture, both as the author of Doctor Zhivago and as a much-
translated poet. His life-story continues to fascinate (or at least entertain) the 
reading public; new translations of his famous novel enter the market; archival 
materials and biographies are prepared for publication on an ongoing basis; 
and productions of Zhivago and documentaries about Pasternak, the rebel-
lious Soviet author, appear with surprising frequency. On the other hand, 
these trajectories of success do little to dispel the puzzling aura of “one of 
the most mysterious authors of the twentieth century” (Fleishman 1980, 7),1 
and if the absence of innovative approaches to Pasternak has not affected the 
writer’s reputation with the general public, it has significantly dampened the 
enthusiasm of Pasternak scholars and obscured the writer’s significance in the 
eyes of students of philosophy and cultural studies. Like his hero Tsvetkov in 
The Childhood of Luvers, Pasternak is in danger of becoming a stranger, “po-
storonnyj,” not only to the development of contemporary art and literary the-
ory, but also to the very core of intellectual intercultural discourse—namely, a 
stranger to the links and bridges between literature, philosophy, and psychol-
ogy, disciplines that interested him so profoundly at different stages of his life.
 There cannot then be a better time to start the project of addressing this 
critical impasse. The Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, central to the 
 1. To broaden the sphere of critical inquiry, Lazar Fleishman has urged for a more con-
textual reading of Pasternak’s early work, warning in 1980 that “the major poet of the twentieth 
century appears immersed in a cultural vacuum, sparsely decorated by the magnificent portraits 
of Mayakovsky, Cohen, Skriabin and Rilke” (Fleishman 1980, 7). In 1996, he reiterated the 
challenge to criticism presented by Pasternak’s “singular individual qualities” [неповторимо 
индивидуальные особенности] (Fleishman Lehrjahre 12).
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cultural world of the Russian Silver Age, was overshadowed for almost a cen-
tury by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and by the Frankfurt School, but 
this period of neglect has definitely ended. The major impediment for the 
writer’s literary investigators—Pasternak’s intense philosophical training—can 
now be addressed alongside new scholarly works dedicated to the thought of 
Hermann Cohen. In other words, the chasm that divided Pasternak’s early and 
later periods in the eyes of his critics and readers can now be re-evaluated in 
the context of new scholarly approaches to the Marburg philosophical school. 
A recent publication of Pasternak’s student konspekty from both Moscow and 
Marburg—the two volumes of Boris Pasternaks Lehrjahre: Neopublikovannye 
filosofskie konspekty i zametki Borisa Pasternaka (1996)2—has begun to dis-
solve some of the more inscrutable problems surrounding that “most shad-
owy and mysterious period of his life” (Fleishman Lehrjahre 11). Not only 
does the availability of Pasternak’s actual notes provide a factual comparative 
basis for determining Pasternak’s interests; the publication also makes it pos-
sible for “the philosophical work of Pasternak to enter into the context of the 
intense ideological battles taking place in the Russian culture of the Silver age” 
(Fleishman Lehrjahre 11).
 How crucial then was that early philosophical period, and can it provide 
significant help in a new reading of Pasternak’s early fiction? In the 1909–10 
academic year, the twenty-year-old Pasternak began his studies in philosophy 
at Moscow University and, in the spring of 1912, drawn to Neo-Kantianism 
like the rest of Russia’s cultural elite, he traveled to Marburg to study with 
the famous Neo-Kantian philosophers of the day, Hermann Cohen and Paul 
Natorp (having examined with great precision their works prior to this jour-
ney). Pasternak’s Marburg pilgrimage was, therefore, not a trifling endeavor, 
but a consciously defining choice, highly ambitious in its aims: he sought to 
establish a theoretical foundation for all scientific disciplines and for philoso-
phy in general in order to explain “the aesthetics of those who were the men-
tors of his generation in literature” (Fleishman 1990a, 29). For a trip of such 
significance, nonetheless, it was surprisingly short-lived: he set out for Ger-
many on April 21, but after a concentrated period of study and several highly 
successful presentations in seminars, he resolved to leave philosophy. The 
decision was as abrupt as it was irrevocable: on July 5 he was still consider-
ing joining Ernst Cassirer in Berlin, but on July 17 he confirmed to his friend 
Alexandr Shtikh the news that was announced to family and friends a week 
 2. Sendelbach aptly articulates the gratitude of every Pasternak scholar to this invaluable 
publication, which, in her assessment, changes the very field of Pasternak’s studies: “In other 
words, this collection gives the reader insight into the mind of Pasternak and into the minds of 
those who helped shape it: his philosophy professors” (2001, 764).
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earlier: “I am unwell. I am putting an end to philosophy” (PSS 7:124). For 
another year, Pasternak continued his philosophical studies half-heartedly in 
Moscow, but his choice of profession after Marburg was firm: he was to be a 
poet and a writer.
 In spite of the abruptness of his decision and his habitual evasiveness 
about his philosophical studies, the archival data collected by scholars is 
incontrovertible: the writer’s grasp of philosophical issues was genuine and 
deep.3 Yet the editors of the two volumes of the Lehrjahre are cautious in their 
expectations. Not only do they assess previous scholarly attempts to locate 
the key to Pasternak-the-writer in philosophy in Kant, Bergson, Cohen, and 
Husserl as “one-sided” and even “mistaken” (Fleishman Lehrjahre 10); they 
also do not sound overly optimistic about the possibility of establishing any 
direct correspondences between Pasternak’s philosophical notes (which iden-
tify the texts and textbooks he studied and loved) and his literary work. Their 
caution in this regard is sensibly motivated: “This theme [the demonstra-
ble content of Pasternak’s philosophical studies] cannot be mechanically or 
straightforwardly connected with another question, that of Pasternak’s poetic 
sensibility. His philosophical readings were only a part, and quite possibly 
not the principal part, of his unified Weltanschauung” (Fleishman Lehrjahre 
13).
 On balance, this assessment may in fact be too restrictive, since such cau-
tion should also extend to all relationships of Boris Pasternak to his men-
tors and artistic predecessors, even, for example, to the German poet he 
so admired, Rainer Maria Rilke.4 None of Pasternak’s intellectual interests, 
whether well documented or still circumstantial, can be mechanically applied 
to his work, and no static comparison between him and other authors, literary 
or philosophical, can provide fruitful avenues for investigation. At the same 
time, the path to his dynamic and transformative engagement with other art-
ists and thinkers is difficult to demonstrate conclusively. In 1923, Yevgenij 
Zamyatin, a highly perceptive critic and a brilliant artist in his own right, 
observed that even among the experimental and gifted apprentices of the Sil-
 3. Sendelbach emphasizes the importance of the publication of Boris Pasternaks Lehrjahre 
to a full understanding of Pasternak’s output: “The breadth and depth of this collection reminds 
the reader that Pasternak was not merely a dabbler in philosophy but rather a scholar of it, and 
a prolific one at that. To understand better Pasternak the writer is to understand Pasternak the 
philosopher” (2001, 764). Livingstone comments upon the importance of the two volumes: 
“No matter that the very ardor with which he studied philosophy suggested the romantic: he 
could have become the professional philosopher. One realizes with a certain shock that he was 
exceptionally good at it; the notes are ‘first class’” (1998, 946).
 4. On the inconclusiveness surrounding Rilke’s role in Pasternak’s work, see Fleishman 
Lehrjahre 12.
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ver Age, the prose of Boris Pasternak had “neither kith nor kin” [без роду и 
племени].5 Lazar Fleishman, assembling the archival materials of Pasternak’s 
world in the 1920s, commented upon the deep-seated consensus among Pas-
ternak investigators that the writer’s creative life took place in “isolation from 
the concrete ‘immediate’ details of the literary and cultural life of his time,” 
so much so that Akhmatova was to exclaim on many occasions: “He does 
not read any of us” [Он никого не читает] (1980, 7). This apparent artistic 
isolation of the early Pasternak is further reinforced by surviving anecdotal 
recollections depicting his communicative eccentricities. In the recent popular 
biography of the poet, Dmitry Bykov, for example, deftly employs Fazil Iskan-
der’s remark that a conversation with Pasternak, the young author, was akin to 
an exchange “with a very interesting drunk” (2007, 57), a sentiment that per-
mits Bykov to dismiss the poet’s early prose as “subjective, fragmentary, and 
resisting understanding” (434). Indeed, the portrait of the early Pasternak (as 
well as any evaluation of his prose) has been molded into the image of a young 
passionate artist unable to communicate in a coherent manner, who instead 
only “hooted or droned” with intonations simultaneously “wild, joyful and 
astonished” (54).
 In clarifying Pasternak’s philosophical range in his early stories, one of 
my aims is to address this reductive portrait—its picture of absent-minded 
exuberance—by shedding light on the reasons behind the writer’s character-
istic evasiveness in discussing influences on his art. Highly telling in this con-
text, for instance, is the ambition Pasternak ascribes to his protagonist Yuri 
Zhivago who “ever since his schooldays [ . . . ] had dreamed of composing a 
book about life which would contain, like buried explosives, the most striking 
things he had so far seen and thought about” [Он еще с гимназических лет 
мечтал о прозе, о книге жизнеописаний, куда бы он в виде скрытых 
взрывчатых гнезд мог вставлять самое ошеломляющее из того, что он 
успел увидать и передумать] (Zhivago, 65; PSS 4:66). The emphasis upon 
“buried explosives,” made up of the most treasured past thoughts and experi-
ences, speaks of prose as the painstaking creation of a carefully hidden sub-
text, wide-ranging and highly provocative in its after-effects. Nor does this 
subtlety of evasiveness disappear when Pasternak, in the post-Revolutionary 
period, loses much of his “joyful hooting.” Even though Pasternak, after the 
1930s, rejected the unnecessary complexity of his earlier works,6 a recognition 
 5. Zamyatin’s review of “Detstvo Luvers” was published in “Novaja russkaja proza,” in 
Russkoe Iskusstvo 2–3 (1923): 56–57. In English “The New Russian Prose” was published in A 
Soviet Heretic: Essays by Evgeny Zamyatin, ed. and trans. by Mirra Ginsburg (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1970), 100.
 6. See Pasternak’s characterization of his early writing in his reference to Safe Conduct 
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of influences did not become more transparent or straightforward in his later 
writings. Indeed, throughout his career, whether his style was simple or com-
plex, the conceptual frames of his works remained a challenge for his readers 
and critics.
 In examining Pasternak’s works in the light of philosophical themes, this 
book does not seek to isolate all, or even a significant part, of his artistic pre-
decessors in philosophy. Instead its main task is much more critical to the 
overall scholarly enterprise. In its quest to expand the range of Pasternak 
scholarship, this study seeks to demonstrate the deeper conceptual pathways 
that transformed the young pre-Revolutionary author, a major figure of the 
Russian avant-garde, into a popular, accessible, albeit politically uncontrol-
lable novelist. This book argues that the materials of his Moscow and Marburg 
studies help best to illuminate the most difficult aspects of his thought—his 
formidable capacity to reshape radically the very thoughts and ideas that 
moved him most deeply. In other words, his studies of philosophy are viewed 
as an invaluable tool in finding access to the dynamic intensity of Pasternak’s 
thought as he, in the act of writing, worked with other writers.
 Recognition of the transformative character of Pasternak’s thought 
explains best, in fact, the young writer’s deep-seated evasiveness and carefully 
nurtured evocation of mystery and dislocation.7 As late as 1930, in the very 
first pages of Safe Conduct, Pasternak acknowledged that the ever-widening 
gap between himself and his audience constituted more than a passing fancy 
or an accidental occurrence; this gap was the very precondition for writing 
prose. In order to compose a longer work, he needed to outdistance his prede-
cessors and readers both temporally and spatially:
He [the reader] [ . . . ] likes those places beyond which his walks have never 
taken him. He is immersed in forewords and introductions, but for me 
life has revealed itself only at the point where he tends to sum things up. 
Even without mentioning how the inner articulation of history was thrust 
upon my understanding in an image of unavoidable death, I only came 
completely alive, within life itself, on those occasions when the dreary sim-
mering of ingredients was done and, having dined from the finished dish, 
being “spoilt by unnecessary mannerism, the common fault of those years” [книга испорчена 
ненужной манерностью, общим грехом тех лет] (Remember, 19; PSS 3:295).
 7. In one of the most recent studies of Pasternak’s early prose, Jensen summarizes the 
author’s narrative strategies, basing his argument on the Childhood of Luvers: “With the double 
paradox the author emphasizes that the enchantment and warmth of the story are achieved 
not by the closeness between the author and his protagonists, but, by contrast, through alien-
ation and distance” [занимательность и теплота рассказа обусловлены не близостью 
рассказчика к героям, а, напротив, отчуждением и дистанцией] (2006, 299).
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a feeling equipped with all conceivable spaciousness tore loose from its 
moorings and escaped to freedom. (CSP 23)
Ему [читателю] по душе места, дальше которых не простирались его 
прогулки. Он весь тонет в предисловиях и введеньях, а для меня 
жизнь открывалась лишь там, где он склонен подводить итоги. Не 
говоря о том, что внутреннее члененье истории навязано моему 
пониманью в образе неминуемой смерти, я и в жизни оживал цели-
ком лишь в тех случаях, когда заканчивалась утомительная варка 
частей и, пообедав целым, вырывалось на свободу всей ширью 
оснащенное чувство. (PSS 3:150)
The style of this passage may well index Pasternak’s youthful arrogance, but it 
also foregrounds his unusual manner of understanding influences, traditions, 
and patterns of relation with his reading public.8 The startling reference to 
death indicates emphatically that the very process of absorption of influence is 
in Pasternak’s case a radical metamorphosis that reshapes and erases the dis-
continuous elements of the past. Similarly indicative is the writer’s compari-
son of his own work to the image of a soaring bird that has fed on the dishes 
of the past and now breaks free. The image captures quite ingeniously the state 
of puzzlement and uncertainty of his critics, for it celebrates the writer’s well-
planned escape, precluding in its flight any painstaking critical attempts to 
trace areas of influence or intertextual contexts for his thought.9
 The underlying problem of Pasternak’s prose (and this includes all of his 
work) is by no means trivial, for there is a formidable gap, carefully protected 
by the writer himself, between his passionate affirmation of allegiance to cer-
tain artistic figures and the absence of easily demonstrable lines of apprentice-
ship and influence, a problem that extends to his studies of philosophy but 
that is by no means limited to them. For instance, in the poem “Lofty Malady,” 
written in the turbulent 1920s, Boris Pasternak promised “to leave the stage” 
together with the pre-Revolutionary cultural milieu of Russia and pledged an 
unshakable loyalty to its art,10 but as it so happened, he did not abandon the 
 8. See in Fleishman: “Pasternak is frequently presented as standing outside of the literary 
conflicts, arguments and battles, inhabiting a higher plane or passively observing them” (1980, 
7).
 9. Fleishman, for example, expresses uncertainty that the key to the startling originality 
of Pasternak can, in fact, be located in Rilke (Fleishman Lehrjahre 12). See here Barnes (1972), 
Livingstone (1983), and Gifford (1990).
 10. Cf. “I am speaking about the whole milieu, with which I meant to leave the stage, and to 
leave the stage I will. There is no place for shame here” [Я говорю про всю среду, / С которой 
я имел в виду / Сойти со сцены, / и сойду. Здесь места нет стыду] (PSS 1:255–56).
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stage at all, nor was he to vanish in the decades that followed: he was destined 
to belong to that smallest group of Russian artists who not only outlived the 
worst of the purges, executions, and war-time devastation, but survived hon-
orably and fruitfully. Still, the same pledge of allegiance was reiterated by the 
writer throughout his career. At the acme of his international success in the 
late 1950s, during the major political crisis surrounding the publication of 
Doctor Zhivago, Boris Pasternak continued to emphasize his deep identifica-
tion with the cultural world of the Russian Silver Age, insisting that “his artis-
tic taste had been formed in his youth and [that] he remained faithful to the 
masters of that period” (Berlin 2004,  222). The concrete reality of this identi-
fication of his tastes offers the point of departure for what becomes the subject 
matter of this study.
 Chapter One, “The Character of Philosophical Influence in Pasternak’s 
Early Prose,” addresses the causes of the puzzling evasiveness of Pasternak’s 
manner of acknowledging influences, in general, and philosophical influ-
ences, in particular, by juxtaposing his recollections of his Marburg period in 
Safe Conduct with surviving archival materials from the period.
 Chapter Two, “Similarity and Contiguity in Pasternak’s Early Poetics and 
Their Philosophical Underpinnings,” clarifies Pasternak’s debt to philosophy 
through a discussion of the metaphor–metonymy opposition, first applied to 
Pasternak’s prose by Roman Jakobson in 1935. The chapter recognizes that 
Jakobson’s analytical tour de force, a masterful blend of theory and criticism, 
still holds the status of the reigning scholarly perspective,11 even though crit-
ics, on many occasions, have tended to balk at his conclusion that Pasternak’s 
metaphors and symbols are not “what determines and guides his lyric theme” 
(Jakobson 1969, 141). Chapter Two questions Jakobson’s findings by argu-
ing that it was Pasternak in 1913, in fact, who first proposed the opposition 
between contiguity and similarity, borrowing his terminology from David 
Hume12 and expanding its problematics in the context of Immanuel Kant’s 
 11. For the historical context of Roman Jakobson’s “Marginal Notes on the Prose of the 
Poet Pasternak” of 1935, see Barnes’s account of the appearance of Safe Conduct in Czech 
(1998, 111). In his “Afterword” to the Czech edition, Jakobson proposes his famous opposi-
tion between metaphor and metonymy, which, according to his argument, shaped the styles of 
Mayakovsky and Pasternak respectively. Pasternak himself, of course, always insisted that the 
Russian symbolists had a profound influence on his writing: “The depth and charm of Bely and 
Blok could not but be revealed to me. Their influence was combined in a singular way with a 
force that went beyond mere ignorance” [Глубина и прелесть Белого и Блока не могли не 
открыться мне. Их влияние своеобразно сочеталось с силой, превосходившей простое 
невежество] (CSP 31; PSS 3:159).
 12. For Hume, ideas derived from perceptions and based on experience are organized ac-
cording to “resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect” (An Enquiry Concern-
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criticism of Hume’s materialism. By taking careful account of Pasternak’s phil-
osophical notes, early reviews, and pamphlets, including “The Wasserman 
Test,” the chapter argues that Pasternak himself never conceived of the rela-
tionship between similarity and contiguity, or metaphor and metonymy, as a 
stark contrast. Rather, he viewed this opposition as the poles of a changing 
continuum of relationships with language, characteristic of any genuine poetic 
inner work, wherein metonymy, or association by contiguity, constitutes a 
basis of the poetic process from which metaphoric relationships necessarily 
emerge. By clarifying Pasternak’s early ventures in poetic theory, the chapter 
creates a heuristic philosophical dictionary, if not to enumerate the philo-
sophical preoccupations of the writer (a rather meaningless goal), then at least 
to prepare a context for the analysis of his early narratives.
 Chapter Three, “Arguing with the Sun in ‘The Mark of Apelles,’” initiates 
a philological analysis of Pasternak’s early fiction. This chapter is dedicated to 
the study of a story written in 1914 that has defied critical analysis or under-
standing. Heinrich Heine, its mysterious protagonist, is understood not as a 
poetic wanderer who bears a famous name, but as an atemporal “apriorist of 
lyricism,” entering into the darkness of the night out of unlimited time and 
space and realigning reality by the force of his personality and talent. The 
chapter examines the major (and heretofore ignored) interplay between light 
and shadow in the story, pointing to Pasternak’s masterful rendition of Plato’s 
cave, where the endangered human being, however, is no longer the philoso-
pher, but the poet. This is, indeed, a significant substitution to which Paster-
nak returned, not only in his poem “Hamlet,” but also throughout his life.
 Chapter Four, “‘Letters from Tula’: ‘Was ist Apperzeption?’”, is one of the 
central chapters of the book. It seeks to illustrate Pasternak’s ability to trans-
form a philosophical argument into an artistic space of multiple interrelations 
rather than simply arguing the specific philosophical issues at hand. Address-
ing the perplexing narrative of “Letters from Tula,” this chapter introduces the 
central role of the Kantian theory of apperception, a subject on which Her-
mann Cohen, according to Pasternak’s recollection of his time at the Marburg 
school in Safe Conduct, drilled his students with particular fervor. Pasternak’s 
revision of Kant is approached as a key to the narrative’s organization, further 
augmented by Hermann Cohen’s emphasis on the role of the “other” in the 
autonomous development of the self. Cohen’s correction of Kant is addressed 
as a major philosophical paradigm-shift, understood and implemented by 
Pasternak as one of his boldest artistic experiments, anticipating, in fact, Jorge 
ing Human Understanding, 1.3 ¶ 3–4; 2007, 20). Hume in his later works approaches “cause and 
effect” as contiguity in time. See Chapter 2.2. 
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Luis Borges (a writer influenced, incidentally, by another Marburg student, 
Ortega y Gasset).
 Chapter Five, “Contextualizing the Intellectual Aims of 1918: From ‘Let-
ters from Tula’ to The Childhood of Luvers,” examines Pasternak’s letters, dia-
ries, and excised chapters (from Luvers) written in 1918, while addressing his 
shift of perspective from the consciousness of the poet to that of a growing 
girl. Deepening the analysis of Pasternak’s meditation on the limitations of 
Kantian theory of apperception, the chapter addresses human developmen-
tal psychology as reflected in the thought of Cohen’s closest colleague, Paul 
Natorp. Pasternak’s 1910 sketch, “Ordering a Drama,” is examined in this con-
text for its particular emphasis on three levels of awareness, and the chapter 
suggests that Luvers not merely integrates all three levels into its construction, 
but also develops the pivotal role of the “other,” a singular theme of Hermann 
Cohen’s ethics. This fifth chapter operates, therefore, as a theoretical context 
for the novel approaches to The Childhood of Luvers worked out in the next 
two chapters.
 Chapter Six, “‘The Long Days’ in The Childhood of Luvers: Chronology 
of a Permeable Self,” is dedicated to an analysis of the first part of the novella. 
While comparing the construction of the narrative to the two levels of the ear-
lier sketch, “Ordering a Drama,” the chapter shows Pasternak’s careful employ-
ment of the contiguous series (a device that Jakobson describes as metonymy). 
These devices show the emergence of consciousness (a contiguous relation-
ship with the inanimate world) and the birth of soul (a contiguous relationship 
between the child’s psychological formation and natural/physical processes), 
and they also prepare the context for the crucial metaphorical transformations 
in the second part of the narrative. In order to clarify further these carefully 
structured tropes, the chapter concludes with Table 1, Chronology of a Perme-
able Self: “The Long Days” of The Childhood of Luvers.
 Chapter Seven, “‘The Stranger’ in The Childhood of Luvers: Disruptions in 
Chronology and the Collision with Other Worlds,” explores the emergence of 
new metaphorical tropes, which frame the parallel emergence of the human 
self—the development of the personality of the future adult. As the growing 
girl begins to observe the spirit that enters from outside—“an other,” Stranger 
or Postoronnyj—Pasternak’s tale becomes an intertextual reversal of the story 
of Lermontov’s Demon. Moreover, Zhenya’s reaction to Tsvetkov is not only 
a restructuring of Tamara’s suffering in the presence of the invisible Demon 
(in Lermontov’s poem), but also a reflection of Alexander Scriabin’s influence 
(and that of his music) on the formation of the early Pasternak. The presence 
of Tsvetkov in Zhenya’s life, resonating with echoes of Heine’s appearance in 
“The Mark of Apelles” and the role of Tolstoy in “Letters from Tula,” demon-
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strates Pasternak’s own emergence as a highly complex writer, able to crown 
his early metonymies with carefully thought-out and, indeed, breathtaking 
metaphoric structures. This chapter also concludes with Table II: Disruptions 
of Chronology and the Collision of Multiple Worlds in “The Stranger,” which 
reflects the transformation of metonymic relations into metaphors whose 
carefully constructed and increasingly complex worlds, nestled within each 
other, describe the maturation of the intrinsically artistic personality of the 
young Zhenya Luvers.
 The Conclusion, “Pasternak’s Symbolic World: Prose and Philosophy,” 
summarizes the findings of this study. It also addresses Pasternak’s apparent 
and well-documented dislike of his early prose and identifies this problem as 
located not merely in his complex narrative style, but also in his belief in the 
exalted position of the spirit of the “other,” understood in his youth as vestiges 
of the sublime world that enter, realign, and eventually undermine the mun-
dane world. My analysis traces Pasternak’s growing resistance to these spirits 
of the sublime, a theme that once again is central to the aesthetics of the Kan-
tian and Neo-Kantian school. I suggest that in his later narratives Pasternak 
no longer embraces the sublime roles of these carriers of the a priori spirit, but 
instead expands the role of nature and of its resonance as coextensive with the 
domain of the soul—as, for example, in the first chapters of Zhivago, it is not 
Tsvetkov, Heine, or Scriabin, but the snowstorm that acts as a threatening a 
priori guest knocking on the window and awakening the young Yuri Zhivago, 
calling him into his future.
 My aim throughout is to develop, on the basis of these earlier stories, a set 
of questions that can be fruitfully applied to Pasternak’s writing as a whole, his 
collection of “buried explosives.” In other words, the complexity of his early 
writing will be approached throughout as a necessary means of uncovering 
some of the most significant and recurrent networks and patterns of thought 
that will never disappear from Pasternak’s writings.
ikhail Bakhtin, who never traveled to Marburg, spoke of Hermann 
Cohen as a formidable force in his own formation: “this was an 
extraordinary philosopher, who simply had an enormous influence on me, 
an enormous influence” (Duvakin et al., 1996, 36). No such sentiment or any 
other clear-cut evaluation of Hermann Cohen was ever expressed by Pas-
ternak, even though his first awareness of Marburg as a probable point of 
destination for his studies is presented in Safe Conduct as a seminal event, 
saturated with mythical undertones. In Safe Conduct, after Dmitry Samarin1 
advises Pasternak in a cold and semi-abandoned Café Grec2 to study with 
Cohen, the surrounding snowstorm intensifies and begins to draw circles of 
infinity. The snowflakes, whirled by the wind, fall to the ground in the shape 
of a figure eight (or, from another angle, of infinity), recalling in their move-
 1. For Dmitry Samarin’s life and his role as a possible prototype of Yuri Zhivago, see Po-
livanov (2006, 450–66).
 2. There is a somewhat hidden relationship between Pasternak’s mention of Café Grec and 
John Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” established by Pasternak’s line, “I could not stop think-
ing of what I had heard, and I grieved for the little town that I thought I was no more likely 
to see than my own ears” [Я не мог позабыть о слышанном, и мне жалко было городка, 
которого, как я думал, мне никогда, как ушей своих, не видать] (CSP 36; PSS 3:166), and 
its implicit reference to Keats’s famous “And, little town, thy streets for evermore / Will silent 
be; and not a soul, to tell / Why thou art desolate, can e’er return” (309).
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ment the gathering of seamen’s hawsers and nets and announcing the young 
man’s initiation into a long if somewhat intangible journey:
The weather had changed. A wind had risen and begun lashing down a 
February sleet. It was falling to the earth in regular windings like a figure 
eight. This was how men piled up hawsers and nets in wavy layers, swing-
ing stroke upon stroke. [ . . . ] I could not stop thinking of what I had heard, 
and I grieved for the little town that I thought I was no more likely to see 
than my own ears. (CSP 36)
Погода переменилась. Поднявшийся ветер стал шпарить февраль-
скою крупою. Она ложилась на землю правильными мотками, вось-
меркой. Было в ее яростном петляньи что-то морское. Так, мах к 
маху, волнистыми слоями складывают канаты и сети. [ . . . ] Я не мог 
позабыть о слышанном, и мне жалко было городка, которого, как я 
думал, мне никогда, как ушей своих, не видать. (PSS 3:166)
After such a haunting and promising overture, the absence of any clear ref-
erence to Cohen’s philosophy or direct acknowledgement of his intellectual 
influence either in Safe Conduct or elsewhere is puzzling, all the more so 
because in Marburg Pasternak did not merely study philosophy—he engaged 
with it wholeheartedly and succeeded in receiving, as he was also careful to 
point out, the School’s highest acclaim.3
 While this avoidance of the question of Cohen’s actual teaching is not 
Pasternak’s only silence about his own philosophical interests, it is, nonethe-
less, startling. No investigator of Pasternak’s early prose would deny Paster-
nak’s indebtedness to Neo-Kantianism or forget to stress the importance of 
his studies in Marburg. At the same time, a strange hollowness character-
izes critical efforts to locate Pasternak’s philosophical precursors.4 As Fleish-
 3. In his letters to Aleksandr Shtikh, on July 17 and 19, 1912, Pasternak emphasized, quite 
pointedly in fact, that he was not only invited to Hermann Cohen’s house, but also offered to 
remain at Marburg University as a professor (PSS 7:124–29).
 4. See, for example, de Mallac’s tracing of the “dichotomies pervading the Kantian philo-
sophical system” in Pasternak’s art (1979, 426), Gifford’s claim that “philosophy is an adjunct” 
to Pasternak’s poetry and prose (1977, 27), or Muchnic’s insistence that Pasternak while becom-
ing “an apostate philosopher” still “retained the interest of the discipline he has renounced” 
(1961, 390). Equally telling in this regard is de Mallac’s conclusion that the role of philosophy 
for the poet was secondary to issues of the heart: “Of all the experiences that were to have an 
impact on Pasternak in Marburg, however, the most powerful was that of rejected love” (1981, 
65). Since de Mallac always insisted on the philosophical context of Pasternak’s work, this 
conclusion emphasizes the uncertainty that characterizes the process of locating or arguing for 
influences in Pasternak’s work.
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man succinctly observes in his “Introduction” to the publication of Pasternak’s 
philosophical konspekty, the quest to elucidate Pasternak’s philosophical 
thought is invariably undermined by the poet himself: “[T]he deep interest in 
philosophy was acknowledged by him in Safe Conduct. But having described 
his studies, Pasternak left his readers uncertain in which of the philosophical 
schools one should search for the ‘philosopher’s key’” (Lehrjahre 12). More-
over, this puzzling evasiveness was a life-time characteristic of the writer. 
When, for instance, in Doctor Zhivago Pasternak drew the portrait of a phi-
losopher who would have a life-long influence on the novel’s hero Yuri, he was 
careful to ensure that Nikolay Nikolayevich Vedenyapin belonged to no school 
of thought, that he was influenced by Tolstoy much more decisively than by 
Kant, and that even in the Moscow University of the time he walked alone:
Soon he was to take his place among contemporary writers, university pro-
fessors and philosophers of the revolution, a man who thought about all of 
their questions, but had nothing in common with them except their termi-
nology. All of them, without exception, clung to some dogma or other, sat-
isfied with words and superficialities, but Father Nikolai had gone through 
Tolstoyism and revolutionary idealism and was still moving forward. He 
thirsted for something new. (Zhivago 7; trans. altered)
Скоро среди представителей тогдашней литературы, профессоров 
университета и философов революции должен был появиться этот 
человек, который думал на все их темы и у которого, кроме терми-
нологии, не было с ними ничего общего. Все они скопом держались 
какой-нибудь догмы и довольствовались словами и видимостями, а 
отец Николай был священник, прошедший толстовство и револю-
цию и шедший все время дальше. Он жаждал нового. (PSS 4:10)
Any possible philosophical precursors to Vedenyapin’s thought are, thus, care-
fully and decisively obliterated.
 What are the underlying causes of this habitual pattern of misdirection 
in Pasternak’s discussions of the role that philosophy might have had in his 
formation? Marina Tsvetaeva, in “My Pushkin,” insisted that she loved cou-
ples (fictional and living) most when they separated,5 and Pasternak is both 
 5. Cf. 
Neither then, nor afterwards did I ever love when there was a kiss of greeting; 
always when there was a farewell of parting.  I never loved when they sat together; 
always when they walked apart.
 [ . . . ] If afterwards, a whole life long, and to this day, I was always the first one 
to write, the first one to stretch out my hand and my arms, not fearing judgment, 
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emphatic and yet evasive in his employment of descriptions of intellectual and 
artistic influences as departures and farewells.6 In this chapter I will accept 
Pasternak’s challenge in this regard and then go on to examine his famous 
yet obviously unsatisfactory account of leaving philosophy that follows the 
equally puzzling break-up with music in Safe Conduct (1.1–1.2) and to com-
pare these passages with Pasternak’s philosophical diaries and the archival 
data from his time in Marburg (1.3), which includes the letters he wrote to his 
family and friends during the destiny-altering July of 1912.
 The celebrated passages of Safe Conduct that explain Pasternak’s irre-
vocable decisions to leave both Scriabin and Cohen, as well as the factual 
information that has been assembled, are, for the most part, familiar to Pas-
ternak’s readers.7 The key, however, lies in approaching his recollections not 
as straightforward explanations, but as instances of covert, even cunning sub-
terfuge (1.4.)—as episodes whose tropes are guided by an intricate narrative 
strategy revealed when set beside the straightforward evidence of the poet’s 
archival data.8
it is only because at the dawn of my days, a Tatyana in a book, lying prone, by the 
light of a small candle, her braid tousled and thrown across her breast, before my 
eyes, did what she did. [ . . . ] A lesson of courage. A lesson of pride. A lesson of 
fidelity. A lesson of fate. A lesson of loneliness (Tsvetaeva 1980: 336–37).
[Я ни тогда, ни потом, никогда не любила, когда целовались, всегда - 
когда расставались. Никогда не любила - когда садились, всегда - когда 
расходились. 
 [ . . . ] Если я потом всю жизнь по сей последний день всегда первая 
писала, первая протягивала руку — и руки, не страшась суда — то только 
потому, что на заре моих дней лежащая Татьяна в книге, при свечке, с 
растрепанной и переброшенной через грудь косой, это на моих глазах — 
сделала. [ . . . ] Урок смелости. Урок гордости. Урок верности. Урок судьбы. 
Урок одиночества] (Tsvetaeva 1979 2: 261–62). 
 6. In this work, I have intentionally avoided discussing Rilke’s influence, not because it is 
unimportant, but because the philosophical context, examined here, makes Rilke’s influence all 
the more profound and significant and requires a very careful examination focused on philoso-
phy and Rilke. However, in discussing the influence of the departed—or influence in absence 
rather than in presence—Rilke must be cited. See here Leishman’s summary of Rilke’s medita-
tion in writing Duino Elegies: “.  .  . he needed continual reminders of the human past and of 
intense human living, and yet, at the same time, to be free from distracting personal encounters. 
Surrounded, as it were, by spirits of the departed, by objects that recalled a long line of users 
and lovers, by a present that melted into the past and by a past that melted into the present, he 
could more easily achieve, more easily invoke . . .” (Rilke 2008, 48–49).
 7. Critics used to believe, at first, that Safe Conduct’s account of Pasternak’s relationship 
with Scriabin and Cohen was historically precise, but in the last two decades it has become clear 
that his recollections are often less than exact. Thus, Pasternak’s leaving music was not as abrupt 
as he claimed, and the dates of Cohen’s invitation and offers were not in June 1912—the month 
of Pasternak’s first love, Ida Vysotskaya’s visit (E. B. Pasternak 1989, 111–15 and 156–62).
 8. A complex account of Pasternak’s evasiveness, prompted by political consideration, in 
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1.1 Safe Conduct: 
 Farewell to music and the soul’s stretched wings
Though Safe Conduct provides—on the surface—a somewhat muddled and 
poetically confusing context for the poet’s abrupt decisions in changing his 
intellectual goals, the juxtaposition of the two modes of farewell—to music 
and to philosophy—clarifies, however covertly, the future role that philosophy 
was to play in Pasternak’s life. Krystyna Pomorska, after a careful investiga-
tion of Safe Conduct, concluded that the underlying patterns or “invariants” in 
Pasternak’s relationships with either the composer Alexander Scriabin, or the 
philosopher Hermann Cohen, or eventually the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, 
remain unchanged: “Everything [  .  .  .  ] ends up in defeat” (Pomorska 1975, 
66). However, defeat is apparent only on the surface: in each circumstance 
of departure, Pasternak structures the narrative to imply that his decisions, 
no matter how apparently reckless and erratic,9 are indicative of some deep 
inner processes, incomprehensible and disturbing to any onlooker, but con-
cealing an intensely personal and joyful exaltation. Nor are the two visions 
of the future experienced during his departures from music and philosophy 
identical. In fact, their differences, subtly introduced, signal some of the key 
themes10 of Pasternak’s art, namely, his work with his precursors and his man-
ner of accepting, rejecting or concealing influences.
 Pasternak’s decision to abandon music is accompanied by a highly specific 
set of images, including the evocation of the “winged will”—the intimation of 
a growing readiness for flight and the birth of a free self no longer humbled by 
self-inflicted subjugation:11
writing Safe Conduct is found in Clowes (2002). For a contrasting viewpoint on the straight-
forwardness of Safe Conduct, see Bykov: “there was an honest conversation about the time and 
oneself ” (2006, 434).
 9. Pasternak’s seemingly nonchalant description of his return from Scriabin’s home indi-
cates that his journey takes him through side streets, not ready as yet to merge with the main 
road: “I went along side streets, crossing over more often than I needed to” [Я шел переулка-
ми, чаще надобности переходя через дорогу] (CSP 28; PSS 3:156). Pomorska (1975) over-
looks this subtheme.
 10. As Pasternak points out, on taking leave of Scriabin his emotions were contradictory: 
“Something was mounting up in me. Something was tearing and trying to get free. Something 
was weeping; something was exulting” [Что-то подымалось во мне. Что-то рвалось и осво-
бождалось. Что-то плакало, что-то ликовало] (CSP 28; PSS 3:155). In describing his break 
with philosophy, he stresses his ardor, rather than his dislike: “I lived my scientific studies more 
powerfully than their subject required” [Я переживал изученье науки сильнее, чем это 
требуется предметом] (CSP 51; PSS 3:182–83; emphasis added).
 11. About Pasternak’s overcoming in himself “Scriabin’s superman” and its accompanying 
winged flight, see Zholkovsky, who notes that in Pasternak’s later period the emphasis is on 
falling from the clouds rather than flying upwards (1994, 285). Nonetheless, while the image of 
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But music was to me a cult, that is, the destructive focal point at which 
everything that was most superstitious and self-abnegating in me gathered, 
and therefore every time my will took wing after some evening inspiration, 
I hastened next morning to humble it again by recalling this defect. (CSP 
26; emphasis added)
Но музыка была для меня культом, то есть той разрушительной 
точкой, в которую собиралось все, что было самого суеверного и 
самоотреченного во мне, и потому всякий раз, как за каким-нибудь 
вечерним вдохновеньем окрылялась моя воля, я утром спешил 
унизить ее, вновь и вновь вспоминая о названном недостатке. (PSS 
3:153)
The turbulent expansion of the soul’s will is suggested, rather than stated, in 
the description of Pasternak’s mood as he leaves Scriabin’s home; the whole 
occasion is tightly contained within a quickly flowing paragraph, ever more 
resonant because of its brevity and restraint. First, Pasternak mentions, as 
if in passing, the intensity of the emotions that cause his soul’s turbulence: 
“no matter how exciting the news I was taking [to the people at] home, my 
soul was disquieted” [как ни возбуждала весть, которую я нес домашним, 
на душе у меня было неспокойнo] (CSP 28; PSS 3:156; emphasis added). 
Through a careful choice of words and the reiterated emphasis on “soul,” the 
process of decision making implies not so much the defeat of former dreams12 
as an emergent new inner state of the soul’s development, with its energy 
beginning to affect the surrounding world. The force of this new energy is 
felt at this point only by Pasternak himself, as the decision, still deeply private, 
begins to expand into the neighboring space, propelled by the semi-conscious 
anticipation of a future triumph over the surrounding landscape—Pasternak’s 
birth city, Moscow:13
Yet the consciousness that this very sadness was something I would never 
be able to pour into anyone else’s ear, and that, like my future, it would stay 
below, in the street with all Moscow, my Moscow, mine at this moment 
as never before—this consciousness more and more resembled happiness. 
(CSP 28)
spreading wings enters through the figure of Scriabin, it continues throughout Pasternak’s work 
in the images of the bird, pilot, and flight.
 12. See Pomorska’s argument to the contrary (1975, 66ff).
 13. This sense of unity with Moscow is picked up by Bykov: “Pasternak recollects in Safe 
Conduct that Moscow seemed to belong to him” (2006, 36).
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Но все больше походило на радость сознанье, что именно этой гру-
сти мне ни во чьи уши не вложить и, как и мое будущее, она оста-
нется внизу, на улице, со всей моею, моей в этот час, как никогда, 
Москвой. (PSS 3:156)
His future as a poet is at this point only implicit, but if Moscow shows at the 
beginning of the passage its independent “single-souledness” [единодушие 
московской ночи] (CSP 28, trans. altered; PSS 3:156), later that night Mos-
cow already belongs to the poet in some not too distant triumph, for the city is 
beginning to partake in his new state, with the old “world” broken and trans-
formed: “Entirely without my knowledge, a world was melting and crackling 
in me that only a day before seemed inborn forever” [Совершенно без моего 
ведома во мне таял и надламывался мир, еще накануне казавшийся 
навсегда прирожденным] (CSP 28, trans. altered; PSS 3:155).14 The soul’s 
capacity to dissolve into space as a triumphant, all-embracing reverberation 
(a characteristic trope of Pasternak15) is, thus, suggested—subtly, but surely—
during his instinctive turning toward his real vocation.
 The wings of the will [окрыление воли] found in this intimation of his 
future victorious embrace of Moscow in Safe Conduct16 is a traditional image 
for the unfettered soul.17 Resonances of this image are everywhere in Pas-
ternak’s depictions of the role of poetry in his life. The exhilaration of flight 
is reflected in the titles (as well as the poems themselves) of his first poetic 
volumes—The Twin in the Clouds [Близнец в тучах] (December 1913) and 
Over the Barriers [Поверх барьеров] (1914–16). The full spread of wings in 
flight as a challenge to death appears in the famous “program” poems written 
 14. I argue for a very similar employment of the concept of the expanding “soul” in Luvers 
when the ice on the Kama River melts and breaks (see Chapter 6 of this book).
 15. Evgenij Pasternak argues that while the symbolists used the trope of correspondences, 
Pasternak employed the suggestion of “dissolution” or “dissolving”: “The formula ‘Everything 
that perishes is only a reflection [or copy],’ which played in its time such a major role in the 
theoretical works of symbolism, became for Pasternak a process of the temporary dissolving 
into the eternal [ . . . ].” [Формула “Все преходящее—только подобие,” которая играла в 
свое время такую большую роль в теоретических построениях символизма, приобрела 
у Пастернака смысл перехода временного в вечное] (1997, 662).
 16. The unfettered spreading of wings is intimated also in Pasternak’s comparison between 
his own creative preferences and those of his readers that opens Safe Conduct: “I only came alive 
completely on those occasions when [ . . . ] a feeling equipped with all conceivable spaciousness 
tore loose from its moorings and escaped to freedom” [я и в жизни оживал целиком лишь 
в тех случаях, когда [  .  .  . ] вырывалось на свободу всей ширью оснащенное чувство] 
(CSP 23; PSS 3:151)
 17. Psyche literally means “butterfly” In Greek. There is, of course, a further parallel with 
biblical and Platonic notions, namely, the wings of the dove in the Bible (Old and New Testa-
ment) and the wings of the psyche in Plato’s Phaedrus. For Solovyov’s adaptation of the Platonic 
winged soul, see also Kornblatt (1992, 35–50).
The Character of Philosophical Influence | 19
at very different times in his career: “Mature archer, cautious hunter” [Рослый 
стрелок, осторожный охотник] (1928) and “Night” [Ночь] (1956). The 
theme persists in Zhivago’s “August” (1953) with its evocative last stanza: 
“Farewell, the flight of the fully stretched wing, the free stubborn intensity of 
flight” [Прощай, размах крыла расправленный, / Полета вольное упор-
ство] (PSS 4:531). The admission that the fall abruptly stops life-long flight is 
implied in one of his last poems, “God’s World” [Божий мир] (1959): “I too 
have fallen from the clouds” [Я ведь тоже упал с облаков] (PSS 2:195). And, 
more specifically, in “God’s World,” Pasternak muses that it is no longer he but 
his book that is engaged in flight, reaching across continents to awaken read-
ers all over the globe. In his fallen state, however, he himself can only follow in 
the footsteps of the foxes and cats, a reference both to the animal kingdom and 
to the instincts of his neighbors, other writers in Peredelkino (and, quite pos-
sibly, to his own instinctive ability—tame and yet cunningly feral—to survive 
catastrophe and to live a little longer):
By the footsteps of cats and the footsteps of foxes,
By the cats and foxes’ footsteps
I return with a stack of letters
To the house where I’ll give my joy its free will.
Mountains, countries, borders, lakes,
Peninsulas and continents,
Discussions, reports, reviews,
Children, youth and old men. . . . 
[По кошачьим следам и по лисьим,
По кошачьим и лисьим следам
Возвращаюсь я с пачкою писем
В дом, где волю я радости дам.
Горы, страны, границы, озера,
Перешейки и материки,
Обсужденья, отчеты, обзоры,
Дети, юноши и старики.] (PSS 2:195)
Thus, the impulse toward unfettered flight—that is, his turn toward poetry—
is already firmly established in his first autobiographical account, where the 
decision to leave music is linked to the soul’s expansion, with its potential 
commanding energy carefully acknowledged.
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1.2 Seeing the fate of philosophy “in the flesh”
What is no less remarkable is that the image of expanding liberated wings, 
for all its direct links to Plato, Neo-Platonism, and Vladimir Solovyov,18 nei-
ther guides nor informs Pasternak’s recollection of his departure from Mar-
burg University, where he was formally registered in two seminars, one with 
Nikolay Hartmann on Leibniz and the other with Hermann Cohen on Kant.19 
As we shall see below, Safe Conduct provides for its readers, in place of the 
intimation of the soul’s wings, a new case of carefully constructed narrative 
subterfuge—an ingenious portrayal of an intellectual chasm between the two 
schools of philosophy that occupied Pasternak’s thoughts in Marburg. While, 
on the surface, the content of his studies is obscured by the nonsensical con-
tradictions of the narrative, the reader’s perception is clearly jarred when 
Pasternak claims with startling nonchalance that he withdrew from both sem-
inars, abandoned Cohen (whom he had ardently praised in both Safe Conduct 
and letters written just a few days prior to the abrupt decision),20 and changed 
 18. See Pasternak’s notes on psyche in Plato as the inextinguishable impulse for movement 
in Lehrjahre:
 Psyche = the beginning of self-directing movement. (The animate differs from 
the inanimate by the fact that it carries in itself the source of its own movement.) 
Psyche (as independently moving) always moves, cannot stop itself; its life is in-
extinguishable. Psyche is the beginning of movement of other objects; conse-
quently it itself cannot have a beginning. One cannot conceive an end of uncon-
ditional movement. Ergo—it is immortal. [Psyche = начало самоопределяемого 
движения. (Одушевл[енное] отлич[ается] от неодушевл[енного] тем, 
что носит в себе источник своих движений). Psyche (как самостоятельно 
движущееся) движется всегда, не может сама себя остановить; ее жизнь 
неистребима. Psyche начало движения других предметов, след[овательно] 
не мож[ет] само иметь начало. Немыслимо прекращение безусловного 
движения. Ergo—бессмертна”] (Lehrjahre I:361; emphasis in original).
  This understanding of soul is, of course, the same one that proved so highly influential 
for Solovyov’s concept of soul under the influence of Eros: “When Eros enters into an earthly 
being, he at once transforms it; the lover feels within himself a new power of infinity; he has 
received a new and great gift. But here inevitably arises the rivalry and struggle of two parts, or 
tendencies, of the soul—the higher and the lower; which of them will capture for itself and turn 
to its advantage the mighty power of Eros [  .  .  . ]. The sensuous soul drags down the winged 
demon and blindfolds him, in order that he should maintain life in the empty sequence of mate-
rial phenomena . . . ” (Solovyov 2000, 242).
 19. See Fleishman Lehrjahre 82ff. See also Tropp (1996, 151) and Clowes (2002).
 20. In a letter from July 5, 1912, Pasternak writes: “Yesterday there was a banquet in honor 
of Cohen. It was a grand celebration, warm, inspiring, with excellent food, light, a multitude of 
people. I clinked my wine glass with him” [Вчера был банкет в честь Когена. Было торжест-
венно, тепло, вдохновенно, вкусно, светло, многолюдно, обширно. Чокался с ним] (PSS 
7:116). In the same letter Pasternak praises Cassirer and plans to join him in Berlin, particularly 
because Cohen is also moving there.
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his career path because of . . . a disorder in his room, an intense and single-
minded immersion in his studies.
 Puzzles associated with this destiny-altering decision increase exponen-
tially in the light of new scholarly findings, all pointing to the formidable 
depth of Pasternak’s philosophical engagement.21 Pasternak’s depiction of his 
room in Marburg reflects this atmosphere of deep concentration, even though 
he proceeds to contextualize his chaos of opened books with a startlingly non-
Kantian concept—an organic vegetative thinking [растительное мышление] 
that had begun its independent life both in him and in his room:
I lived my scientific studies more powerfully than their subject required. 
A vegetable  kind of thinking dwelt in me. Its peculiarity was that any sec-
ondary idea would boundlessly unfold in my interpretation of it and start 
demanding sustenance and attention, so that when under its influence, I 
turned to books, I was drawn to them not from interest and knowledge but 
by the wish to find literary references in support for my idea. And despite 
the fact that my work was being accomplished by means of logic, imagina-
tion, paper and ink, I loved it most for the way in which in the course of 
the writing it became overgrown with a thicker and thicker ornamentation 
of comparisons and quotations from books. And because, with the limited 
time available, I had at a certain stage to give up copying pieces out and 
had begun, instead, simply leaving the authors open at the pages I needed, 
a moment arrived when the theme of my work had materialized and the 
whole of it lay visible to the naked eye from the doorway of my room. It 
spread across the room in the likeness of a tree fern, heavily unfurling its 
leafy coils on my desk, divan, and windowsill. (CSP 51–52; emphasis in 
original)
Я переживал изученье науки сильнее, чем это требуется предметом. 
Какое-то растительное мышленье сидело во мне. Его особенностью 
было то, что любое второстепенное понятье, безмерно развертыва-
ясь в моем толкованьи, начинало требовать для себя пищи и ухода, 
и когда я под его влияньем обращался к книгам, я тянулся к ним 
не из бескорыстного интереса к знанью, а за литературными ссыл-
ками в его пользу. Несмотря на то, что работа моя осуществлялась 
с помощью логики, воображенья, бумаги и чернил, больше всего я 
любил ее за то, что по мере писанья она обрастала все сгущавшимся 
убором книжных цитат и сопоставлений. А так как при ограни-
ченности срока мне в известную минуту пришлось отказаться от 
 21. Cf. Sendelbach (2001, 764).
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выписок, взамен которых я просто стал оставлять авторов на нуж-
ных мне разгибах, то наступил момент, когда тема моей работы 
ма терьялизовалась и стала обозрима простым глазом с порога ком-
наты. Она вытянулась поперек помещенья подобьем древовидного 
папоротника, налегая своими лиственными разворотами на стол, 
диван и подоконник. (PSS 3:182–83)
For all its apparent naïveté, this passage crystallizes a formidable strategic 
trope. As observed above, the depiction of organic, intertextual, multi-ref-
erential thought processes undermines, however implicitly at this point, the 
non-organic principles of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophies of mind. 
Spreading like a menacing, dragon-like, preternatural wilderness, the book 
fern of expanding intellectual interests overtakes the larger parts of the 
room—a rhizome-rootedness of unfurling coils, requesting additional food, 
“materializing,” as Pasternak claims, “the theme of his work”; and this means 
that the intellectual content of Pasternak’s two seminars in Marburg battles for 
his attention like a Leibnizian “organic body”—a “natural automaton, which 
infinitely surpasses all artificial automata” (Monadology §64; Cahn, ed. 2002, 
595)—and presents a threat to any Kantian abstraction of intellectual thought.
 This implied contrast between the organic fern and non-organic thinking 
is never to disappear from Pasternak’s thought, and even a cursory glance over 
Pasternak’s future imagery suggests a firm preference for uniting organic and 
non-organic modes of thought and viewing them as one process, rather than 
for distinguishing between them. For instance, Yuri Zhivago’s love for Lara 
becomes all the more piercing because of her ability to read “as if reading were 
not the highest human activity, but as if it were the simplest possible thing, 
a thing that even animals could do” [Она читает так, точно это не выс-
шая деятельность человека, а нечто простейшее, доступное животным] 
(Zhivago 291; PSS 4:291). In Safe Conduct this potential for continuity between 
intelligible reality and nature, in spite of the brevity of the quickly sketched 
image, presents a remarkable anticipation of what modern philosophers Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Rhizome will call, in their own opposition to 
Kant, “the triumphant irruption of the plant in us” (1987, 12).
 In depicting the expanding book-fern that threatens the peacefulness of 
the room, Pasternak is far from being a naïve innocent, blithely unaware of 
the contradictions in his own recollections. On the one hand, he makes his 
readers believe that he abandoned philosophy because of his room’s chaos, 
which, when remembered, triggered a sense of premonition: “And when in my 
journey I saw this room in my imagination, I was really seeing in the flesh my 
philosophy and its possible fate” [И когда дорогой я видел в воображеньи 
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мою комнату, я, собственно говоря, видел во плоти свою философию 
и ее вероятную судьбу] (CSP 51–52; PSS 3:183). On the other hand, his 
intriguing statement of “seeing in the flesh” the future of his philosophy can 
just as easily signify not the abandonment of philosophy, but the discovery of 
a new philosophical pathway, tangibly present in its initial rhizomic irruption. 
This latter reading is all the more plausible because the fern is an embodiment 
of a constant cross-referencing between philosophical ideas and literary notes 
and texts [литературные ссылки]. The instinctive rightness of this new 
pathway is also supported by the obvious linguistic pun, or resonance between 
“vegetative consciousness” [растительное мышление] and Pasternak’s own 
last name with its vegetable connotations meaning parsnip in Russian.22 The 
fern of books then can be understood as indicating an immediate and positive 
awareness, even a premonition on Pasternak’s part, that this newly emergent 
vegetative growth of his “philosophy in the flesh,” possessing all the qualities 
of a stubborn Darwinian survivor, will not abandon philosophy, but will take 
on a highly specific form of philosophizing, instinctive to him and no one else.
 The book fern, then, is not so much a reason for leaving philosophy, nor 
is it a life-altering symbol of his chaotic habits, but rather it is the announce-
ment of a new manner of philosophical engagement.23 And while the sug-
gestion of the leaves spreading from philosophy to literature is both implied 
and obscured by the wildness of organic-intelligible life (preternatural, with 
no clear point of origin and no visible end in sight), the growing “vegetative” 
book-plant,24 certainly a highly nuanced challenge to the Neo-Kantianism of 
Marburg, replaces the earlier intimation of the soul’s wings tightly bound, but 
demanding their freedom in passages associated with music and the overpow-
ering brilliance of Scriabin.25
 22. On Pasternak’s “idiostyle,” his play with the vegetative connotation of his name and its 
multilayered reference—“poet, plant, poem”—as well as a dual meaning of a leaf (leaf and page) 
in his poetry, see Fateeva (2003, 62ff). See also Bykov’s echo of Pasternak’s family conversations 
concerning Pasternak’s falling in love in 1917 with Elena Vinograd, the bride of Sergei Listo-
pad, who also happened to be Pasternak’s friend: “an almost comical coincidence of the garden 
vegetable falling in love with the orchard fruit” [почти комическое совпадение фамилий—
огородное растение влюбилось в садовое] (2006, 136).
 23. For an alternative interpretation that Pasternak is actually abandoning philosophy once 
and for all, see Björling (2006, 298ff).
 24. About Pasternak’s poetic theme, his “auto-metaphor” of “putting soul into leaves and 
greenery,” see Fateeva (2003, 62).
 25. See Björling’s argument for the centrality of metaphors in Pasternak as an overlap of 
temporal and atemporal sensibility. Her focus upon the image of the fern emphasizes, in con-
trast to my reading, Pasternak’s abandonment of philosophy rather than the emergence of its 
newly transformed state: “Vegetative thinking implies not the abstract space of logical thinking 
but a physical space invaded by the unruly growth accomplished in time. Pasternak’s inability to 
remain in the logical space of concepts is expressed through the metaphor of a grotesque plant 
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1.3 Between Leibniz and Neo-Kantianism
 Archival data and Boris Pasternaks Lehrjahre
Since the implicit philosophical dilemma of unity-opposition between nature 
and intellect underlies his explanation for leaving Marburg, Pasternak must 
have been aware that there were at least as many precursors of this “intelligible 
tree” as the number of leaves and pages spreading around the room. A par-
tial list includes the Neo-Platonic view that Nature’s meditation is expanded 
by intellectual contemplation,26 Kant’s exploration of multiple causality in 
the image of tree leaves,27 and, more specifically, the examination of nature 
and instinct in Spinoza and Leibniz28 that in turn inspired all the Romantic 
thinkers,29 including Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and Goethe’s Metamorpho-
sis of Plants. For Pasternak, however, the image also possessed a more focused 
intellectual context, directly reflecting his work (and its implicit contradic-
tions) for his seminars on Leibniz and Kant.
 Prior to Marburg, Pasternak had already experienced a tension between 
his earlier admiration for Leibniz and Naturphilosophie, an interest inspired by 
his Moscow professor Gustav Shpet30 and his subsequent immersion in Neo-
growing uncontrollably within the space of the confined room. The metaphor conveys the fact 
that even when engaged in logic and philosophy, Pasternak was unable to be still and settle in 
the timelessness of ontological discourse” (2006, 298). See here also Fleishman’s argument that 
for the early Pasternak philosophy and poetry were intertwined (1993, 59–74).
 26. One locus classicus is Plotinus’ treatise on Nature, Contemplation and the One, Ennead 
38 [30 in chronological order], vol. 3, see especially chapter 10.
 27. Grene and Depew term this Kant’s “subscription to epigenesis”: “One part can certainly 
trigger off the development of another in a causal sequence under external environmental 
conditions. [ . . . ] But in a living thing the existence and balanced functioning of each part still 
seems to depend on the prior or concomitant existence of all the other parts, as the leaves of the 
tree, for example, depend in their existence on its branches, but the branches in turn depend on 
the leaves” (2004, 97).
 28. See Dorzweiler’s examination of the influence of Leibniz’s philosophy on Pasternak 
(1993, 25–31).
 29. Historians of philosophy habitually emphasize that the father of Naturphilosophie and 
Schelling’s Philosophie der Natur was clearly Leibniz, “the darling of the Romantic age”: “The 
great ancestor of the organic concept of nature was that old Erzfiend of Cartesianism: Leibniz. 
It was not the exoteric Leibniz of the monadology who made the mental and physical distinct 
realms, but the esoteric Leibniz of the monadology, who made matter only an appearance of 
vital force. It was no accident that Herder and Schelling, self-consciously and explicitly, revived 
Leibniz. Ironically, the arch dogmatist, so recently interned by Kant, had now been resurrected. 
Leibniz’s hour had finally come; despite the baroque peruke, he had become a darling of the 
Romantic age” (Beiser 2004, 141). See here Evans-Romaine’s chapter on “Pasternak and Ger-
man Romanticism” (1997, 1–43).
 30. As Fleishman observes, Gustav Shpet was a follower of Leibniz, and he opposed Kant, 
crediting his thought with the initiation of such philosophical directions of modernity as “em-
piricism, subjectivism, relativism, etc.” As far as Plato was concerned, Shpet considered Leibniz 
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Kantianism.31 Pasternak was also acutely aware of the philosophical debates 
concerning the possibility of continuity, or lack thereof, between the acts of 
the mind and the content of nature. In this regard, his letters from Marburg 
in June and July of 1912 provide an illuminating context; they clarify, first of 
all, that his decision to leave Marburg matured literally between his two final 
presentations (“рефераты на семинарах”): the first of these was delivered on 
June 27 at Hartmann’s seminar, where Pasternak spoke of Leibniz (PSS 7:113), 
and the final presentation, on the ethics of Kant, was received by Cohen par-
ticularly warmly on July 8 (PSS 7:117)—by which time the decision to leave 
had already been made. As Fleishman is careful to point out, Pasternak’s most 
unpleasant experiences were directly connected not to Cohen’s course, but 
to Nikolai Hartmann’s seminar on Leibniz: a particularly “acute distaste” 
was expressed by Pasternak at the time of his own presentation (Fleishman 
Lehrjahre 83ff). In his letter to Alexandr Shtikh (dated June 27), Pasternak 
questioned Hartmann’s approach to Leibniz and praised his “old” Moscow 
understanding of Leibniz, warmly reiterating his support for Herbart’s read-
ings as preferable by far to Hartmann’s interpretation:
I did give my presentation about Leibniz. It was a complicated matter: the 
professor did not allow me to develop those thoughts where I am—if not 
particularly original—at least trying to reconstruct a careful and singularly 
correct understanding of Leibniz that was given at one time by Herbart.
О Лейбнице я прочел. Сложно: проф. не дал мне развить тех мест, 
где я если не оригинален, то, во всяком случае, стараюсь восстано-
вить тонкое и единственно правильное понимание Лейбница, кото-
рое в свое время дал Гербарт. (PSS 7:113)
What those places were in which Pasternak considered himself knowledge-
able may remain unclear, but his Lehrjahre and the notes pertaining to 1910 
and 1911 (when his dedication to Leibniz was at its height32) are explicit: 
to be a philosopher dedicated to the potentiality implicit in Platonism, while he saw Kant as 
empowering all the negative pathways toward Plato. See here Mikhail Polivanov (1993) and 
Fleishman Lehrjahre 25ff.
 31. Just a few days earlier, Pasternak was still hopeful that Cohen’s Neo-Kantianism would 
be centrally important for his future. In his letter of June 5, 1912, he wrote, “I should forget all 
Leibniz(es) and math and philosophy as a general subject, and study only his [Cohen’s] system” 
[мне надо плюнуть на всяких Лейбницев и математику и философию как предмет во-
обще—и отдаться исключительно изучению его системы] (PSS 7:105). A similar view was 
expressed in the letter to his parents of June 22, 1912 (PSS 7:113 n. 2).
 32. On the importance of Leibniz for Pasternak in 1910–11, see Fleishman Lehrjahre 
25–28. Pasternak’s own recollection of the doctoral dissertation on Leibniz emerges in the 
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Pasternak, following Herbart,33 was taken with the spiritual unveiling of ideas 
through nature’s material content by means of the aggregation of monads. 
The former involvement with Leibniz via Herbart was, therefore, primarily 
concerned with the dynamic continuity, even progression, of spirit and soul in 
our physical “organism”:
Leibniz is a monist. The monads are spiritual indivisible units, which have 
an inner reality: the capacity of presentment. [ . . . ] Monads are spiritual 
atoms. Our organism is a complex of monads within a hierarchical rela-
tionship. The monad of the soul is primary. The monad of the soul is a 
simple substance; it is indivisible.
 Herbart: realities. One of these realities is soul.
Л<ей>бн<и>ц—монист. Монады духовн<ые> непротяж<енные> 
единицы, которым прис уще вну тр<енние> состоян<ия>: 
способн<ость> пр<е>дст<а>вл<ения>. [ . . . ] Монады—духовн<ые> 
атомы. Организм наш = комплекс монад с иерархич<еским> 
отношением. Монада души господствует. Мон<ада> души—
прост<ая> субстанция—неразрушима.
 Гербарт: реалии. Одна из реалий душа. (Lehrjahre I:174)34
Further, in Lehrjahre this thought is articulated by means of images already 
anticipating the book fern of Marburg’s room. Thus, when Pasternak speaks 
of Leibniz and illustrates the progressive continuum of the spiritual essence 
through physical materiality by means of a conglomerate of monads, he draws 
an arresting picture of the multi-voiced and multi-willed interchange of crea-
tures and creations. The preternatural book-fern with authors speaking both 
to each other and to the new apprentice is here potentially present:
context of the life-altering meeting with Samarin in Café Grec, when “a piece of Hegelian infin-
ity stretched itself across the pavilion” [Поперек павильона протянулся кусок гегелевской 
бесконечности], and Samarin himself “had leapt from Leibniz and mathematical infinity to 
the dialectical one” (CSP 36; PSS 3:165). In Safe Conduct, Pasternak notes that in the eighteenth 
century Lomonosov came to study with Leibniz’s disciple Christian von Wolff.
 33. Johann Friedrich Herbart (May 4, 1776–August 11, 1841) was a German philosopher 
whose interpretations of Leibniz influenced Neo-Kantian views of psychology and education. 
See Davidson (1906). While studying in Moscow, Pasternak worked with the textbook Intro-
duction to Philosophy [Введение в философию], written by G. I. Chelpanov, a colleague and a 
friend of Shpet.
 34. The marks in the quotation are in keeping with those chosen by the editors of Lehrjahre 
that indicate abbreviations in Pasternak’s original notes.
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The world is a gathering of the wills of the different levels of complexity 
[  .  .  . ]. Consequently nature is a self-disclosure of the spirit: the exter-
nal part of the cosmic world is matter; the internal—feelings, attractions, 
spiritual creativity. [ . . . ] Nature is a self-reflective spirit, reaching its con-
sciousness in the human being. The difference of complexities between dif-
ferent willful units. [ . . . ] The goal of life—is a realization of the spiritual 
in nature, the outflow of spirituality, a transformation of nature into the 
substratum for the achievement of spiritual goals.
Мир—совокупн<ость> воль различн<ой> степени сложности [ . . . ]. 
Отс<юда> природа—самораскрытие духа: внешн<яя> стор<она> 
космич<еского> мира—материя; внутренн<яя>—чувств<а>, 
влечен<ия>, духовн<ое> тв<орче>ство. [ . . . ] Природа = дух созна-
ющий, достигающ<ий> самосознания в человеке. Различие сложно-
сти межд<у> отд<ельными> волев<ыми> единицами. [  .  .  . ] Цель 
жизни—реализация духовности в творчестве, распростран<ение> 
духовности, превращение природы в субстрат для достиж<ения> 
духовн<ых> целей.] (Lehrjahre I:185–86)
There is, then, a notable similarity between the content of these Moscow notes 
and the picture of the Marburg room that gives material evidence, not merely 
of the state of chaos during Pasternak’s studies, but also of his acceptance of 
the Leibnizian model of “Nature as a self-reflective spirit, reaching its con-
sciousness in human beings,” a model so influential for Schelling, Goethe, and 
other Romantics.35
 Might one then conclude that Pasternak decided to embrace Leibniz’s 
understanding of the continuum between nature and intellect and because of 
this abandoned Neo-Kantianism?36 According to scholars who have examined 
Kant’s attitude to Leibniz, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant was particu-
larly averse to Leibniz’s organized continuum, his “marked enthusiasm for the 
notion of an infinity of infinitely small systems organized into functionally 
differentiated parts”; Kant, for example, rejected as “unthinkable” Leibniz’s 
view that this organization could go on to infinity (Kant 1781 [A], ¶ 526; 1787 
[B], ¶ 554) (Grene and Depew 95). While there is no indication that Pasternak 
 35. Pasternak’s own thoughts on the matter are skillfully articulated: they constitute a ma-
terial structure made up of distinct units that can, of course, be dismantled, but not without 
profoundly reorienting the poet’s primary intellectual landmarks.
 36. Indeed, Pasternak had to know that Leibniz’s notion of the unification and mutual ad-
dress of human wills though the intelligible forces of nature, or material monads, was not well 
received by either Kant or his followers.
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after Marburg became an exclusive apprentice of Leibniz, there is considerable 
support for the idea that in the debate about the relationship between nature 
and intellect, Pasternak sided with Leibniz and the Romantics,37 and that this 
decision meant for him the choice of a literary path. His letter to Shtikh of 
July 8—written just after his final presentation for Cohen—opens with rather 
telling praise for Shtikh’s own letter, as Pasternak speaks of nature and natu-
ral growth that together give birth to human life and thought in a manner 
reminiscent of a living cell dividing itself into new, independent but intercon-
nected units. Thus, in his compliment to Shtikh, one can see botany, writing, 
and life as an infinitely divisible and yet unified organic whole: “Your letter is 
a botanical garden, out of which life has separated itself, awash in a still pal-
atably-steaming layer of nature” [Так, твое письмо—ботанический сад, от 
которого отделилась жизнь—со всем парным налетом природы] (PSS 
7:117).
 However, the presence of Gottfried Leibniz is palpable not only in the 
tone and imagery of this momentous letter of July 8. Pasternak, in fact, admits 
unequivocally that as far as his future, as-yet-unwritten poetry is concerned, 
his overall preference and love are not far from Leibniz. In deciding to leave 
Marburg because he had come to Cohen too late, but still having accepted 
Cohen’s dinner invitation, Pasternak emphasizes that if he were ever to publish 
poetry, he would dedicate it “to the philosopher of the infinitesimal method.” 
For most scholars the reference is to Cohen and his 1883 work Das Prinzip der 
Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte [The Principle of the Infinitesimal 
Method and its History],38 and the focus of the letter does suggest that Cohen’s 
personality here dominates Pasternak’s thoughts, and yet the supposed refer-
ence to a book written by Cohen thirty years ago is perplexing:
It is vexing that it is too late. I will not be his student. But I will go to his 
dinner. And if I ever publish any poems, I would dedicate them to the phi-
losopher of the infinitesimal method, and for the sake of this—since I have 
no poems of my own—I would even steal, all the conflictual combination 
of these words notwithstanding. 10 years ago Gavronsky, Harmann, etc., 
etc. studied with him. Now I will go to dine with him. It doesn’t matter. 
It’s vexing.
 37. Dorzweiler (1993) makes a persuasive argument that Leibniz’s influence on Pasternak 
was considerable and, possibly, decisive as far as philosophy is concerned.
 38. See Kudriavtseva’s note (2001, 64 n. 3) that Cohen’s work of 1883 dealt with the infini-
tesimal method. What she forgets to mention is that Cohen deals with Leibniz in this work. As 
Poma points out in her work on Cohen, the infinitesimal method of Leibniz reached its full 
potential not only “in its application to algebra and geometry” and to “problems of mechanics,” 
but also “this method is revealed as a principle of the reality of nature” (1997, 39–40).
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Это досадно,—что поздно. Я не буду его учеником. Но я пойду к 
нему на ужин. А если бы я когда-нибудь издал стихи—я посвятил 
бы их философу инфинитесимальной методы; и ради этого, за неи-
мением собственных—я пошел бы даже на кражу во всей противо-
речивости этого словообразования. Десять лет назад у него учились 
Гавронский, Hartmann, etc. etc. Я мог бы стоять среди них. Теперь 
я пойду ужинать к нему. Ничего, ничего. Это досадно. (PSS 7:118; 
emphasis added)
Much more telling is the fact that Cohen’s study of the infinitesimal method 
was an engagement with Leibniz, who is known much more widely as the 
founding philosopher of the method in question,39 and this makes Pasternak’s 
reference in the letter highly ambiguous, unless his allegiance to Cohen is 
linked to that aspect of Cohen closest to Leibniz. In the very next paragraph, 
in fact, Pasternak proceeds to contrast the objective method of philosophi-
cal self-discipline with the spirit and creativity of Romanticism. His real self, 
Pasternak suggests, is still there in the late summer of 1910, even though from 
that point on he forbids himself any outright acceptance of Romantic imagi-
native creativity:40
And the vexation can only grow when . . . Marburg . . . Cohen . . . 1912 . . . —
when, as I say, this combination of words enters into a belated connection 
with August 1910 in Spasskoe . . . after St. Petersburg . . . with the project 
of radical “self-reeducation” for the sake of entry into the world of Olia 
and her father, and so on. Distancing myself from romanticism and the 
creative, again and again, creative fantasy—objective judgment and strict 
discipline—all of this began for me with that laughable decision. It was an 
error.
Как же увеличивается досада, когда . . . Марбург . . . Коген . . . 1912 
.  .  .—когда, говорю я, это сочетание входит в непредвиденную—
запоздавшую связь с  .  .  . августом 1910  .  .  . в Спасском .  .  . после 
Петербурга  .  .  .  с проектом коренного ‘самоперевоспитания’ для 
сближения с классическим миром Оли и ее отца etc. Отдаление от 
 39. Leibniz is known to students of philosophy as the founder not only of “infinitesimal 
geometry,” but also of “the theory of infinitely small and infinite quantities [ . . . ] the theory of 
quantified indivisibles” (Knobloch 2002, 59).
 40. See here the recurrent argument of historians of philosophy that the father of Naturphi-
losophie and Schelling’s Philosophie der Natur was clearly Leibniz, “the darling of the Romantic 
age” (Beiser 2004, 141).
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романтизма и творческой и вновь творческой фантастики—объек-
тивизация и строгая дисциплина—начались у меня с того комиче-
ского решения. Это была ошибка. (PSS 7:118–19)
It is characteristic of Pasternak that the role of Leibniz, the original “phi-
losopher of the infinitesimal method” and the father of Romanticism and 
Naturphilosophie, should not be named, just as the authors of the books in 
Pasternak’s room in Marburg remain anonymous; Leibniz-Cohen’s “infini-
tesimal” influence lives in the prism of other voices and traditions—an erup-
tion of mind working as part of nature that permits Pasternak to abandon 
his self-imposed discipline and to accept his own long-suppressed “wish to 
find literary references in support” of philosophical ideas [я тянулся [ . . . ] 
за литературными ссылками] (CSP 51; PSS 3:183). Leibniz’s influence on 
Romantic poets and philosophers alike is a case in point; it proves to the ques-
tioning glance of Cohen that literature can be a worthy interlocutor for phi-
losophy, and for Pasternak such a path was not only possible and passionately 
desirable, but also organically instinctual.
1.4  The multi-voicedness of philosophical themes 
searching for literary nourishment
The interdependence of mind and nature has been one of the most easily 
identifiable Pasternakian themes, an artistic signature of sorts prevalent ever 
since the writer returned to Moscow, a city where poets can be philosophers 
and philosophers poets.41 In 1913, in the poems “Eden” [Эдем] and “Of the 
Forest” [Лесное], Pasternak characterizes his own voice as a participant in the 
forests’ conversation:42 “I entered as a historical face into a family of forests” 
[Я историческим лицом вошел в семью лесин] (PSS 1:64);43 he is also a 
direct expression of intense but mute organic processes44—an articulation of 
the as-yet inaudible wetness of grass or the thickness of leaves in an impen-
etrable forest:
 41. On the exceptional cross-fertilization between literature and philosophy, see Fleishman 
Lehrjahre 28–47.
 42. On this signature theme in Pasternak, see Fateeva (2003, 62–63) and Pollak (2006, 
94–115).
 43. This line appears in the later version of “Eden,” “When to the Lyre’s Labyrinth” [Когда 
за лиры лабиринт] (PSS 1:326).
 44. A similar stance is clearly evident in yet another early program-poem “Spring” [Весна] 
(1914), where poetry, a sponge left between the wettest and freshest greenery, expresses the 
inaudible voices of nature abandoned into itself (PSS 1:90–92).
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Lacking words—the hundred-headed woods is
Sometimes—a chorus; sometimes—a solitary someone . . . 
I am the conversation of anonymous lips,




Я—столп дремучих диалектов.] (PSS 1:327)
It is in prose, however, that this evocation of writing as an intelligible matura-
tion of the forces of nature, reflected in the multitude of human interlocutors, 
finds its clearest and most articulate expression.
 “Some Propositions” [Несколько положений] (1918, 1922) compares the 
birth of the “book” to the rustle of a great number of treetops, all awakened 
into conversation. It is also in these “programmatic” passages of 1918 that 
Pasternak claims that the manuscript of his dreams (as preternatural as the 
fern in Marburg) is infinite; born together with life itself and made up of the 
voices and observations of many testimonies, the book asserts its “rootedness” 
not merely in natural instinct, but in the indelible, intellectual, and ultimately 
spiritual impulses of human beings:
Without it [the book] there could be no continuation of a spiritual kin. It 
would have become extinct. The apes have never possessed a book.
 The book was written. It grew, increased in intelligence, became 
worldly wise [ . . . ]
 Life has not just begun. Art had no beginning. [ . . . ] No genuine book 
has a first page. Like the sighing of the forest, it is born goodness knows 
where, and it grows and rolls along, arousing the thick backwoods, and 
suddenly, at its darkest, thunderstruck, and panicked moment, it reaches 
its goal and speaks out at once from every tree top. (CSP 260; trans. altered; 
emphasis added)
Без нее духовный род не имел бы продолжения. Он перевелся бы. 
Ее не было у обезьян.
 Ее писали. Она росла, набиралась ума, видала виды,— и вот она 
выросла и—такова. [ . . . ]
 Жизнь пошла не сейчас. Искусство никогда не начиналось. 
[ . . . ] Ни у какой истинной книги нет первой страницы. Как лесной 
шум, она зарождается Бог весть где, и растет, и катится, будя запо-
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ведные бредни, и вдруг, в самый темный, ошеломительный и пани-
ческий миг, заговаривает всеми вершинами сразу, докатившись. 
(PSS 5:24–25)
This characteristic merging between intellect, nature, and the world of past 
and future is evident many years later in Doctor Zhivago, in the sketch of the 
library room in Yuriatin. Pasternak, in fact, expands within a new setting the 
earlier tropes of the gathering of treetops in “Some Propositions” and of the 
book-fern in Safe Conduct. Drawing together many voices, presences, and 
realities of different wills and intensities, Yuriatin’s library enriches the writer’s 
earlier plateau with a communion—“the bustling intersection”—not only of 
open books and thoughts, but of the sun, houses, streets, lives, and people, 
imagined and real, from near and far:
Now, as the reading room gradually filled with local people, some sitting 
down near to him and others farther away, he felt as if he was getting to 
know the town by standing at one of its bustling intersections, and as if not 
only people but also the houses and the streets in which they lived were 
coming into the room.
 However, from the window one could also see the actual Yuriatin, real 
and not imagined.
 [ . . . ] The crowd of readers did not distract him. He had had a good 
look at his neighbors; those on the left and right were fixed in his mind, he 
knew they were there without raising his eyes and he had the feeling that 
they would not leave before him, just as the houses and churches outside of 
the window would not move from their places.
 The sun, however, did move. (Zhivago 288; 290)
И когда на его глазах зал постепенно наполнялся юрятинскими 
жителями, садившимися то поодаль от него, то совсем по сосед-
ству, у Юрия Андреевича являлось чувство, будто он знакомится 
с городом, стоя на одном из его людных скрещений, и будто в зал 
стекаются не читающие юрятинцы, а стягиваются дома и улицы, на 
которых они проживают.
 Однако и действительный Юрятин, настоящий и невымышлен-
ный, виднелся в окнах зала.
 [  .  .  .  ] Людность зала не мешала ему и не рассеивала его. Он 
хорошо изучил своих соседей и видел их мысленным взором справа 
и слева от себя, не подымая глаз от книги, с тем чувством, что состав 
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их не изменится до самого его ухода, как не сдвинутся с места цер-
кви и здания города, видневшиеся в окне.
 Между тем солнце не стояло. (PSS 4:287; 289)
Most prominently, however, Pasternak’s view of the interconnectedness of 
natural, vegetative, intellectual, and spiritual processes is given its fullest artic-
ulation in the Tolstoyan passages of Doctor Zhivago,45 especially when Yuri 
Zhivago argues that history, always in movement, develops according to the 
often invisible laws of the “vegetative kingdom” in its reach upwards:
He reflected again that he conceived of history, of what is called the course 
of history, not in the accepted way but by analogy with the vegetable 
kingdom. [ . . . ] [I]n only a few days in spring the forest is transformed, 
it reaches the clouds, and you can hide or lose yourself in its leafy maze. 
(Zhivago 453; emphasis added)
Он снова думал, что историю, то, что называется ходом истории, он 
представляет себе совсем не так, как принято, и ему она рисуется 
наподобие жизни растительного царства. [ . . . ] Весной в несколько 
дней лес преображается, подымается до облаков, в его покрытых 
листьями дебрях можно затеряться, спрятаться. (PSS 4:451)
With such powerful echoes of Naturphilosophie and its themes, Pasternak’s 
indirectness in presenting his philosophical indebtedness becomes less per-
plexing. The literary examples, drawing upon these philosophical themes, 
not only clarify the precise pathways of his relationship with philosophy, but 
also demonstrate the ever-growing number of participants in such vision and 
conversation.
 “Life has not just begun. Art had no beginning. [ . . . ] No genuine book 
has a first page” [Жизнь пошла не сейчас. Искусство никогда не начи-
налось. [ . . . ] Ни у какой истинной книги нет первой страницы] (CSP 
260, PSS 3:25), Pasternak observes in “Some Propositions” in 1918. His pro-
tagonist Yuri, returning from the war in 1918, speaks about the colossal nature 
of impending events, emphasizing that they too have no single cause and no 
single author. Like all major living phenomena, processes of great significance 
have multiple causality and are similar in this to the elemental forest or clouds 
in the sky:
 45. See particularly Boris Gasparov (1992a) on the role of Leo Tolstoy in Pasternak’s prose.
34 | Chapter 1
It is petty to explore causes of titanic events. They haven’t any. It is only 
in a family quarrel that you look for a point of origin—after people pull 
each other’s hair and smash the dishes they rack their brains trying to 
figure out who started it. What is truly great is without beginning, like 
the universe.
 [ . . . ] The new order of things will be all around us and as familiar to 
us as the woods on the horizon or the clouds over our heads. (Zhivago 182; 
trans. altered)
Мелко копаться в причинах циклопических событий. Они их не 
имеют. Это у домашних ссор есть свой генезис, и после того как 
оттаскают друг друга за волосы и перебьют посуду, ума не прило-
жат, кто начал первый. Все же истинно великое безначально, как 
вселенная. Оно вдруг оказывается налицо без возникновения, 
словно было всегда или с неба свалилось.
 [ . . . ] Наставший порядок обступит нас с привычностью леса на 
горизонте или облаков над головой. (PSS 4:180–81)
In other words, Pasternak’s position, firmly adopted in Marburg, on the con-
tinuity between the overlapping relationships of thought and nature, appears 
to have been accompanied by the major artistic challenge he set for himself: to 
portray the relationship between ideas and actions as engendered by a multi-
plicity of causes and influences, by generations of thinkers, natural processes, 
and historical events.
 Pasternak left Marburg, then, not to return to Gottfried Leibniz, but to 
escape the confines of a single philosophical school; his book-fern was a weed, 
and it grew freely only among texts whose number could not be itemized. His 
acceptance of the organic character of intellectual events necessitated an artis-
tic program within which underlying philosophical principles could never be 
isolated, named, or categorized as single causes or influences; their attractive-
ness lay in their ability not to unveil the pages of some philosophical text-
book, but to gather instead a living world of dynamic interlocutors. In the 
same manner, the influence of the philosopher-uncle Nikolay Vedeny a pin on 
Pasternak’s young protagonist Yuri, in contrast to his effect, for example, on 
Misha Gordon, was one of unlimited freedom: “Yuri realized the great part his 
uncle had played in molding his character. [ . . . ] Yuri advanced and became 
freer under the influence of his uncle’s theories, but Misha was fettered by 
them” [Юра понимал, насколько он обязан дяде общими свойствами 
своего характера. [  .  .  . ] Юру дядино влияние двигало вперед и осво-
бождало, а Мишу—сковывало] (Zhivago 65–66; PSS 4:67). Similarly, Pas-
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ternak’s turn to art in 1912 was, first and foremost, an “unfettered” reaction 
to philosophy—the discovery of literary form as a multiplicity of addresses, 
engaged in an ongoing dialogue and situated from the outset within the fullest 
range of philosophical questions.
 Although the evidence provided by his philosophical konspekty goes, to 
some extent, against the overall principle of the author’s project—the unfet-
tered evocation of an open-ended exchange of philosophical questions—the 
publication of Pasternaks Lehrjahre from his Moscow and Marburg studies is 
a powerful ally for anyone who wishes to examine the philosophical themes in 
Pasternak’s oeuvre. Side by side with his early prose works, these philosophical 
notes help to explain more fully what Pasternak as a writer learned from his 
philosophical studies—how to evoke a chorus of philosophical positions—
directly, without preface or ornament.46 In this context, his student notes are 
a rare treasure, and not only because they reveal in detail the contents of his 
philosophical training. The greater value of the notes is in the access they 
grant to the expanding conversations between Pasternak the philosopher and 
Pasternak the literary artist.
 In what follows, I will offer new readings of Pasternak’s short stories 
through 1918, the year in Russian history when the world of Imperial Russia 
was to disappear forever. 1918 is also recreated in Doctor Zhivago in the chap-
ters “Farewell to the Past” and “The Moscow Encampment.” In these chapters, 
the Russia of the past does not depart without a last significant conversation 
between Yuri, already a published poet dreaming of a future prose work, and 
his philosopher uncle Nikolay Vednyapin. As the two men face each other at 
this major historical crossroads, the topic of their conversation is left charac-
teristically open-ended, but their meeting reinforces the kindredness of the 
two elemental forces—poetry and philosophy, without whose mutual address 
each interlocutor would be weaker and less comprehensible:
Theirs was a meeting of two artists, and although they were close relatives, 
and the past arose and lived again between them [ . . . ] the moment they 
began to speak, all other ties between them vanished, their kinship and dif-
 46. In her analysis of the role of nature in Zhivago, Witt argues that Pasternak follows 
Solovyov’s bringing together of Schelling and Darwin, since the Russian philosopher tended 
to draw “many examples from the works of ‘the great Darwin’” (2000a, 116) and, together 
with Schelling, viewed “art as a kind of continuation” of nature, with Solovyov particularly 
stressing art’s role as an evolution “carried on by humanity” (2000a, 116). It is possible, how-
ever, to expand Witt’s list of philosophical references to include Leibniz (a major influence on 
Kant) among the unnamed voices that passed through Yuri’s mind when “Darwin was next to 
Schelling, the butterfly that had just flown by next to modern painting and Impressionist art” 
(Zhivago 346).
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ference of age was forgotten, all that was left was the confrontation of the 
elemental forces, of energy and principles. [ . . . ]
 Their talk was full of exclamations, they paced excitedly up and down 
the room [ . . . ] deeply moved by the exalting discovery of how completely 
they understood each other. (Zhivago 178)
Встретились два творческих характера, связанные семейным род-
ством [ . . . ] но едва лишь речь зашла о главном, о вещах, извест-
ных людям созидательного склада, как исчезли все связи, кроме 
этой единственной, не стало ни дяди, ни племянника, ни разницы в 
возрасте, а только осталась близость стихии со стихией, энергии с 
энергией, начала и начала. [ . . . ]
 Oба поминутно вскрикивали и бегали по номеру [ . . . ] потря-
сенные доказательствами взаимного понимания. (PSS 4:176–77)
The passage has potent autobiographical resonances. By 1918, Boris Pasternak 
could already claim considerable accomplishments in his open-ended prose, 
which constituted itself as an ardent conversation between literature and phi-
losophy, not unlike the spirit of the episode between Vedenyapin and Zhivago.
 Like his protagonists’ conversation, Pasternak’s narrative approach to 
philosophy does not involve single and discrete parts or occasional “micro”-
themes that might inform his stories’ intellectual content. His emphasis on 
the dialogic content of ideas, on a multitude of voices, a “maze of leaves,” 
suggests that philosophical themes operate as large-scale narrative frames—
as ideas and questions in open-ended dialogue. Pasternak’s narrative strat-
egy, therefore, is propelled neither by a detailed unveiling of causal relations 
between protagonists nor by explicit philosophical digressions. The text gains 
momentum through a series of powerful metaphoric images that subsume a 
multi-layered philosophical context so fully that it appears erased in this new 
transformation. Only a certain eccentricity signals this covert strategy. Thus, 
the deeper processes underlying his farewell to music are signified by a fleet-
ing suggestion of expanding wings, and a chaos of opened books, both philo-
sophical and literary, is offered as an explanation for leaving Marburg.
 Uniquely, in fact, Pasternak’s narratives acquire their fuller significance 
within a wide sphere of textual resonances, and this includes a philosophi-
cal substratum, suggested rather than spelled out in a fleeting and seemingly 
absent-minded way. As I will argue in Chapter Two, this manner of writing 
undermines the validity of Jakobson’s conclusion that Pasternak’s attempts 
at metaphor tend to make his narratives “banal and unoriginal,” even while 
the author defends “in theoretical digressions his right to triviality” (1969, 
The Character of Philosophical Influence | 37
149). Rather, Pasternak’s writing presents serious challenges for his literary 
investigators, who can compete neither with the depth and initial ardor of his 
philosophical training, nor with his ability to choose images that for all their 
natural embeddedness in the text signal not one, but a manifold of philosophi-
cal voices.
 For all of the above reasons, the examination of Pasternak’s early stories 
in the context of his philosophical interests points to a highly important piece 
of a larger puzzle, since his engagement with philosophy must be approached 
as inseparable from the tales themselves. The availability of his philosophical 
notes permits his critics to grasp more surely the direction of his interests, 
which are transformed almost without trace within his fictional prose. Bring-
ing together philosophy and his prose narratives presents an opportunity to 
uncover some of the significant and recurrent networks or patterns of thought 
that will never disappear from Pasternak’s writings. Consequently, as I shall 
argue in subsequent chapters, a detailed unearthing of these networks goes a 
long way toward elucidating these more hidden path- or rootways within the 
multi-voiced maze of his thought.
n Safe Conduct, Pasternak presents a rather curious list of the philoso-
phers who occupied his thoughts during his university studies in Mos-
cow and Marburg: “Along with some of my acquaintances I had connections 
with ‘Musaget.’ From others I learned of the existence of Marburg. Kant and 
Hegel were replaced by Cohen, Natorp, and Plato” [Вместе с частью моих 
знакомых я имел отношение к “Мусагету.” От других я узнал о сущест-
вовании Марбурга: Канта и Гегеля сменили Коген, Наторп и Платон] 
(CSP 31; PSS 3:159). Plato appears at the end of the series (prominently and 
non-chronologically, even in terms of the order of Pasternak’s studies1) and, in 
Pasternak’s characteristic manner, is never mentioned in Safe Conduct again, 
while such philosophers as David Hume, Pasternak’s major early work on “The 
Psychological Skepticism of Hume” notwithstanding, are omitted altogeth-
er.2 In this case Pasternak’s habitual obliqueness had straightforward political 
underpinnings: in 1930, in spite of the prevailing ideological materialism, he 
clearly and somewhat eccentrically (his lifelong manner was to appear eccen-
 1. Pasternak studied Plato with Lopatin in 1909–10 and in seminar-form with Kubitsky in 
1910–11 (Lehrjahre I:353, 366) and later referred to Plato in the context of Cohen’s work (spring 
1911 [Lehrjahre I:356]). Nonetheless, he singles out Plato as the major influence before his trip 
to Marburg. See also Fleishman’s note on the singularity of this notation in Lehrjahre 129 n.49.
 2. The most probable date of Pasternak’s work on his thesis [реферат] dedicated to David 
Hume is spring 1911 (Fleishman Lehrjahre 121).
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tric while saying exactly or almost exactly what he wanted) re collected in a 
public forum his youthful immersion in philosophical idealism,3 foreground-
ing “Musaget,”4 Hegel, Kant, Neo-Kantiantism, and particularly Plato as his 
key influences in the pre-Revolutionary years. This memory, as we shall see, 
was by no means a superficial reminiscence.
 Some important aspects of Pasternak’s employment of philosophical con-
cepts have been brought to light by the debates that have followed Jakobson’s 
seminal appraisal of Pasternak as the “master of metonymy” (1969, 149),5 an 
appraisal that tends to co-exist in criticism with what is essentially its coun-
ter-argument, namely, that Pasternak’s roots are in Symbolism.6 For Jakob-
son, metaphors—and, by implication, symbols (Jakobson wisely abstains from 
 3. The Soviet critics were not amused. Safe Conduct was banned in 1933, and in 1931 
the confiscation of a number of the issues of the journal Red Virgin Soil [Красная новь] was 
believed to have been caused by the publication of Pasternak’s memoirs (Blum 2003). For a 
thorough account of Soviet criticism’s rejection of the memoirs, see Fleishman (1984, 55–57) 
and PSSCom 3:553. In Fleishman’s view Safe Conduct made Pasternak’s confrontation with the 
official line both “clear and inescapable” (1984, 55).
 4. Cf.: “ . . . ‘something like an academy’ . . . was formed around the Musaget publishing 
concerns when it opened in the autumn of 1909. A special attraction of the Musaget gatherings 
was their Germanic bias” (Barnes 1989, 95 and 121 ff.), and Fleishman Lehrjahre 143ff. See 
further Davydov (2009, 8ff).  
 5. Vuletić carefully sketches the uneasy nature of Jakobson’s gradual acceptance and re-
evaluation of Pasternak’s role in Russian modernism (2004, 483–86).
 6. As scholars engage in the metaphor–metonymy discussion, the question of whether 
Pasternak’s roots lie in Symbolism or in avant-garde Futurism inevitably arises. Pasternak’s 
pre-Revolutionary acquaintance Feodor Stepun, who is minimally interested in Pasternak’s use 
of metonymy, is emphatic about Pasternak’s roots in Symbolism: “Let me add that Pasternak’s 
philosophical and atmospheric affinity for the Symbolists is indirectly indicated by the fact that 
when in the third part of his Safe Conduct . . . [he] identifies the force that kept them afloat as 
the art of Aleksandr Blok, the leading poet of Russian Symbolism, and of Andrey Bely, author of 
a voluminous work on Symbolism and, without any doubt, its most remarkable writer, as well as 
the art of Skriabin, whose association with Symbolism is attested to by Vyacheslav Ivanov, and, 
finally, of the most popular actress of the era, Vera Komissarzhevskaya, who, rather than por-
traying on the stage visible reality, strove to embody the invisible” (1962, 49). For other views on 
the subject, see Victor Erlich’s conclusion that Pasternak’s metonymy is a version of metaphor 
(1979, 281–88), M. Gasparov’s quantitative analysis of the poetry of Mayakovsky and Pasternak 
that disputes Jakobson’s position (1995), Fateeva’s introductions of “metatropes” (or intertextual 
tropes) in her analysis of Pasternak (2003, 17–19), as well as Vuletić’s careful argument against 
Jakobson’s position. Thus, the debate regarding Pasternak’s range in image construction is only 
gaining momentum. According to Kling, for instance, “the conversation between Pasternak and 
symbolism lasted almost for a century” (1999, 37), and he questions Fleishman’s placement of 
Pasternak within Futurism (2002). Faryno speaks of metaphoric Pasternak (1993); Gorelik, of 
Pasternak’s post-symbolist mythopoetics (2000). Others, like Rudova, see Pasternak’s style as 
reflecting cubo-futurist painting with “metonymy so abundant [ . . . ] that the reader is forced to 
follow the connections between things, whereas things as such fall out of the picture altogether” 
(1997, 60–61).
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making this interrelation clear)7—“are not what determines and guides [Pas-
ternak’s] lyric theme” (1969, 141). Jakobson’s judgment has never been dis-
puted on theoretical grounds, and so it remains both piercingly apt and yet 
problematic. For instance, Pasternak’s understanding of an individual (as well 
as his or her role in the surrounding world) is obscured by the debate. Since 
metonymy, in Jakobson’s evaluation, implies a weakened role for the human 
subject,8 Pasternak’s style, rich in metonymic constructions, contrasts with 
the main focus of his philosophical studies—the emergence of the individu-
ality and self-consciousness: “All of Pasternak’s studies during his university 
years proceeded under a banner of ‘self-consciousness.’ This term [self-con-
sciousness] appears everywhere, not only in his philosophical notes but in his 
early literary drafts and correspondence” (Fleishman 1990a, 29). Fyodor Ste-
pun, a leading figure in Musaget (remembered by name in Safe Conduct), was 
certain that Pasternak’s prose reflects principles that “appear in Kant as ‘the 
transcendental subject,’ in Fichte—as the ‘absolute I,’ and in Hegel as absolute 
spirit” (Stepun 1962, 48), but the interconnection between such a judgment 
and the metonymic worldview is not easily drawn. Stepun’s position is instruc-
tive, in fact, in allowing a metonymic Pasternak9 to accompany Pasternak the 
Symbolist:10 having accepted Jakobson’s position, Stepun goes on to insist that 
 7. Jakobson is aware that Pasternak traces his ancestry to the Symbolists, but he argues 
that “Pasternak, who conceives as his literary task the continuing of Symbolist tradition, is 
aware that out of his efforts to recreate and perpetuate the old the new art is always arising” 
(1969, 137). The conclusion that should be drawn from Jakobson’s positions—that in Pasternak 
metonymies predominate not only over metaphors, but also over symbols (which are, in fact, 
intertextual metaphors)—remains blurred in criticism, for no one would want to arrive at such 
a blatantly false conclusion. Fateeva’s work with “metatropes” reflects her view that Pasternak 
does not accept ready-made symbols, but creates his own mythological codes (2003, 17–21); it 
also permits her to bypass the metaphor–metonymy conversation altogether. Thus, the acute-
ness of Jakobson’s observation invalidates attempts to problematize his position, “that overcoat 
out of which other commentaries” on Pasternak have emerged (Malmstad 1992, 302).
 8. See, for instance, Erlich, in analyzing the poem “Marburg,” who refers to Jakobson’s 
“sharp analysis” while noting that the subject is not weakened or turned into a passive presence 
but equated with the objects of his surroundings (1979, 282).
 9. Stepun accepts Jakobson’s premise and simultaneously reverses it by insisting that the 
poet’s imagery expands the self: “Pasternak’s poetry, on the other hand, though not immune 
to the metaphor, abounds, in Jakobson’s words, ‘in metonymic sequences.’ To simplify though, 
I hope, not to distort Jakobson’s interesting observation, one might say that in Pasternak the 
range of associations is virtually boundless since it is not restricted by the principle of similarity 
and contrast. [ . . . ] Jakobson notes that at the first glance the associative downpour of Paster-
nak’s verse may appear to drown out the poet’s ‘I.’” Actually, Stepun argues, Pasternak’s most 
bizarre images are metonymic companions, if not reflections, of the poet’s self (1962, 51ff).
 10. Stepun, with all his sensitivity to Pasternak’s Neo-Kantian roots, insists that “Symbol-
ism” in Pasternak’s case by no means cancels out his closeness to the avant-garde, but stresses 
his “Expressionism” rather than Futurism: “By positing Pasternak’s innermost bond with the 
Symbolists I do not mean to call into question his association, to be exact, the association of the 
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the early Pasternak with his “every metaphor” points to “the world’s hidden 
mystery” presenting in this “a nearly literal echo of V. Ivanov’s [ . . . ] theory of 
religious symbolism” (Stepun 1962, 48).
 However distinct the diverse critical positions are, Jakobson’s view remains 
a formidable reality to confront—a seminal analysis of a virtuoso theoretician 
that has profoundly affected the direction of Pasternak criticism, endowing it 
with much excitement, but also leaving it in a critical quandary. For there is 
a further problem to consider: the essential framework of Roman Jakobson’s 
1935 essay closely resembles Pasternak’s own distinction between similarity 
and contiguity [ассоциативная связь по сходству или по смежности] 
in “The Wassermann Test” [Вассерманова реакция],11 his fiery review of 
Vadim Shershenevich in 1914. Since this polemical essay was not reprinted in 
Soviet Russia during the author’s lifetime, Pasternak critics and readers were 
unaware for decades of the intriguing interconnection between Pasternak’s 
theoretical pronouncements and Jakobson’s subsequent remarks. A direct line 
of influence from Pasternak to Jakobson and then to the subsequent criti-
cism is noted by Livingstone, who echoes in this regard an emerging criti-
cal consensus: “[Pasternak’s] distinction between, on the one hand, metaphor 
based on contiguity [ . . . ] and, on the other hand, metaphor based on simi-
larity between things or ideas, has been taken up by Roman Jakobson and, 
after him, by a number of scholars, who find Pasternak’s own verse character-
ized by metonymy” (MG 70). Pasternak himself, then, rather than Jakobson, 
becomes the principal source of the metaphor–metonymy paradigm, even 
though Pasternak never spoke of metonymy but of contiguity, while Jako-
bson equated the two notions.12 Introducing Pasternak into the middle of 
pre-1940 Pasternak [ . . . ] with the Futurist movement. [ . . . ] With this Mayakovsky, and with 
a number of his poetic contemporaries, Pasternak shared a quest and a discovery of new poetic 
modes that pointed beyond the Symbolist achievement. The most accurate label for these inno-
vations is Expressionism, which at the beginning of the twentieth century became the dominant 
artistic style throughout Europe” (Stepun 1962, 49–51). See also Hasty’s noting of “Pasternak’s 
metaphoric explosions” and “picture-taking” (2006, 116–32), as well as Björling’s view of the 
metaphoric early Pasternak (2006, 285–303).
 11. As to the title of the essay, see Barnes (1998, 111): “The Wassermann Test” (with its title 
borrowed from a medical test for the presence of the antibodies against syphilis) was a vitriolic 
attack on the recent convert to Futurism, the former symbolist poet Vadim Shershenevich.
 12. Though Hughes explains that Pasternak’s support of “contiguity” in “The Wassermann 
Test” (1914) becomes in Jakobson’s essay of 1935 (see Jakobson 1969) Pasternak’s “predilection 
to metonymy,” she avoids discussing the character of the actual historical connection between 
the two works: “[Pasternak,] without naming it, describes metonymy and explains his predilec-
tion for metonymic expression” (Hughes 1974, 70). Barnes, however, is more openly critical of 
this common theoretical stance: “the 1935 Jakobson’s ‘Marginal Notes on the Prose of the Poet 
Boris Pasternak’ drew some of their ideas (without acknowledgement) from Pasternak’s own 
article-review ‘The Wassermann Test’ (1914)” (Barnes 1998, 111).
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the debate significantly restructures its focus: it implies a direct interrelation 
between Pasternak’s theoretical thought and his artistic style, thus offering 
possibilities for analysis altogether missing when one approaches Pasternak’s 
prose through the prism of Jakobson’s judgment. Fleishman, in responding to 
some of these potential theoretical directions, characterizes Pasternak’s “met-
onymic” worldview as evidence of a phenomenological stance and Husserl’s 
influence (Fleishman 1977, 19–21) and then adds Ernst Cassirer as another 
probable source (Lehrjahre 132).13 In so doing Fleishman acknowledges, how-
ever, a certain insoluble residue—the lack of clear philosophical precursors 
that could shed light on Pasternak’s distinction between contiguity and simi-
larity, and consequently elucidate the theoretical context of the writer’s work 
with imagery (Lehrjahre 132–33).
 In taking up the implicit challenge of this impasse in this chapter, I will 
argue that Pasternak’s emphasis on the importance of “association by conti-
guity” [ассоциативная связь по смежности] in “The Wassermann Test” is 
based on a much broader philosophical context than most scholars suspect, 
a context altogether alien to Jakobson’s work. To clarify Pasternak’s thoughts 
regarding the similarity–contiguity opposition (see 2.1) is to uncover, first 
of all, major parallels between Pasternak’s terminology and David Hume’s 
famous classification of observations and ideas along the principles of simi-
larity, contiguity in time and space, and causality (2.2). Hume’s classification, 
as well as his belief that all impressions and ideas are derived from percep-
tion and are posterior to it, is a strictly philosophical position. Nowhere does 
Hume apply this opposition to poetics, while Pasternak, in his move from 
philosophy to poetry, readjusts his own philosophical training to a new field. 
Pasternak’s characteristic insistence on the centrality of perception in poetic 
work was, therefore, reinforced (if not suggested in the first place) by Hume’s 
philosophical analysis, even though Pasternak’s attitude to Hume was also 
sifted through Immanuel Kant’s equally famous objection to Hume—the locus 
classicus of the meeting ground between materialism and idealism in mod-
ern philosophy (2.3). “The apriorist of lyricism” was the characterization Pas-
ternak chose for the Futurist poet in his essay “The Black Goblet,” written 
roughly at the same time as “The Wassermann Test.”14 This definition points 
 13. Cf. Fleishman Lehrjahre 132–33: “The opposition of metaphor as similarity to meta-
phor as contiguity (‘with its compulsory force and spiritual drama’) in “The Wassermann Test” 
(1914) may be a far echo of the critique of the theory of abstraction of [ . . . ] Ernst Cassirer.”
 14. Pasternak’s involvement in Futurism was particularly acute in 1913–15, but he pub-
lished his polemical pamphlets in 1914 in the first and second editions of Tsentrifuga, the 
publication of the innovatory Futurist circle, in opposition to Mayakovsky. Cf. Livingstone: 
“‘The Black Goblet’ was Pasternak’s second published article. It was preceded by one published 
in 1914 as ‘The Wassermann Reaction’” (MG 69).
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to Kant, who argued in opposition to Hume that not all ideas were a poste-
riori, that is, derived from observation and experience; some were a priori and 
preceded experience.
 As I will argue in this chapter, such terminological resonances were not 
accidental. In elucidating the implicit philosophical context and its role in Pas-
ternak’s youthful attempt at poetics, I will show that Pasternak argues for the 
principal role of contiguities not in order to privilege them over metaphors, 
but to pursue another goal altogether. In bringing together such opposed phil-
osophical positions as Humean skepticism and the idealism of Kant (and, by 
extension, that of Plato), Pasternak aimed to emphasize poetry’s reliance on 
perception and yet to preserve its link to a priori intuitions—an impossible 
task, in his view, without preserving the importance of contiguities in poetic 
art. This theoretical context was formulated in Pasternak’s polemical essays 
of 1913–14 in a style that translated his philosophical training into a liter-
ary polemical discourse; on too many occasions Pasternak was stating philo-
sophical ideas as seemingly commonplace, if idiosyncratic, assertions, and this 
manner of writing stymied most of his critics. It inspired, however, Roman 
Jakobson’s famous argument of the metonymy–metaphor opposition (2.4), 
even though for Jakobson the implied conflict between Hume and Kant was 
hardly essential. All of this suggests, then, that the clarification of the differ-
ence between Pasternak’s “contiguity” and Jakobson’s “metonymy” constitutes 
an indispensable step if one is to clarify a long-lost theoretical background for 
Pasternak’s early prose.
2.1 Pasternak’s “justification through metaphor”
“The Wassermann Test,” on the surface, is a vitriolic attack on Vadim Sher-
shenevich for disregarding the “associations by contiguity” (“metonymic” or 
contiguous series in Jakobson’s rendition) and relying instead on metaphors 
dictated by society’s marketplace. In this polemical essay, Pasternak’s writing 
is dynamic, highly aggressive, but opaque.15 Only in the essay’s concluding 
paragraphs does Pasternak unambiguously establish an opposition between 
contiguity and similarity (or, as he also terms it, the opposition between 
“proximity” and metaphor), which can be summarized as follows:
 15. See Barnes: “His polemical article ‘The Wassermann Test’ (Vassermanova reaktsiya) 
was a typically oblique Pasternakian response to a commission from Bobrov which at the same 
time pursued issues bound up with his own creativity. The set task, in this case, was to destroy 
Shers henevich’s credibility as a poet” (1989, 166).
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a)  association through contiguity or proximity [ассоциативная связь по 
смежности] is the essential work of the poet, for it creates the necessary 
intensity for further transformative work;
b)  this work is “justified” metaphorically only when metaphors emerge 
out of the fermenting intensity of the poetic process, generated by the 
dynamism of contiguities [только явлениям смежности и присуща 
та черта принудительности и душевного драматизма, которая 
может быть оправдана метафорически] (PSS 5:11);
c)  only consumers believe that metaphors and symbols constitute the 
essential poetic work, and Shershenevich has accepted this view;
d)  metaphors, when not necessitated by contiguities, are products of the 
marketplace;
e)  contiguities, the fruits of poetic observation, call forth the need for 
metaphors, and without that practice there is no genuine poetic work.
Although Pasternak’s style may seem tortuous, his suspicion of market-place 
metaphors is significantly ahead of his time, for “The Wassermann Test” is one 
of the first theoretical works that resists the power of metaphoric relationships 
by emphasizing that they (when unaccompanied by contiguities) expand and 
reflect the extraneous codes of social conditioning and economic relations:
Figurative imagery—this is what emerges in the understanding of the con-
sumer as a principle of poetry. [ . . . ]
 However, even the construction of Shershenevich’s metaphor is such 
that it is called forth not by the inner need of the poet, but dictated rather 
by the conditions of external usage. [ . . . ]
 The fact of similarity, more rarely—the associative link according to 
similarity—and never the fact of proximity—this is the origin of Sher-
shenevich’s metaphors. In the meantime the sense of necessity and inner 
dramatism is a characteristic of proximity, which can [then] be justified 
metaphorically. An independent need for association through similarity 
is simply unthinkable. However, such and only such association can be 
necessitated from within.
Фигуральная образность, вот что связывалось всегда в представле-
нии обывателя с понятием поэзии. [ . . . ]
 Однако и строй метафоры Шершеневича таков, что не кажется 
она вызванною внутренней потребностью в ней поэта, но внушен-
ную условиями внешнего потребления. [ . . . ]
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 Факт сходства, реже ассоциативная связь по сходству и никогда 
не по смежности—вот происхождение метафор Шершеневича. 
Между тем только явлениям смежности и присуща та черта прину-
дительности и душевного драматизма, которая может быть оправ-
дана метафорически. Самостоятельная потребность в сближении 
по сходству просто немыслима. Зато такое и только такое сближе-
ние может быть затребовано извне. (PSS 5:10–11)
Such an approach to metaphor, novel in 1914, has become since the 1980s a 
mainstay of literary analysis.16 By contrast with the contemporary (or post-
structuralist) position, however, Pasternak does not resist metaphor as such; 
rather he points to a poetic process within which metaphors can be renewed 
or “justified” as part of the poet’s contemplative attention to locality, to its 
proximate, immediate (or contiguous) phenomena.
 The conclusion that metaphor must be necessitated from “within” by the 
expanding “associations through contiguity” (that reflects the phenomena 
grasped by the poet’s perception) is carefully prepared throughout the essay. 
Shershenevich’s metaphors are indicative, Pasternak claims, of the poet of 
marketable ideas, not of the poet-nurturer or poet-developer; the world Sher-
shenevich represents lacks “the intimacy of the individually fostered device” 
developed in “the lyrical space of the initial conception” [лирик[и] замысла 
согретого интимностью лично взлилеянного приема] (PSS 5:6). Shersh-
enevich’s metaphors, therefore, point to the external fashion only, with poetry 
as a bi-product that reinforces the prevailing tastes of consumers: “the keys to 
Shershenevich’s locks are found among the amateurs of the crowd” [ключи 
от Шершеневических затворов—в руках любителей из толпы] (PSS 5:11). 
The sharpness of the polemical attack must be understood as part of a much 
wider picture: the problem is not even that Shershenevich’s metaphors, “pack-
aged from without,” lack justification from “within.” Rather, contiguity and 
similarity in poetry should not be independent—or opposed—associative 
principles. The intimate work of the poet’s perception, expressed through the 
language of contiguities, is a pre-condition to the discovery of the “inner her-
mitage,” the poet’s capacity for integrative contemplation, assisted by emerging 
metaphors. If contiguity’s role is the training ground for seeing the proximate, 
metaphor is a lock to the deepest chambers of contemplative space where vari-
ous elements of vision and experience are to be integrated and transformed. 
 16. See Jacques Derrida’s proclamation: “a metaphor would be forbidden. The presence/
absence of the trace [ . . . ] carries in itself the problem and the spirit” (1976, 71).
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This process of integration is of the highest value; all else is merely preparation 
for it, even though the integration cannot be achieved without all the prelimi-
nary steps:
The lyrical agent, call it whatever you want, is, first of all, the vehicle of inte-
gration. The elements which are submitted for integration, or rather, which 
receive their life through it, are altogether insignificant in comparison with 
the integrating process itself.
[ . . . ] One wants to compare metaphor with that ornamental lock, the key 
to which is kept by the poet, and, in the worse cases, with the lock through 
whose keyhole17 one can look at the female hermit hidden in the stanza.
Лирический деятель, называйте его, как хотите,—начало интегриру-
ющее прежде всего. Элементы, которые подвергаются такой интег-
рации или, лучше, от нее только получают свою жизнь, глубоко в 
сравнении с нею несущественны.
[ . . . ] [M]етафору хочется сравнить с тем узорчатым замком, ключ от 
коего хранит один лишь поэт, да и то—в худших случаях с замком, 
сквозь скважину которого разве только подсмотришь за таящейся в 
stanz’е затворницей]. (PSS 5:9–10)
The “female hermit” [затворницa] of the passage gives readers pause or at 
least a jolt. In Pasternak’s later writing the “female hermit” will be habitually 
connected to the presence of the immeasurable or infinite. The female her-
mit is either soul (as, for example, in his poem “Soul” [Душа] of 1915, where, 
not unlike Princess Tarakanova, the soul is “a prisoner of years” [пленница 
лет] [PSS 1:84]), or is indicative of the presence of the Muses (as in Luvers 
[затворницa в песне]),18 or of the future, still brewing and undisclosed.19 In 
 17. Kling’s (2002) argument that Pasternak is aware of Bryusov’s “keys of the mysteries” is 
highly apt in this context: “Let us also remember a gesture towards the ‘theurgists’—the essay 
‘The Keys of Mysteries’ in Vesy (1904 [1]): Pasternak tries out on himself the theurgistic neck-
lace ‘of pure creativity, purified from all extra elements’ art, on the basis of life” (2002, 33).
 18. When Zhenya Luvers sees the three still women in black, prior to her meeting Tsvetkov, 
she muses: “They showed up black, like the word ‘anchorite’ in the song” [Они чернелись, как 
слово “затворница” в песне] (CSP 151; PSS 3:54). The reference to the “female hermit” here is 
mysterious and ambiguous. Among the multiple meanings, the reference to the hermit may also 
signify the “black” mistress-soul of Solomon’s “Song of Songs.”
 19. See in Doctor Zhivago a sinister apprehension of the future, presented through a female 
hermit [затворница], the unstable mother of Evgraf: “The princess is a recluse. She lives—God 
knows on what—in her house just outside Omsk, and she never goes out. [ . . . ] And recently 
I’ve had the feeling that the house is staring at me nastily, through all its five windows, across 
the thousands of miles between Siberia and Moscow, and that sooner or later it will give me the 
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“The Wassermann Test,” however, the female hermit appears without expli-
cation, disturbing and seemingly out of place. Thus, no matter what oblique 
connotations the image may signify in his later writing,20 its role in 1914 is to 
point to the mystery that contrasts with the quickly churning images of the 
marketplace.
 In other words, for all its polemical avant-garde bravado, “The Wasser-
mann Test,” from its first paragraph, is directed against modernity if moder-
nity means the repackaging and reassembling of images by means of a 
conveyor belt and eradicating those signposts of “grey antiquity”—the signi-
fiers of the sacred—that are still preserved in the language of the past:
In our century . . . of democratization and technology such principles as 
vocation and personal gift are viewed as superstitions. “Laisser faire, laisser 
passer” has entered in the area of artistic enterprise. [ . . . ] To grey antiquity 
one attributes such expressions, quite meaningless nowadays, as talent, feu 
sacré, etc. [ . . . ]
 As always, the sign is given by the market. The reader no longer 
requires relationships with the thinker Dei gratia, just as he is no longer 
troubled by the question of whether the design of his textiles is woven by a 
Lancaster craftsman or executed by machine.
В наш век . . . демократизма и техники понятия призвания и личного 
дара становятся вредными предрассудками. “Laisser faire, laisser 
passer” проникает и в область художественного производства. [ . . . ] 
К седой этой старине нужно отнести и такие смысла лишившиеся 
выражения, как талант, feu sacré, и т.п. [ . . . ]
 Как и всегда, знак был подан с рынка. У читателя нет потребно-
сти в сношениях с деятелем Dei gratia, как не занимает его вопрос о 
том задуман ли узор его сукна ланкастерским сукноделом или без-
ымянно подкинут машиною. (PSS 5:6)
evil eye” [Княгиня—затворница. Она безвыездно живет с сыном в своем особняке на 
окраине Омска на неизвестные средства. [ . . . ] И вот все последнее время у меня такое 
чувство, будто своими пятью окнами этот дом недобрым взглядом смотрит на меня 
через тысячи верст, отделяющие Европейскую Россию от Сибири, и рано или поздно 
меня сглазит] (PSS 4:71).
 20. As late as 1957, in the poem “After the Break” [После перерыва], the image of a hermit 
[затворник] is still directly linked to writing: “I estimated in my mind / That I will close off 
as if a hermit” [Прикинул тотчас я в уме. / Что я укроюсь, как затворник] (PSS 2:176). In 
“Behind the turn” [За поворотом] (PSS 2:187), the mysterious singing bird does not permit 
anyone to come to her threshold [и не пускает на порог / Кого не надо] as she guards the 
unknown certain future).
48 | Chapter 2
These transcendental significations, introduced at the beginning of the 
polemic seemingly à propos (thrown in as habitual expressions in French and 
Latin—feu sacré, etc., and Dei gratia), make their way into the text almost 
unobserved, protected by the apparent bluster of a debonair poet. Nonethe-
less, these terms, together with the mysterious “female hermit” behind the 
metaphoric lock, establish implicit contiguities and deepen their significance; 
the work of contemplative perception of the proximate refuses to banish nou-
mena or a sense of a priori intuitions, all equally endangered by the new fash-
ion, common in equal measure to politics, art, and the marketplace. What is 
being attacked, then, is not merely Shershenevich, but rather the emergence 
of a new social order and its outright dismissal of the hidden or sacred from 
the poet’s vocation—a version of Futurism that Pasternak vehemently rejected 
from his first steps as a poet.21
2.2 The “unparalleled analytical clarity of Hume”22
The philosophical antecedents of this extraordinary argument are actually 
at the very center of Pasternak’s philosophical studies: they emerge from his 
knowledge of David Hume’s “association of ideas.” Hume’s insistence that 
impressions have a vibrancy of vitality, lost when they are transformed into 
ideas, was accepted enthusiastically in Pasternak’s student notes and his let-
ters, and yet this acceptance came with an important proviso. Pasternak’s ren-
dition of Hume was placed alongside his understanding of Plato, Kant, and 
Post-Kantian philosophy. Even though Pasternak’s long essay on Hume has 
survived only in part, “The Wassermann Test” remains an important docu-
ment reflecting the development of Pasternak’s philosophical thought. Paster-
nak’s terminology—for instance, his introduction of the distinction between 
similarity and contiguity—is a clear debt to the laws of David Hume’s famous 
“fork” in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and particularly to 
Hume’s division of subjective experience, drawn from perception, into impres-
sions and ideas, with the latter organized by the laws of (1) resemblance or 
 21. Fleishman traces this position of 1914 all the way to a highly dangerous confrontation 
with Left Futurism, and the principle of “social demand” to the arts [социальный заказ] in the 
middle of 1920s. Thus, Pasternak’s support of Vyacheslav Polonsky (expelled from Novy Mir in 
1931 and exiled in 1932 to Magnitogorsk, en route to which he died from typhus) must be read 
in the context of his opposition to the market-place generated metaphors in “The Wassermann 
Test.” See Fleishman (1980, 72ff).
 22. Cf. “Аналитическая зоркость Юма не знает ничего равного себе” (Lehrjahre 
I:222).
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similarity, (2) contiguity in time and space, and (3) causality (which is essen-
tially for Hume contiguity through time):23
To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, 
namely, resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect.
[ . . . ] A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original [resemblance]: 
The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an 
enquiry or discourse concerning the others [contiguity]: And if we think 
of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it 
[cause and effect]. (1.3. ¶ 3–4; 2007, 20)
In his notes on Hume that preceded his studies in Marburg, Pasternak care-
fully diagrams this “fork” and supplements the diagram (noted in English) 




Ideas exist in a causal relationship from impressions; the first appearance 
of each idea necessarily appears as an impression; impressions are simple 
and complex; [ . . . ] simple ideas are correlated with simple impressions; 
complex ideas do not correlate in this manner.
Ideas в причинной зависимости (?) от impressions; первое появление 
каждой idea обязательно impression; простые и сложные, прост<ые> 
вызываются, простые ideas соответствуют прост<ым> impressions, 
сложные не соответствуют. (Lehrjahre I:209)
Thus, just as in Hume’s philosophy where the power of impressions acquired 
through perception remains the foundation of ideas, whether the latter are 
analytical or imaginative, Pasternak in “The Wassermann Test” makes the 
world of the proximate, grasped by perception, a precondition for metaphoric 
processes.
 23. See Traiger’s exposition of the relationship between causality and contiguities in space 
and time: “It is unclear how something that has not existed for many years can suddenly cause 
the occurrence of the state of mind here and now; indeed, Hume himself says that a causal 
relationship between two things requires their temporal and spatial contiguity. . . . Even if we 
waive the requirement of spatial contiguity for causal relations between perceptions, we are left 
with the unmet requirement for contiguity in time” (2006, 49).
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 Indeed, in his 1910 philosophical notes, Pasternak carefully details how 
ideas are derived from perception through impressions, and he observes that 
the imagination, working from perception and expanding beyond “simple 
impressions,” operates through the relationships of similarity and temporal 
and spatial conjunctions or links (in other words, contiguities):
Fantasy (or imagination) aims to develop combinations (ideas) out of sim-
ple perceptions which do not correspond to impressions, according to a 
particular principle. These principles are as follows: the relationship of simi-
larity, temporal, spatial, and causal series. In this, memory and imagination 
coincide: both activities link simple impressions according to the same three 
principles. 
Фантазия (воображ[ение]) стремится из простых perceptions обра- 
зовать комбинации ideas, не соответствует impressions, по определен-
ному принципу. Эти принципы: отношения сходства, времен [н]ой, 
пространственной и причинной связи. В этом совпадают воображе-
ние и память; обе деятельности связывают простые восприятия по 
тем же трем принципам. (Lehrjahre I:209; emphasis added)
Thus, when Pasternak in “The Wassermann Test” lays out the laws of similarity 
and contiguity, he has not forgotten the relationships described in his diaries 
as “temporal, spatial and causal series” [отношения сходства, вре мен - 
[н]ой, пространственной и причинной связи] (Lehrjahre I:209). Nor is 
he unaware of Hume’s unambiguous insistence that every idea and every fan-
tasy derives its power from perception: “Let us chase our imaginations to the 
heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step 
beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those percep-
tions, which have appeared in that narrow compass” (A Treatise of Human 
Nature, 1.1.6; 2000, 49). And when Pasternak in July 1914 writes in his letters 
to his parents that the gift of the poet24 is predominantly that of “sight” and not 
of “thinking,” it is impossible to ignore his student years dedicated to Hume:
It seems to me that the artistic gift consists in the following: in a fateful, 
instinctive, and unintentional manner, one must see as others think, and, 
vice versa, think as others perceive.
 24. As Susanna Witt points out, “The emphasis on seeing in connection with creating has 
been observed by many scholars” (2000a, 32), as she proceeds to argue that Yuri Zhivago “writes 
poetry as an artist paints etudes” (2000a, 34).
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Мне кажется, художественное дарование заключается вот в чем: 
надо роковым, инстинктивным и непроизвольным образом видеть 
так, как все прочие думают, и наоборот, думать так, как прочие 
видят. (PSS 7:185)
It is probable, then, that Pasternak aims, above all, to preserve the vitality of 
all available pathways from perceptions to impressions and ideas and that his 
insistence on the importance of contiguities [отношения пространственной 
связи] in “The Wassermann Test” must be read in this context.
 The notes of Lehrjahre cannot be viewed, of course, as a precise indicator 
of Pasternak’s thoughts in 1914, but the philosophical diary reflects, none-
theless, the direction of his philosophical interests as he studied Hume. The 
evidence of Lehrjahre, together with “The Wassermann Test,” suggests, for 
instance, that Pasternak’s early philosophical interests were still very much in 
play even after he broke with philosophy and that his emphasis on the need 
for the widest pathways from perception and impressions to poetic activity 
(with similarities never outweighing the power of contiguities) reflects Hume’s 
insistence that all ideas, simple or complex, weaken the vitality of immediate 
impressions and lose that initial “force and liveliness with which they strike 
upon the mind” (Treatise, 1.1.1; 2000, 7).25 Even Pasternak’s passionate defense 
of contiguities in poetic work follows Hume, who observed that contiguous 
relationships between objects, when repeated, carry a sense of inexplicable 
mystery:
There is nothing in any objects to persuade us, that they are either always 
remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation 
we discover, that their relation in this particular is invariable, we always 
conclude that there is some secret cause, which unites or separates them. 
(Treatise, 1.3.2; 2000, 53)
Both in 1910 and 1914, then, Pasternak agrees with David Hume that the 
pathways from perception to imagination have to be all-inclusive if they are to 
preserve the vitality of impressions.
 25. As Hume writes, the impressions are “all our more lively perception[s], when we hear, 
or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will” (Enquiry 1.2. ¶ 3; 2007, 15), and ideas are fainter 
and weaker entering reality “when we reflect on a passion or an object which is not present” 
(Treatise 2.3.7; 2000, 275). It is in this context that Pasternak’s development of Symbolism needs 
to be located; after Hume his path to imagination is through the vitality of impressions, not 
through symbols or ideas “purified from perception.”
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 It is highly plausible, then (and here the missing, full text of the longer 
paper written in 1912 for Moscow University would have been most help-
ful), that in downgrading metaphor to a position dependent on contiguities, 
Pasternak imitates Hume’s challenge to traditional understandings of philoso-
phy. As Hume dismisses philosophers’ habitual dedication to the primacy of 
ideas, a process that started with Plato, so Pasternak dismisses the central-
ity of metaphor, understood by “consumers” as the essence of poetry. Hume, 
indeed, reversed Plato’s view that material reality is only a copy of “ideas”;26 
he instructed philosophers that perception, not ideas, should be the subject of 
philosophical study: “I desire those philosophers, who pretend that we have 
an idea of the substance of our minds, to point out the impression that pro-
duces it, and tell distinctly after what manner that impression operates, and 
from what object it is derived” (Treatise, 1.4.5; 2000, 153). Thus, ideas as faint 
copies of experience are necessarily “posterior,” being increasingly weaker 
resemblances of actual reality:
An impression first strikes upon senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, 
thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impres-
sion there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression 
seizes, and this we call an idea. [ . . . ] These again are copy’d by the memory 
and imagination, which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions 
and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their 
corresponding ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from 
them. (Treatise, 1.1.2; 2000, 11)
Pasternak’s indebtedness to Hume includes, therefore, a taste for a certain 
argumentative flamboyance, common to both thinkers. And if this flamboy-
ance on Pasternak’s part was relatively short-lived or his admiration for Hume 
limited, his acceptance of Hume’s skepticism had much deeper roots.
 In his university notes, Pasternak praises the “incomparable” analytical 
powers of Hume [Аналитическая зоркость Юма не знает ничего рав-
ного себе] (Lehrjahre I:222), but he also emphasizes Hume’s “blind” dis-
missal27 of what Descartes called “connexion nécessaire,” the power of the 
 26. Cf. Plato, Republic, Book X, 596–601e (2005, 820–26).
 27. See his characterization of Hume’s “blindness” to ideas and to the formulas underly-
ing the phenomena of nature: “The foundations of connections are minimized in status to that 
of the causes of combinations. He is blind in relation to the constitutive inseparability of the 
mathematical principles with the objects and objective facts of nature” [Основа коннексии 
мельчает до повода к комбинированию. Он слеп по отн<ошению> к конститутивной 
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ideas that arise in the mind, alike in precision and vitality to mathematical 
formulas, and armed with the vital power to define reality, rather than being 
defined by it:
But the connection of ideas, called by Descartes “connexion nécessairе” 
lose in Hume their necessary nature, their inner productive mathemati-
cal verity. Although Hume cites the examples of geometric, algebraic and 
arithmetic relations, he does not see how these connections, independent 
from their immediate links to the processes of nature, are viewed all the 
more as constitutive of nature.
Но и связи идей, названные Декартом “connexion nécessaire” лиша-
ются у него необходимости, внутренной, продуктивно математи-
ческой истинности. Хотя Юм и приводит как примеры отношения 
геометрии, алгебры и арифметики, но он не видит, как эти связи, 
безотносительные к бытию их образований в природе вещей, 
именно поэтому признаны конституировать эту природу. (Lehrjahre 
II:52)
While the emphasis on the primacy of seeing was to stay with Pasternak 
for the rest of his life, there is no parallel denigration of the power of ideas; 
instead he adds a complexity to his visual images that has no parallel in Hume. 
“The Wassermann Test” is indicative in this regard of the care, caution, and 
an admixture of cunning (hidden in the language of a Futurist debater) with 
which Pasternak states in 1914 his allegiance to the material proximity of 
phenomena grasped by perception, and yet also intimates the reality of tran-
scendental imprints underlying the impressions of any artist who fights for 
the longevity of his feu sacré.28 In this manner “The Wassermann Test” sug-
gests a perilous complementarity between materiality and ideality, betray-
ing its author’s awareness of a Kantian and Post-Kantian critique of Hume’s 
skepticism.
неразрывности математич<еских> понятий с вещами и фактами природы] (Lehrjahre 
II:52).
 28. See the image of feu sacré in “The Letters from Tula,” in Pasternak’s imitation of Tolstoy: 
“A fashion has established itself in life, such that now there is no place left in the world where a 
man may warm his soul at the fire of shame; for the shame has everywhere gone damp and will 
not burn” [Завелся такой пошиб в жизни, отчего не стало на земле положений, где бы 
мог человек согреть душу огнем стыда; стыд подмок повсеместно и не горит] (CSP 121; 
PSS 3:28).
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2.3  Perception, contiguity, and Immanuel Kant’s  
a priori of time and space
For Hume, as for Locke and for empiricists generally, all thought starts in per-
ception: “Nihil est in intellectu, quod antea fuerit in sensu” (Lehrjahre II:51). 
For Kant, by contrast, a priori principles exist prior to the a posteriori aspects 
of cognition derived through experience and impressions. As Kant famously 
announces in the first pages of his Critique of Pure Reason, these a priori prin-
ciples underlying perception strike one’s consciousness with a force character-
ized by intrinsic necessity:
But even though all our cognition starts with experience, that does not 
mean that all of it arises from experience. [ . . . ] Yet experience is far from 
being our understanding’s only realm, and our understanding cannot be 
confined to it. Experience indeed tells us what it is, but not necessarily 
that it must be so and not otherwise. And that is precisely why experience 
gives us no true universality; and reason, which is eager for that [universal] 
kind of cognition, is more stimulated by experience than satisfied. Now 
such universal cognitions which are at the same time recognized by intrinsic 
necessity, must be independent of experience, clear and certain by them-
selves. Hence they are called a priori cognitions; by contrast, what is bor-
rowed solely from experience, is, as we put it, cognized only a posteriori, or 
empirically. (Kant A1; 1996, 43–44; emphasis added)
And according to Kant’s most startling dictum, we would be unable to appre-
hend both time and space in specific instances without their a priori reality, 
independent of our perception:
Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer 
experience. For the presentation of space must already lie at the basis in 
order for such sensations to be referred to something outside me. (Kant 
A23/B38; 1996, 27)
Time is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from any experi-
ence. For simultaneity or succession would not even underlie our percep-
tion if the presentation of time did not underlie them a priori. Only on the 
presupposition of this presentation can we present this and that as being 
at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (sequen-
tially). (A30/B46; 1996, 32)
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As his student diaries indicate, Pasternak’s philosophical training was focused 
to a great extent upon the synthetic character of perception which blends a 
posteriori and a priori phenomena. In notes taken prior to Marburg, he jots 
down the following characterization of Kant’s time and space (this passage is 
only a brief example of many similar notes):
Space and time are guided by immanent laws, which belong to the very 
essence of contemplative activity. Space and time are constitutive principles 
of every separate act of apprehension. When we free them, in abstraction, 
from all their sensible content, we only raise to consciousness those laws 
which operate in the genesis of every apprehension.
Пространство и время имеют имманентную, свойственную самой 
сущности созерцательной деятельности закономерность. Про-
странство и время—конститутивные принципы каждого отдель-
ного восприятия. Когда мы освобождаем их, в абстракции, от всего 
чувственного содержания, мы только приводим в сознание ту зако-
номерность, которая действительнa в гинезисе каждого восприя-
тия. (Lehrjahre II:12)
This conception, of course, was central to instruction in the Marburg school; 
Hermann Cohen’s exposition and critique of Kantian synthetic knowledge 
dealt directly with a posteriori and a priori aspects of cognition unifying in the 
act of apperception within a transcendental subject.
 In order to honor Hermann Cohen’s work on synthetic judgment, Paster-
nak’s Safe Conduct presents Cohen’s teaching in the following manner: prior 
to unfolding his own findings and demanding from students a definition of 
Kantian apperception (CSP 56; PSS 3:188), the great Marburg philosopher dra-
matizes for his students the full intensity of the battle between pre-Kantian 
metaphysics and Humean skepticism,29 himself siding with Hume:
Already I knew how on some other occasion, stealthily creeping up on 
the Pre-Kantian metaphysics, he would croon away, pretending to woo 
it, then suddenly utter a raucous bark and give it a terrible scolding with 
 29. Pasternak invariably emphasizes the dramatic gift of Hermann Cohen, in a hidden 
echo, perhaps, of Cohen’s own view from 1906 (several years after Kants Begründung der Ästhe-
tik) that drama manifests the new spirit of the age: “the peculiarity of drama is the realization 
of action not only by the author on the stage, but in a ‘dialogue’ between actor and spectator, in 
a spiritual exchange between the two” (Poma 2006, 91).
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quotations from Hume. How, after a fit of coughing and a lengthy pause, 
he would then drawl forth, exhausted and peaceable, “And now, gentle-
men . . . ,” which meant that he had finished telling the century off, the 
performance was over, and it was possible to move on to the subject of the 
course. (CSP 44)
Уже я знал, как в другом каком-нибудь случае, вкрадчиво подъехав 
к докантовой метафизике, разворкуется он, ферлякурничая с ней, 
да вдруг как гаркнет, закатив ей страшный нагоняй с цитатами из 
Юма. Как, раскашлявшись и выдержав долгую паузу, протянет он 
затем утомленно и миролюбиво: “Und nun, meine Herrn. . . . ” И это 
будет значить, что выговор веку сделан, представленье кончилось и 
можно перейти к предмету курса. (PSS 3:173)
The whole experience of Marburg in Safe Conduct is presented, in fact, as 
an experiment in synthesizing temporal and spatial sequences, open to the 
immediate perception, but suggesting a deeper “transcendental” and immea-
surable signification. Even the town itself is depicted as resting in its depth 
upon the “lowland” [низина], first discovered by Saint Elizabeth on her leg-
endary nightly walks. On these trips, the eccentric saint directed her steps 
toward Marburg’s “unreachable” foundations and in the process established 
the spatial height and depth of the city’s life. As she organized the space, the 
town began to operate, and has operated ever since, by means of the synthetic 
blending of chronological and non-chronological time, hidden in the town’s 
lowest depth:
Since that time the town, establishing itself along the path of her nightly 
excursions, had set firm on the height in the form it had taken by the mid-
dle of the sixteenth century. But the lowland that had harassed her spiri-
tual peace, the lowland making her break the orders of her superior, the 
lowland set astir by miracles as before walked fully in step with the times. 
(CSP 43)
С тех пор город, расположившийся по пути ее ночных вылазок, 
застыл на возвышеньи в том виде, какой принял к середине шест-
надцатого столетья. Низина же, растравлявшая ее душевный покой, 
низина, заставлявшая ее нарушать устав, низина, по-прежнему при-
водимая в движенье чудесами, шагала в полную ногу с временем. 
(PSS 3:174)
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In this manner Pasternak’s depiction of Marburg enacts the philosophy prac-
ticed in its famous School. The atemporal layers of human perception enter 
not merely the town’s locality; they transfix the minds of the students drawn 
to Hermann Cohen and his instruction.
 Pasternak’s notes on Hermann Cohen’s Kants Theorie der Erfahrung indi-
cate further work on atemporal signification. The roots of Kantian transcen-
dentalism for Cohen, Pasternak observes, are not phenomenological; they are 
Platonic. In Cohen’s world,30 the Kantian a priori principles are synthesized 
through the centuries and become interconnected with the Platonic world of 
ideas (Republic, Book VII, 524–25), which are as independent of subjective 
impressions as the laws of mathematics and geography:
The beginning of the history of epistemology is found in Plato’s differen-
tiation within apprehension between the processes which do not call for 
scientific study and those which require the contemplation of numbers 
and geometrical designs. The latter—“awakening”—of the mind; these turn 
the mind away from the sensual and direct it towards the contemplation 
of essence. Such an apprehension is “drawing to substance and calling up 
thought.” [ . . .] The systematization of this philosophy unites Plato and Kant.
Начало истории критики познания лежит в Платоновском разли-
чии восприятия, которое не призывает научного рассмотрения, от 
такого восприятия, которое дает повод к мышлению чисел и созер-
цанию геометрических тел. Это— ἐγερτικὰ—разума, они отвращают 
от чувственного, направляя на созерцание сущего ([ . . . ]καὶ μετα-
στρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν) . . . Такое восприятие есть ὁλκὸν 
ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἢ παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας [ . . . ] Систематичность этой 
философии роднит Платона с Кантом. (Lehrjahre II:41)
An awareness of the a priori existence of transcendental principles and their 
forceful energy—the “contemplation of essences,” which are understood in 
Kant as the forms of inner and outer intuition of time and space31—consti-
 30. See Poma’s examination of the relationship between Platonic “teaching of ideas” and 
Cohen’s ethics: “In Cohen’s view, Plato had not provided a satisfactory answer to this problem, 
and perhaps, no such answer is possible, but positing the problem and the way in which it is 
posited have an important meaning for critical philosophy” (Poma 2006, 179–80).
 31. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, time is a form of inner intuition, because unlike 
space, it “cannot determine the outer appearances”: “it does not belong to any shape or position, 
etc., but rather determines the relation of presentations in our inner state” (A33/B49–50; 1996, 
88).
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tutes an essential feature of Pasternak’s artistic vision, with its idealistic, even 
metaphysical overtones, invariably emphasized and just as invariably masked 
and skillfully subdued.32
 In “The Wassermann Test,” then, Shershenevich, a misguided convert to 
Futurism in the eyes of Pasternak, is criticized for employing only a small part 
of the arsenal of image processing necessary for poetic maturation. And yet 
in lamenting the absence of deeper layers in Shershenеvich’s poetry (or the 
lack of transformative potential in his “lyrical activity”), Pasternak remains 
subtextually linked to Kant’s transcendental themes. These Kantian a priori 
principles of “inner” and “outer” intuition,33 present as an implicit subtext in 
“The Wassermann Test,” emerge more clearly in “The Black Goblet,” an article 
published in the second issue of Tsentrifuga’s “Rukonog,” just after “The Was-
sermann Test” (Barnes 1989, 166–68). In “The Black Goblet,” the relation-
ship between perception and contiguous series is unambiguous, although the 
philosophical terminology of contiguity—ассоциативная связь по смежно-
сти—is not employed. Nonetheless, the leading image of this article—“coffres 
volants” traveling between centuries—implies precisely this association of 
contiguity of time; the tightly packaged “goods” [добро] in the flying coffers 
are not objects; they are temporal sequences brought into an intense proximity 
to each other. The Futurists, then, by contrast with Vadim Shershenevich, are 
proclaimed as capable of condensing these “goods” into the tightest possible 
content and are praised for this ability as the “apriorists of lyricism”:
The art of impressionism—the art of cautious handling of time and space—
the art of packaging; the moment of impressionism—the moment of pack-
ing for a trip; Futurism—for the first time, a startling example of packing 
in the shortest possible time. [ . . . ] Generally, the movements of differ-
ent speeds, observed by us, present in themselves one of the multilayered 
articles of all the good(s) chosen for the parcel.
 [  .  .  .  ] Permit then the impressionism in the heart of metaphor of 
 32. Pasternak’s tendency simultaneously to evoke and to “camouflage” his most startling 
thoughts is best described by Pasternak himself, but it is usually applied to his later period when 
he admits to Gladkov that he dreams about “originality unobtrusive, concealed in a simple and 
familiar form” (Gladkov 1977, 33). However, as I will argue in this book, this tendency is opera-
tive in Pasternak’s prose from his first sketches. Partially it can be explained by his simultaneous 
attraction both to Hume and to Kant, and by his conviction that a priori aspects must underlie 
a posteriori experiences, even in his own artistic texts.
 33. For Kant the a priori of time was grasped by “inner intuition”: “Time is nothing, but the 
form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuiting we do of ourselves and our inner state” (A33/B49–50; 
1996, 88). Space on the other hand was grasped though “outer intuition”: “Space is merely the 
form of outer intuition . . . but not an actual object that can be intuited externally” (B457 n. 126; 
1996, 460; emphasis in original).
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Futurism to become the impressionism of the eternal. The transformation 
of temporary into eternal by means of the limited moment—this is the tru-
est meaning of the Futurist abbreviations.
 [ . . . ] But only with the heart of lyricism there begins to beat the heart 
of the Futurist, this apriorist of lyricism.
[  .  .  .  ] Искусство имрессионизма—искусство бережливого обхо-
ждения с пространством и временем—искусство укладки; момент 
имрессионизма—момент дорожных сборов, футуризм—впервые 
явный случай действительной укладки в кратчайший срок. [ . . . ]  
Вообще, движения всех скоростей, наблюдаемых нами, представ-
ляют собою одну из многоразличнейших статей всего предназна-
ченного к этой укладке добра.
 [ . . . ] Позвольте же импрессионизму в сердцевинной метафоре 
футуризма быть импрессионизмом вечного. Преобразование вре-
менного в вечное при посредстве лимитивного мгновения—вот 
истинный смысл футуристических аббревиатур.
 [ . . . ] Но только с сердцем лирики начинает биться сердце футу-
риста, этого априориста лирики. (PSS 5:13–14)
In other words, Pasternak’s “Black Goblet,” intriguing and unclear as the essay 
may be, is saturated with direct evocations of the a priori realities of Futur-
ism, which employs—or so Pasternak proclaims—“the veritable lyrical expres-
sion, this truly a-priori condition of subjectivism” [истинная лирика, это 
поистине априорное условие возможности субъективного] (PSS 5:14). 
This a priori content of Futurism, as the movement’s very name implies, is 
an experiment first and foremost with time, perception, and impression: “the 
impressionists of the eternal” discover metaphors through “the transforma-
tion of temporary into eternal by means of the limited moment.” Whatever 
this complex polemic suggests, it clearly suggests the integration of David 
Hume with that of Immanuel Kant from within the intense debates that were 
characteristic of the Russian cultural and poetic modernist scene.
2.4  Beyond “The Wassermann Test”:
  Contiguities and their characterization in Roman  
Jakobson’s essays and Boris Pasternak’s early prose
Jakobson’s 1935 essay “Marginal Notes on the Prose of the Poet Boris Pas-
ternak,” written initially as an “Afterword” for the Czech translation of Safe 
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Conduct,34 argues that in Pasternak’s narrative, the “images of the surrounding 
world function as contiguous reflections or metonymical expressions of the 
poet’s self ” (1969, 141). As critics have observed, Pasternak himself never used 
the word “metonymy,” but his concept of contiguity definitely corresponds to 
Jakobson’s metonymic examples (Hughes 1974, 70). Or does it? Jakobson’s 
metonymy is predominantly a spatial concept; it embraces environment, land-
scape, material objects, the natural world, and the human agent, all blend-
ing with the world that such an agent observes. In Vuletić’s view, Jakobson’s 
analysis of “the most frequent cases of metonymy in Pasternak’s prose” isolates 
the following metonymic relations: (a) objects represented by other objects, 
(b) objects represented by their states, (c) human beings represented by 
objects, (d) human beings represented by actions, and (e) the whole repre-
sented by the part and vice versa (2004, 485). Apparently, then, neither Pas-
ternak’s experimentation with time nor his indebtedness to Kant’s inner and 
outer a priori intuition—which complicates the Humean division of ideas and 
impressions into similarity, contiguity, and causality—resonates with Jakob-
son’s terminology and approach. Does this omission minimize the effective-
ness of Jakobson’s analysis?
 For Jakobson, Pasternak’s hero lives in a single temporal layer, and both 
the animation of the surrounding world and the de-animation of the acting 
human subject unfold on the same temporal plane:
Pasternak’s lyricism, both in poetry and in prose, is imbued with meton-
ymy; in other words, it is association by proximity that predominates. 
[ . . . ]
It is the same with Pasternak’s poems and, in particular, with his prose, 
where the anthropomorphism of the inanimate world emerges much more 
clearly: instead of a hero it is, as often as not, the surrounding objects that 
are thrown in turmoil; the immovable outlines of the roofs grow inquisi-
tive, a door swings shut with a silent reproach, the joy of family reconcili-
ation is expressed by a growing warmth, zeal and devotion on the part of 
lamps. (Jakobson 1969, 141)
As a result, Pasternak’s poetic self, as well as his protagonists, become an 
inalienable part of the landscape that the self shapes, but in which it is also 
 34. As Christopher Barnes notes, Jakobson’s 1935 essay was formulated in response to the 
“publication of a Czech translation of Safe Conduct by Svatava Pirkova-Jakobson together with 
an afterword by her husband Roman Jakobson” (1998, 111). Barnes’s perception of Jakobson’s 
debt to Pasternak is accompanied by surprise over the fact that Jakobson never acknowledged 
this debt or referred his readers to Pasternak’s youthful work.
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encompassed: “Show us your environment and I will tell you who you are. We 
learn what he lives on, this lyric character outlined by metonymies, split up by 
synecdoches into individual attributes, reactions, and situations” (Jakobson 
1969, 147). The metonymous protagonists, then, tend to be observers, rather 
than active agents: “the favorite transitional formula of Pasternak’s lyric prose 
is a railway journey during which his excited hero experiences a change of 
locality in various ways and in enforced idleness” (Jakobson 1969, 147). Such 
a rendition of Pasternak’s predominant stylistic characteristics is focused and 
precise, and yet surprisingly limited, for there exists in Pasternak’s prose an 
equally predominant pattern of relationships that contrasts with (and compli-
cates) the world of spatial contiguities.35
 Pasternak speaks of space and time as both measured and immeasurable, 
and he develops his images in such a way that the suggestion of potentially 
infinite interrelations pierces the tangible contiguities of the world grasped 
by perception. This aspect remains Pasternak’s consistent signature, and it 
is noteworthy that as late as 1956, in returning to the earlier poetic sketches 
of 1912, he wants to explain to his readers that even while his attention was 
directed toward making a visual picture exist on the page with the power of 
real-life experience, he used not colors but print, not photographs but ideas:
I did not express, reflect, represent, or depict anything at all. [ . . . ] Quite 
the contrary, the subject matter of my poem was my constant preoccupa-
tion, my constant dream was that my poem itself should have something 
in it, that it should have a new idea or a new picture, that it should be 
engraved with all its peculiarities in the book and should speak from its 
pages with all the colors of its black colorless print. (Remember 77–78)
Я ничего не выражал, не отражал, не отображал, не изображал. 
[  .  .  .  ] Совсем напротив, моя постоянная забота обращена была 
на содержание, моя постоянная мечта, чтобы само стихотворение 
нечто содержало, чтобы оно содержало новую мысль или новую 
картину. Чтобы всеми своими особенностями оно было вгравиро-
вано внутрь книги и говорило с ее страниц всем своим молчанием и 
 35. The very word “metonymy” is actually somewhat of a misnomer, for Jakobson absorbs 
synecdoche into this term. A further development of this “highly influential theory” has neces-
sitated a clarification of terms. Elam notes, “The Structuralists, including Jakobson, consider the 
kind of substitution at work here, i.e. of a part for the whole, as a species of metonymy, whereas 
the classical rhetoricians termed it synecdoche. It is worth insisting on the difference, since in 
practice synecdochic replacement of part for whole is essential to every level of dramatic repre-
sentation” (1980, 24–25).
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всеми красными строками своей черной, бескрасочной печати. (PSS 
3:326)
Insisting that the poem should intensify the senses open to perception “with 
all the colors of its black colorless print,” Pasternak makes a subtle deviation 
from what Hume considered the most vital elements of impressions. The 
image impresses most, Pasternak suggests, when an immediate sensation 
grows in complexity to embrace not just the present, but also the past and the 
future in such a manner that the actual picture can expand beyond an obser-
vation limited within a particular time and space. In the same passage Paster-
nak describes his poem “Venice” as a way of exhibiting the expanding series 
not merely of objects, or of reflections and impressions—and of their “copies” 
in water—but of the ever-growing number of interconnections, overtaking in 
intensity the actual materiality of the city, expanding as numerous impressions 
“on the horizon” far beyond an immediate temporal and spatial locality:36
For instance I wrote a poem “Venice” and a poem “The Railway Station.” 
The city on the water stood before me, and the circles and figures of eight 
of its reflections widened and multiplied, swelling like a rusk in tea. Or, far 
away, at the end of the tracks and platforms, there arose before me, in all 
clouds and smoke, a railway farewell horizon, behind which the trains were 
hidden, and which contained the history of relationships, meetings, and 
partings, and the events before and after them. (Remember 78)
Например, я писал стихотворение “Венеция” или стихотворение 
“Вокзал.” Город на воде стоял передо мною, и круги восьмерки его 
отражений плыли и множились, разбухая, как сухарь в чаю. Или 
вдали, в конце путей и перронов, возвышался, весь в облаках и 
ды мах, же лезнодорожный прощальный горизонт, за которым скры-
 36. A somewhat similar image concludes the life of Yuri Zhivago, as Zhivago sits by the 
window of the tram and observes people passing him and each other in close proximity, but at 
different speeds, indicating their lives before and after this meeting, as well as a quasi-invisible 
theory of relativity underlying the speed of their entrances and exits: “He tried to imagine 
several people running parallel and close together but moving at different speeds, and he won-
dered in what circumstances some of them would overtake and survive others. Something 
like a theory of relativity governing the hippodrome of life occurred to him, but he became 
confused and gave up these analogies” [Он подумал о нескольких, развивающихся рядом 
существованиях, движущихся с разною скоростью одно возле другого, и о том, когда 
чья-нибудь судьба обгоняет в жизни судьбу другого, и кто кого переживает. Нечто 
вроде принципа относительности на житейском ристалище представилось ему, но 
окончательно запутавшись, он бросил и эти сближения] (Zhivago 490; PSS 4:487–88).
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вались поезда и который заключал целую историю отношений, 
встречи и проводы и события до них и после них. (PSS 3:325)
While suggesting what Hume would view as the material vivacity of actual 
impressions,37 Pasternak proceeds in a direction that opposes not only Hume’s 
dismissal of the power of ideas, but also what Jakobson would draw as a met-
onymic picture of his world, for Pasternak carefully blends and synthesizes 
the immediate picture of the city and the suggestion of the infinite meetings 
and separations that have already been and will be taking place on its streets.
 This blending of the measured and immeasurable, the tangible and elu-
sive, occurs not only in 1912 or in the recollections of that period in 1956. It 
is possible, of course, that the account of an expanding consciousness in The 
Childhood of Luvers supports Jakobson’s depiction of Pasternak’s metonymies 
(Jakobson refers to that novella frequently), but the prose of Safe Conduct that 
caught Jakobson’s attention in the first place is rich with passages38 that chal-
lenge his idea that the fragments of the landscape and the human protagonist 
share and exchange similar characteristics. The very first figure in Safe Con-
duct, Rainer Maria Rilke,39 takes the same train as other passengers and speaks 
 37. In the same passage (and after speaking of the intense power of the past and future that 
opens far beyond the horizon), Pasternak concludes the description on a precise and realistic 
note, as if he is unaware of the temporal and spatial expansion that has just been created on the 
page: “There was nothing I demanded from myself, from my readers, or from the theory of art. 
All I wanted was that one poem should contain the city of Venice and the other the Brest (now 
the Belorussko-Baltiysky) railway station” [Мне ничего не надо было от себя, от читателей, 
от теории искусства. Мне нужно было, чтобы одно стихотворение содержало город 
Венецию, а в другом заключался Брестский, ныне Белорусско-Балтийский вокзал] (PSS 
4:325–26). The structure of the poem “Vokzal” [Вокзал], remembered in this passage, echoes 
this development of immediate impressions and occurrences pointing to a wider, possibly im-
measurable context. See the examination of several versions of this poem in Gasparov and 
Polivanov (2005, 68–73).
 38. In Jakobson’s rendition, the arbitrary replacement of one part for the other in the de-
scription of artistic inspiration (Safe Conduct, CSP 31; PSS 3:160) points to a metonymic mind 
at work: “To define our problem: the absolute commitment of the poet to metonymy is known 
[ . . . ] . He is replaced by a chain of concretized situations and surrounding objects. [ . . . ] One 
and a half decades later, in his book of reminiscences Safe Conduct, Pasternak mentions that he 
is intentionally characterizing his life at random, that he could increase the number of signifi-
cant features or replace them by others [ .  .  . ]” (1969, 146–47). In Vuletić’s view, “In limiting 
himself to noticing the very few types of metonymy indisputably used in Pasternak’s prose and 
poetry, Jakobson himself never slipped into a problematic detailed analysis of figurative speech 
in Pasternak” (2004, 488).
 39. Pasternak not only dedicates Safe Conduct to Rilke, but he intimates throughout these 
memoirs that he is only too aware of Rilke’s style and vision and that he can strike Rilkean notes 
throughout his narrative. Pasternak, in fact, invariably approaches Rilke as a figure who can be 
materially accessible (or contiguous) only by an impossible or improbable chance. Pasternak’s 
earliest mention of Rilke in his letters to his family initiates this theme. On May 17, 1912, 
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the language of a powerful European nation, but he appears to be an inhabit-
ant of an unknown world, contiguous with no mortal creature:40
The unknown man spoke only German. Although I knew the language 
perfectly, I had never heard it spoken as he spoke it. For this reason, there 
on the crowded platform, between two jangles of the bell, the foreign man 
seemed to be a silhouette among bodies, a fiction in the midst of the unfic-
titious. (CSP 21)
[H]езнакомец же говорит только по-немецки. Хотя я знаю этот язык 
в совершенстве, но таким его никогда не слыхал. Поэтому тут, на 
людном перроне между двух звонков, этот иностранец кажется 
мне силуэтом среди тел, вымыслом в гуще невымышленности. (PSS 
3:148)
A similar pattern is evident in Pasternak’s description of Hermann Cohen, a 
Pasternak writes to his sister Josephine from Marburg that he himself is interested in objects 
that are not part of everyday life, the ones that have been lost or misplaced and that can be 
recovered only by imagination. In this context he refers directly to Rilke, for whom this world 
of lost objects—truth in the space recoverable only by imagination—is akin to the ground of 
God: “I would like to tell you to check carefully the features of your past and of your fantasies; 
to tell the truth of them is difficult, awfully difficult. [ . . . ] These are lost and, in essence, the 
only real things. They are owned not by a pocket, but by someone real, anxiously checking the 
shelves, asking the servants and calling his acquaintances. And around that which is picked up 
by imagination there rushes about someone’s life looking for what it lost. Rainer Maria Rilke 
calls this God” [Мне хочется еще раз сказать тебе это: вглядывайся в свое прошлое и в 
свои фантазии; правду о них трудно, страшно трудно сказать. [ . . . ] Эти утерянные, и 
только они, суть настоящие вещи. Ими владеет не карман, а кто-то живой, мечущийся 
по шкафам, расспрашивающий прислугу и телефонирующий знакомым. И вот вокруг 
того, что подбирает воображенье, мечется чья-то потерявшая все это жизнь. Райнер 
Мария Рильке называет это Богом] (PSS 7:94–95). In 1931 in the “Afterword” to Safe Con-
duct, Pasternak describes how the realization that Rilke could actually read Pasternak’s work 
made him feel as if he is read in Heaven. See E. B. Pasternak (1997, 389–90). Pasternak’s letter 
to Rilke on April 12, 1926, echoes this amazement at Rilke’s actually reading him, as Pasternak 
compares this to being read by Pushkin or even Aeschylus, that is, the poets no longer found 
among the living (PSS 7:648). See also Ciepiela’s account of the Pasternak-Tsvetaeva-Rilke cor-
respondence (2006, 178ff).
 40. Pasternak’s debt to Rilke himself is unmistakable in this regard and was meant to be 
grasped by his readers. Echoing what most critics call Malte’s “Brahe heritage,” Pasternak recre-
ates, although very much in his own way, the atmosphere of the atemporal contiguous series, 
echoing Rilke’s world of existence that knows no temporal borders. For example, Malte’s grand-
father, Count Brahe, lives according to his own temporal measurement: “The passing of time 
had absolutely no meaning for him; death was a minor incident which he completely ignored; 
people whom he had once installed in his memory continued to exist, and the fact that they had 
died did not alter that in the least. [ . . . ] with the same obstinacy, he experienced future events 
as present” (Rilke Notebooks 31). See also see Schäfer (1997, 193–208).
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philosopher whose mind is firmly situated in a world that contrasts and even 
conflicts with the immediate everyday temporality of Marburg in 1912:41
In his roomy frock coat and his soft hat, this university professor was filled 
to a certain degree with the valuable essence that in the olden times had 
been bottled in the heads of Galileos, Newtons, Leibnizes, and Pascals. 
(CSP 59)
Этот университетский профессор в широком сюртуке и мягкой 
шляпе был в известном градусе налит драгоценною эссенцией, уку-
поривавшейся в старину по головам Галилеев, Ньютонов, Лейбницев 
и Паскалей. (PSS 3:191–92)
On the other hand, the personal tragedy of Vladimir Mayakovsky is presented 
as that of a man who is unnerved by his own ability to reach, with “medi-
eval boldness” [со средневековой смелостью], the most ancient layers of 
lyricism and to speak in “the language of sectarian identifications” [языком 
почти сектантских отождествлений]42 (CSP 84; PSS 3:223). Frightened by 
the isolation inherent in the inborn gift of the visionary whose sight uncovers 
the temporal layers inaccessible to his contemporaries, Mayakovsky chooses, 
quite willfully in Pasternak’s view, the adjacent neighborhood of the immedi-
ate “local” modernity and its “dwarf-like” inhabitants:
[T]his poet took up just as hugely and broadly another, more local tradi-
tion.
 Beneath him he saw the city that had gradually risen up to him from 
the depths of The Bronze Horseman, Crime and Punishment, and Peters-
burg, a city in a haze [ . . . ]. He could embrace such views as this and yet, 
at the same time as these enormous contemplations, still remained faithful, 
almost as to a debt, to all the dwarf-like doings of his accidental clique, 
 41. Pasternak writes from Marburg to Konstantin Loks (May 19, 1912) about Cohen being 
a man not connected directly to his everyday environment, so Cohen’s description is consistent 
with Pasternak’s earlier verbal sketches: “Cohen is something trans-natural. [  .  .  .  ] All such 
people, in their unbroken, hourly growth rise by their shoulders into some sky of idealism. At 
the feet of these crags there plays a handful of enfants terribles” [Коген—сверхъестественное 
что-то. [ . . . ] Все это люди, в своем неприрывном, ежечасном росте ушедшие по плечи 
в какое-то небо идеализма. У подошвы этого хребта чудачит горсть художественных 
enfants terribles] (PSS 7:100).
 42. In fact, Mayakovsky’s description in Safe Conduct is the precise opposite of Cohen’s 
portrait in Pasternak’s letter to Loks (see previous note). Mayakovsky chooses the local enfants 
terribles, terrified of the atemporal vision open to him. (PSS 3:223)
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which was hastily assembled and invariably mediocre to the point of inde-
cency. (CSP 84)
[O]н так же широко и крупно подхватил другую традицию, более 
местную.
 Он видел под собою город, постепенно к нему поднявшийся 
со дна “Медного всадника,” “Преступления и наказания” и “Петер-
бурга,” город в дымке [  .  .  .  ]. Он обнимал такие виды и наряду с 
этими огромными созерцаньями почти как долгу верен был всем 
карликовым затеям своей случайной, наспех набранной и всегда до 
неприличья посредственной клики. (PSS 3:223)
Jakobson’s spatial metonymies, highly characteristic of Pasternak’s prose, 
are insufficient as analytical tools for those instances when Pasternak intro-
duces the individuals capable of living43 in a neighborhood that expands far 
beyond the tangible landscape into the atemporal depth of interrelations (that 
so frightened Mayakovsky). Pasternak’s indebtedness to the philosophy of a 
posteriori and a priori sensibilities cannot provide in this context the whole 
of the answer, and yet this philosophical context clearly elucidates something 
fundamental about Pasternak’s patterns of thought and image construction.
 The inner world of visionaries, open to the many different layers of tem-
poralities, dominates Pasternak’s artistic tropes, but it is precisely this aspect of 
his writing that remains alien to Jakobson’s understanding of Pasternak’s use 
of metonymy. In his lecture to Musaget in 1913, “Symbolism and Immortality” 
[Символизм и бессмертие], for instance, Pasternak insisted that “the poet 
dedicates the apparent richness of his life to atemporal signification” [Поэт 
посвящает наглядное богатство своей души безвременному значению] 
(PSS 5:318), a position which on that occasion left his audience somewhat 
disoriented and dumbfounded.44 Similarly, in “The Black Goblet,” symbols 
 43. See Rilke’s description of the state of writing in the Notebooks of Malte Brigge: “But 
outside—outside there is no limit to it; and when it rises out there it fills up inside you as well, 
not in the vessels that are partly in your control or in the phlegm of your most impassive organs: 
it rises in your capillaries, sucked up into the outermost branches of your infinitely ramified 
being. There it mounts, there it overflows you, rising higher than your breath, where you have 
fled as if to your last refuge. And where will you go from there? Your heart drives you out of 
yourself, your heart pursues you, and you are already almost outside yourself and can’t get back 
in. Like a beetle that someone has stepped on, you gush out of yourself, and your little bit of 
surface hardness and adaptability have lost all meaning” (Notebooks 73–74).
 44. Durylin gives the following account of Pasternak’s lecture and the reaction of the musi-
cal and literary critic Emil Medtner, who was one of Musaget’s founders: “Nobody understood 
anything, and looked at me crossways. (I organized this presentation.) Especially E. Medtner 
shrugged his shoulders with a smile [ . . . ]. The smile meant: this is highly juvenile. The poets 
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and images of different centuries are packaged alongside each other—as “cof-
fres volants,” the flying chests or coffers—moving en masse into the future. 
This theme appears as a personal discomfort in Safe Conduct, when Paster-
nak asserts that he himself never felt at home in his immediate locality, and 
that this alienation included even Moscow University, where he experienced, 
almost as illness or feverish attraction, some other atemporal pole. This impa-
tience, he noted, attracted the inhabitants from other worlds and “regions” 
into his own “small settlement” [из ее краев в свой поселок] with something 
of a magnetic force:
This is why the sensation of the city never corresponded to the place in it 
where my life was being lived. [ . . . ] [w]here too, with its hundred audi-
toriums, the gray-green, much littered university ebbed and flowed with 
sound.
[ . . . ] Had I gone to the doctor then, he would have thought I had malaria. 
Yet these attacks of chronic impatience could not have been cured by qui-
nine. This strange perspiring was caused by the obstinate crudeness of 
those worlds—their turgid visuality [ . . . ]. Among them, uniting them 
into a kind of colony, the antenna of the universal preordainment rose up 
mentally. Just at the base of this imagined post came the attacks of fever. It 
was generated by the currents sent to the opposite pole. Conversing with 
the distant mast of genius, it summoned from those regions some new Bal-
zacs into its own small settlement. (CSP 33–34)
Вот отчего ощущенье города никогда не отвечало месту, где в нем 
протекала моя жизнь. [ . . . ] Там также сотнею аудиторий гудел и 
замирал серо-зеленый, полузаплеванный университет.
[ . . . ] Покажись я тогда врачу, он предположил бы, что у меня маля-
рия. Однако эти приступы хронической нетерпеливости лечению 
хиной не поддавались. [ . . . ] Объединяя их в какое-то поселенье, 
среди них мысленно высилась антенна повальной предопределен-
ности. Лихорадка нападала именно у основанья этого вообража-
емого шеста. Ее порождали токи, которые эта мачта посылала на 
противоположный полюс. Собеседуя с далекою мачтой гениально-
particularly understood nothing” [Hикто ничего не понял, и на меня посмотрели капель-
ку косо. (Я устроил чтение.) Особенно Э. Метнер пожал плечами с улыбкой  .  .  . Она 
означала: ‘очень ювенильно.’ Поэты—просто ничего не поняли] (1991, 54). It is signifi-
cant that Pasternak, who objected to his own early style, remembered the lecture fondly and 
emphasized in his 1956 memoirs his success: “The paper created a stir. It was talked about” 
[Доклад произвел впечатление. О нем говорили] (PSS 3:319).
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сти, она вызывала из ее краев в свой поселок какого-то нового Баль-
зака. (PSS 3:160–61)
Thus, there is a startling discontinuity between Pasternak’s casual admission 
that “the sensation of the city never corresponded to the place in it where 
[his] life was being lived” (CSP 33; PSS 3:160) and Jakobson’s assertion that 
Pasternak’s hero is invariably an observer of his environment, “experiencing a 
change of locality in various ways and in enforced idleness” (Jakobson 1969, 
147). Unintentionally, it seems, Jakobson redirects Pasternak’s focus toward 
a world of limited interrelations just when Pasternak seeks to expand them.
 On the whole, the juxtaposition of “The Wassermann Test” and Jakob-
son’s “Remarks” discloses several significant points of difference, reflective 
of the characters of the two men. The main binary tenets of Jakobson’s essay 
are precise and clear-cut, while Pasternak’s expression is pervaded by ideas 
that will take him a lifetime to develop. This includes—centrally—Pasternak’s 
experimentation with time and temporal sequences that expand from within 
the contiguous series brought together in an intense proximity. In this con-
text, it is particularly instructive to examine yet another document—a letter 
Pasternak wrote in December 1913 to his uncle, Mikhail Freidenberg, which 
provides not so much an explanation of his decision to leave Marburg as an 
outline of his earliest plans for his future protagonist. The young poet claims 
that most of all he aspires to capture “in life or artistically” the type of person 
near whom time and space open up their significance as infinite categories. 
The reason Pasternak offers this explanation to Freidenberg is also notewor-
thy: according to this letter, his uncle exemplifies the personality that cannot 
be neutralized by inanimate objects, for he is given “the gift of time,” so that 
his impressions can call forth the “spirit” of the city and invite both time and 
the depth of space to situate themselves around his work-place and to magne-
tize every surrounding object:
But there is a special gift granted to rare individuals that I would like to call 
the gift of time.
 People are caught by every present minute, which belongs to no one 
and imbues them with a general colorlessness of a particularized time—
actuality. [ . . . ]
 However, I have met several individuals who appear to breathe with 
their own time, and for whom reading their clocks is only a concession 
to the common order. What does this signify? It signifies, first, a certain 
feature of immortality that has entered into their movement. And it also 
speaks of their kindredness with their destiny. [ . . . ]
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 It is difficult to express this reality. A happier attempt would be to find 
living or artistic means for my enthusiasm in front of them. And if such 
a task were within my means, I would necessarily think of you. I would 
think of your serene capacity, instinctually, to take control of that chaotic 
and close to dream impression, which leaves behind itself Petersburg, city 
spirit. [ . . . ] how you fantasize over your work place, in the evening, with 
bloodless nothingness behind your back. And how you transmit this dra-
matically performed life to surrounding objects, to the whole mystery of 
furnishings and rooms.
Дело, может быть, в особом даре нескольких редких людей, который 
я бы назвал дар времени.
 Люди захвачены настоящей минутой, которая никому не при-
надлежит и обнимает их общей бесцветною средою данного вре-
мени—действительности. [ . . . ]
 Однако я встретил несколько личностей, которые как бы дышат 
своим собственным временем, у которых показанья их часов, может 
быть, только—уступка общественному порядку. Что это означает? 
Это означает, во-первых, некоторую черту бессмертия, проникаю-
щую их движения. И затем это говорит о какой-то одинокой их бли-
зости со своей судьбой. [ . . . ]
 В таких выражениях трудно дать об этом представление. Гора-
здо счастливее была бы попытка жизненно или художественно 
запечатлеть свой энтузиазм перед ними. И если бы такая задача 
была по силам мне, я неизменно думал бы о Вас. Я думал бы о том, 
как невозмутимо и с каким странным неведением об этом завлaде-
ваете Вы тем хаотическим и близким к грезе впечатлением, которое 
оставляет по себе Петербург, как город-дух. [ . . . ] как [ . . . ] фанта-
зируете Вы над своими станками, вечером, с бескровною пустотой 
за спиной. И о том, как заражается этой, драматически разыгран-
ной Вами жизнью мир предметов вокруг, вся эта тайна обстановки 
и комнат. (PSS 7:157)
This letter, with its emphasis on the city-spirit, on the inner layers of space 
and time, and on the capacity of the self engaged in thought to bring dra-
matic intensity into the world of objects, signifies with a startling clarity that 
the themes of Pasternak’s philosophical studies have not been left behind. As 
the subject matter and the protagonists of his future work are outlined, the 
Kantian a priori principles of time and space constitute an important phil-
osophical subtext, and admirers of Pasternak can already recognize in the 
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text of this December letter the images of space and time that anticipate not 
only the future portraits of Rilke, Scriabin, Cohen, and (with some qualifica-
tions) Mayakovsky in Safe Conduct, but also the poetry of Doctor Zhivago, be 
it “Magdalina” for whom eternity is waiting at her desk,45 or Christ in “The 
Garden of Gethsemene” who, sweating blood, clings for the last time to the 
piece of land on which he stands surrounded by the impenetrable and unin-
habitable abysses of eternity that have come so dangerously close to him.46 The 
themes and images of Pasternak’s early prose works may as yet be unclear, but 
the next step of this inquiry is straightforward and obvious: the mysterious 
traveler, Heinrich Heine, appears altogether out of his apparent time and place 
amidst the darkness of Pisa in Pasternak’s first published short story, “The 
Mark of Apelles.”
 45. “Oh, where would I now be, / My teacher and my Savior / If at night, near the desk / 
The eternity would not be waiting for me” [О, где бы я теперь была, / Учитель мой и мой 
Спаситель, / Когда б ночами у стола / Меня бы вечность не ждала] (PSS 4:545).
 46. “The spaciousness of the universe was uninhabitable, / And only the garden was a place 
for the living. / Looking then into these black abysses, / Empty, without beginning or end, / So 
that the cup of death would pass him by / In a bloody sweat he begged his father” [Простор 
вселенной был необитаем, / И только сад был местом для житья. / И, глядя в эти чер-
ные провалы, / Пустые, без начала и конца, / Чтоб эта чаша смерти миновала, / В поту 
кровавом он молил отца] (PSS 4:547).
n Pasternak’s writing, the gift of poetry is either identified with or perme-
ated by an energy force that lifts the world from gloom and darkness and 
fills it, as it were, with fresh air. Both Tsvetaeva and Mandelstam in their 
portraits of Pasternak attest to this refreshing dynamism in his poetic world, 
Tsvetaeva by comparing it to pouring rain filled with sunlight [световой 
ливень] and Mandelstam by noting that Pasternak’s poetry could become an 
effective treatment for tuberculosis.1 What is intriguing in these poets’ intui-
tive responses is not simply their enthusiastic description; rather, they both 
name a major early theme in Pasternak that otherwise has remained unob-
served in critical literature: the comparison, and even competition, between 
the artist’s ability to affect the surrounding world, on the one hand, and the 
power of the sun and fresh air, on the other. In this chapter I will argue that 
this competition, highly characteristic of Pasternak’s early prose, consti-
tutes a hidden mechanism in his first published story, “The Mark of Apelles” 
[Апеллесова черта], and that the story’s technical innovation includes the 
 1. Tsvetaeva’s “Downpour of Light” was in itself a forceful “breakthrough” in reaction to 
Pasternak’s “downpour,” since her essay was one of the first instances of the émigré poet praising 
the Soviet poet, and it was written almost immediately after receiving Pasternak’s My Sister Life 
[Сестра моя жизнь] in the summer of 1922 (Ciepiela 2006, 82–84). Mandelstam’s description 
of this book in “Vulgata: Notes on Poetry” [Заметки о поэзии] (1923) points to poetry’s natu-
ral capacity for healing the traumatic and hungry 1920s (Mandelstam 2:302).
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inversion (or rather the reformulation) of Plato’s trope of the sun as the high-
est good.
 It is noteworthy that in Doctor Zhivago, while describing pre-Revolution-
ary cultural life in the Russian capital, Pasternak singles out the themes of 
competition with, or imitation of, the sun when the Tolstoyan follower Vyvo-
loch nov dismisses with disdain the decadent preoccupations of the Silver Age 
as he addresses the philosopher Vedenyapin:
Hmm. And now it’s all this highbrow stuff—fauns and nenuphars and 
ephebes and “let us be like the sun.” I can’t believe it, bless me if I can—an 
intelligent man like you, and with your sense of humor and knowledge 
of people. . . . Come, now. . . . Or am I intruding into the holy of holies? 
(Zhivago 41)
Нда. А теперь эти фавны и ненюфары, эфебы и “будем как солнце.” 
Хоть убейте, не поверю. Чтобы умный человек с чувством юмора 
и таким знанием народа. . . . Оставьте, пожалуйста. . . . Или, может 
быть, я вторгаюсь. . . . Что-нибудь сокровенное? (PSS 4:43)
Even apart from the prominence and extent of this theme in the Silver Age 
and its powerful presence in post-Revolutionary culture,2 images of sun and 
sunset, light and darkness, are hardly new in literature, and intertextual influ-
ences here are unlimited.3 My task in this chapter, therefore, is not to situate 
Pasternak’s artistic treatment of the sun in the cultural context of his time, 
but to elucidate the deeper philosophical roots responsible for his startling 
confidence as he entered, without apology or hesitation, into what might have 
appeared to be already exhausted subject matter and added to this well-estab-
lished image his own artistic vision, by no means conventional or trite.
 It is never easy to isolate a predominant philosophical influence (or the 
importance of a specific philosopher) in the work of any writer who finds 
 2. The motif of the sun and sunlight is characteristic of all Modernism (Russian and 
European); it is in Balmont, in Vyacheslav Ivanov, in the Futurists’ 1913 opera The Victory over 
the Sun [Победа над Солнцем], with Malevich’s picture for the brochure. Malevich’s concept 
of Suprematism is to some extent a development of this theme, for the famous Black Square 
(1915) can be viewed as a total sunset, an actual victory over the sun. This theme is central for 
such classical images of Revolutionary culture as Gorky’s Dan’ko with his “flaming heart” and 
Mayakovsky’s 1918 “conversation with the sun.” See, for example, Koretskaya (1978, 54–60); 
V. V. Ivanov, “Solyarnye mify” (1978, 54–60); and P. Davidson (1989).
 3. Gifford, for example, sees parallels between My Sister Life and St. Francis of Assisi and 
his “Canticle of the Sun”: “My Sister Life records a bond not unlike that of Saint Francis for 
whom sun and wind were his brothers, the moon and the stars his sisters” (1977, 53).
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his voice in a period of intense cultural cross-fertilization. It is all the more 
difficult to identify these influences in the exceptionally elusive texts of a 
writer responding to the widest range of philosophical and literary voices.4 To 
address this challenge, the analysis of “The Mark of Apelles” will be divided 
into three sections. The first section (3.1) will examine the theme of the sun in 
Pasternak’s own recollection of the preoccupations of his youth—in Safe Con-
duct—with specific attention to passages dedicated to his university years and 
his descriptions of the birth of poetry. The consistent appearance of this “sun-
less” theme in Pasternak up to his “second birth” will be emphasized through-
out. The second section (3.2) will extend this analysis to the discussion of 
Pasternak’s philosophical diary and letters of 1910–13 and his proposed (and 
abandoned) philosophical dissertation, dedicated to “the laws of thought and 
the category of the dynamic object.”5 Pasternak’s modus operandi (which he 
shared with Neo-Kantian philosophers)6 of approaching Plato’s “ideas” as 
diverse forms of energy rather than intellectual “abstractions” will be one 
focus of my approach. The examination of “The Mark of Apelles” in the third 
section of the chapter (3.3) will clarify the importance of these philosophical 
themes and their interconnection with the light of the sun for the overall con-
struction of the story.
3.1 Poetry born in darkness: 
 Toward an unwritten philosophical aesthetics
Any critic working with Pasternak’s early prose cannot ignore the writer’s 
consistent framing of narratives with images of sunset.7 Even apart from the 
 4. As de Mallac observes, “Pasternak occupies in his national and international literary 
age a place analogous to the one Goethe occupied in his age” (1981, xvii).
 5. The topic of Pasternak’s dissertation (“работа о законах мышления как о категории 
динамического предмета”) was announced at the very same time as he decided to leave Mar-
burg—in the letter to Alexander Shtikh of July 11, 1912 (PSS 7:121–22). 
 6. It is noteworthy that Fyodor Stepun, once an organizing force of Musaget, recognized 
in his discussion of Doctor Zhivago not only the Kantian roots of what he called Pasternak’s 
transcendental aesthetics (which he thought were beyond doubt), but the wider influence of 
philosophical idealism. To explain Pasternak’s belief in the dynamic force of art, Stepun begins 
by quoting Rickert’s phrase—“to understand the world is to make it unrecognizable”—and then 
shows the complex resonance of the idealist tradition in Pasternak’s writing (1962, 47–49).
 7. Witt locates this theme both in Zhivago and in the poetic works of the later period as 
Pasternak’s engagement with Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov and, more specifically, Alyo-
sha’s memory of his mother’s prayers and “the slanting rays of the setting sun” [косые лучи 
заходящего солнца] (2000a, 77–87). Witt also traces the theme of sunset in Dostoyevsky and 
that of “the slanting rays” to Sergei Durylin’s article, published in 1928, on Dostoyevsky (“Ob 
odnom simvole u Dostoevskogo”). As Witt aptly observes, “Durylin’s summarizing description 
74 | Chapter 3
spectacular sunset that opens “The Mark of Apelles,” the narrative frames of 
each of Pasternak’s early stories display the same constellation of images: the 
rays of the sun are either departing (usually at the beginning of the story) or 
re-appearing (at the conclusion), and they are more often than not set against 
the background of a journey, its railway lines, stations, street lines, or quickly 
changing settings. Sometimes the image is obscure, as in the first page of The 
Childhood of Luvers when the girl is frightened by the lights of an industrial 
factory and by the new state of reality colored by the sunset. In “Aerial Ways,” 
for instance, the emphasis is not so much upon the sun as upon an electric 
cloud that darkens the world. However, the interplay between light and dark-
ness is always present and always significant.
 In the surviving manuscripts of 1910, Pasternak’s hero Reliquimini is 
invariably surrounded by dusk, sunset, and darkness, while sunshine is always 
a rare occasion, never directly named.8 Nonetheless, Reliquimini recollected 
his childhood as daylight, while he conceived his youth as a sunrise that “pre-
dated” his childhood and framed it:
It’s growing dark. How many roofs and spires! And all of them, catching 
and tearing, have bent the sky down like a misty bush. (MG 18)
Just look at this chaos of shadows and silhouette-patches, all this buzzing 
and flowing thaw of blackened colors feathered with soot, look at them. 
(MG 20)
Dusk, you understand that dusk is some thousandth homeless anxiety, 
unbalanced and lost, and the lyricist has to find a placement for the dusk.
Childhood remembered noons [ . . . ] youth linked itself with dawn.
of the ‘символ заката и косых лучей’ in Dostoevskij [ . . . ] touches upon a subject that very 
much occupied Pasternak—and that the two friends discussed: the question of realism in art” 
(2000a, 89). The major question is the dating of the friendship between Durylin and Pasternak. 
Fleishman (as Witt points out [2000a, 90]) speaks of the earliest period of Durylin and Paster-
nak’s acquaintance, placing it in 1910–13, as highly influential in a lifelong friendship. Fleish-
man also observes that in 1911 Durylin was an active participant of Musaget and contributed 
(under the pseudonym S. Severny) to the volume dedicated to Francis of Assisi (1981, 228ff ). 
Thus, it is more than possible that Durylin, who became a Russian Orthodox priest in 1918 (the 
same year as Sergei Soloviev and Sergei Bulgakov), discussed with Pasternak Alyosha’s “oblique 
rays of the sun” as Pasternak first turned to his prose, adding Dostoyesky’s influence to the great 
number of other influential contexts, including Scriabin’s experimentation with darkness and 
light in his 9th (Black Mass) and 10th sonatas, as well as his insistence that one can look into 
the eyes of the sun as one listens to Le Poème de l’extase.
 8. Livingstone notes “the twilight’s erasure” of objects, so that “they begin to need forms 
to hold them together; so they are now god-seekers” (MG 57).
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That is why Reliquimini’s youth took place for him earlier than childhood. 
Youth predated Reliquimini’s childhood.
Уже темнеет. Сколько крыш и шпицей. И все они, цепко обрывая, 
нагнули небо, как туманный кустарник, и выпустили его из рук. 
(PSS 3:420)
Вот посмотрите на этот хаос теней и пятен и силуэтов, на всю эту 
журчащую, проточную оттепель почерневших, оперенных копотью 
красок [ . . . ]. (PSS 3:422)
Сумерки, понимаете ли вы, что сумерки это какое-то тысячное без-
домное волнение, сбившееся и потрявшее себя, и лирик должен раз-
местить сумерки. (PSS 3:428)
Детство запомнило полдни [ . . . ] юность связала себя с рассветом.
Поэтому юность Реликвимини настала для него раньше его детства. 
Юность предшествовала детству Реликвимини. (PSS 3:436)
 If one examines the prose that followed “The Mark of Apelles,” there is a 
consistent pattern of staging action in darkness, framed by sunrise. “Without 
Love” (Безлюбие, 1918), for example, starts with a blinding blizzard and sig-
nals the sun’s eventual approach, measured not by hours, but by the length of 
the protagonists’ journey:
[ . . . ] it was high time for the sun to rise, but the sun was still far away.
 The sun was still far away. They would see it only after another five 
versts, after a short stop at the inn [ . . . ]. 
 Then it appeared. It entered the manager’s office with them, flooded 
over the carpet, settled behind the flowerpots. (CSP 131)
[ . . . ] и давно было уже время взойти солнцу, но до солнца было 
еще далеко.
 До солнца было еще далеко. До солнца оставалось еще верст 
пять пути, короткая остановка на въезжей [ . . . ].
 Тогда оно выглянуло. Оно вошло вместе с ними в кабинет, где 
оно разбежалось по коврику и, закатившись за цветочные горшки, 
усмехнулось [ . . . ] (PSS 3:408)
“Letters from Tula” (written in 1918) begins with a sunset:
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[ . . . ] in the train from Moscow, a suffocating sun was borne along on the 
many striped bench seats. The sun was setting. (CSP 119)
[ . . . ] в поезде, шедшем из Москвы, везли задыхавшееся солнце на 
множестве полосатых диванов. Оно садилось. (PSS 3:26)
The story also ends with sunrise, which means that all the events of the story 
take place, explicitly, between sunset and daybreak:
The train was heading for Moscow, and an enormous crimson sun was 
borne along on the bodies of many sleeping passengers. It had just appeared 
from behind a hill, and it was rising. (CSP 126)
Шел поезд в Москву, и в нем везли огромное пунцовое солнце на 
множестве сонных тел. Оно только что показалось из-за холма и 
подымалось. (PSS 3:32)
“Detstvo Luvers” (1918) begins with the child’s tearful reaction to a world so 
different during sunset, which she sees unexpectedly when awakened by the 
cat:
In those days Zhenya was put to bed early. She could not see the light of 
Motovilikha. [ . . . ] However, there was no name of determining what was 
happening far, far away on the bank. That had no name, and no precise 
color or definite outline. (CSP 133; emphasis in original)
Женю в те годы спать укладывали рано. Она не могла видеть огней 
Мотoвилихи.[ . . . ] Зато нипочем нельзя было определить того, что 
творилось на том берегу, далеко-далеко: у того не было названия и 
не было отчетливого цвета и точных очертаний [ . . . ]. (PSS 3:34)
“Aerial Ways” (1924) opens dramatically with darkness stretching over the 
world:
When the huge lilac storm cloud rising at the roadside had silenced even 
the grasshoppers that torridly chirruped in the grass, and when the drums 
gave a sigh and their pattering ceased in the encampment, the eyes of the 
earth turned dim and there was no more life in the earth. (CSP 179)
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Когда огромная лиловая туча, встав на краю дороги, заставила 
умолкнуть и кузнечиков, знойно трещавших в траве, а в лагерях 
вздохнули и оттрепетали барабаны, у земли потемнело в глазах и на 
свете не стало жизни. (PSS 3:86)
It seems, therefore, that a critical analysis of “The Mark of Apelles” or any of 
these earlier stories needs to be located within a wider discussion of the artis-
tic aims guiding Pasternak’s persistent evocation of the occluded sun in his 
earlier works.
 In this examination, one cannot avoid the Urtext of the image in Western 
culture; in Plato’s trope for the highest good, the sun is a simile for the univer-
sal power that brings to the material world its highest illumination and true 
generation:
The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnished to visibles the power of 
visibility, but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture 
though it is not itself generation.
 In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not 
only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their 
very existence and essence [which] is derived to them from it, though the 
good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and sur-
passing power. (Republic Bk. VI, 509b–c; 1930, 744)
Moreover, for Plato the ideas with which the soul opines are charged with 
power and acuity in the intelligible world “where truth and reality shine 
resplendent,” while the shining flow of energy recedes in darkness:
When [the soul] is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality 
shine resplendent it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess 
reason, but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, 
the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is 
blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if 
it lacked reason. (Republic Bk. VI, 508d5–d9; 1930, 744)
It is, therefore, noteworthy that in describing his philosophical training in 
Safe Conduct and the accompanying “birth of poetry,” Pasternak is indicating 
his distance from Plato’s most famous topos of the good. Carefully emphasiz-
ing that poetry’s birth is awakened in the thickening atmosphere of darkness, 
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Pasternak prefaces this recollection with an invocation of the brightest sun-
shine whose rays illuminated his music studies throughout the many pre-
ceding years. Just as happens after Reliquimini’s childhood and youth, the 
sunshine in Pasternak’s inner and outer worlds departs as he turns eighteen 
(with the cessation of his music studies):
Although my story has inclined this way, I have not asked the question of 
what music is or what leads up to it. I havе not dоne so, not only because 
I woke up one night in my third year of life and found the whole horizon 
flooded with it for more than fifteen years ahead, and thus had no occa-
sion to experience its problematics. [ . . . ] However, the same question in 
relation to art as such, art as a whole, in other words, in relation to poetry, 
cannot be passed over. I shall answer it neither theoretically nor in a suf-
ficiently general form, but much of what I shall relate will be the answer I 
can give for myself and my poet. (CSP 30; emphasis added)
Хотя к этому располагал рассказ, я вопроса о том, что такое 
музыка и что к ней приводит, не ставил. Я не сделал этого не 
только оттого, что, проснувшись однажды на третьем году ночью, 
застал весь кругозор залитым ею более чем на пятнадцать лет 
вперед и, таким образом, не имел случая пережить ее проблема-
тику. [  .  .  .  ] Однако того же вопроса в отношении искусства по 
преимуществу, искусства в целом, иными словами—в отношении 
поэзии, мне не обойти. Я не отвечу на него ни теоретически, ни в 
достаточно общей форме, но многое из того, что я расскажу, будет 
на него ответом, который я могу дать за себя и своего поэта. (PSS 
3:158)
As Pasternak proceeds to describe how the sunny luminosity of music was 
replaced by the sun’s restricted light and very limited hours of its entry into 
the family’s home, it seems unwise to make a categorical assertion that Paster-
nak is here engaged in an implicit reconstruction of the atmosphere of the Pla-
tonic cave, “which has a way up to the light along its whole width” and whose 
“entrance is a long way up” (514a). However, this classic Platonic depiction of 
education in the polis cannot be too far away when the picture of Pasternak’s 
philosophical studies is transformed into a full-fledged parody of Platonic 
apprentices searching for enlightenment. Pasternak begins this description by 
recollecting his younger self reading Hegel and Kant while the sun is dimmed 
by the walls of the adjacent houses and by his family apartment, the living 
quarters made up of former classrooms:
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The sun used to rise behind the post office and, slipping down Kiselny 
Lane, would set over the Neglinka. When it had gilded our half of the 
house, it would make its way from dinnertime on to the dining room and 
kitchen. The apartment was government property; its rooms were made up 
from classrooms. I was studying at the university. I was reading Hegel and 
Kant. (CSP 30)
Солнце вставало из-за Почтамта и, соскальзывая по Кисельному, 
садилось на Неглинке. Вызолотив нашу половину, оно с обеда пере-
биралось в столовую и кухню. Квартира была казенная, с комна-
тами, переделанными из классов. Я учился в университете. Я читал 
Гегеля и Канта. (PSS 3:158)
This implicit comparison with Plato’s descriptions of philosophers searching 
for liberation in darkness becomes all the more pronounced when Pasternak 
recalls the habits of philosophy students (and, more generally, his early artistic 
friends) at Moscow University who wake up at night and, stoically deaf to the 
material demands of the body, avoid sunlight altogether as they change their 
nights into day. In their pursuit of alternative sources of illumination and with 
disdain for mere unenlightened mortals,9 they meet at the dead of night and 
travel as far as the railway station, Sokolniki or Yaroslav on the outskirts of 
Moscow—a task that for some unclear reason must be accomplished before 
sunrise. It is in this context that Pasternak mentions learning of Marburg—
and a new liberating destination is finally singled out, with Plato explicitly 
identified and placed in a position of prominence equal to that of Cohen and 
Natorp:
Often we would get each other up in the dead of night. The reason for it 
always seemed of utmost urgency. Whoever was woken was ashamed of 
his sleep, as if it was an accidentally exposed weakness. To the fright of 
the unfortunate inhabitants of the house, all without exception considered 
nonentities, we would instantly set off—as if to an adjoining room—to 
Sokolniki and the Yaroslav railway crossing. [ . . . ] The illusion of inde-
 9. Pasternak’s irony is reminiscent of Plato’s humor as he describes the arrogance of the 
disciples “consecrated” into the higher mysteries of higher truth. Socrates’ disciple, Apollodor-
us, admits in The Symposium that he despises everyone, including even himself, who is unaware 
of the truths of philosophy: “Because, you know, before that I used to go dashing about all over 
the place, firmly convinced that I was leading a full and interesting life, when I was really as 
wretched as could be—much the same as you, for instance, for I know philosophy’s the last 
thing you’d spend your time on” (173a1–3; ed. Hamilton and Cairns; trans. M. Joyce, p. 527).
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pendence was obtained by means of such moderation in food that on top 
of everything else there was hunger too, which conclusively transformed 
night into day in the uninhabited apartment. . . . Along with some of my 
acquaintances I had connections with “Musaget.” From others I learned of 
the existence of Marburg. Kant and Hegel were replaced by Cohen, Natorp, 
and Plato. (CSP 30–31)
Часто подымали друг друга глубокой ночью. Повод всегда казался 
неотложным. Разбуженный стыдился своего сна, как нечаянно 
обнаруженной слабости. К перепугу несчастных домочадцев, счи-
тавшихся поголовными ничтожествами, отправлялись тут же, 
точно в смежную комнату, в Сокольники, к переезду Ярославской 
железной дороги  . [ .  .  . ] Иллюзия самостоятельности достига-
лась такой умеренностью в пище, что ко всему присоединялся еще 
и голод и окончательно превращал ночь в день в пустопорожней 
квартире . . . Вместе с частью моих знакомых я имел отношение к 
“Мусагету.” От других я узнал о существовании Марбурга: Канта и 
Гегеля сменили Коген, Наторп и Платон. (PSS 3:159)
With this explicit mention of Plato, Pasternak presents the background for 
his recollections of the “birth” of poetry, which he describes as a pattern that 
somehow refuses to follow the motif of the Platonic philosopher liberated into 
the blinding light.
 Thus, unlike the luminous light of his music studies, this new guiding 
force that directs his life at night is presented as altogether independent of 
the sun’s energy, which, in Plato’s writing, directs the soul to “the form of the 
good” that “is the last thing to be seen and hardly seen” (Republic VII, 517 
b5–c; 1930, 749). By contrast, Pasternak remembers himself directed by a sun-
less force, one displaying its capacity to compete with all life-giving forces, 
including the power of the sun:
I had made friends with a girl from a wealthy family. It was obvious to 
everyone that I loved her. She took part in these walks only in abstract, on 
the lips of those more used to going without sleep and adapted to such a 
life. [ . . . ]
 Love raced along most impetuously of all. Sometimes it found itself 
at the head of nature and would overtake the sun. (CSP 30–31; emphasis 
added)
Я дружил с девушкой из богатого дома. Всем было ясно, что я ее 
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люблю. В этих прогулках она участвовала только отвлеченно, на 
устах более бессонных и приспособленных. [ . . . ]
 Всего порывистее неслась любовь. Иногда, оказываясь в голове 
природы, она опережала солнце. (PSS 3:159)
The energy of poetic practice is found to have a further ability to enliven those 
aspects of reality, which, semi-forgotten, lag behind in the ever-expanding, 
darkened distance. Echoing the act of “conversion” or “turning around” of the 
cave prisoner who is liberated and “compelled to stand up suddenly and turn 
his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light” (Republic VII 
515 c7–d; 1930, 748), Pasternak offers readers his own version of “turning” or 
conversion—a backward glance that focuses upon a semi-forgotten series of 
impressions, experiences, facts.10 The power of the sun is, thus, presented as 
a contrasting foil: as the sun directs the rotation of seasons, the poet, turning 
toward the call of ephemera disappearing in the darkness, has the indepen-
dent ability to recover and invigorate these lifeless aspects of existence, imbu-
ing them with new intensity that his eye discerns and awakens:11
I shall ask myself at this point by what virtue and whereabouts in reality 
poetry was born. [ . . . ]
 It was born from the interruption of the series, from the diversity of 
their speed, from the way the more sluggish lagged behind and piled from 
the rear, on the deep horizon of memory.
 Love raced along most impetuously of all. Sometimes it found itself at 
the head of nature and would overtake the sun. But as this happened only 
rarely, one could say that the force that gilded one side of the house and then 
began to bronze the other, which washed weather away with weather and 
turned the heavy winch of the four seasons, moved forward with constant 
superiority, nearly always competing with love, while the remaining orders 
dragged along at the back, at various distances. I often heard the hiss of 
yearning that had not originated with me. Catching up with me from 
behind, it filled me with fright and pity. It issued from the point at which 
everyday life was torn away, and it either threatened to put brakes on reality 
or else begged for everyday life to be joined to the living air, which in the 
meantime had moved a long way ahead. And what is known as inspiration 
 10. See here MacKinnon (1988, 152ff.), who sees in this passage the announcement of 
“Pasternak’s theory of art.”
 11. See Rudova on “making art a creative process” (1997, 70). See also Rudova’s comparison 
of this passage to Rilke’s writing on Paul Cézanne and Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (1994, 
62–73).
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consisted in this turning around to look back. The most tumid, uncreative 
forces of existence called for a special vividness because of the distance to 
which they had rolled away. (CSP 31; emphasis added)
[Я] тут же и спрошу себя, где и в силу чего из нее рождалась поэзия. 
[ . . . ]
 Она [поэзия] рождалась из перебоев этих рядов, из разности их 
хода, из отставанья более косных и их нагроможденья позади, на 
глубоком горизонте воспоминанья.
 Всего порывистее неслась любовь. Иногда, оказываясь в голове 
природы, она опережала солнце. Но так как это выдавалось очень 
редко, то можно сказать, что с постоянным превосходством, почти 
всегда соперничая с любовью, двигалось вперед то, что, вызолотив 
один бок дома, принималось бронзировать другой, что смывало пого-
дой погоду и вращало тяжелый ворот четырех времен года. А в хво-
сте, на отступах разной дальности, плелись остальные ряды. Я часто 
слышал свист тоски, не с меня начавшейся. Постигая меня с тылу, 
он пугал и жалобил. Он исходил из оторвавшегося обихода и не то 
грозил затормозить действительность, не то молил примкнуть его 
к живому воздуху, успевшему зайти тем временем далеко вперед. 
В этой оглядке и заключалось то, что зовется вдохновеньем. К осо-
бенной яркости, ввиду дали своего отката, звали наиболее отечные, 
нетворческие части существованья. (PSS 3:159)
The parallel with the sun is carefully maintained, even though the sun is not 
the force that moves inspiration. Poetry is born, along with compassion, when 
some as-yet-unnamed power invigorates the forgotten aspects of reality that 
are begging the poet to preserve them from disappearing from life.12 And for 
his young self this new force, just like love, can outdistance the sun.
 In the later sections of Safe Conduct, having described his pursuit of phi-
losophy in Marburg, Pasternak announces that he can foresee a new theory of 
aesthetics. Laying its first foundations (or at least suggesting its outlines), he 
restates his conviction that art is intertwined with a force that shows its tra-
jectory by displacing or transforming the objects it pierces. With a significant 
shift in metalanguage, Pasternak claims yet again that, as far as this process 
is concerned, textual devices are merely the by-products of a reality that has 
been transformed and reordered by this alternative power which exists along-
side that of sunlight:
 12. For an alternative view, see Livingstone’s commentary on Safe Conduct (1985, 58–64). 
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At the beginning of Safe Conduct I said that sometimes love outstripped 
the sun. I had in mind the patency [evidential power] of feeling that every 
morning outdistanced the whole of the surrounding world [ . . . ]. In com-
parison with this, even the sunrise acquired the character of a local rumor 
needing verification. In other words, I had in mind the patency [evident 
force] of a power that outweighed the evidential nature of light. (CSP 54; 
trans. altered; emphasis added)
В начале “Охранной грамоты” я сказал, что временами любовь обго-
няла солнце. Я имел в виду ту очевидность чувства, которая каждое 
утро опережала все окружающее с достоверностью вести [ . . . ]. В 
сравненьи с ней даже восход солнца приобретал характер городской 
новости, еще требующей проверки. Другими словами, я имел в виду 
очевидность силы, перевешивающую очевидность света. (PSS 3:186)
Thus, by comparison with this newly discovered “beam of energy,” the sun’s 
rays are relegated to the status of an inferior “news item,” and, as Pasternak 
suggests, in all seriousness it seems, a formula for artistic power has been dis-
covered that contrasts with the force of light:
If, given the knowledge, ability, and leisure, I were to decide now to write a 
creative aesthetics [ . . . ]. I would show that as distinct from science, which 
takes nature in the section of a shaft of light, art is interested in life at the 
moment when the beam of energy is passing through it. (CSP 54; trans. 
altered; emphasis added)
Если бы при знаньях, способностях и досуге я задумал теперь 
писать творческую эстетику [ .  .  . ]. Я показал бы, что, в отличье 
от науки, берущей природу в разрезе светового столба, искусство 
интересуется жизнью при прохожденьи сквозь нее луча силового. (PSS 
3:186)
Moreover, according to this non-existent (but already conceived) aesthetics, 
the creative force of art [сила движущегося языка образов] affects reality 
as if by magnetism, while the force itself is discovered in reality and not in 
art. Even the transference of the metaphor found in reality (and Pasternak on 
this occasion employs a linguistic double-entendre—see the use of the word 
“pull” [тяга] in the passage below) is a testimony to the uncovered dyna-
mism in static objects at the moment when they are transfixed by the force 
in question:
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Art is realistic [ . . . ] by virtue of the fact that it did not itself invent metaphor 
but found it in nature and faithfully reproduced it. The transferred sense 
means nothing in isolation but refers to the general spirit of all art, just as 
the parts of the altered reality mean nothing if taken separately.
 And in the configuration of the whole pull art is symbolic. [ . . . ] The 
interchangeability of images [undergoing displacement], that is art, is the 
symbol of power. (CSP 55; emphasis added)
Искусство [ . . . ] реалистично тем, что не само выдумало метафору, 
а нашло ее в природе и свято воспроизвело. Переносный смысл так 
же точно не значит ничего в отдельности, а отсылает к общему духу 
всего искусства, как не значат ничего порознь части смещенной 
действительности.
 Фигурой всей своей тяги и символично искусство. [ . . . ] Взаи-
мозаменимость образов, то есть искусство, есть символ силы. (PSS 
3:187)
In this process, the immobile objects of reality are clearly neither illuminated 
nor changed, but rather returned to life by the animating force that sleeps in 
them:
How one understands what it is like for the visible object, when it begins to 
be seen. Once noticed, nature moves aside with the obedient spaciousness 
of the story, and in this condition, like one asleep, is quietly transferred 
onto the canvas. (CSP 70)
Как вдруг постигается, каково становится видимому, когда его начи-
нают видеть. Будучи запримечена, природа расступается послуш-
ным простором повести, и в этом состоянии ее, как сонную, тихо 
вносят на полотно. (PSS 3:205)
In other words, as Pasternak claims that he is rewriting the classical philos-
ophy of aesthetics, he still borrows from the Greeks the affirmation of the 
potency of contemplative “ideas,”13 and his position contrasts altogether in 
 13. In a letter to Loks of January 28, 1917, Pasternak speaks of literary forms and clearly 
draws on his former philosophical position where forms as ideas are dynamic living energies: 
“if the form is to be created [  .  .  .  ] it must be created as living, moved by an irrational self-
consciousness of its self-subsistent and self-propelling organism” [если форма может быть 
создана [  .  .  .  ] то она может быть создана только в виде живого,—иррационально 
осмысленного своею способностью самоподвижности организма] (PSS 7:314–15). This 
principle in Pasternak’s world is so long-standing that it still resonated in Doctor Zhivago when 
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this regard with that of Hume, who claims that ideas are merely pale copies of 
impressions (Treatise 1.1.1; 2000, 7).
 It is equally clear that in bypassing the imagery of light, Pasternak dis-
tances himself from the Platonic theory of mimesis. If in Plato’s understanding 
of art as a reflection three times removed from reality, “the concave becomes 
convex, owing to the illusion about colors” as well as “[to] the art of conjuring 
and of deceiving by light and shadow” (Republic X, 602c8–d3; 1930, 827), then 
the unnamed power that in Pasternak’s writings unearths the living energy 
of materiality cannot be discerned with the force of light, and in this it dif-
fers from all other ideas and aspects of consciousness [oстальные стороны 
сознанья]:
Actually, only this power needs the language of material proofs. The other 
aspects of consciousness are durable without this need for proof. For them 
there is the direct path to the visual analogies of light: to number, precise con-
cept, and idea. But there is nothing except the mobile or dynamic language 
of images, that is, the language of attendant attributes, for power to express 
itself by, the fact of power, power durable only at the moment of its mani-
festation. (CSP 55; trans. altered; emphasis added).
Собственно, только сила и нуждается в языке вещественных дока-
зательств. Остальные стороны сознанья долговечны без замет. У 
них прямая дорога к воззрительным аналогиям света: к числу, к точ-
ному понятью, к идее. Но ничем, кроме движущегося языка образов, 
то есть языка сопроводительных признаков, не выразить себя силе, 
факту силы, силе, деятельной лишь в момент явленья. (PSS 3:187)
In short, although the force of poetry may be measured alongside the potency 
of sun, poetic power is an independent energy source. And when measured 
against feelings or passions, this power is found to be both wider and stronger 
than any of these other forces:
When we suppose that a strong passion is depicted in Tristan, Romeo and 
Juliet and other masterpieces, we undervalue these works’ content. Their 
theme is wider than this forceful theme; their theme is the theme of power. 
(CSP 54)
Yuri in Varykino “made a note reaffirming his belief that [ .  .  . ] form is a key to organic life, 
since no living thing can exist without it” [снова проверил и отметил, что [ . . . ] форма же 
есть органический ключ существования, формой должно владеть все живущее, чтобы 
существовать (Zhivago 454; PSS 4:452). 
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Когда мы воображаем, будто в Тристане, Ромео и Юлии и других 
памятниках изображается сильная страсть, мы недооцениваем 
содержанья. Их тема шире, чем эта сильная тема. Тема их—тема 
силы. (PSS 3:186)
These famous passages of Safe Conduct are interpreted by critics as the central 
aesthetic statement of the early Pasternak.14 What has been centrally over-
looked, however, is not only Pasternak’s reliance in this regard upon the ideal-
istic tradition that springs from Plato;15 but the significance and consistency of 
the contrasts to the light force in early Pasternak are also underemphasized by 
Pasternak scholars, and as a result a major direction of his thought and image 
construction is altogether ignored.
 How far-reaching, then, is Pasternak’s opposition to the tradition of light 
metaphysics (and physics) in his writing? Traces can be found in a significant 
number of passages; they appear even in Pasternak’s attempt (in what became 
the unfinished and unpublished Afterword to Safe Conduct) to explain to 
Rilke the difficulty of his personal life. Speaking with the conviction that Rilke 
would grasp the full seriousness of his predicament, Pasternak juxtaposes the 
beauty of the two women in his life by noting that one needs the illumination 
of light or of happiness to be beautiful, while the other is herself simply a force 
that, independent of sunshine, radically affects the world. This second type 
of beauty is excavated from the deepest layers of earth and in its very stony 
materiality needs little from the world itself, whereas the world cannot exist 
without it:
A smile rounded the chin of a young woman painter, pouring out its light 
into her cheeks and eyes. [ . . . ] And since she always needed this illumina-
tion in order to be beautiful, she needed happiness to be admired.
 You would say that all faces share in this. Untrue—for I know others. 
I know a face that pierces and cuts both in grief and joy, and it becomes all 
the more beautiful in conditions destructive to the beauty of everyone else. 
Whether this woman flies upward or falls headlong, nothing affects her 
fearsome charm, and she needs less from the earth than the earth needs 
from her because she is femininity herself, taken out entire like a rough 
mountain crag out of the stony mines of creation.
 14. Livingstone (2006b); MacKinnon (1988); de Mallac (1981, 340–42).
 15. See here Stepun (1962, 48–49). Soviet critics were predictable in their reaction to Safe 
Conduct; immediately after its publication they accused Pasternak of counter-revolutionary 
“idealism” (PSSCom 3:523). 
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Улыбка колобком округляла подбородок молодой художницы, зали-
вая ей светом щеки и глаза. [ . . . ] И так как она всегда нуждалась 
в этом освещеньи, чтобы быть прекрасной, то ей требовалось сча-
стье, чтобы нравиться.
 Скажут, что таковы все лица. Напрасно,—я знаю другие. Я знаю 
лицо, которое равно разит и режет и в горе и в радости и стано-
вится тем прекрасней, чем чаще застаешь его в положеньях, в кото-
рых потухла бы другая красота. Взвивается ли эта женщина вверх, 
летит ли вниз головою; ее пугающему обаянью ничего не делается, и 
ей нужно что бы то ни было на земле гораздо меньше, чем она сама 
нужна земле, потому что это сама женственность, грубым куском 
небьющейся гордости целиком вынутая из каменоломен творе-
нья. (PSS 3:522–23)
In other words, the major emphasis on the dynamic power of the yet unnamed 
force, independent from sunlight, is undeniable, and although the theme of 
competition with the sun emerges in the final draft of Safe Conduct only in the 
context of the birth of poetry, one finds the notion of ideas as self-subsistent 
energetic centers in Pasternak’s numerous student notes on Plato.
3.2 “I have dug into idealism to its very foundation”
Pasternak’s initial plans in Marburg were to work on his dissertation enti-
tled “The laws of thought and the dynamism of the material object.” While 
the plans for his dissertation were abruptly abandoned (E. B. Pasternak 1997, 
144), his notes on Plato, written throughout his philosophical training, point 
to this very specific interest in the energy of ideas or forms and the parallel 
discovery of living energy in the surrounding world.
 The young Pasternak’s reading of Plato is concerned almost exclusively with 
the dynamism and power of ideas—the energizing nature of intelligible reality 
and its empowering of material objects. Already in 1909–10, while studying 
with L. M. Lopatin, Pasternak summarizes the latter’s understanding of Plato’s 
ideas as an energy flow: the idea of the good, for instance, is the most “mighty” 
source attracting material objects and supplying them with its own dynamism. 
The word—тяга or “pull”—exercised over material objects, set out in these 
notes, already looks forward to the “pull” of artistic language in Safe Conduct:
The power and durability of the idea is directly proportionate to its capac-
ity. [ . . . ] The highest, all-embracing idea = the idea of the good, beatitude  
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= highest living substance, with intellect and creativity, pulling others 
towards itself.
Мощность и жизненность идеи прямо пропoрциональны ее объему. 
[  .  .  .  ] Верховная, всеобъемлющая идея = идея добра, благости = 
высшее существо, обладающее разумом и творчеством, притягиваю-
щее к себе. (Lehrjahre I:356; emphasis added)
There is a striking consistency in Pasternak’s understanding that the idea of 
the “good” cannot be abstract or general; ideas or forms, in contrast to “prin-
ciples,” are living, dynamic spiritual centers:
But ideas are alive spiritual centers. The relationship between things and 
ideas is directly opposed to the relationship between things and intellec-
tual principles. Great dynamic power. [ . . . ] Idea as an ideal not abstractly 
generated by the mind, but possessing full reality. The ideal as the highest 
force, attracting objects to itself.
Но идеи – живые духовн<ые> центры. Отн<ошение> между 
вещ<ами> и идеями обратно тому, что между делами и поняти-
ями. Мощность. [  .  .  . ] Идея как идеал, не отвлеченно порожда-
емый рассудком, а имеющий полную действительность. Идеал 
к<а>к верховн<ая> сила, притягивающая вещи к себе. (Lehrjahre 
I:356–67)
This emphasis (a position directly opposed to Hume) predates Marburg, 
and Pasternak’s notes on Cohen prior to his trip indicate his awareness of 
the application of Plato’s dynamism of ideas to Neo-Kantianism. In study-
ing Cohen’s thoughts on Plato, Pasternak carefully captures the transition in 
which the intelligible potency of thought is fused with Hegel’s spirit, and even 
more so with Kant’s a priori principles underlying apperception:
Cohen studies the apriori, reforming element of this spirit, which in a 
new way applies and enacts apperception upon the aposteriori material of  
science.
Cohen исследует априoрный, реформирующий элемент этого духа, 
который по-новому апперцепировал апостериори материал науки. 
(Lehrjahre I:393–94)
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His first letters from Germany indicate that he viewed Cohen’s school as a 
direct offspring of the Platonic academy and Cohen himself as the insightful 
reader par excellence of Platonic philosophy, capable of experiencing a living 
energy of Plato’s thought when all the preceding schools were simply filled 
with the silent and deadening “stuff of ideas”:
It is strange and terrifying to understand that, after Plato, the next crowd, 
armed for the whole world and for centuries ahead, is this smoked audi-
torium and this eccentric, confusing, and inspiringly clear old man, who 
himself shakes from this startling surprise, from this shocking miracle that 
history was not understood before him, and that all these centuries, stuffed 
so tightly with lives, with myriads of consciousness and myriads of ideas, 
are so uninterestingly mute precisely in the places where he is struck by 
clarity.
Странно и жутко сознавать, что следующей, за Платоном, сваей, 
вооруженной всемирно на все века, оказывается вот эта заколчен-
ная аудитория и этот чудной, запутанный и вдохновенно ясный 
старик, который дрожит и сам от потрясающего изумления, от 
того поразительного чуда, что история была понята до него, что 
эти века, туго набитые жизнями, мириадами сознаний, мириадами 
мыслей, так тускло молчат, именно там, где его осеняет ясностью. 
(PSS 7:93)
Pasternak’s notes on Cohen’s Aesthetics indicate his further engagement with 
the vitality and dynamism of material reality, energized by substance, that is, 
by the highest vitality of ideas.16 At which point the study of ideas capable of 
transforming material reality disclosed itself as simply a “safe profession” is 
unclear, but by the time Pasternak was thinking of joining Cassirer in Berlin, 
the decision to leave philosophy was expeditiously maturing, and as philoso-
phy was losing its luster, art was promising the real grandeur of working with 
the dynamism of thoughts, which could uncover a parallel vitality of material 
reality. In his letter to Shtikh of July 11, 1912, Pasternak noted both his deep 
engagement with the power of thought “as the category of the dynamic object” 
 16. As the poet’s studies in Marburg expand, a new theme is introduced as if in medias res: 
the dynamic power characteristic not merely of substantive ideas, but of hallucination, ideas as 
obsessions, and also of “a singular poetry,” the poetry of an object signifying not so much the 
necessity of its transition into a higher status, but rather “indicating its readiness for this transi-
tion” (Lehrjahre II:118–19).
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and his irrevocable and unconditional decision to leave philosophy in favor 
of art:
I have dug into idealism to its very foundation. I have started work on the 
laws of thought as the category of a dynamic material object. This is one of 
the attractive logical themes that can pass for a harmless narcotic. But I do 
not want the harmless. O God, how successful is this trip to Marburg. But 
I dropped it all; art—and nothing else. 
Я докопался в идеализме до основания. У меня начаты работы о 
законах мышления как о категории динамического предмета. Эта 
одна из притегательных логических тем, которые иногда могут 
сойти за безобидный наркотик. Но безобидности я не хочу. Боже, 
как успешна эта поездка в Марбург. Но я бросаю все;—искусство и 
больше ничего. (PSS 7:122; emphasis added)
The transition from philosophy to art was by no means without unexpected 
twists. In presenting his 1913 lecture “Symbolism and Immortality” to “Mus-
aget,” a text where a great number of philosophical postulations was applied to 
poetics, Pasternak all but silenced the group’s members by his intense philo-
sophical language.
 It is equally noteworthy that in “Symbolism and Immortality” his highest 
expectations for art were formulated as follows: art was a living repository of 
the dynamism of ideas alongside transformed material reality. From his sur-
viving “theses” of the lecture and his later recollection of the occasion in Sketch 
for an Autobiography [Автобиографический очерк], Pasternak’s abandoned 
dissertation topic, “the laws of thought as the category of a dynamic material 
object,” reappears—this time as the qualitative essence of material reality that 
cannot be perceived, except by living thought or the meditative perception of 
the artist. Artists, he claims, leave their imprint of subjectivity as they observe, 
armed only with their subjective search, the actual shifts in reality that nec-
essarily emerge in response to the authenticity of their quest. Furthermore, 
since art continues to testify to this shift of disclosure, the uncovering of qual-
ity rather than quantity in objects that constitute art, together with the artist’s 
subjective perception, is communicated to the audience: the artist, with his 
vision freed from accidental historical features, enters eternity, gains immor-
tality, testifying in his very engagement to the process he experiences:
Qualities are enveloped by consciousness, which liberates them from con-
nection with personal life [. . . ]. Immortality takes possession of the con-
tents of the soul. Such a phase is the aesthetic phase.
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 [ . . . ] Thus immortality is the Poet, and the poet is never a being, but 
a condition for quality.
 [ . . . ] The reality accessible to personality permeated with the quest for 
the free subjectivity belonging to quality. Signs of this quest, issuing from 
reality itself and concentrated in it, are perceived by the poet as the signs 
of reality itself. The poet submits to the tendency [direction] of the quest, 
imitates it, and conducts himself as the objects around it. (MG 40–41)
Качества объяты сознанием, последнее освобождает качества от 
связи с личной жизнью [ . . . ]. Бессмертие овладевает содержанием 
души. Такой фазис есть фазис эстетический.
 [ . . . ] Итак, бессмертие есть Поэт, и поэт никогда не существо, а 
условие для качества.
 [ . . . ] Действительность, доступная личности, проникнута пои-
сками свободной субъективности, принадлежащей качеству. При-
знаки этих исканий, исходящих от самой действительности и в ней 
же сосредоточенных, воспринимаются поэтом как признаки самой 
действительности. Поэт покоряется направлению поисков, перени-
мает их и ведет себя как предметы вокруг. Это называют наблюда-
тельностью и письмом с натуры. (PSS 5:318)
In this equating of the dynamism of ideas with the contemplative perception 
of the artist, there is not a trace of the “sunless” theme which, one should note, 
cannot be said as easily about “The Mark of Apelles.”
 This puzzling story opens as Heinrich Heine, assisted by “a whole horde 
of leaning sunsets and leaning shadows” (CSP 101; PSS 3:6), enters altogether 
ahistorically the busy streets of Pisa. This mysterious wanderer opens the doors 
of the hotel just as the sun’s rays are “slaughtered,” reflecting in this a much 
more complex intellectual context than the competition between Pasternak 
and Vladimir Mayakovsky, or the portrait of the Romantic hero, embodying 
a metaphoric approach, opposed to the quieter “passive” metonymic artistic 
type, Emilio Relinquimini.17 Employing the somewhat tortuous phraseology 
 17. The interpretations and discussions surrounding “The Mark of Apelles” tend to reflect 
Jakobson’s distinction between metaphor and metonymy, an opposition that has been recast 
by Aucouturier (1969) as a contrast between a Romantic hero, Heinrich Heine, and a quieter 
“passive” artistic type, Emilio Relinquimini. In this context, the story becomes a competition 
between two artistic types, or, in the words of Lazar Fleishman, about Pasternak’s reaction to 
Mayakovsky: “as Michel Aucoutier has convincingly shown, the content of the novella and its 
hero, Heine, are indissolubly linked with Pasternak’s reflections about the theatrical nature of 
the poet and the theatrical essence of poetry, as well as with two conceptions of art offered in 
most complete form in 1931 in Safe Conduct. There one poet’s outwardly passive mode of be-
havior (often characteristic of Pasternak) is contrasted to another type of poet: one who never 
leaves the stage [ . . . ] Vladimir Mayakovsky” (Fleishman 1990a, 77–78). It is amusing, however, 
that critics, having accepted this interpretation, on occasion mix up who is who, and Hingley, 
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of Pasternak in “The Black Goblet,” one may suggest that the Heine of this 
story is “the apriorist of lyricism,” emerging out of the “coffres volants” of cul-
tural wealth (PSS 5:14) or, in the language of “Symbolism and Immortality,” “a 
living soul alienated from [historical] personality in favor of free subjectivity” 
(MG 41; PSS 5:318). If one prefers to adopt the language of Pasternak’s notes 
on Plato, Heine becomes a testimony to the power of immortal or atemporal 
human thought that continues to exert a vital influence over material reality. 
The topic of his abandoned dissertation—“the laws of thought and the cat-
egory of the dynamic object”—becomes then an organizing idea for a literary 
construction whose paradoxical design is illuminated further when Pasternak 
the philosopher continues to assist the critical understanding of Pasternak the 
prose writer.
3.3  The composition of “The Mark of Apelles” and  
its “vertical saturation”
Indifference to the philosophical Pasternak has meant that while so many 
of the modernist works of major Russian authors have continued to be reas-
sessed and discussed on both sides of the Atlantic, critical evaluations of “The 
Mark of Apelles” have remained frozen in time. Written in the spring of 1915, 
the story appeared in print only in 1918, that is, at a time when Russia was 
already a new country, demanding new themes and allegiances. The archival 
data, pointing to the editors’ reluctance to publish this work, foreshadows the 
puzzling absence of subsequent critical engagement. After rejections from 
several more or less traditional journals in 1915,18 Pasternak offered the story 
to Bobrov for the third volume of Tsentrifuga,19 and, in the accompanying 
letter of December 30, 1916, cautiously explained the technical challenges in 
the execution of the narrative, while disclosing very little else about the goals 
of this execution, which “directed a lot of energy to the vertical saturations” 
[вертикальные насыщения] of the plot:
In its technical aspects, “Apelles” is not at the height of modernity [ . . . ]. 
But the story is written with excitement and upsurge. Perhaps, an excessive 
technical intensity due to my lack of skillfulness, excludes the enthusiastic 
for instance, speaks of “Relinquimini-Mayakovsky” and “Heine-Pasternak” (1983, 44). 
 18. The story was “successively rejected” by Sovremennik, Gorky’s Letopis, Russkaya Mysl, 
and eventually Bobrov’s Tsentrifuga. Barnes (1989, 193–94).
 19. For the complex history of Pasternak’s relationship with Tsentrifuga, see Fleishman 
(1990a, 79–83).
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upsurge in narrative, directing a lot of energy to the vertical saturations 
and leaving little for the horizontal speediness of movement.
По технике «Апеллес» не на высоте современности [ . . . ]. Но напи-
сана была вещь с увлечением и подъемом. [ . . . ] Может быть, сугубая 
техничность, по моей неумелости, подъем изложения исключает, 
отымая много сил на вертикальные насыщения и для горизонталь-
ной стремительности их не оставляя. (PSS 7:299)
In the same letter to Bobrov, he also admitted that after “Apelles” his technical 
experimentation had been far less successful:
One thing I can say to you. From the spring during which I wrote “Apelles,” 
I attempted more than once to take up prose, moving towards the focus on 
technique. And is it not because of this that my attempts are barren? That is 
why, in all justice, I cannot fully dismiss “The Mark of Apelles.”
Одно скажу тебе. С той весны, как я написал “Апеллеса,” я делал не 
одну попытку прозой заняться, клонясь в сторону техничности. И не 
в силу ли этого остались они бесплодны? Так что осудить совершенно 
“Апеллесову черту” я не мог по справедливости. (PSS 7:299–300)
Admitting the story’s deficiencies, therefore, Pasternak continued to consider 
his efforts in writing it worthwhile.
 His readers tend to disagree,20 and the story remains as puzzling today as 
it must have appeared to its original reluctant readers and publishers. Cer-
tain aspects of the story, of course, are fairly straightforward. It is clear, for 
example, that the competition between the two rivals organizes the story’s 
plot and signifies a “parabolic statement on the nature of art” (Barnes 1989, 
195), and yet “it has been difficult,” as Fleishman aptly points out, “to estab-
lish what it is that makes the types opposite” rather than the fact that “the 
juxtaposition as such is more important than what is being counter-posed” 
(Fleishman 1990a, 77).21 What cannot be questioned are the following facts: 
the story’s epigraph, a fictional account of the competition between two seem-
ingly legendary rivals, Apelles and Zeuxis, directs the story’s events. Emilio 
Relinquimini, who wrote the famous poem “Il Sangue,” signs his work with a 
 20. See Levi: “The Apelles Mark is no more than a clever exercise, something less than a 
detective novel though more densely and intensely written” (1990, 106).
 21. On the whole, Fleishman accepts Aucouturier’s interpretation of the story as reflecting 
Mayakovsky-Pasternak completion and Pasternak’s farewell to Romanticism (1990a, 77–78).
94 | Chapter 3
drop of blood and invites the Westphalian traveler, Heinrich Heine, to give a 
definition of love, by providing “an Apelles-style proof of identity” and ensur-
ing his “membership in the aristocracy of blood and spirit” [Апеллесово удо-
стоверение личности [  .  .  .  ] принадлежность к аристократии крови 
и духа] (CSP 102; PSS 3:7). Having accepted Relinquimini’s challenge (and 
Relinquimini indicates in the letter that he is the story’s Zeuxis22 [CSP 102; 
PSS 3:7]), Heine travels to Ferrara and arranges a meeting with Relinquimini’s 
love, Camilla Ardenze, by claiming in an advertisement placed in the Ferrara 
newspaper that he possesses Relinquimini’s lost notebook and is ready to give 
it to an interested party. After she answers the advertisement, Camilla finds 
Heine irresistible, and Heine, in turn, catches her passion. The contest, then, 
seems to have been won by Heine outright: Relinquimini’s wager, a drop of 
blood, is defeated by Heine’s act of seduction—the mark of Apelles—and yet 
his triumph is somewhat obscured by the abruptness of the story’s ending. As 
Heine switches off the light, either he, or Camilla, or both lovers are enveloped 
by darkness. Despite all the difficulty of finding a publisher, Pasternak never 
corrected the uncertainty of this ending—a fact significant in itself.
 Equally noteworthy, just as Fleishman indicated, is the difficulty of locat-
ing the exact nature of the competition or what is actually being “counter-
posed” (1990a, 77). Here, I believe, the simple fact that Pasternak was brought 
up in the family of an artist must have played a decisive role, for literary critics 
tend to overlook the legendary account of Zeuxis, repeated, as is often empha-
sized, “ad nauseam,” by lovers of the art of painting (Marvin 2008, 50). Thus, 
according to the ancient legend (as well as to the famous painting by François 
André Vincent [1746–1816] exhibited in the Louvre), Zeuxis, when asked to 
paint the portrait of the most beautiful woman, Helen of Troy, worked from 
nature and brought together the most perfect features of five beautiful women 
to make one startling ideal. One may also note the rather famous story of 
German artist Anton Raphael Mengs (1728–1779) who loved to compare the 
paintings of Zeuxis and Apelles and chose Apelles for the vivacity of his col-
ors—the hues of his palette (Marvin 2008, 126). Pasternak, who must have 
been aware of these accounts (and who thought that his readers would also 
have known these facts), clearly gives his own twist to the competition, and yet 
 22. There is a textual suggestion that Relinquimini assumes the role of Zeuxis when he 
challenges Heine to provide an Apelles-like definition of passion: “You must define it no less 
succinctly than the mark of Apelles. Remember, Zeuxis is merely curious about your member-
ship in the aristocracy of blood and spirit” [скажите о ней так, чтобы очерк ваш не пре-
вышал лаконизма черты Апеллесовой. [  .  .  .  ] вот о чем единственно любопытствует 
Зевксис] (CSP 102; PSS 3:7). However, the instability of the story makes such a careful reader 
as Barnes insist that Apelles is Relinquimini, and Zeuxis is Heine (1989, 194). 
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it is clear that his winner does not assemble parts, but rather transforms what 
is assembled—not by the materiality of colors and hues, but by his presence, 
his energy, and, course, the intensity of his meditative glance, all of which dis-
appear before the light of the sun. 
 The ending, then, sets up a puzzle for the story’s interpreter, and any 
successful reading must be able to explain it. No such reading of the story 
has as yet surfaced, but if one еrases the imaginary wall between Pasternak’s 
thoughts about philosophy and his plans for his art, there emerges an intrigu-
ing pathway to an altogether novel interpretation. It relies on the truthful-
ness of Pasternak’s words to Shtikh that the trip to Marburg and its emerging 
focus on the dynamism of the objects and the energy of thought amounted 
to a real intellectual breakthrough: “O God! How successful was this trip to 
Marburg. [ . . . ] Art—and nothing else” (PSS 7:122). No longer fettered by the 
methodology of philosophical arguments, Pasternak was then free to bring 
together within his fiction such diverse principles as the highest potency of 
ideas and the living idea or ideal of the poet around whom all material objects 
shifted, moved, refused to stay in place. Introducing his mysterious Heine 
into the narrative,23 Pasternak was able, therefore, to demonstrate—within an 
altogether new medium of expression—how the “great dynamic power [ . . . ] 
attracting objects to itself ” (Lehrjahre I:356–67) could escape any single encir-
cling explanation and generate a work of art where no identity can remain 
static. Either coming ahistorically, therefore, into Pisa or emerging from the 
pages of the book whose author remains unknown,24 Heine in Pasternak’s 
story was able to teach Relinquimini, a man of flesh and blood and an aspiring 
writer, what it meant to fuse “blood and spirit” and leave behind “a sign [ . . . ] 
which has since become a byword for artistry”—to make the world unrecog-
nizable and to claim the love of what is most precious (CSP 101; PSS 3:7).
 23. Ljunggren speaks of “The Mark of Apelles” as a “kaleidoscope of citations from the 
fragments about Reliquimini” inserted in the words of Heine (1984, 81). For the transition 
from the first prosaic sketches with Reliquimini as a protagonist to “The Mark of Apelles” with 
its contest between Relinquimini and Heine, see Fleishman (1990a, 77). See also Gorelik (2000, 
38–43).
 24. For instance, it is just possible that Heinrich Heine and Camilla Ardenze are Enrico 
and Rondolfina, the fictional characters who emerge from Relinquimini’s manuscript (or his 
fictional lost notebook) and discover their life when Heine tears off one page (CSP 102; PSS 
3:7). The lovers then, one after another, come to life after Relinquimini gives Heine his own 
“visiting card,” a drop of his blood, for on later occasions they do address each other as Enrico 
and Rondolfina. Such a reading, however partial, indicates the disappearing line between the 
so-called real life and fiction, and this is further supported by the fact that Relinquimini’s name 
offers a slight variation upon Pasternak’s youthful pen-name. However, since the name of the 
author of “Enrico and Rondolfina” remains unclear, any explanation would remain preliminary 
and ready to “shift.”
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 This textual mise-en-abyme, permitting only tangential interpretations in 
a narrative caught in motion, explains the textual confusions, a pattern that 
begins with the identity of Apelles’ mark (or line),25 especially when the sto-
ry’s epigraph is coordinated with its title. According to the epigraph’s pseudo-
legend,26 Apelles’ mark (or his line) provokes Zeuxis’ response. In “The Mark 
of Apelles,” however, it is Heine who answers the challenge of Relinquimini, 
which makes him Zeuxis,27 a role already claimed by Relinquimini. Thus, the 
oscillating correspondence between Pasternak’s protagonists and the heroes of 
the legend, of which there is no record, is intentionally imprecise; it shifts, like 
every other aspect of the story, around its fictional poets. If Heine is Enrico of 
Relinquimini’s manuscript, Heine’s victory suggests, by implication, Relinqui-
mini’s success, for Relinquimini, like any writer who makes his characters live, 
needs to remain overshadowed by them. The story’s seemingly straightfor-
ward plot and its intentionally confusing epigraph are, thus, not intended in 
any way to dispel the mystery of Heinrich Heine, who, apart from being con-
nected to “Enrico” of the torn manuscript, is often viewed by critics as either 
“a resurrected Heine [ . . . ] now making a second Journey to Italy”28 (Barnes 
1989, 195), or having “no relation to the real Heine” (Fleishman 1990a, 79), or 
“crudely identifiable with Pasternak himself ” lacking “any obvious connection 
with his German namesake” (Hingley 1983, 44). The plot of the story should 
make any such absolute judgments impossible, and, indeed, in the case of 
Heine there are subtle indications that he reclaims not only the role of Enrico, 
but also the actual identity of the German poet. This important claim shifts in 
and out of focus: it is intentionally lost (or hidden) in the one-sided but sug-
gestive telephone conversation with an enraged newspaper editor who, on the 
final page of the story, insists on knowing the name of the traveler and hears 
the following in response:
“I cannot think of any objection today. Heinrich Heine.”
[ . . . ]
 “That’s right.”
 25. The English translation of “Apellesova cherta” as “The Mark of Apelles” neutralizes the 
importance of lines and boundaries for Pasternak (see particularly Gorelik 2000, 17–26) and 
negates altogether the suggestion of the line in the title as “the tenuous borderline dividing art 
from life” (Fleishman 1990a, 78).
 26. Although there are no accounts of the legend mentioned in the story’s epigraph (PSS-
Com 3:539), artists tend to compare the techniques of these painters (Marvin 2008, 126). 
 27. See here Barnes (1989, 194) for an opposite interpretation.
 28. Mossman suggests Heinrich Heine’s “Florentine Nights” as a possible source for the 
story (1972, 288).
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[ . . . ]
 “Very flattering to hear it.” (CSP 117–18)




Очень лестно слушать. (PSS 3:24)
And in all circumstances, even if Heine wins the competition (and he does 
win the heart of the beautiful Camilla) and appears to claim for himself the 
name of the great poet, his triumph is given the strangest climax when in the 
final lines of the story the electric lights are switched off . . . unless the time-
lessness of the traveler proves “the patency [evident force] of a power that 
outweighs the evidential nature of light” [очевидность силы, перевешива-
ющую очевидность света] (CSP 54; PSS 3:186).
 Indeed, the light–darkness contrast, characteristic of Pasternak’s view 
of art as an energy, is employed in “Apelles” as a significant part of its con-
struction, and Heine’s capacity to upset the orderly everyday routine does 
not minimize the fact that his appearances in the story are coordinated 
painstakingly with the approaching darkness. This consistent use of dark-
ness and shadows, as well as the underlying philosophical echoes of the 
story, suggests that the connection to Plato’s theme of the cave should not be 
overlooked, even if in order to demonstrate these themes, it is necessary to 
re-examine the narrative patterns of the story. Barnes, one of the very few 
of Pasternak’s critics who has paid attention to the spectacular sunset of the 
story’s first paragraph, emphasizes the scene’s chronological discrepancy. 
Pasternak alludes to the September evening and yet dates the occasion as 
August 23:
On one of those September evenings when the Leaning Tower directs 
a whole horde of leaning sunsets and leaning shadows in an assault on 
Pisa and across the whole of Tuscany a nagging evening breeze carries the 
aroma of bay leaf rubbed between the fingers—on an evening such as this, 
why I remember the exact day perfectly well, it was the evening of August 
23 [ . . . ]. (CSP 101; emphasis added)
В один из сентябрьских вечеров, когда пизанская косая башня ведет 
целое войско косых зарев и косых теней приступом на Пизу, когда 
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от всей вечерним ветром раззуженой Тосканы пахнет, как от потер-
того меж пальцев лаврового листа, в один из таких вечеров,—ба, да 
я ведь точно помню число то: 23 августа, вечером [. . .]. (PSS 3:6)
Barnes explains the discrepancy as a singular personal note: the sunset in 
question refers to Pasternak’s reminiscences of his own “1912 August trip to 
Italy” (1989, 194). However, this chronological discrepancy, reinforced by all 
other shifts of the realistic details of the story, may have another purpose—the 
intensification of the battle between the actual reality of Pisa during daylight 
and the poetic world, mindful that “immortality is the Poet” (MG 41), has 
descended upon the town in darkness.
 From the opening paragraph, then, this opposition between the mate-
rial and the poetic is developed by Pasternak as a dramatic battle: upon the 
disappearance of the sun, the peaceful setting of everyday reality is violently 
attacked by the sharpness of the growing shadows, and the scene is further 
unbalanced by the piercing smell of crushed bay leaves. The evening in ques-
tion is so overwhelming for the senses that chronological time is thrown off 
its regular run (hence the chronological discrepancy observed by Christopher 
Barnes) and unbalanced further not only by a spectacular sunset, but by an 
intensification of the battle between the bleeding sun (the rose color of the sky 
at sunset) and dark shadows at the very moment when Heine arrives at the 
hotel that has been just abandoned by Relinquimini:
The sun’s last rays crept across the piazzas like partisans. Some streets were 
crammed with toppled shadows, while elsewhere there was hand-to-hand 
combat in the narrow alleyways. The Leaning Tower of Pisa tilted back-
wards, flailing wildly and indiscriminately, until a giant stray shadow passed 
across the face of the sun. . . . Day snapped off short.
 As he briskly and disjointedly informs Heine about the recent visit, 
the hotel footman managed to hand the impatient guest the card, with its 
brown congealed blotch a few instances before the sun finally set. (CSP 102; 
emphasis added)
Зарева, как партизаны, ползли по площадям. Улицы запружались 
опрокинутыми тенями, иные еще рубились в тесных проходах. 
Пизанская башня косила наотмашь, без разбору, пока одна шальная 
исполинская тень не прошлась по солнцу. . . . День оборвался.
 Но лакей, вкратце и сбивчиво осведомляя Гейне о недавнем 
посещении, все же успел за несколько мнгновений до полного 
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захода солнца вручить нетерпеливому постояльцу карточку с побу-
ревшим, запекшимся пятном. (PSS 3:6–7)
The contest is not so much between people or colors as between the sunlight 
and the creeping shadows, directed by the Leaning Tower of Pisa, itself an 
illusion of continuous fall, an oscillation arrested at a standstill. Relinquimini 
leaves his challenge to Heine with the footman while the sun’s ascendancy 
is still holding and the hope for victory is not yet abandoned: “the sun’s last 
rays crept across the piazzas like partisans.” However, as Relinquimini’s blood-
stained visiting card is taken up by the footman, the world shifts: “the Leaning 
Tower of Pisa tilted backwards” or took aim with all its strength [косила наот-
машь, без разбору], “flailing wildly and indiscriminately, until a giant stray 
shadow passed across the face the sun [  .  .  .  ] [and] Day snapped off short” 
[день оборвался] (CSP 102; PSS 3:6). Even then, according to the text, day-
light does not accept its defeat: Relinquimini’s challenge is handed to Heine 
while the last ray still lingers, that is, in the few instants after sunset: “the 
hotel footman managed to hand the impatient guest the card, with its brown 
concealed blotch a few instances before the sun finally set” (CSP 102: PSS 3:7).
 After such an opening, with Heine linked directly to “the giant stray 
shadow [that] passed across the face of the sun” (CSP 102; PSS 3:6), Pasternak’s 
central technical challenge is to ensure that Heine’s actions against Relinqui-
mini sustain the contrast, and that their duration is limited to the hours after 
sunset and before sunrise, so that the furious nature of the struggle will not 
be lost but developed. Indeed, this textual feature, while carefully veiled in the 
story, is painstakingly observed and even intensified within a precise chrono-
logical frame:
1.  Heine accepts the challenge as the sun sets in September, on August 23, 
and travels to Ferrara throughout the night.
2.  He travels to Ferrara through the night and rushes to the Voce’s office 
in the earliest hours of the morning before the paper goes to print. The 
text carefully indicates that during Heine’s arrival in Ferrara and his 
hurried visit to the editor, limited in time because of the publication 
deadline, the rays of the sun are still not above the horizon and veiled 
further by the fog: “Ferrara! An indigo-black, steely dawn. An aromatic 
mist [fog] suffused with chill” [Феррара! Иссиня черный, стальной 
рассвет. Холодом напоен душистый туман] (CSP 104; PSS 3:10). It 
is during this uncertain hour that Heine manages to have an advertise-
ment inserted about Relinquimini’s lost notebook.
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3.  As the morning of August 24 begins, Heine sleeps in the hotel, and 
his deep and restful sleep is ensured by the fact that the sun’s rays are 
firmly shut out of the room by shutters on the windows. As Heine 
rests, the sun’s rays reach only the floor, creating an illusory carpet 
woven of light and darkness. Signaling this time frame, the authorial 
voice promises that Heine will awaken just as the carpet disappears 
into the victorious darkness (in other words, after the disappearance 
of the rays), yet in the narrative the power of darkness is gradually 
outpouring from within the carpet’s intricate and constantly changing 
design. This illusory carpet—a play of light and shadows—also echoes 
the initial image of the sunset, the intense illusory conflict of rays and 
shadows surrounding the Leaning Tower. On the floor of Heine’s hotel 
room the rays of sunlight endanger Heine; they appear to ignite an 
illusory fire that is transmitted through the blinds, and this fire burns 
the woven shadows as if they are tightly packed straw that is slowly 
turning into a faded, discolored, worn-out rag. The darkness wins but 
at a price:
Venetian blinds in his room, warmed by the breath of the morn-
ing, have heated up [burn] just like the brass reeds of a mouth 
organ. By the window a bundle of sun rays falls on the floor like a 
strip of dilapidated rush matting. [ . . . ] An hour goes by. By now 
the rush matting, flowing across the floor in a pool of sunlight, is 
packed closer together. [ . . . ] Heine sleeps. The pool of sunlight 
contracts as if the parquet floor had soaked it up; then once again 
the scorched plaited straws of matting appear growing more rugged 
all the time. Heine sleeps on. [ . . . ] Hours go buy, drawing out 
just like the expanding black gaps in the matting. [ . . . ] The mat-
ting fades, dims, dusts over. By now it looks like a jute doormat, 
rampled and twisted. [ . . . ] Heine sleeps on. Any minute now he 
will wake up. (CSP 105–6; emphasis added)
Жалюзи в его номере, нагретые дыханием утра, горят, 
точно медные перепонки губной грамоники. У окошка сетка 
лучей упала на пол расползающейся соломенной плетен-
кой. [ .  .  . ] Проходит час. Соломинки уже плотно приле-
гают друг к другу, уже солнечною лужицей растекается по 
полу плетенка. [ . . . ] Гейне спит. Солнечная лужица раз-
жимается, словно пропитывается ею паркет. Снова это—
редеющая плетенка из подпаленых, плоящихся соломин. 
Arguing with the Sun in “The Mark of Apelles” | 101
Гейне спит. [ . . . ] Проходят часы. Они лениво вырастают 
вместе с ростом черных прорезей в плетенке. [ . . . ] Пле-
тенка вы цветает, пылится, тускнеет. Уже это—веревоч-
ный половик, свалявшийся, спутанный. [ . . . ] Гейне спит. 
Сейчас он проснется. (PSS 3:11)
4.  When the carpet disappears and the sunlight is overthrown, the heat of 
the late afternoon still manages to break the wheel of the barrow car-
rying newspapers outside Heine’s window. The forces of the sun are 
fighting for Relinquimini, attempting, vainly, so it seems, to prevent 
the circulation of the paper. As the newspapers are thrown from the 
cart, but not damaged, Heine wakes up. In the background there is the 
metallic sound of his readiness to enter combat. Once again the autho-
rial voice betrays the excitement of the fight. Aware that Heine’s plan 
is endangered during the day, the narrator of the story intensifies the 
expectation of a heated conflict:
Any minute now he will wake up. Any time now he will jump to 
his feet, mark my words. Any minute now. Just give him time to 
finish dreaming his last snatch of dream.
 A wheel that has dried up in the heat splits all the way to the 
hub [ . . . ]. The cart falls on its side [ . . . ]. Bales of newspaper 
spill out. A crowd, sunshades, shop windows, and sun blinds. The 
news dealer is carried off on the stretcher—there is a pharmacy 
quite close.
 There you are now! Heine sits bolt upright.  
 [ . . . ] There is almost a metallic clank as his right foot is low-
ered on the floor. (CSP 106)
Сейчас он проснется. Сейчас Гейне вскочит, помяните 
мое слово. Сейчас. Дайте ему только до конца доглядеть 
последний обрывок сновиденья. 
 От жара рассохшееся колесо раскалывется вдруг по 
самую ступицу [  .  .  .  ] тележка со стуком, с грохотом 
падает набок, кипы газет вываливаются. Толпа, парасоли, 
витрины, маркизы. Газетчика на носилках несут—аптека 
совсем поблизости.
 Вот видите! Что я говорил!—Гейне вскакивает.—Сейчас!
 [ . . . ] Чуть что не металлически брякнув, тяжело опу-
скается на пол правая нога. (PSS 3:11)
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5.  Heine’s love scenes with Camilla, who has been summoned by the 
newspaper advertisement, begin on the evening of August 24. Heine 
performs his magic seduction and falls in love at night, reversing chron-
ological time in Room 8, which now smells of spring. Once again, just 
before the sunrise, still in darkness, the lovers are awakened by a tele-
phone call that Heine answers outside his room, when he admits to the 
editor his lie about the discovered notebook, but claims for himself the 
name of the great German poet. Camilla comes out to join him in the 
hallway, still illuminated by the electricity of the corridor, which Heine 
then accidentally switches off, with the result that the lovers disappear 
in the darkness. The story, as already indicated, ends on this abrupt 
note, just as the hotel is about to be engulfed by sunrise:
Like an automaton, Heine turns off the light.
 “Do not put it out, Enrico”—the sound of a voice came from 
the depths and darkness of the corridor.
 “Camilla?!!” (CSP 119)
Гейне машинально повертывет выключатель.
——— Не туши, Энрико,—раздается в темноте из глубины 
коридора.
——— Камилла?!! (PSS 3:25)
6.  The lovers exist and act only when illuminated by the night, its darkness 
visible by a specific source of energy that exists outside or rather along-
side the world ruled by sunlight.
This dependence of the lovers’ existence on darkness leaves the question of 
final victory wide open; the lovers disappear into the night, and Relinquimini, 
by the implication of his name, will remain,29 assisted in his return by the 
morning sunlight.30
 29. Pasternak’s pen-name in 1910 was Reliquimini. Both in these early sketches and in 
“The Mark of Apelles” the two versions of the last names, Reliquimini and Relinquimini, are 
similar grammatical forms of different verbs. One of the best explanations of the transitions 
of meanings is found in Kagan (1996), which can be summarized as follows: “Reliquimini” 
comes from reliquor, relictus sum, reliquari—“to be in debt.” Relinquimini, possessing both 
the active and passive forms—relinquo, reliqui, relictum, relinquere—means “to leave behind.” 
“Reliquimini”—present tense, passive voice, second person plural, literally “you are in debt.” 
“Relinquimini” is also present tense, passive voice, second person plural, and means “you are 
left behind” (Kagan 1996, 43–50). 
 30. Fleishman observes, in fact, that the protagonists, while being “the antipodes on the 
level of the plot, actually prove to be doubles or transformations of the same essence” (1990a, 78).
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 As already pointed out, “The Mark of Apelles” was not the first Pasternak 
story to be built around a conflict between sun and darkness. The surviving 
notes of “Reliquimini,” written in 1910, suggest not only the overwhelming 
intensity of the darkness, but also the play of reflections and shadows “mov-
ing, like posies pinned on by street lamps” [движутся опадающие скопища 
и пучки, как бутоньерки, наколотые руками] (MG 18–19; PSS 3:420). 
Within these unfinished pages in this early sketch, Reliquimini dies in this 
setting, prefiguring in this, as Ljunggren observes, the death of Yuri Zhivago 
(1984, 81). Moreover, “The Mark of Apelles” was written shortly after Pas-
ternak’s lost fairy tale “The Tale of the Carp and Naphtalain” (dated to late 
1913–early1914). In Lydia Pasternak’s recollection, the subject of the tale that 
Pasternak described to Bobrov as “colorful, condensed and technical” (PSS 
7:299) was an explicit sun-night rivalry, with the sun eventually triumphing: 
“It had a juxtaposition of round, heated vulgarity and savageness, embodied 
in the Carp, alias the sun, alias the summer on the one hand, and the pale 
blue, cool silkiness, moonlit princeliness of Naphtalain on the other. I think 
the Carp finally stole the Prince’s regalia and killed him” (Barnes 1989, 193). 
“The Mark of Apelles” then follows upon an already visualized and established 
pattern, except for the fact that Reliquimini’s death and the Carp’s victory over 
the moonlit, blue, princely silkiness of Naftalene are problematized in “The 
Mark of Apelles”; Relinquimini challenges Heine just before the sun sets, but 
loses to him within 48 hours and just before daybreak. However, according to 
the meaning of Relinquimini’s name, Heine’s existence and ultimate victory 
are by no means final, for neither is tangible in the daylight.
 The story, then, is not about triumph or victory. In his search for the artis-
tic means to denote the force that pierces darkness in a manner comparable 
to the sun, Pasternak’s ultimate challenge was not only to create the sun–
shadow conflict and to ensure that his work registered the transformation of 
the surrounding reality—he must have aimed to develop these images further. 
It is clear, for instance, that Heine’s ability to bring disturbance and intoxica-
tion necessarily overlapped with the fashionable preoccupation of the age: 
the conflict of the Dionysian and Apollonian forces.31 The Dionysian forces 
surrounding Heine bring with them, initially at least, threatening chaos and 
an intensification of pressure, as one might expect from a good Futurist poet 
 31. Gorelik persuasively analyzes young Pasternak’s inevitable closeness (implied in 
Scriabin’s influence) to Nietzsche’s “superman” and Apollonian–Dionysian opposition (2000, 
8–9; 12) and his desire to develop his own artistic world-view (2000, 35). Nietzsche’s Apollo– 
Dionysus dichotomy, so popular among the circle of Viacheslav Ivanov, characterized the intel-
lectual context of the time, and yet it clarifies only partially the character of the early world of 
Pasternak. For the same reason, the revolutionary rhetoric of Futurists, although clearly impor-
tant here, may obscure the deeper layers of Pasternak’s thought.
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always ready to strike a Romantic pose (Aucouturier 1969), and these themes, 
most immediately apparent in the story, are not its only frame. There also 
operates a changing rhythmical pattern, drawn as a musical modulation. On 
the one hand, Pasternak’s Heine, alive in an atemporal Italy much later than 
the actual dates of the great German poet, is materialized within the narrative 
when the chronological sequence is broken. The city is subsumed and aston-
ished by shadows and odors, and shaken by wind and the smell of crushed 
bay leaves—clearly a Dionysian touch [когда от всей вечерним ветром раз-
зуженной Тосканы пахнет, как от потертого меж пальцев лаврового 
листа] (CSP 103; PSS 3:8). Heine’s hurried departure to Ferrara is similarly 
portrayed against a feverish landscape with its citizens cursing Cassiopeia.32 
The town itself, Pasternak emphasizes, is disintegrating into a multiplicity of 
motionless existences: “And in just the same way that the inert town was dis-
integrating [распадался] without objection into blocks, houses, and yards, 
so too the night air consisted of separate motionless encounters, exclama-
tions, quarrels”—until it reaches the “limit of human endurance” [так [ . . . ] 
положила [ .  .  . ] ночь предел человеческой выносливости] (CSP 103; 
PSS 3:8–9). On the other hand, however, it is just as the chaos reaches beyond 
the limit of what is possible that Pasternak frames the picture with a remark-
able line that arrests and transforms the chaos: “All this was beyond the limits 
of human endurance. It was possible to bear all of it” [Все это находилося 
за пределами человеческой выносливости. Все это можно было снести] 
(CSP 103; PSS 3:9).
 If Pasternak searches to describe the power of the force that brings about a 
“shift” in material objects, he clearly does not stop on the Dionysian note. His 
Heine controls and directs the flickering, shimmering, and sputtering reality 
that he awakens—in fact, this upheaval in the surrounding reality does not 
reach or change the graceful, bored elegance with which the traveling poet 
moves through space, as if through the still eye of the storm:
Chaos began right at this point, at this limit, an arm’s length away. The 
same chaos reigned at the railway station [ . . . ]. All this was beyond human 
endurance. It was possible to bear all of it. [ . . . ]
 A seat next to the window. A completely deserted platform made entirely 
of stone, of resonance [ . . . ].
 Heine is travelling on an off chance. There is no thought in his head. He 
tries to doze off. He closes his eyes. (CSP 103–4; emphasis added)
 32. The fact that Cassiopeia is a mythical figure who compared herself with the immortals, 
calling forth Poseidon’s wrath reflects this mixture of Dionysian-Romantic-Futurist “storm and 
stress” characteristics of the story’s atmosphere.
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Тут же, об этот предел рукой подать, начинался хаос. Такой хаос 
царил на вокзале. [ . . . ]
 Место у самого окна. В последний миг—совершенно пустой пер-
рон из цельного камня, из цельной гулкости [ . . . ].
 Гейне едет на авось. Думать ему не о чем. Гейне пытается 
вздремнуть. Он закрывает глаза. (PSS 3:9)
The same commanding stillness in the middle of chaotic intensity is rein-
troduced in the story at several key junctures, each time with a different 
level of intensity. In Ferrara, Heine sleeps (“dead, leaden sleep” [мертвым, 
свинцовым сном] [CSP 106; PSS 3:11]) while the city, closed off by the blinds, 
shimmers with so much life and heat that the carpet of shadows by his bed 
catches imaginary fire, loses its color, ages, and fades away, while outside the 
window the wheel of a cart with newspapers splits altogether. Both the lan-
guage of curses and speaking in tongues follows Heine in Pisa (“cursing with 
fervent fanaticism as if uttering a prayer” [CSP 103; PSS 3:8]) and in Ferr-
ara: “On the street people chatter, drowse; tongues wag” [на улице загова-
риваются, клюют носом, на улице заплетаются языки] (CSP 106; PSS 
3:11), but he himself remains unperturbed. Even when he has just enchanted 
Camilla, his kiss brings balance: “her body sings, extended, led on by the kiss, 
fettered by the kiss” [поет поцелуем влекомое, поцелуем взнузданное, 
вытянувшееся ее тело], even when the embrace is surrounded by “a string 
of Italian oaths, passionate, fanatical, as a liturgy” [Итальянская ругань, 
страстная, фанатическая, как молитвословие] (CSP 111; PSS 3:17).
 The inward intensity of stillness in the midst of an almost elemental chaos 
is, of course, also characteristic of the early Pasternak’s understanding of 
poetry; in the poems of 1913 he liked to use the double-entendre of the word 
“стих” ((1) to quiet things down; and (2) a poem)—to describe the birth of 
poetry. The poem comes into being both by awakening and quieting down 
elemental forces; this process is poetry as such:
And, loud you woke up and quieted down (stikhla)
And the dream, as the echo of the bell, was silent. (“Dream,” 1913)
Вдруг, громкая проснулась ты и стихла
И сон, как отзвук колокола, смолк. (Сон, PSS 1:64; 1913)
***
And everything was quiet, and, nonetheless,
In the dream I heard a cry, and it
As a likeness of silent sign
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Was still troubling the sky.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Now it is a poem (stikh). (“Venice,” 1913)
Все было тихо, и, однако,




Теперь он стих (Венеция, PSS 1:68; 1913)
***
This means—in truth the sea is excited
And it settles into quiet (stikhaet), not asking about the day. (“Winter”)
Значит—вправду волнуется море
И стихает, не справясь о дне. (“Зима,” PSS 1:69; 1913)
It is not merely stillness, however, that Pasternak wants to capture as the 
ultimate effect of the presence of Heine in Ferrara. The new energy, which 
emerges through stillness out of darkness and chaos, implies the gift or birth 
of a new vision, an apprenticeship in the act of a perception that synthesizes 
rather than breaks apart disunited phenomena, and, given the status of the 
artistic act, is viewed as a force which attracts rather than radiates light.
 This birth of new synthetic perception out of chaos,33—a study in apper-
ception, a transcendental principle inherited by Hermann Cohen from Kant 
(but never disclosed as а theme by Pasternak)—is, thus, dramatized as trans-
formative energy that emerges from the very depth of chaos (be it spatial, 
temporal or emotional) and is, in fact, the very mark of Apelles that the story 
conceals within its texture. The mark of true art, proof of which is demanded 
from Heine by Relinquimini, is precisely this: the birth of a new quality of 
vision in the midst of ecstatic experimentation and emotional chaos, and this 
vision, according to Pasternak, is both transitive and transformative, for it has 
to be experienced not by the poet, but by the poet’s other—the perceiver. The 
birth of the new in the other is Heine’s only hope, when he rushes instinctively 
to Ferrara in order to throw himself at the mercy of the totally unknown, as he 
bemusedly assesses the uncertainty of the situation that lies ahead:
“Something must surely come out of this. There is no sense, and in fact no 
 33. Pasternak’s development of Kant’s theory of apperception is discussed in Chapter 4.
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point, in trying to guess the outcome beforehand. Ahead lies beguiling, but 
total uncertainty.” [ . . . ]
 “Something must come out of this, I am certain.” [ . . . ]
 “The mark of Apelles [ . . . ] Rondolfina. In twenty-four hours I doubt 
whether you can achieve anything. But I do not have any longer.” (CSP 104)
“Что-нибудь да выйдет из этого. Наперед загадывать нет проку, да 
и возможности нет. Впреди—упоительная полная неизвестность.” 
[ . . . ]
 “Это—наверняка. Что-нибудь да выйдет.” [ . . . ]
 “Апеллесова черта [  .  .  .  ] Рондольфина.  За сутки, пожалуй, 
ничего не успеть. А больше нельзя.” (PSS 3:9–10)
The mark of Apelles is a quality of vision experienced not simply by Heine 
but by Camilla Ardenze: it must be not an autonomous self-directed glance, 
but a creative and shared perception that grasps and unveils the essence of the 
perceived.
 With all the puzzles of the narrative, Pasternak makes his Heine annunciate 
the identity of Apelles’ mark, a sure sign, in fact, that this philosophical theme 
is not fully integrated in the narrative. Thus, Heine’s compliment to Camilla on 
her capacity for seeing the essence of the situation as if in a flash sounds almost 
like a university lecture: “How perceptive you are! At one stroke, the mark 
of Apelles, you conveyed my whole essence, the whole crux of the situation” 
[Что за проницательность! Одною чертой, чертой Апеллеса, передать 
все мое существо, всю суть положения] (CSP 109; PSS 3:15). Moreover, the 
new gift is not a single mark or even a line, but a continuous energy flow that 
should not be arrested, and for this reason, Heine begs Camilla to continue, 
to draw the line of Apelles further, for that capacity of perception with which 
Camilla has been empowered is a flow that revitalizes what it touches:
You possess that vital vision. You have already mastered a line as unique as 
life itself, so don’t abandon it. Don’t break it off at me; extend it as far as it 
will allow. Take the line farther. [ . . . ]
 Have you made your line already? (CSP 110; trans. altered; emphasis 
added)
Но вы умеете глядеть так чудотворно. И уже овладели линией, 
единственной, как сама жизнь. Так не упускайте же, не обрывайте 
ее на мне, оттяните ее, насколько она сама это позволит. Ведите 
дальше эту черту. [ . . . ]
 Провели ли вы уже эту черту? (PSS 3:16)
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Whatever this line is, awakened anew it initiates a process akin to an electri-
cal current—a power force, rather than a light force. Even if Heine waited in 
“torment” for the force to ignite Camilla, his new vision, given to him by her 
glance, replaces the old coldness and theatricality: the flow of Apelles’ line 
becomes a wave, proceeding from chapter to chapter, uniting the two lovers 
through perception and moving beyond:
“Signora,” exclaims Heine melodramatically, falling at Camilla’s feet. [ . . . ] 
“Have you made your mark [drawn your line] already? [ . . . ] What tor-
ment!” he sighs in half-whisper, abruptly pulling his hands away from his 
pale face .  .  . and glancing up into the eyes of an increasingly confused 
Camilla Ardenze, notices to his utter amazement that . . . 
IV 
. . . that this woman is really attractive, almost unrecognizably beautiful, 
and that the beating of his own heart is like a rising tide gurgling in the 
wake of a boat. [ . . . ] The lazy lapping waves wash about her figure. [ . . . ] 
(CSP 110)
—Синьора,—театрально восклицает Гейне у ног Камиллы [ . . . ]—
провели ли вы уже ту черту? Что за мука!—полушепотом вздыхает 
он, отрывaет руки от внезапно побледневшего лица . . . и, взглянув 
в глаза все более и более теряющейся госпожи Арденце, к несказан-
ному изумлению своему замечает, что . . . 
IV
 . . . что эта женщина действительно прекрасна, что до неузнавае-
мости прекрасна она, что биение собственного его сердца, курлыча, 
как вода за кормой [ . . . ] и ленивыми, наслаивающимися волнами 
прокатывется по ее стану. [ . . . ] (PSS 3:16–17)
The mutuality of vital perception, igniting the other in a moment of trans-
formative contact, explains the name Heine’s beloved receives in the manu-
script: Rondolfina, a circle or cycle which ends in every new artistic instance 
(Rondo-l-fina) and yet has no end, an image perhaps suggested to Pasternak 
by Schubert’s cycle of songs written to the words of Heine’s poetry.34
 For all of these reasons, in assessing Pasternak’s Heine one can suggest a 
new direction of critical inquiry that presupposes an entanglement of multiple 
influences, both philosophical and artistic, and that points to an argument 
 34. Heine’s poem “Der Doppelgänger” (The Double) struck Schubert with its vision of a 
specter mocking a lover’s agony.
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not only with Kant’s understanding of apperceptions, but also with Plato’s idea 
of the good, of light and darkness, and particularly of the new role of the 
poet in the human community. Pasternak’s Heine appears at sunset, avoids 
sunlight, and knows that he is about to “vanish without trace” (CSP 104; PSS 
3:10), but even while embodying an accumulation of Romantic and Gothic 
imagery, this protagonist is definitely not a vampire who awakens at night and 
seduces women prone to art and poetry. The hero of “The Mark of Apelles” 
is conceived as a spirit “breaking out” from a layer of history with no begin-
ning or end, and he speaks for the energy flow of temporal and spatial dimen-
sions that are, in Kantian language, a priori, as he himself confides to Camilla: 
“There are such things as hours and eternities. A whole wealth of eternities 
exist, and not one of them has any beginning. At the first opportune moment 
they come bursting forth” [Существуют часы, существуют и вечности. Их 
множество, и ни у одной нет начала. При первом же удобном случае 
они вырываются наружу] (CSP 110; PSS 3:16). Conceived as a force located 
outside of time, this Heine35 is called not merely into reality, but to a stage or 
a space where the themes of darkness and light, hours and eternities acquire 
new and possibly prophetic significance for his author.
 In alluding to the darkness of the stage, Heine recaptures the absence of 
the sunlight associated with his presence in the story, but he also communi-
cates a more alarming sense of impending turmoil, stemming from “real life’s 
most dangerous places—bridges and crossings” (CSP 110; PSS 3:16). As the 
story seeks to portray the forces of inspiration at work, or the darkest “cross-
ings” of culture, Pasternak articulates a new theme—the danger surround-
ing these fermenting “living dynamic centers” of thought. So hidden is their 
essence and origin that humankind needs more light to discover their secret. 
This is at least how Heine justifies to Camilla the theatrical nature of his own 
language and images as he reintroduces the conflict of light and darkness that 
characterizes Pasternak’s story:
Yes, it’s the stage again. But why not let me stay a little in this pool of bright 
light? After all, it’s not my fault that in real life the most dangerous places—
bridges and crossings—are the most brightly lit. How harsh it is! Every-
thing else is sunk in gloom. On such a bridge, let us say a stage, a man 
flares up in the light of the flickering rays as if he had been put on show, 
 35. See Bykov’s summary of the interview with Evgenij Borisovich Pasternak, whose testi-
mony possibly reflects Pasternak’s own words about the novella, and are colored further by the 
habitual Mayakovsky–Pasternak comparison, though milder in tone. Here, in contrast to other 
critical readings, Pasternak’s son asserts that the hero of the story is Heine himself and that the 
love melodrama is a pure metaphoric fiction (2007, 118).
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surrounded by a railing against the backdrop of the town, of chasms and 
signal lights in the river bank [ . . . ]. (CSP 109–10)
Да, это снова подмостки. Но отчего бы и не позволить мне побыть 
немного в полосе полного освещения? Ведь я не виной тому, что в 
жизни сильнее всего освещаются опасные места: мосты и переходы. 
Какая резкость! Все остальное погружено вo мрак. На таком мосту, 
пускай это будут и подмостки, человек вспыхивает, озаренный тре-
вожными огнями, как будто его выставили всем напоказ, обнесши 
его перилами, панорамой города, пропастями и сигнальными реф-
лекторами набережных [ . . . ]. (PSS 3:16)
Heine’s musings, introduced into the text as if in the middle of idle chatter, 
happen to reflect not only the danger of darkness, but also the danger of a 
chase, for the poet in Heine’s speech is hunted down with searchlights and sur-
rounded with rails and fences as if in siege or a narrowing cage.
 It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that this image of the stage in “The Mark 
of Apelles” has been understood by critics (Aucouturier 1969) as akin to 
the artistic grimacing and showing off on the stage in “Some Propositions” 
[Несколько положений]—and opposed in this to a form of art that hides, 
according to the same passage, in darkness among spectators:
In our days it [art] has seen make-up and powder and the dressing room, 
and it is exhibited on the stage. [ .  .  . ] It is put on the show, whereas it 
should be hiding in the gallery, unrecognized, hardly aware that it cannot 
fail to give oneself away, and that when it hides in the corner it is stricken 
with translucency and phosphorescence as though with some disease. (CSP 
259–60)
[А]в наши дни оно познало пудру, уборную и показывается с 
эстрады [ . . . ]. Оно показывается, а оно должно тонуть в райке, в 
безвестности, почти не ведая, что на нем шапка горит, и что, забив-
шееся в угол, оно поражено светопрозрачностью и фосфоресцен-
цией, как некоторой болезнью. (PSS 5:24)
Such an identification—Heine’s poet on the stage and the art of make-up and 
powder of “Some Propositions”—is a serious misreading that loses the central 
impetus of the story. In fact, the English translations of both passages tend 
to mute the subtle difference in the original Russian, for the English word 
“stage” in both passages neutralizes the singular nuances of the original. Heine 
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uses the word “подмостки” for a theatrical platform, that is, a word etymo-
logically related to a bridge (мост) or crossing (переход), with the root of 
“bridge” (подмостки-мост) emphasizing the dangerous transitions between 
two spheres of reality. By contrast, in “Some Propositions” the term used for 
the stage is “эстрада,” that is, the stage of popular culture. In contrast to the 
stage-performer of “Some Propositions,” Heine’s figure on the bridge-plat-
form is drawn as an endangered self, a self called upon to step onto a cross-
ing between two worlds, or rather pulled onto it, illuminated and acted upon 
possibly against his will—a theme intensified many years later in Pasternak’s 
famous poem “Hamlet.” In contrast to the figure of Hamlet in the later poem, 
the urgency of danger in “The Mark of Apelles” is unexpected, even alarming, 
for there appears no inherent threat to the elegant and seductive protagonist 
who invariably brings calm to chaos and darkness. As far as the context of 
the story is concerned, there is no explanation for this strangest of emphases, 
unless the passage, just like Pasternak’s Heine (and later the figure of Hamlet 
in the poem) acquires its real significance atemporally and intertextually.
 As argued throughout this chapter, Pasternak’s story of 1915 is imbued 
with philosophical themes and images, and the story’s conflict of light and 
darkness indicates somewhat fleeting allusions to Plato’s cave allegory. These 
allusions, however (as argued in 3.1) are more significantly present in Safe 
Conduct—in Pasternak’s recollections of leaving philosophy for poetry. Pas-
ternak, in fact, argues with Plato by insisting upon the existence of the force 
that can compete with the force of light. Moreover, Pasternak admits in Safe 
Conduct that his decision to become a poet and a writer after studying phi-
losophy would be altogether incomprehensible to his Marburg professor Her-
mann Cohen, whose raised eyebrows at this choice Pasternak describes so 
vividly:
What should I say to him? “Verse?” he would drawl. “Verse!” Had he not 
sufficiently studied the whole of human mediocrity and its subterfuges? 
“Verse!” (CSP 57)
Что я скажу ему? “Verse?”—протянет он. “Verse!” Мало изучил он 
человеческую бездарность и ее уловки?—“Verse.” (PSS 3:189)
In “The Mark of Apelles,” where Pasternak employs so many of the themes he 
discovered in Marburg, he actually counters his teacher’s contempt for poetry 
by returning to the famous image of the cave—to that enigmatic, enlightened, 
and thus endangered figure of the philosopher returning into the deepening 
darkness.
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 Thus, in the words of Heine about the endangered poet, the allusion to the 
cave allegory signals an additional and an unexpected meaning—it recasts the 
primacy of philosophy as the pathway to the world of eternity, with the sun as 
its primary image of the good. If at the beginning of Book VII of Plato’s Repub-
lic the enlightened figure of the philosopher having beheld the sun re-enters 
the cave, this newcomer becomes deeply disoriented in the new setting and is 
awkward in his movements:
Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in 
‘evaluating’ these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes 
were accustomed to the dark [ . . . ] would he not provoke laughter, and 
would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with 
his eyes ruined and it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And 
if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release 
them and lead them up, would they not kill him? (Bk. VII, 517a; 1930, 749)
In alluding to this figure surrounded by the darkness of the cave, Paster-
nak challenges Plato as he puts art into a context and setting that Plato had 
reserved exclusively for his philosophers. This means that “The Mark of 
Apelles,” among its many themes, reconsiders the ancient quarrel of Platonic 
philosophy with poetry.
 In Pasternak the figure that stands for the atemporal and eternal, always 
threatened by the darkness within which he exercises his gift, is no longer the 
philosopher, but the poet—less awkward, more graceful and self-assured, per-
haps more seductive, but equally endangered. Unconsciously, perhaps, Paster-
nak introduces here a theme whose authenticity goes beyond “The Mark of 
Apelles” and whose reality is to be tested not merely by literary critics, reluc-
tant editors, and publishers, but by the unveiling of history itself, which, like 
Heine in the narrative, was moving in 1915 inexorably toward chaos and an 
eclipsed sun.
 strange fate befell Pasternak’s “Letters from Tula.” Among his critics the 
story provokes a silence almost as profound1 as its protagonist’s appre-
hension of the “complete physical silence within his soul”: “Not an Ibsen 
silence, but an acoustic one” [в душе настанет полная физическая тишина. 
Не ибсеновская, а акустическая] (CSP 123; PSS 3:30; emphasis in original). 
This critical reaction, reminiscent of the equally taciturn reception of “The 
Mark of Apelles,” has a few features characteristically its own. The dearth of 
interpretative approaches in the case of “Letters” is all the more remarkable 
since the story must have been intended to provoke debate, completed as it 
was in 1918 (a year not without significance in Russian history) for a collec-
tion dedicated to the ideological understanding of art.2 Pasternak’s goals for 
the story were ambitious, even boisterous. In a letter to his parents (Febru-
ary 7, 1917), he spoke of the future story steeped in theoretical discourse 
[там будет много теории] and emphasized his desire to separate himself 
from all “isms,” to adopt a form akin to a diary or letters of correspondence, 
 1. Payne’s observation that “nearly all of Doctor Zhivago is contained in embryo in this 
short, closely written sketch” (1961, 103) constitutes an exception, as is also the work of Gorelik 
(2000, 53–60), which emphasizes the story’s capacity to provoke confusion even in the most 
knowledgeable of Pasternak’s critics (53).
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and to mingle ideology with the “concrete” citations of fictional sources (PSS 
7:322). The disjuncture between his conviction that the story would contain 
some of his most deeply felt theory, on the one hand, and what can only be 
called the miserly amount of subsequent debate, on the other, could suggest 
either a certain eccentricity in Pasternak’s judgments and aims (which he as a 
young writer failed to communicate), or the misdirection of critical inquiry, 
or, again, a mixture of both options. In this chapter I argue that the story has 
been read for a long time in a key that is essentially unproductive and that 
critics have ignored many textual clues that suggest a focus on the processes 
involved in the coalescence between art and the moral quest in a world rapidly 
losing its ethical orientation.
 In taking up the theoretical design of “Letters from Tula,” this chapter will 
apply some of the philosophical themes discovered in “The Mark of Apelles” 
and extend them to include the Kantian notion of apperception—also a key 
Neo-Kantian preoccupation and the subject-matter of Pasternak’s studies at 
the universities of both Moscow and Marburg.3 In his portrait of Hermann 
Cohen in Safe Conduct, Pasternak foregrounds this philosophical principle 
as he depicts a severe Cohen asking his students “Was ist Apperzeption?” 
and failing those who believed it was “durchfassen” (to grasp through) (CSP 
56; PSS 3:188).4 Pasternak, as I shall argue both in this and the subsequent 
chapter, did not disappoint Cohen in this regard, but, like Cohen himself, did 
not fully share Kant’s belief that all phenomenological data can be success-
fully synthesized within the autonomous self. Nonetheless, both Cohen and 
Pasternak understood only too well the force of Kant’s argument that percep-
tion alone cannot unify personality and that only apperception “in contrast to 
perception deals with a unified consciousness, rather than with the separated 
contents” [Апперцепция в отличие от перцепции; единство сознания 
как особенность сознания, а не содержаний] (Lehrjahre I:268). It is clear, 
of course, that “Letters from Tula” cannot but be read in the context of Paster-
nak’s primary theoretical interests of 1918—his desire to address in prose the 
question of what constitutes the unified human being,5 as it is also apparent 
 3. See here Fleishman Lehrjahre 11:138; Vigilianskaya (2007).
 4. Pasternak was rarely given to nonconsequential descriptions without an underlying 
emphasis on the importance of the theme he was conveying (even when on the surface he ap-
peared to be merely chatting). In fact, the appearance of mere chat is often his favorite method 
of introducing a major theme.
 5. Barnes emphasizes that the overall goal of Pasternak in 1918 was working on his “pro-
jected book of articles on man,” Quinta Essentia (1989, 256). See also Pasternak’s insistence in 
“Some Propositions”: “By its feeling, through its spirituality, prose seeks and finds man in the 
category of speech” [Чутьем, по своей одухотворенности, проза ищет и находит человека 
в категории речи] (CSP 261; PSS 5:26).
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that in pursuing this interest he could not bypass the principal direction of 
his university training, that is, the question of apperception and the Kantian 
emphasis that a unified personality emerges only on the level of the transcen-
dental ego and can never be inferred simply through the data supplied by 
perception.6
 My argument throughout seeks not merely to establish Pasternak’s employ-
ment of Kant’s theory of apperception in his narrative design (4.1–4.2), but 
also to demonstrate the writer’s argument with Kant and his own emerging 
emphasis on the importance of creativity and play for others in the process of 
the conscious synthesis of impressions, be it the case of his story’s protagonists 
or the contrasting case of the obnoxious “film actors” from Moscow (4.3). The 
difficulty of the topic, as in all arguments concerning the philosophical Paster-
nak, remains that of direct access and demonstrability: critical thought must 
find a way to elucidate philosophical influences even though Pasternak never 
explains the philosophical direction of his thought. He may have mentioned 
the emphasis on “theory” in his letters to his parents (PSS 7:322), but what 
he demonstrates in art must be read by others, not proclaimed by the author.7 
And yet unless the philosophical subtext of Pasternak’s thoughts on apper-
ception—deepened by Cohen’s thought on the necessity of bringing together 
citizenship, philosophy, and art—is unveiled, the story’s principal importance 
in Pasternak’s thought is lost altogether (4.4), and this loss is colossal, for the 
story contains an admission of one of the deepest realignments in Paster-
nak’s life. Therefore, this step—toward the traces of a self-erasing philosophi-
cal subtext—needs to be firmly taken, for Pasternak’s interests in the mysteries 
of perception also explain to a remarkable degree his lifelong interest in Lev 
Tolstoy, who was not merely the genius loci of Tula, but also a man of many 
tasks and responsibilities, ready to sacrifice beauty for the sake of morality and 
justice, and yet possessing a singular all-uniting gift—“the passion of creative 
contemplation” [страсть творческого созерцания]—a gift that, as we shall 
 6. This interest also directed his plans during his work on The Childhood of Luvers (cf. the 
account of his philosophical interests in 1917–18 in Chapter 5 (5.1)).
 7. In terms of explaining his aims, Pasternak, for many years and particularly in his youth, 
was exceptionally tight-lipped. In a short essay, published in 1928, in Chitatel’ i pisatel’ (4–5): 4, 
he formulates this best: “Now about the reader. I require nothing from him and have only great 
wishes for him. The arrogance and egoism that lie at the base of a writer’s appeal to his “audi-
ence” are alien to me and beyond my comprehension. [  .  .  . ] Very probably, I like the reader 
more than I can say. Like him, I am reticent and uncommunicative, and unlike most writers, I 
cannot conceive of any correspondence with him.” [Теперь о читателе. Я ничего не хочу от 
него и многого ему желаю. Высокомерный эгоизм, лежащий в основе писательского 
обращения к “аудитории,” мне чужд и недоступен. [ . . . ] Вероятно, я люблю читателя 
больше, чем могу сказать. Я замкнут и необщителен, как он, и в противоположность 
писателям переписки с ним не понимаю] (CSP 267–68; PSS 5:220).
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see further, is not without some bearing upon Pasternak’s struggle with the 
synthetic capacity of apperception in “Letters from Tula” (4.2; 4.5).
4.1 “Was ist Apperzeption?”
 Finding a fruitful approach to “Letters from Tula”
There is no need to debate the accepted biographical fact that Pasternak’s Neo-
Kantian training was deep and genuine, and that it reflected the intellectual 
language of the time. In Fleishman’s words, the “wide use of neo-Kantian ter-
minology in literary battles, in the purely literary press, contributed to further 
dissemination of the ideas of the Marburg school among the Moscow artistic 
elite” (Fleishman 1990a, 28). Furthermore, as Fleishman aptly observes, Pas-
ternak’s particular interest was always in aesthetics and philosophy, which 
he approached with ambitious zeal: “Just as his transfer to the university’s 
philosophy department was provoked by Pasternak’s efforts to surpass Skri-
abin in this sphere, his zealous study of the Marburg philosophers originated 
in his desire to understand more fully the aesthetics of those who were the 
mentors of his generation in literature, Andrei Bely and the other symbolists” 
(1990a, 29). Christopher Barnes equally emphasizes Pasternak’s enthusiasm 
for Neo-Kantianism, a philosophical direction which, he stresses, prevailed in 
Moscow both in “the Musaget philosophical circle run by Fyodor Stepun, who 
was a follower of the Freiburg Neo-Kantian, Heinrich Rickert” (1989, 121) 
and among university “students and younger lecturers [steeped in] the teach-
ings of Henri Bergson, German Neo-Kantianism, and the phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl” (122).
 It is equally true, however, that all the critical emphasis upon Neo- 
Kantian influences in Pasternak is usually focused upon the phenomeno-
logical Wesensschau of Husserl—the elimination of the sharp divide between 
observer and observed.8 The erasure of the demarcation line between subject 
and object, so helpful, according to scholars, for understanding The Childhood 
of Luvers,9 does surprisingly little for “Letters from Tula.” Indeed, writing a 
story for a volume dedicated to ideologies of art should have given Pasternak 
a rare opportunity to demonstrate his mastery of philosophical themes within 
 8. In this respect there seems to exist an established critical consensus, reinforced by 
Barnes as he echoes Fleishman’s judgment: “In Lazar Fleishman’s paraphrase of Husserl: ‘Intui-
tive recognition preserves the object in its authenticity. Man does not perform the act of cogni-
tion, but lives within it. It is not I who must speak about the object, about existence—the object 
and existence must speak about themselves’” (Barnes 1989, 122).
 9. See Fleishman (1977, 19–21).
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a new political setting and, perhaps, to establish his own trail-blazing path in 
aesthetics, but nothing happened, even though critics to this day remain polite 
and sympathetic toward the story that, in speaking about some unknown film 
actors making some unknown film, apparently settles the author’s unending 
score with Mayakovsky—and all of this in the catastrophic 1918 (Barnes 1989, 
268). For all the critical forbearance, however, “Letters from Tula” appears in 
critical accounts to thematize only the banal:10 the poet of the story, heart-
broken and overly emotional over his separation from his beloved, complains 
about film actors as “he finds himself involuntarily associated with their play-
ing the genius and their declamatory gestures and phraseology,” while the 
story’s elderly actor, depressed with filming, returns home and “begins playing 
through to himself one of his old roles” (Barnes 1989, 267–68). Aside from the 
opposition between the poetic and the dramatic, the authentic and the preten-
tious, the story displays a new “moralizing tendency” (Fleishman 1990a, 94), 
unusual for Pasternak; the writer does, indeed, appear to claim high moral 
ground,11 following in this the example of Tolstoy: “Indeed, this is Tula! [ . . . ] 
This is an occurrence on the territory of conscience” [Ведь это Тула! [  .  .  . ] 
Это случай на территории совести] (CSP 119; PSS 3:29; emphasis in origi-
nal). If Pasternak’s supposed intention of developing “much theory” within a 
narrative is realized in this handful of commonalities, Pasternak, the prose-
writer, must have been an exceptionally pedestrian thinker and a personality 
radically different from the groundbreaking poet of My Sister Life.12 It is all 
the more disconcerting then that Pasternak himself, at least in 1918, was so 
unaware of these obvious shortcomings that he continued to push on with the 
publication of this prose work for several years, long after the plans for the 
initial theoretical volume were suspended.
 The interpretative picture changes significantly, however, when the Pla-
tonic themes of “The Mark of Apelles” are viewed as relevant to the analy-
sis of the “Letters,” and the story’s vigor increases even more dramatically 
when Pasternak’s “Neo-Kantianism” is expanded beyond phenomenological 
subject-object blending to reveal instead a spectacular study in apperception. 
The importance of the principle of apperception for the history of philoso-
phy is by no means minor: Kantian apperception presupposes the existence 
 10. Even Gorelik’s insistence that the story actively asserts the necessity of the artist to 
forego his personal interests in order to enter his surroundings (2000, 60) cannot break the spell 
of lukewarm critical regard.
 11. Mossman (1972, 289–80).
 12. The story took shape while Pasternak was working on My Sister Life (Barnes 1989, 
267–68), and when it was finally published in 1922, just after My Sister Life (Fleishman 1990a, 
111), the success of his poetry far outweighed the success of the prose.
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of the transcendental ego, which alone can unify consciousness, and without 
whose capacity for synthesis the multiple data infused by the a priori and a 
posteriori phenomena supplied by perception remain merely a disunited flow. 
The reality of apperception was central to Hermann Cohen and the Marburg 
school, where Cohen’s dream of developing a logical investigation of synthetic 
unity in self-consciousness was realized in setting out the formal categories of 
apperception for the a priori principles of space and time.13 In Cohen’s rendi-
tion of Kantian principles, the unity of synthetic judgment (the blending of a 
priori and a posteriori aspects of perception) presupposes the manifold data of 
a priori categories in and through experience, a “rhapsody of perception” to be 
processed and unified in the individual consciousness:
For our conception, the essential point of the a priori lies solely in the fact 
that it contains the formal condition of experience. As a consequence we 
only uphold “synthetic unity in the connection of the manifold” as an a 
priori category. For experience in general is not possible without this. By 
means of it, the “rhapsody of perceptions” becomes “synthetic unity of the 
phenomena.” (KTE 101; trans. Poma-Denton 11)
In the criticism of Pasternak’s early poetry, including My Sister Life, written 
for the most part just before “Letters,” the glorification of the poet’s gaze as it 
adjusts between eternity and history has been attributed to the poet’s ecstatic 
temperament, to his characteristic manner of coordinating between the upper 
and lower spheres within the lyrical subject (Zholkovsky 1978; 1994, 286–87; 
Fateeva 2003, 176–79). However, this pervasive emphasis on the synthesis 
between the infinite and the finite in spatial and temporal landscapes can 
also be understood as a reflection of his deeply rooted interest in the laws of 
apperception—a synthetic blending of the a priori and a posteriori14 made 
proverbial by his poetry:
 13. See here Cohen about the a priori nature of categories: “Although not a Kantian ex-
pression, it can be in the spirit of Kant to observe: how space is the form of outer intuition and 
time that of inner intuition; thus transcendental apperception is the form for the categories. 
Self-consciousness is the transcendental condition under which we produce the pure concepts 
of understanding. Synthetic unity is the form that, as a common element, is at the base of all the 
single types of unity thought in the categories” (KTE 144; trans. Poma-Denton 11–12).
 14. It is with similar interests that Pasternak will endow his young Yuri Zhivago: Yuri, 
qualified in general medicine, “had a specialist knowledge of the eye,” and his pursuit of “the 
physiology of sight was in keeping with other sides of his character—his creative gifts and his 
preoccupation with imagery in art and the logical structure of ideas” (Zhivago 79: PSS 4:80).
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Through the window I’ll call out to children
What millennium, my dear ones,
Is presently in our yard?
 ***
My dear—it’s horror! When the poet loves,
The unshackled god is infatuated,
And chaos crawls out into the light
As in ancient times.
Tons of fog make his eyes tear up.
He is covered by it. He seems like a mammoth. (1917)
Сквозь фортку крикну детворе
Какое, милые, у нас
Тысячелетье на дворе? 
 ***
Любимая—жуть! Когда любит поэт,
Влюбляется бог неприкаянный,
И хаос опять выползает на свет,
Как во времена ископаемых.
Глаза ему тонны туманов слезят.
Он застлан. Он кажется мамонтом. (PSS 1:155; 1917)
Apperception, synthetic wholeness, the transcendental ego in its comprehen-
sion of a priori categories, transcendental consciousness with its intuitive grasp 
of the “a priori of synthetic wholeness” [a priori синтетических единств] 
(Lehrjahre II:88)—these themes are all-pervasive in Pasternak’s student dia-
ries, and his notes dedicated to Cohen’s treatment of “synthetic judgment” are 
particularly illuminating in this regard. However, precisely where the Neo-
Kantians, following Kant, see the unity of consciousness emerging from all 
“the forms of perception,” Pasternak suggests a contrast (and later contradic-
tion) between synthetic consciousness and the logical “forms of thought pro-
cesses.” In his view, it is precisely out of this contradiction that there emerges a 
living spontaneous unity of receptivity, an a priori “transcendental” potential 
of consciousness:
[T]here is an antagonistic meeting of creativity in its potential (not the 
analyses of creativity, but creativity as such) with the judgment regarding 
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the material object, and through the soil of this antagonism there awakens 
in us creativity in its different forms—as an aspect of antagonism between 
the associations of judgments and transcendental synthesis.
[E]сть антагонистическая встреча творчества в потенции (не суж-
дения о творчестве, а творчество) с суждением об объекте, на 
почве которого в нас [?] это творчество так или иначе пробуди-
лось, в роде антагонизма между ассоциацией представлений и 
трансценд[енталь]ным синтезом. (Lehrjahre II:139–40)
What was for Pasternak-the-student, then, the overlap between transcenden-
tal synthesis in consciousness and transcendental metaphysics (spearheaded 
by his own study of multiple philosophical approaches, including those of 
Plato, Kant, and the Neo-Kantians) becomes in Pasternak-the-writer one 
of his most characteristic themes—the adjustment of the perception of the 
inhabitants of eternity, the “a priori lyricists,” to the particularized histori-
cal setting. Whether or not unified consciousness emerges as a result of this 
adjustment remains very much an open question, but what is always empha-
sized in Pasternak is the need to address the antagonistic contradictory data 
by means of engagement in creative work.15 The aesthetic and ethical, imita-
tive and passionately personal do not want to cohere unless they challenge 
creativity, and the effort to find the answer to the gaps between them16 is an 
 15. In Zhivago, the antagonism between a priori and a posteriori manifests itself directly, 
and not as covert, albeit crucial, philosophical content. The reality of death seems to stand out 
as a gap or contradiction—a mysterious challenge addressed to the synthetic consciousness. In 
responding to this call, the philosopher Vedenyapin speaks of the work of time and memory 
in creating a second universe, called human history: “he developed his old view of history as 
another universe, made by man with the help of time and memory in answer to the challenge 
of death” [он развивал свою давнишнюю мысль об истории как о второй вселенной, 
воздвигаемой человечеством в ответ на явление смерти с помощью явлений времени и 
памяти] (Zhivago 66; PSS 4:67). Young Yuri, influenced by Vedenyapin, senses this “presence of 
mystery tangible in everything” [присутствие тайны чувствовалось во всем] when working 
as a medical student in the anatomic theater (Zhivago 66; PSS 4:66) and realizes that “art has 
two constant, two unending concerns: it always meditates on death and thus always creates life” 
[Сейчас, как никогда, ему было ясно, что искусство всегда, не переставая, занято дву-
мя вещами. Оно неотступно размышляет о смерти и неотступно творит этим жизнь] 
(Zhivago 90; PSS 4:91).
 16. Pasternak’s love for Hamlet, the play and its protagonist, was fueled by the fact that 
Hamlet answers the gap in reality and that being called by this contradiction in life, by the 
eternal conveyed by chance, he finds strength to respond: “[W]hen appearance and reality are 
shown to be at variance—to be indeed separated by the abyss—the message is conveyed by 
supernatural means [  .  .  .  ]. What is important is that chance has allotted Hamlet the role of 
judge of his time and servant of the future” [Когда обнаруживается, что видимость и дей-
ствительность не сходятся и их разделяет пропасть, не существенно, что напоминание 
о лживости мира приходит в сверхъестественной форме [  .  .  .  ]. Гораздо важнее, что 
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invitation issued by what Pasternak will eventually call “the drama of high 
destiny, a life preordained to a heroic task” [драма высокого жребия, запо-
веданного подвига, вверенного назначения] (Remember 131; PSS 5:75). 
If one applies such a perspective to “Letters from Tula,” the story—banal and 
seemingly self-absorbed—displays unexpected cohesiveness, depth, and the-
matic richness, suggesting new and fruitful spaces for analysis.
4.2 Between love and art in the world of reflections: 
 The adjustment of the protagonists’ gaze
The sublunary world of the story, in which a nameless poet bemoans his lonely 
state and an aging actor17 tries to act out an eccentric scene in his room, can 
now be approached as a space characterized by multiple crossings and path-
ways between unknown destinations. In Plato’s philosophy the material world 
is made up of reflections only (imitations of ideas); in Hume’s language, this 
landscape of vital impressions is imbued with contiguities and similarities, 
both spatial and temporal; in Kant, the disparate and contradictory phenom-
ena presented to perception demand an integration at the deepest, transcen-
dental level of consciousness. At the opening of “Letters from Tula,” human 
beings are in transit; they seek to understand their particular locality through 
a multitude of reflections, with every subject reflected in the other.18 All the 
while, some major and as yet unspecified event, already in the past, continues 
to pervade both the present and the future:
The sun was setting. A bridge with the inscription “Upa” sailed across a 
hundred carriage windows at the very instance when the stoker [ . . . ] dis-
covered the town [ . . . ] through the roar of his own hair and the fresh 
excitement of the evening saw it speeding to meet them.
 Meanwhile people over there were greeting one another in the street 
and saying, “Good evening.” To this some added, “Have you been there?” 
“No, just going,” others replied. “You’re too late,” they were told. “It’s all 
over.” (CSP 119)
волею случая Гамлет избирается в судьи своего времени и в слуги более отдаленного] 
(Remember 131; PSS 5:75).
 17. There is no historical or fictional figure with this name, and therefore Savva Ignatievich 
has no intertextual references—this explains the choice for the name. The poet of course is 
without a name. Thus the protagonists belong to this text and no other.
 18. Cf. Pasternak in the poem “Marburg” about the world of stone open to his eyes: “And 
all of these were merely likenesses” [И все это были подобья] (PSS 1:110).
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Оно садилось. Мост с надписью “Упа” поплыл по сотне окошек в ту 
самую минуту, как кочегару [ . . . ] открылся в шуме его собствен-
ных волос и в свежести вечернего возбуждения, в стороне от путей, 
быстро несшийся навстречу город.
 Тем временем там, здороваясь на улицах, говорили: “С добрым 
вечером. ” Некоторые прибавляли: “Оттуда?”—“Туда, ”—отвечали 
иные. Им возражали: “Поздно. Все кончилось.” (PSS 3:26)
In Fleishman’s view, Pasternak the philosopher was never a docile or obedi-
ent thinker: “the independence and originality of Pasternak was expressed not 
only in the character of his literary débuts, but in his philosophical studies” 
(Fleishman Lehrjahre 14). The same critical temperament can be seen at work 
from the very first passages of the story, for if Pasternak here is commenting 
upon the life of the prisoners in the cave, all of whom live in the neighbor-
hood of reflected rather than real events and objects, his depiction is more 
positive than a Platonic world of shadows. Pasternak’s emphasis on communal 
reflections as a means of communication also introduces, and does so with 
an assured touch, a serious conflict with Kant—undermining in the very first 
paragraph (and promising to continue to do so in the future) the autonomy 
of transcendental consciousness and presenting instead the data of percep-
tion as essentially a shared experience. On the whole, however, in relation 
to Pasternak’s technique in “The Mark of Apelles,” the frame, suggestive of 
the cave allegory with its reflections and shadows, signals the presence of an 
endangered, possibly disoriented figure at the center of the setting, and this, 
indeed, proves to be the case. The story, in two parts, presents in each segment 
a different kind of disorientation and a different kind of protagonist, the poet 
and the old actor, one at the beginning and the other at the end of his artistic 
(and earthly) life.
 “Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prison-
ers in ‘evaluating’ these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his 
eyes were accustomed to the dark [ . . . ] would he not provoke laughter, and 
would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with 
his eyes ruined?” (Bk. VII, 517a; 1930, 749), Socrates observes in the Republic 
about the state of the philosopher who returns to the cave from the sunlight. 
“You possess that vital vision. You have already mastered a line as unique as 
life itself, so don’t abandon it” (CSP 110; PSS 3:16), exclaims Heine to Camilla 
in “The Mark of Apelles,” himself struck that this woman appears as if anew 
before his eyes. “What misery to be born a poet! What torment is imagination! 
Sunshine in beer. Sunk to the very bottom of the bottle. [ . . . ] Oh my dear, 
they are all strangers around me. [ . . . ] Why they think it is their sun they sip 
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with milk from their saucer” [Какое горе родиться поэтом! Какой мучи-
тель воображенье! Солнце—в пиве. Опустилось на самое донышко 
бутылки. [ . . . ] Ах, родная, все чужие кругом. [ . . . ] Ведь они думают, 
свое солнце похлебывают с молоком из блюдец] (CSP 120; PSS 3:27), 
writes the young poet to his beloved in “Letters from Tula,” clearly unable to 
adjust his vision and distinguish clearly between what is near and what is “far 
far away, beyond the horizon” [очень, очень далеко, за горизонтом] (CSP 
120: PSS 3:27). “Some modern movements have imagined that art [ . . . ] can 
be resolved into means of representation, whereas it is composed of organs of 
perception. It should always be one with the audience and have the clearest, 
truest, most perceptive view of all” [Современные течения вообразили что 
исскуство [  .  .  .  ] может быть разложено на средства изобразительно-
сти, тогда как оно складывается из органов восприятия] (CSP 259; PSS 
5:25), Pasternak observes in “Some Propositions.” And in Safe Conduct Her-
mann Cohen, as already noted, fails students unable to explain the principles 
of apperception (CSP 56; PSS 3:188). In short, Pasternak’s early work is imbued 
with the conviction that a very specific quality of perception constitutes an 
integral part of the artist’s power, and his allusions to Plato and Kant, as well as 
his reminiscences of Cohen, suggest the key philosophical principles that are 
destined to become an inalienable part of his narrative art.
 “Letters from Tula” is highly significant in this context. Its theme—the 
true quest of the artist, whose journey is stretched uneasily between two infi-
nite passions, love and his all-absorbing craft, among dangerous and violent 
reflections in a landscape steeped in awakened memories and criss-crossed by 
trains—will later become Pasternak’s signature, the landscape of Tula being 
its first (not most successful but still fascinating) articulation. The application 
of Kant’s principles of perception and apperception clarifies the narrative’s 
framework, which remains otherwise obscure and perhaps unimpressive.19 
The story’s startling fragmentation20 forbids any facile alignment; instead 
it drives the narrative through seemingly contradictory aspects of vision 
towards not so much an integration, but a realignment of the protagonists’ 
inner world. Hence, the poet and the actor, unaware of each other throughout 
an apparently uneventful sleepless night, between sunset and sunrise, are not 
 19. See here Gorelik’s resistance to Fleishman’s “story within a story” or the “matreshka” 
design of the narrative (2000, 53–54).
 20. Cf. Rudova: “There are problems with spatiality: objects, places, sounds, and memories 
seem somehow to co-exist in one plane. The narrative lacks smoothness and continuity. It 
can serve as an excellent illustration of the ideal type of writing praised by Kruchenykh and 
Khlebnikov. [ . . . ] The character’s thought development does not follow a linear track, which 
contributes to a disappearance of one-point perspective. What we get instead is a free, broken 
perspective along which fragments of narration are dispersed” (1994, 100).
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only disoriented and forlorn; like Pasternak’s Heine, they are caught in the 
“crossing” between everyday reality and an atemporal world where precise 
historical knowledge as well as different fragmented memories embodied in 
the immediate landscape become both awakened and yet simultaneously dis-
sipated. It is in order to overcome this uncertainty during the crossing that the 
poet has given his beloved a volume of Kluchevsky (“look it up in a textbook, 
my dear. [ . . . ] I put it in the case myself ” [Дорогая, справься с учебником 
[ . . . ] клал сам в чемодан] [CSP 121; PSS 3:26]), while he himself is engaged 
in a futile search for a receipt from a pawnshop where the mementos from his 
past must have been stored.21 In contrast to the Heine of “Apelles,” the charac-
ters of this story are not famous in any way, although they do find themselves 
in Tula, a few miles from Tolstoy’s Iasnaia Poliana, a fact that eventually “acts 
as a lever” for the story’s poet.
 The choice of Tolstoy is not accidental as far as the story’s philosophical 
themes are concerned.22 As late as 1956, while describing Tolstoy in his Sketch 
for an Autobiography [Автобиографический очерк],23 Pasternak continues 
to attribute to Tolstoy the diverse and mutually opposed “categories” of vision 
that can be embraced and unified only by his massive talent:24 “What are we 
to say of Tolstoy, if we must limit the definition to one characteristic only?” 
[что сказать о Толстом, ограничив определение одной чертой?] (Remem-
ber 69; PSS 3:322). Proceeding to emphasize Tolstoy’s contradictory modes 
 21. Scholars point to the receipt from the pawnshop as a recollection of Pasternak’s journey 
with Siniakova in 1915 (PSSCom 3:541). However, the image has a haunting quality: a disori-
ented speaker finding his way back into immediate historical setting by recalling the mementos 
of the past, including a history textbook.
 22. Mossman senses the relationship between Neo-Kantianism and the role of Tolstoy but 
is uncertain where to place the focus in this regard, suggesting that in contrast to the Soviet 
“objective view of history,” Pasternak believes that “the shadowy, subjective land of paradox and 
illogic was the fertile territory of new empirical discovery” (1972, 290). However, Pasternak’s 
interest in apperception must be carefully examined, for the contradiction between unified 
consciousness and multiple contradictory phenomena is clearly a major theme in the story, and 
the width of the talent, its multiple strands that leave no room for superficiality—these themes 
with which Pasternak dealt throughout his life. One finds a similar emphasis on Pasternak’s debt 
to his father because of the latter’s multilayered talent (his ability to work on several sketches at 
once) and yet his all-unifying “eye” (see his letter to Olga Freidenberg of Nov. 30, 1948; Moss-
man, ed. 1982, 284).
 23. The “Sketch” was written in May–June 1956 by request from Goslitizdat (PSSCom 
3:582).
 24. It is customary for critics to emphasize the role of Tolstoy’s influence on Pasternak’s life 
in 1918, owing to the effect of Tolstoy’s moralizing on the tone of this story (Fleishman 1990a, 
94) and the fact that “it is Tolstoy’s view of art which Pasternak adopts in his next prose work, 
‘The Childhood of Luvers’” (Mossman 1972, 290). The contradiction between the multilayered 
interests and the singular insight that Pasternak always emphasized when speaking of the writer 
needs to be added to this list.
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of thought, Pasternak foregrounds his extraordinary gift of perception, thus 
echoing, with a mature certainty of touch, the philosophical preoccupations 
of his own student years (cf. the unifying synthesis of perception in Kantian 
apperception) as reflected in “Letters from Tula”:
The chief quality of this moralist, leveller, and preacher of a system of 
justice that would embrace everybody without fear or favor would be an 
originality that distinguished him from everyone else and verged on the 
paradoxical.
 All his life and at any given moment he possessed the faculty of seeing 
things in the detached finality of each separate moment, in sharp relief, as 
we see things only on rare occasions, in childhood, or on the crest of an all 
embracing happiness, or in a triumph of a great spiritual victory.
 To see things like that it is necessary that one’s eye should be directed 
by passion. For it is passion that by its flash illuminates an object, intensify-
ing its appearance.
 Such a passion, the passion of creative contemplation, Tolstoy con-
stantly carried about with himself. (Remember 69)
Главным качеством этого моралиста, уравнителя, проповедника 
законности, которая охватывала бы всех без послаблений и изъя-
тий, была ни на кого не похожая, парадоксальности достигавшая 
оригинальность.
 Он всю жизнь, во всякое время обладал способностью видеть 
явления в оторванной окончательности отдельного мгновения, в 
исчерпывающем выпуклом очерке, как глядим мы только в редких 
случаях, в детстве, или на гребне всеобновляющего счастья, или в 
торжестве большой душевной победы.
 Для того чтобы так видеть, глаз наш должна направлять страсть. 
Она-то именно и озаряет своей вспышкой предмет, усиливaя его 
видимость.
 Такую страсть, страсть творческого созерцания, Толстой посто-
янно носил в себе. (PSS 3:322)
In “Letters from Tula,” however, neither the poet nor the old actor is of Tol-
stoy’s stature; rather, they struggle to acquire both for their art and for their 
alienated self “the faculty of seeing things in the detached finality of each sepa-
rate moment” (Remember 69; PSS 3:322). The essential frame of the story, and 
possibly the deepest preoccupation of Pasternak’s art, is, then, this capacity of 
seeing the diverse and mutually exclusive aspects of reality and yet discover-
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ing in this challenge a living, rather than unified, self. As we shall see further, 
aware that he is reflecting Kant’s notion of apperception, in “Letters from Tula” 
Pasternak does not fully agree with Kant but provides his own solution to 
the problem of how an individual self is able to comprehend the diversity of 
observed phenomena.
 The difficulty of adjusting perception is the opening leitmotif of “Letters.” 
The poet, whose diary, or rather letter to his beloved, is the first fragment 
of the story, is oppressed, rather than invigorated, by the disjointedness of 
the world that meets his sight. He is also burdened by his recognition that 
there are separate realities of perception—communal or shared spaces with 
others,25 whom this young man happens to fear and despise. Apparently in no 
way reminiscent of “the passion of creative contemplation, [that] Tolstoy con-
stantly carried about with himself,” the poet’s observations of his surrounding 
world are accompanied by complaints—even horror—when he realizes that an 
utterly alien world enters his own through perception:26
They do not realize that their flies stick in yours, or in ours. [ . . . ]
 My dear one, it sickens me! This is a display of the ideals of our age. 
The fumes that they produce are my own—fumes common to us all! This 
is the burning smell of woeful insolence and ignorance. This is my own 
self. [ . . . ] How dreadful to see oneself in others. It is a caricature of [left 
incomplete] [ . . . ] (CSP 120–21)
Думают не в твоем, не в нашем вязнут их мухи [ . . . ].
 Дорогой друг! Мне тошно. Это—выставка идеалов века. Чад, 
который они подымают,—мой, общий наш чад. Это угар невежест-
венности и самого неблагополучного нахальства. Это я сам. [ . . . ] 
Как страшно видеть свое на посторонних. Это шарж на (оставлено 
без продолжения). [ . . . ] (PSS 3:27–28)
As Pasternak remains true to his plans, set out in the letter to his parents, “to 
keep to the concreteness of different fictional citations of unknown author-
ities” (PSS 7:322), these fictional “authorities” are represented by a name-
 25. A sense of similar “physical” impatience and strain is featured in Pasternak’s recollec-
tion of his university years, when observing the capacity of the students’ minds to be lifted only 
as high as the ceiling, he feels “these attacks of chronic impatience” (CSP 32–33; PSS 3:160–61).
 26. See Rudova’s argument (1994; 1997) that understanding Pasternak depends on seeing 
in his work the influence of Cubo-futurism (see also Wiegers 1999). However, the technique 
of montage or “projection of different objects into one plane” (Rudova 1994, 139) may also be 
approached not as an end in itself, but as a “rhapsody of impressions” that remain a prelude to 
a deeper, transcendental force emerging in the self.
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less poet, whose future art is only a potential still forming, and an actor far 
past his prime, who, with the unlikely name of Savva Ignatievich, is defini-
tively not to be found in any historical chronicles of Russian culture. Both 
men, however, shocked by the mundane, long for a lost transcendent: the 
poet mourns for his lost beloved; the actor dreams of the deepest artistic 
engagement, disconcerted that for the whole long day he has not heard the 
real “human speech of tragedy” [оно оставило неудовлетворенной его 
потребность в трагической человеческой речи] (CSP 124; PSS 3:31). As 
the story unfolds, the seeming uneventfulness of the night is called into ques-
tion; in each case the alterations in the protagonists’ inner states and, thus, in 
the character of their perceptions are intensely dramatic. Without conscious 
awareness of these processes (although registering his every emotion in his 
letters), the young man is preparing for his other indelible passion—his future 
life and art, with the layers of his memory and vision radically realigning. By 
contrast, the actor, unaware of the finality of his life experiences, is reorient-
ing himself for “extraordinary stillness.” Employing several sharp contrasts, 
Pasternak develops a narrative framework within which both protagonists of 
“Letters” are experiencing intense shifts between transcendental and experi-
ential perceptions of reality, moving in this regard in contrasting directions: 
the poet, in his search for the transcendent, proceeds from longing for his 
beloved to artistic engagement, and the old actor reverses this inner journey 
and begins to recall anew his long lost and perhaps deepest love, aptly named 
Liubov’ Petrovna.
 In Safe Conduct, Pasternak speaks of the power of the lovers’ passion 
in Tristan and Romeo and Juliet and suggests that the theme of these works 
is “wider than this forceful theme; their theme is a theme of force” [Тема 
их—тема силы] (CSP 54; PSS 3:186). Inhabiting a similar state of deepest 
attachment, the poet of the “Letters” initially holds on to the memory of an 
extraordinary personal experience. The need to return to life without his 
lost beloved, kindred to him in her essence, to reverse the journey from the 
infinite to the everyday, is overwhelmingly painful, but it can (only just) be 
soothed by his passion for writing:
Oh, what anguish! I will choke it back, this raging anguish! I will choke it 
back, this raging anguish, I will dull the ache with verses.
[ . . . ] Alas, there is no middle road. One must leave at the second bell, or 
else set off together on a journey to the end, to the grave. Look now, it will 
be dawn already when I make this entire journey in reverse—and in every 
detail too, in every trivial detail. And now they will all have the subtlety of 
some quite exquisite torture. (CSP 120; trans. altered)
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О тоска! Забью, затуплю ее, неистовую, стихами.
[  .  .  . ] Ах, середины нет. Надо уходить со второго звонка или же 
отправляться в совместный путь до конца, до могилы. Послу-
шай, ведь будет светать, когда я проделаю весь этот путь целиком 
в обратном порядке, а то во всех мелочах, до мельчайших. А они 
будут теперь тонкостями изысканной пытки. (PSS 3:26–27)
Biographers refer here to the incident with Nadezhda Sinyakova,27 who left 
for Kharkov in April 1915 (PSSCom 3:541), but the profound angst of the 
separation and ensuing readjustment in the young protagonist’s inner world 
(as well as the changing plans for his art) point rather to the power of a fare-
well described in 1930 in Safe Conduct,28 where Pasternak recollects an occa-
sion when the infinite force of unrequited love left him with his perception of 
material reality radically altered, an event that demanded an explicit “cross-
ing into a new faith” [переход в новую веру] assisted by a quickly departing 
train:
It was the pose of a person who has fallen down from something high that 
had held and carried him for a long time, then let him go, passed noisily 
over his head, and vanished around the turn forever.
[ . . . ] I was surrounded by changed things. Something never before experi-
enced had crept into the essence of reality. The morning recognized my face 
and made its appearance for the very purpose of being with me and never 
leaving me.
[ . . . ] The end, the end! The end of philosophy, that is, of any thought of 
it at all.
Just like my fellow passengers on the train, it too would have to come to 
terms with the fact that every love is a crossing into a new faith. (CSP 50; 53; 
emphasis added)
 27. Barnes suggests either Elena Vinograd or Sinyakova as the prototypes of the poet’s 
beloved (1989, 268). It is notable, however, that the journey with Sinyakova took place in 1915, 
while the poem “Marburg,” which displays so many images in common with “Letters,” was writ-
ten in 1916.
 28. It is possible, of course, that the description of farewell “among the train crossings” 
with Vysotskaya in Marburg is enriched post factum by the narrative depth of the “Letters from 
Tula.” The echo of the “Letters” in the Marburg episode is further reinforced by the fact that 
the anonymous poet, just like Pasternak in Safe Conduct, grieves over the incompleteness of 
the farewell, their separation in the middle of the journey, which he describes as madness, and 
the necessity to return alone to Moscow. As Payne observes, “Pasternak is inclined to attribute 
superhuman powers to railroad stations” (1961, 101).
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Это была поза человека, отвалившегося от чего-то высокого, что 
долго держало его и несло, а потом упустило и, с шумом пронесясь 
над его головой, скрылось навеки за поворотом.
[ . . . ] Меня окружили изменившиеся вещи. В существо действитель-
ности закралось что-то неиспытанное. Утро знало меня в лицо и 
явилось точно затем, чтобы быть при мне и меня никогда не оста-
вить.
[ . . . ] Конец, конец! Конец философии, то есть какой бы то ни было 
мысли о ней.
Как и соседям в купе, ей придется считаться с тем, что всякая 
любовь есть переход в новую веру. (PSS 3:181–84)
“Letters from Tula,” then, can be viewed as a careful depiction of “this cross-
ing into the new faith,” an altogether irrevocable separation between lovers 
taking two train journeys and going in opposite directions. As if returning 
to the cave, even if he needs to adjust his vision to the approaching dawn, 
the poet of the story is to travel alone in the morning29—back to the city, 
while she, with a volume of Kluchevsky’s history,30 has gone over her own 
“crossing”: “So you changed the pathways, as we agreed with the guide”31 [Ты 
значит перешла, как мы договорились, с проводником] (CSP 120; PSS 
3:26). The poet’s excruciating grief at his separation from the deepest, possibly 
eternal kindredness may suggest at first that he is also losing his connection 
with transcendence and needs to adjust instead to the world of phenomenal 
experience. Indeed, he undergoes singular changes: by the end of the night, 
the poet (described already in the third person) has forgotten not only the 
purpose of his journey, but also the addressee of his passionate diary (the 
name and address of the recipient of his letters), and has become no longer the 
 29. Cf. “I was surrounded by changed things. Something never before experienced had 
crept into the essence of reality. The morning recognized my face and made its appearance for 
the very purpose of being with me and never leaving me” [Меня окружили изменившиеся 
вещи. В существо действительности закралось что-то неиспытанное. Утро знало 
меня в лицо и явилось точно затем, чтобы быть при мне и меня никогда не оставить] 
(CSP 50; PSS 3:181). A similar emphasis is on the poem “Marburg”: “I recognize the face of the 
morning” [Я белое утро в лицо узнаю] (PSS 1:112).
 30. Pasternak was Vysotskaya’s tutor, and the emphasis on the history textbook reflects 
something of the teacher–student relationship.
 31. The translation here is altered from “So you changed compartments then, as we agreed, 
with the conductor” (CSP 120). Compare this passage’s emphasis on the crossing with the dan-
gerous bridge [переход] in “The Mark of Apelles”: “After all, it’s not my fault that in real life the 
most dangerous places—bridges and crossings—are the most brightly lit” [Ведь я не виной 
тому, что в жизни сильнее всего освещаются опасные места: мосты и переходы] (CSP 
109–10; PSS 3:16).
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“I,” but rather a “third person” of the narrative—he.32 Still, the sense of inner 
vigilance—and his link to the transcendence—is not lost; rather it has shifted 
from the experience of personal passion to his vocation as an artist involved 
in the fate of the other, the third person:
The man who had been writing strolled up and down. He thought of many 
things. He thought of his art and how he might find the right path. He for-
got with whom he had been travelling, whom he had seen off, and to whom 
he was writing. (CSP 123)
Писавший прохаживался. Он думал о многом. Он думал о своем 
искусстве и о том, как ему выйти на правильную дорогу. Он забыл, 
с кем ехал, кого проводил, кому писал. (PSS 3:30)
Furthermore, there is an indication that his eyesight is beginning to find its 
focus even in everyday reality, but only by means of some deep realignment 
that focuses on his emerging art. With the gray dawn, the reader leaves the 
young protagonist on the platform, once more framed by the new complex-
ity of the light and darkness motif, but ready to buy a ticket for the onward 
journey:
The east was turning gray, and a perplexed and rapid dew settled on the 
face of all conscience, still plunged in deepest night. It was time to think 
about his ticket. The cocks were crowing and the ticket office was coming 
to life. (CSP 123)
Серел восток, и на лицо всей, еще в глубокую ночь погруженной 
совести выпадала быстрая, растерянная роса. Пора было подумать 
о билете. Пели петухи и оживала касса. (PSS 3:30)
If in Kant the synthesis between different layers of experience can be achieved 
by transcendent consciousness, Pasternak, by contrast, seems to suggest that a 
full synthesis is impossible to achieve within an isolated self, and that art—the 
creation of another self, of he rather than I—reflects the ongoing and open-
ended process of synthesis, initiated in Tula as a lifelong vocation. The young 
lyrical poet accepts the premises of this experience and the confusing contrast 
 32. Mossman notes the emphasis on the switch from the first to the third person and links 
this to the influence of Rilke in The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, where the switch between 
“I” and “he” is the structural device of the narrative (1972, 289). For the importance of this 
switch for Pasternak see also Pomorska (1975, 48).
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of perspectival angles, adjusting better to everyday reality, but remaining in 
considerable turmoil, while the switch to the “third” person may indicate the 
transition to a new genre, fiction with the third person(s), rather than the 
first-person lyricism of poetry.33
 The old actor’s sense of the eternal, by contrast with the young poet, mani-
fests itself from the very beginning of the narrative as his explicit and lifelong 
devotion to art—an aesthetic longing that starts to readmit personal memory 
only after a shocking meeting with an alien reality (an experimentation in 
violence by “film actors,” understood by the old man as free fantasy—a perfor-
mance that he detests and from which he is also excluded). The first indication 
of emotional reawakening takes place when he catches himself searching for 
someone to use a diminutive version of his name (Саввушка), and this need 
for dear ones persists until he experiences a living re-enactment of a meeting 
with his younger self in a deeply familiar celebration of homecoming:
And he gave a start when after five and twenty years he heard—just as 
he was supposed to—from behind that other partition the beloved joyful 
reply: “Yes, I am at home!” . . . The old man was stifled with silent sobbing. 
(CSP 125)
[И] вздрогнул, когда, как это полагалось, на расстоянии двух с поло-
виной десятков лет услыхал за той перегородкой милое, веселое: 
‘До-о-ма’ . . . Старика душили беззвучные рыданья. (PSS 3:32)
Furthermore, in his return to his youthful love, lost for so many years of his life 
behind that partition, the old man does not abandon his art:34 he experiences 
this meeting with his younger self as a play in which he is finally a master and 
where he can exhibit “a skill at illusion that a colleague might be proud of on 
such an occasion” [с иллюзией, которая соcтавила бы гордость иного 
его брата] (CSP 125; PSS 3:32). There is, then, textual indication that the old 
man, reversing the inner journey of the poet and finding his beloved Liubov’ 
Petrovna without abandoning his artistic self, achieves the unity denied the 
poet. This indication appears in the story, however, as supplied through the 
intrusion of yet another perspective—this time, the emergence of an authorial 
 33. It is noteworthy that Pasternak’s decision to write a novel is dated 1918 (the year of 
“Letters from Tula”): “In January 1918 at the Tsetlins’ Pasternak had told Tsvetaeva of an ambi-
tion to write a novel ‘with a love intrigue and a heroine in it—like Balzac,’ and by the summer 
he was showing the first drafts of it to friends and colleagues” (Barnes 1989, 269).
 34. This deeper synthesis between the personal and the artistic leads Gorelik to assert that 
“the old actor is the only artist of the story” (2000, 55).
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voice indicating the fictional nature of the narrative: “And like the main char-
acter, he too was in search of physical silence. He was the only one in the story 
to find it, having made another to speak through his own lips” [Он тоже, как 
главное лицо, искал физической тишины. В рассказе только он нашел 
ее, заставив своими устами говорить постороннего] (CSP 126; PSS 3:32; 
emphasis added). The age of the old man and his shaken sense of reality sug-
gest that this silence—this achievement of some unity between man and art—
is also an indication that his life journey is approaching a stage as finite as his 
longing for transcendence is infinite.35
 Without attempting to reconstruct a fuller picture of Pasternak’s philo-
sophical debt to his Neo-Kantian training in Marburg (a formidable task, 
necessitating in any case a very different focus of inquiry), one may suggest 
that Pasternak appears to accept the premises of Kant’s notion of appercep-
tion in several crucial ways. First, it is clear that for Pasternak-the-writer the 
world does not exist outside of the mind and that the mind, in fact, constitutes 
the world,36 and, second, that he, as artist, tends to employ multiple changing 
forms of perception and is drawn to the dramatization of processes in which 
the perspectives of phenomenal and transcendental “ego-consciousnesses” 
weave in and out of everyday reality. These multilayered and distinct spheres 
of perception are reflected in Pasternak’s narrative in constant shifts of focus 
that also include, as we have seen in the case of the poet, the changing pat-
terns of address in a movement away from the first person to a third-person 
narrative. Pasternak’s employment of these multiple perspectives in “Letters 
from Tula” reflects, therefore, his intentional and painstaking thematization 
of what is involved in Kantian apperception; he draws a process within each 
of his protagonists in which the empirical data of everyday reality and long-
ing for the eternal and infinite are being synthesized, realigned, and brought 
into new focus. However, if in Kant the synthetic unity of all perceived phe-
nomena is achieved by an autonomous transcendental ego, “a permanent 
spiritual substance underlying the fleeting succession of conscious experi-
ence,” inaccessible “to direct introspection, but rather inferred from intro-
 35. It is Mossman’s view that “the physical silence attained is figuratively that of a lifeless 
world bereft of an observer, deaf and muted [ . . . ] a silence under normal circumstances un-
available” (1972, 290). There is also a transcendent layer here, a performance in front of eternity, 
which in Pasternak’s later poems would be more forcefully introduced, when for example, prior 
to the emergence of Hamlet on the stage, “the sound is hushed” [Гул затих] (PSS 4:515), or in 
“Bakhanalia”: “How much courage is needed / In order to play in front of centuries” [Сколько 
надо отваги / чтоб играть на века] (PSS 4:183). The anticipation of “Hamlet” is noted in 
Hingley (1983, 63).
 36. The theme is identified by Fleishman as the phenomenological position of Husserl 
(1975, 79–126; 1977, 8–13).
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spective evidence” (Runes 1984, 88), one does not find a similar emphasis on 
autonomy in Pasternak. Reflecting upon the nature of art, Pasternak appears 
to revise Kant’s thought and to assert instead that the multiple strands of 
experience cannot be synthesized in the isolated, “pure, original, unchange-
able consciousness” as postulated by Kant (Runes 1984, 15), but must remain 
an ever-widening and living experience, inclusive of other selves—an artistic 
act that is always in play with the other, making “another to speak through 
one’s own lips” [заставив своими устами говорить постороннего] (CSP 
126; PSS 3:32).
 The complex philosophical intertext and Pasternak’s dialogical engage-
ment with its main precepts (rather than philosophical subservience) explain 
the disorienting and puzzling quality of the story—its employment of a suc-
cession of radically changing viewpoints never fully synthesized in the story 
and nuanced so carefully37 that they cannot be easily grasped and processed by 
the reader. The first essential emphasis, then, is on dislocation and confusion 
in perception. For instance, as the poet looks, in a highly impractical manner, 
for a mailbox into which he can drop the letters to his beloved who is already 
slowly fading from his memory, Pasternak experiments widely with constant 
shifts of focus from inward (suggesting a close-up of a reflection in water or 
of seats banging in the train, that is, registering in an almost simultaneous 
observation two very different locations) to outward (an emphasis upon look-
ing from a great distance), as well as moving the perspective from above (the 
height of the stars) to below (the trains “lying” upon the earth as if depicted 
from a very high viewpoint), and crossways over a large distance, making it 
impossible to suggest who is looking “beyond” or why the scene is observed 
from so “far away”:
Five hours passed. There was quite an extraordinary stillness. It became 
impossible to tell where the grass ended and where the coal began. A star 
twinkled. Not a living soul remained by the pumphouse. Water showed 
black through a moldering cavity in a moss-covered swamp. The reflection 
of the birch tree trembled there. It quivered feverishly. But this was far far 
away. Far far away. Apart from the birch tree there was not a soul on the 
road.
 37. These separated levels of perception within a single narrative are reflected in a tech-
nique responsible for the difficulty associated with Pasternak’s early prose (and often under-
stood as Futuristic incomprehensible trans-sense or fragmentary Cubism). For a more sub-
stantial reading of Pasternak’s prose, the Neo-Kantian “rhapsody of perceptions” waiting to be 
transformed into the “synthetic unity of the phenomena” should be introduced alongside these 
concepts (KTE 101; trans. Poma-Denton 11).
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 There was quite extraordinary stillness. Lifeless boilers and coaches lay 
on the flat earth like piles of low storm clouds on a windless night. [ . . . ] 
The Tula trolley line came up from the town. The reversible backrests of 
the seating banged. The last to alight was a man carrying letters, which 
jutted from the wide pockets of his broad overcoat. The others made their 
way into the waiting room. But this man remained outside of the building 
looking for the green letterbox. But no one could tell where the grass ended 
and where the coal began. [ . . . ] The night uttered a long-drawn-out gut-
tural sound—then everything was silent. It was all far, far away, beyond the 
horizon. (CSP 120)
Прошло пять часов. Была необычайная тишина. На глаз нельзя 
было сказать, где трава, где уголь. Мерцала звезда. Больше не было 
ни живой души у водокачки. В гнилом продаве мшаника чернела 
вода. В нем дрожало отраженье березки. Ее лихорадило. Но это было 
очень очень далеко. [ . . . ] Кроме нее, не было ни души на дороге.
 Была необычайная тишина. Бездыханные котлы и вагоны 
лежали на плоской земле, похожие на скопления низких туч в без-
ветренные ночи. [ . . . ] Последний вагон Тульской конки подошел 
из города. Захлопали откидные спинки скамей. Последним сошел 
человек с письмами, торчавшими из широких карманов широкого 
пальто. Остальные направились в зал, к кучке весьма странной 
молодежи, шумно ужинавшей в конце. Этот остался за фасадом, 
ища зеленого ящика. Но нельзя было сказать, где трава, где уголь. 
[ . . . ] Ночь издала долгий горловой звук—и все стихло. Это было 
очень, очень далеко, за горизонтом. (PSS 3:27)
When placed, however, in the context of Kant’s “transcendental apperception” 
(the “ultimate foundation of the synthetic unity of experience” [Runes 1984, 
15]), these narrative patterns show that Pasternak as artist and storyteller 
portrays the capacity for expansion in human awareness, as he dramatizes 
the angles of perception from the viewpoints of multiple separated aspects of 
“ego-consciousness” and searches for an experience that can facilitate for his 
protagonists the need to integrate external phenomena within an emerging 
sense of self. In contrast to Kant, Pasternak sees art (desired by his poet) and 
“play” (practiced by his actor) as essential to this process, and yet he proceeds 
to distinguish two opposed manifestations of this process: a play calling forth 
inner alignment and further ongoing synthesis that uncovers moral concerns, 
and a bohemian, indeed fraudulent, play-acting, dependent upon imitation 
that misses or bypasses self-consciousness and conscience.
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4.3 Searching for synthesis: 
 Art, play-acting, and film actors from Moscow
The disorientation in immediate historical reality, sensed by the story’s pro-
tagonists, permits Pasternak to comment upon the revolutionary spirit of 
the time while displaying his rarely recognizable sly humor (aligned with 
his better-known political sense and its perilous balance of insight and cau-
tion). The uncertain sense of historical reality—the time of troubles [смутное 
время]38—is drawn in the story both as a state of incomprehension (com-
municated to the readers), an intimation of the ongoing, disturbing acts of 
violence and murder, and as the subject of the film practiced by the actors. 
In Doctor Zhivago, this uncontrollable anxiety of the inhabitants of Moscow 
in 1918 will be identified and named in the narrative: “The inevitable was 
approaching. Winter was near and in the human world that very same state of 
death that winter brings to nature was in the air, finalized, decided upon and 
incessantly talked about” [Нависало неотвратимое. Близилась зима, а в 
человеческом мире то, похожее на зимнее обмирание, предрешенное, 
которое носилось в воздухе и было у всех на устах] (Zhivago 183, trans. 
altered; PSS 4:182). In “Letters from Tula,” however, Pasternak experiments 
with the creation of the very spirit of anxiety through the eyes of two people, 
alienated by the very nature of who they are: the poet who has not yet dis-
covered his voice39 and the actor who is aging in an alien world. Tula, a place 
of major upheavals during the civil war, was to experience the revolutionary 
onslaught in spurts of activity and short periods of rest40—a network of rail-
 38. “Letters from Tula,” composed in 1918, Russia’s turbulent year that followed upon the 
altogether unprecedented 1917, cannot be placed alongside such Revolutionary works as Blok’s 
“Twelve” or, for instance, John Reed’s Ten Days that Shook the World (1919). What happens 
instead in Pasternak’s tale is, above all, an event that had already finished before it properly 
started and was decisive for the provinces (at the beginning of the story)—an event that needs 
to be grasped via reflections. As Pasternak notes in Doctor Zhivago, the revolution was made 
in the cities, which, nonetheless, suffered most from what they had engendered: “The people in 
the cities were as helpless as children in the face of the unknown [ . . . ], although it was itself 
the offspring of the city and the creation of city dwellers” [Люди в городах были беспомощ-
ны, как дети, перед лицом близящейся неизвестности [ . . . ], хотя сама была детищем 
города и созданием горожан] (Zhivago 183; PSS 4:182).
 39. In his recent popular biography, Bykov suggests that Pasternak, in love with Elena Vi-
nogradov, did not notice the Revolution, and quotes here the support of E. B. Pasternak in his 
interpretation of Gladkov’s memoirs (2006, 147).
 40. Tula, 200 kilometers south of Moscow, was a strategically important location for rail 
access because of the River Upa. In 1896, Tula became a major center for the production of 
armaments and weapons, and for this reason one of the centers of active Bolshevik propaganda 
during the Revolution. According to Soviet historians, the membership of workers in the Bol-
shevik party in 1917 grew from 22 people (in February) to 1500 (in October), and on October 
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roads and a major strategic center with its famous Tula Arms Plant [Тульский 
оружейный завод], but also a province in a state of uncertainty, its future 
determined by the country’s capitals. The fact that both the poet and the old 
man are disturbed by film actors who appear to be playing some major his-
torical drama of mutiny and execution should, therefore, be sifted through 
the unfocused lenses of this ongoing anxiety during a period of unnamed his-
torical turmoil. The uncertainty between reflection and reality that permeates 
the narrative permits Pasternak to approach an otherwise dangerous politi-
cal theme—the description of an arrogant crowd that has taken the action 
from the Kremlin to Tula, where they are now playing out some “violent” 
episode involving “Bolotnikov and Peter,” spectacles of mutiny and execution 
described, the poet surmises, in the historical accounts of Kluchevsky:
They act as if they were geniuses, declaiming and hurling phrases at each 
other [ . . . ]. They have been shooting The Time of Troubles in the Kremlin 
and in the places where the ramparts were.
 Read Klyuchevsky’s account—I have not read it myself, but I think 
there must be some episode with Bolotnikov and Peter. This is what 
brought them to the River Upa. I find they have set the scene exactly and 
shot it from another bank. (CSP 121; trans. altered)
Они гениальничают, декламируют, бросаются друг в дружку фра-
зами [ . . . ]. Ставили «Смутное Время» в Кремле и где были валы.
 Прочти по Ключевскому,—не читал, думаю, должен быть эпи-
зод с Петром и Болотниковым. Это и вызвало их на Упу. Узнал, что 
поставили точка в точку и сняли с другого берега. (PSS 3:28)
The drowning of Ivan Bolotnikov’s followers in the River Upa in 1607, which, 
according to the poet’s oblique remark, was shot by the film crew “from the 
other bank” with  professional exactitude [точка в точку], belongs to some 
of the most disturbing pages of  Russian history, and yet the violent content 
of this historical reference is overlooked, as most of Pasternak’s commenta-
tors accept this strange, unfocused frame at face value, as a straightforward 
31 the arsenal of arms was confiscated by the revolutionary committee and sent to Moscow. 
After that time, Tula became the center of the civil war, a process that reached its zenith in 1919 
when Denikin’s army descended on Tula, attempting to destroy the “principal source of the 
supply of the armaments for the Soviet army” or, as Trotsky termed it, “the jewels of the Soviet 
Republic.”
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account41 of the poet’s dislike of film actors.42 However, it is equally probable 
that Pasternak uses the context of film and acting, as well as the historical 
memory of mutiny and mayhem in Tula, to develop, for the first time in his 
prose, an opposition between two kinds of self: the imitator, ready to copy acts 
of murder and violence, if these become fashionable, and the creative self43—
and to find his original voice by approaching this contrast alongside Kant’s 
theory of apperception.
 It will be helpful to sketch, however briefly, the centrality of this theme 
in Pasternak’s later writing. In Doctor Zhivago the opposition between artist 
and imitator appears in one of the novel’s most startling scenes—Yuri’s meet-
ing with Pasha Strelnikov, once again at a railway station. The gift of the fiery 
revolutionary is identified as his ability to copy, so typical (and necessary for 
survival) in those turbulent years:
This talent, which showed itself in his every movement, might well be the 
talent of imitation. In those days everyone modeled himself on someone 
else—they imitated heroes of history, or the men who had stuck their 
imagination by winning fame in the fighting at the front or in the streets, 
or those who had great prestige with the people, or this or that comrade 
who had won distinction, or simply one another. (Zhivago 249)
Дар, проглядывавший во всех его движениях, мог быть даром 
подражания. Тогда все кому-нибудь подражали. Прославленным 
героям истории. Фигурам, виденным на фронте или в дни волнений 
в городах, и поразившим воображение.
 41. Apart from the actors representing episodes of rebellion and execution, there is also the 
reality of the mutiny of 1607 in the name of the self-appointed “Prince” Peter (hence “the time 
of troubles”), re-enacted in 1918. The mutiny of 1607 near Tula was led by Ivan Bolotnikov, and 
Bolotnikov’s army gave itself up to Prince Schuisky in October 1607 (PSSCom 3:541), when most 
of Bolotnikov’s men were drowned in the River Upa. The device of ahistorical re-enactment is 
also reminiscent of Rilke’s The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, in which the ghosts of the past 
move in and out of reality. In “Letters from Tula,” however, scholars tend to see “the depressing 
sight of the amateurish attempts by the bunch of film actors to re-enact the ‘Time of Troubles’ 
and then pick up this record of ‘history’ in their suitcases” (Barnes 1989, 268). Fleishman speaks 
of Pasternak aiming at “Mayakovsky, who deemed it necessary to take a visible role in revolu-
tionary affairs” (1990a, 94).
 42. The acceptance of film actors prima facie contributes to the perception of Pasternak’s 
early prose as highly idiosyncratic and more preoccupied with Mayakovsky’s actual participa-
tion in the film versions of either Martin Eden (Barnes 1989, 268) or The Young Lady and a 
Hooligan [Барышня и хулиган] (PSSCom 3:541) than with the major historical upheavals of 
Russia (and Tula as its microcosm). Fleishman argues that “Tolstoy, like Pasternak, had come 
to consider film as a profanation of art” (1990a, 95).
 43. Hingley calls this “a study of the false and genuine in art” (1983, 63).
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 Наиболее признанным народным авторитетам. Вышедшим в 
первые ряды товарищам. Просто друг другу. (PSS 4:248)
The significance of the episode, presenting the highly unified and con-
centrated personality of Strelnikov,44 emphasizes that not all “synthesized 
phenomena” can awaken an independent and original (and for Kant, tran-
scendental) self. More often than not, surrounded by so many indigestible 
reflections during Russia’s “horrifying years,” the participants of these events 
do not develop an original synthesizing response, but choose instead to imi-
tate others, and survive the turbulence of reality in this chameleon-like state 
just as well or, perhaps, even better.45 In Zhivago, in fact, Pasternak frequently 
returns to the declamatory, unnatural, and imitative characters of political 
figures, and his female heroine, Lara Antipova, even attributes the cause of 
Strelnikov’s downfall to his inability to see through the stage rhetoric of their 
times and to become infected by the general societal malaise that reinforces 
the herd instinct of “imitators”:
[T]hey must all sing in chorus, and live by other people’s notions, notions 
that were being crammed down everybody’s throat. And then there arose 
the power of the glittering phrase, first the Tsarist, then the revolutionary.
 This social evil became an epidemic. It was catching. And it affected 
everything, nothing was left untouched by it. Our home, too, became 
infected. Something went wrong in it. Instead of being natural and sponta-
neous as we had always been, we began to be idiotically pompous with each 
other. Something showy, artificial, forced crept into our conversation—you 
felt you had to be clever in a certain way about certain world-important 
themes. (Zhivago 404)
[Т]еперь надо петь с общего голоса и жить чужими, всем навязан-
ными представлениями. Стало расти владычество фразы, сначала 
монархической—потом революционной.
 Это общественное заблуждение было всеохватывающим, при-
липчивым. Все подпадало под его влияние. Не устоял против его 
пагубы и наш дом. Что-то пошатнулось в нем. Вместо безотчетной 
живости, всегда у нас царившей, доля дурацкой декламации прони-
 44. There is an emphasis in the description on the fact that Strelnikov is a completed “man-
ifestation of will” [этот человек представляет законченное явление воли] (Zhivago 248; PSS 
4:248).
 45. See Witt (2000a, 97–105) on mimicry in Doctor Zhivago.
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кла и в наши разговоры, какое-то показное, обязательное умнича-
нье на обязательные мировые темы. (PSS 4:401)
This participation in history as a form of imitative role-playing constitutes a 
recurrent theme in Pasternak’s poetry dedicated to these revolutionary years, 
when, for instance, he speaks of Russia’s cultural pre-revolutionary milieu as 
performers about to leave the theatrical stage in “Lofty Malady” [Высокая 
болезнь]46 and Vladimir Lenin47 as a new figure exploding onto that stage 
(PSS 1:259).
 Thus, it is more fitting to suggest that the film actors, disturbing irritants 
for both the poet and the old actor, are, in fact, indistinguishable in their roles 
from the actual revolutionaries who, after their unparalleled performance in 
the Kremlin, continued to exercise their craftsmanship in Tula. Employing the 
persona of the disoriented observer, Pasternak accuses these contemporary 
trendsetters, political actors and the revolutionary crowd with their ideologies 
and “isms,” of behaving like inferior actors, armed with the worst pretensions, 
and the poet’s careful erasing of this thought in his letter indicates both his 
anger and a need for caution: “I have not said who they are: the worst form of 
the bohemians [carefully crossed out]” [Я не сказал, кто это. Худший вид 
богемы. (Тщательно зачеркнуто)] (CSP 121; PSS 4:29). Moreover, there is 
a trace of the unexpectedly subtle humor of the situation where appearances 
and reality blend as the young poet thinks that these performers of The Time 
of Troubles must have hidden parts of their costumes in their suitcases (“Now 
they have the seventeenth century stowed away in their suitcases while all the 
remnants linger on over the dirty tables” [Теперь семнадцатый век рассо-
ван у них по чемоданам, все же остальное виснет над грязным столом] 
[CSP 121; PSS 4:29]).
 This humorous touch ensures that the mixture of horror and indignation 
at the actual scenes of violence does not automatically signal a sharp political 
commentary; instead, the uncertain events remain obscured, suggesting either 
a film narrative or the unleashing of ancient ghosts and memories locked 
within the surrounding landscape. The poet’s observation—“The Polish 
 46.  “We were a music on ice. / I speak here about the whole milieu / With which I meant 
to leave the stage and will do so” [Мы были музыкой во льду. / Я говорю про всю среду, / 
С которой я имел в виду / Сойти со сцены, и сойду] (PSS 1:255–56).
 47. In the description of Lenin, there is an uncertainty whether the leader of the Revolution 
is an author, approaching his art from the standpoint of the first person: “Then having met him 
in reality / I thought and thought without end / About his authorship and his right / To dare 
from the first person narrative” [Тогда его увидев въяве, / Я думал, думал без конца / Об 
авторстве его и праве / Дерзать от первого лица] (PSSCom 1:517).
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women are horrid, and the boyars’ children even more dreadful” [Ужасны 
полячки, и боярские дети страшней] (CSP 121; PSS 3:28)—points, there-
fore, to the reality of actual historical events of 1607 and yet obscures the 
reference, for the old actor rummaging “through his own repertoire,” finds 
“no such chronicle there” (CSP 124; PSS 3:31). The old man’s terror in front 
of a scene of obvious execution (be it in film or in reality) is again depicted 
through a multitude of lenses: the old man observes an event, which he, well-
trained in theater, understands as lacking a good script; he leaves the scene 
saddened that it is not yet a performance, but rather “some free flight of fan-
tasy” [Старик [ . . . ] пошел опечаленный прочь с лужайки, когда узнал, 
что это вообще не пьеса, а покудова вольная еще фантазия] (CSP 124; 
PSS 3:31). The freedom of fantasy, however, is clearly directed toward scenes 
of mass murder that the old man understands again as free re-enactment of 
some historical drama, safely removed from everyday reality, although the 
battle-axes (obviously rifles) they use reflect no light:48 “he first saw the boyars 
and governors milling on the far shore, and the commoners leading the bound 
men and knocking off their hats into the nettles, he saw the Poles clinging to 
laburnum bushes on the scarp, and their battle-axes, which gave no response 
and no bright ring” [Сначала, при виде бояр и воевод, колыхавшихся на 
том берегу, и черных людей подводивших связанных и сшибавших с 
них шапки в крапиву, при виде поляков, цеплявшихся за ракитовые 
кусты по обрыву, и их секир, нечувствительных к солнцу и не издавав-
ших звона] (CSP 124; PSS 4:31; emphasis added).
 This covert and ambiguous identification of the imitative historical “per-
formers” with the “bohemian artistic crowd of the worst sort” is, of course, 
not merely a cautious political statement or an unsuccessful artistic device.49 
 48. In Doctor Zhivago, Lara speaks about the interdependence between the daily violence of 
wartime and revolution and the loss of personal viewpoint. Repetition and mimicry are the root 
of the loss of morality: “And then there was the jump from this peaceful, naïve moderation to 
blood and tears, to mass insanity. [ . . . ] The main misfortune, the root of all evil to come, was 
the loss of confidence in the value of one’s own opinion. People imagined that it was out of date 
to follow one’s own moral sense, that they must all sing in chorus, and live by other people’s no-
tions. [ . . . ]” [И вдруг этот скачок из безмятежной, невинной размеренности в кровь и 
вопли, повальное безумие и одичание [ . . . ] Главной бедой, корнем будущего зла была 
утрата веры в цену собственного мнения. Вообразили, что время, когда следовали 
внушениям нравственного чутья, миновало, что теперь надо петь с общего голоса и 
жить чужими, всем навязанными представлениями] (Zhivago 404; PSS 4:401).
 49. In his letter to Polonsky in the summer of 1921, Pasternak basically recreates the scene 
of his own aversion to the political position of the avant-garde artists that is virtually identical 
to the stance of the poet, and he mentions 1917 as the last year of their common journey. His 
own “sea sickness,” that is, the mixture of nausea and horror, is mentioned in the context of the 
“sea of violence” [море произвола] and he puts a significant emphasis on his own “isolation” 
from the “originality” of the artistic crowd: “Until 1917 I had a path externally common with 
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Pasternak’s participation in the Futurist movement was becoming ever more 
problematic as he began to view the world of politics and that of revolutionary 
futurist art as interconnected, if not ideologically identical.50 Still in 1918, the 
story’s employment of film actors indicates that he was still hoping that better 
spectacles (and actors) might soon appear on the stage—a hope that would 
not last long.51 Pasternak’s lifetime experience, in fact, was to observe the pro-
cess by means of which ethical and aesthetic judgments in the worlds of state-
sanctioned art and politics were to become based entirely upon the imitation 
of fraudulent principles, and as a result any pathways to the inner self and to 
the personal capacity for independent judgment were entirely closed. Needless 
to say, these patterns were in direct contrast to the Kantian view of appercep-
tion that situates true moral judgment in the autonomous transcendental self.
 The relationship between art and the awakened voice of conscience, 
entailed in the opposition between the two types of play-acting in life and 
art—imitative and creative—was only to deepen in Pasternak’s writing, with 
“Letters from Tula” disclosing his first artistic draft that also carried the most 
immediate imprint of his philosophical studies. Just as Heine’s passage into 
the dark world of Pisa in “The Mark of Apelles” echoes the Platonic philoso-
pher’s return to the cave, “Letters from Tula” presents yet another page of the 
writer’s apologia for art’s primacy over philosophy. When put into the context 
of the Kantian theory of apperception, art’s capacity to mediate and synthe-
size the deepest layers of reality52 is theoretically grounded and demonstrated. 
Moreover, the focus of “Letters from Tula” on the synthetic processes of con-
sciousness entails the obligation of the artist to address all aspects of percep-
tion presented to him, and this includes questions of morality and conscience 
that are necessitated by scenes of cruelty and violence imposed on the eyewit-
nesses. Hermann Cohen’s work with Kant’s “synthetic unity” and his writing 
all, but my fatal peculiarity [роковое своеобразие] brought me to an impasse, and I alone, it 
seems [ . . . ] realized that logical end into which our era’s originality in quotation marks leaves 
us” (PSS 7:371).
 50. As Nerler observes, “Mayakovsky, alas, was one of the first poets who initiated the mu-
tual infiltration between the Cheka and the writers’ world” (2010, 26). See also Gordin about 
the “Futurists serving in the Cheka” (1993, 8)
 51. See a careful account of Pasternak’s alienation from Futurism in Fleishman (1980, 
12–43).
 52. Answering a questionnaire from the Soviet magazine The Writers’ Watch in 1927 [“На 
литературном посту” 5–6], Pasternak defines the “classical” writer as a person who can syn-
thesize reality within an approximation of a holistic vision that can be accepted as the world-
view of his epoch [Под классиком я разумею писателя, который в свoeм творчестве 
дает пластическое подобие цельного мировоззрения. Классическая же литература есть 
совокупность таких произведений и тенденций, которые впоследствии принимаются 
за мировоззрение эпохи] (PSS 5:216).
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on philosophy, law, religion, and aesthetics no longer present themselves in 
this context as irrelevant or “safe” meditations53—rather, Cohen’s philosophy 
helps to address as if anew the traditional opposition between aesthetics and 
morality, or between the “beautiful” and the “good,” as part of the phenomenal 
world open to the synthetic processes of apperception. Nor is Tula’s landscape 
indifferent to these problems, for it remembers, as the poet too is about to 
recollect in the course of a single night, that its actual spaciousness had been 
transformed not only by Bolotnikov and “the time of troubles,” but by Lev Tol-
stoy’s writing, which testified to an irreducible “territory of conscience”—to 
the inescapable tension between “the beautiful” and “the good.”
4.4 Between to kalon and to agathon: 
  Cohen’s Neo-Kantianism, the fire of conscience, and  
Lev Tolstoy’s gift of perception
Once the purpose of sharply changing perspectives is understood as a prin-
cipal frame of the story (and a frame rooted in Pasternak’s dialogue with the 
key philosophical questions of his day), the psychological realities of his pro-
tagonists lose their apparent banality, and the story’s landscapes of different 
phenomenal perspectives no longer appear hopelessly disjointed. Rather, their 
disjointedness becomes a necessary precondition for the living contradictory 
force of creative consciousness. Like no other Russian writer of his generation, 
Pasternak was thoroughly prepared to address the relationship between the 
moral and aesthetic, and to bring into close proximity highly complex philo-
sophical, political, ethical, and literary concerns.
 The relationship between the moral and aesthetic was not only the leading 
frame of Kant’s Third Critique and its insistence that universal agreement in 
judgments of the sublime rests on an appeal to moral feeling (§29, 265–66); 
these questions constituted the very kernel of the philosophy of Hermann 
Cohen, and, more generally, stood for the intellectual signature of the Mar-
burg school. Cohen’s own work in law and religion stemmed from his ardent 
loyalty to the unity of the transcendent, the sublime, and the moral, reflecting 
in this the Platonic affirmation of the kalon (the beautiful) and agathon (the 
good) as the organizing forms for the experience of the infinite.
 53. According to his letters to Shtikh from July 8 and 11, 1912, Pasternak viewed Cohen’s 
“logic, the idea of reality, integration, self-consciousness of the state” as a harmonious and 
beautiful work of genius [его логика, его идея реальности, интеграла, самосознания го-
сударства], but a safe narcotic [безобидный наркотик] (PSS 7:118, 122). In 1918, Cohen’s 
“idealism,” surprisingly apropos, would no longer provide a safe haven.
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 Cohen’s stature as a thinker, his deep devotion to the reality of both tran-
scendent categories and logical argument, need no introduction, and yet it is 
helpful to recollect how every step of his argument presupposes the longing of 
the finite for the infinite. In this longing, moral principles draw the “external 
or heterogeneous” infinity into the immediacy of aesthetic purity:
The finite is not happy to remain finite, but has the courage to overcome 
the distance from infinity. The limitations of the finite are eliminated, 
there is an aspiration to elevation (Erhebung) to infinity. Infinity must not 
remain something alien, external. It may well be that it must be and remain 
something transcendent. This is unimportant, as long as it must not be 
something external or heterogenous. But is what happens in this aesthetic 
sublimity (Erhebenheit) arrogant, or presumptuous (Uberhebung)? This can-
not be right, since presumption is contrary to moral law, but the latter is the 
indispensable premise, concerning matter and method, of aesthetic purity. 
The sublime thrust towards infinity is not at all presumptuous, otherwise 
sublimity will be presumptuous as well as elevation. (ARG I:266–67; trans. 
Poma-Denton 144; emphasis added)
Cohen’s argument that aesthetic and cultural products belong in the moral 
domain opposes Marx’s view of culture as by-products of economic relations, 
a position Cohen found particularly misleading:54 “It is simply not true that 
the compulsion of nature and especially of animal nature in man produced 
those achievements of culture which can be only hypocritically called moral 
culture, and should rather be labeled economic” (Ethic 37; trans. in Munk 
2005, 20). The loss of presumption in the “sublime thrust towards infinity” 
presupposes in Cohen the heavy weight of ethical self-judgment, just as the 
need for “the courage to overcome the distance from infinity” emphasizes the 
ensuing difficulty of perseverance.
 Pasternak, as his student notes (and all his later work) indicate, was 
stirred by these views, emphasizing for himself the need to push conscious-
ness toward new creative solutions and new boundaries, without minimizing 
the power of contradictory impulses (operating in “obverse proportions” and 
directions) and thereby inflaming consciousness and awakening creativity. 
Thus, he jots down the following under the subtitle “Towards Urtheilskraft–
Kant” [К Urtheilskraft—Kaнта]:
 54. Holzhey argues that for Cohen the man’s adoration of himself would end in “anthro-
pological naturalism,” against which Cohen defends his “ethical idealism”—“the notion of a 
human being who makes it his task to ‘eternally’ perfect himself ” (2005, 20).
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Any construction emerging from transcendental conditions serves as an 
antagonistic impulse towards a problem only when we enter (think of) 
life as such, in whatever form it is presented; then the construction of the 
object and its non-material residue enter into an obverse relationship. The 
more clear is the organism, as an object of study, the less clear it becomes 
as a unifying life force; and only thinking of its living quality, do we break 
through the sphere of its object-like materiality; the sphere of experience. 
[ . . . ]
 But in creativity, immanent apperceptions, the whole Milky Way of the 
centers of creative unities, the incomprehensibility of its inflamed systems 
[ . . . ].
Конструкция из тр[ансцендент]альн[ых] условий возможности 
становится антагонистическим толчком к проблеме лишь когда 
мы мыслим жизнь как таковую, где бы то ни было представлен-
ную; тогда конструктивность предмета и его непредметный оста-
ток обратно пропорциональны по своей понятности. Чем яснее нам 
организм, как предмeт познания, тем он непонятнее, как единство 
жизни; и тогда мысля его жизненность, мы прорываем сферу пред-
метности, сферу опыта. [ . . . ] Т.е. телеологический принцип антaго-
ничен принципу предметности. [ . . . ]
 Но в творчестве имманентные апперцепции, целый Млечный 
путь центров творческого объединения, тумaнности их воспален-
ных систем [ . . . ] . (Lehrjahre II:139–40)
The notes in his Lehrjahre provide, of course, only a superficial demonstration 
of what must have been in reality a deep intrinsic conviction, reinforced by the 
Russian pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary cultural scenes, that diversity is 
both a challenge and the fodder for a creative thinker.
 In “Letters from Tula,” Pasternak does little to dilute the complexity of the 
intellectual and moral intertext, as he brings together in the consciousness of 
his poet dispersed phenomenological data that are infused by the memory 
of his lost beloved, confusion, pangs of conscience, abhorrence of violence, 
revulsion, fear, shame, the need to find truth, and the need to write—all of this 
constituting the challenging (and necessary) preconditions for the flame of 
creativity,55 “the whole Milky Way of the centers of creative unities, the incom-
prehensibility of its inflamed systems” [целый Млечный путь центров 
 55. Cohen, after Kant, saw this process in somewhat milder terms: the “rhapsody of per-
ceptions” longing to be transformed into the “synthetic unity of the phenomena” (KTE 101; 
trans. Poma-Denton 11).
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творческого объединения, тумaнности их воспаленных [ . . . ] систем] 
(Lehrjahre II:139). Contradictory data that cannot be easily unified communi-
cate an intense pressure capable of igniting the objects it touches. In the face of 
deeply troubling historical events, Pasternak’s poet is not only shocked, smit-
ten, and pierced; when the difficult April night obscures all available sources 
of light, his conscience, unable to work through the startling contradictory 
data, is set aflame:56
“O night; all is not over yet; scorch me to cinder; that word that thrust 
through all accumulated dross, burn, burn bright and clear, the forgotten, 
angry, fiery word ‘conscience’ [heavily underscored with a line that tears 
through the paper in places]. [ . . . ]
 Now for the first, for the very first, time since the distant years of child-
hood I am consumed with fire [crossed out].”
 Another fresh attempt. The letter remains unposted. (CSP 121–22)
“Терзай, терзай меня, ночь, не все еще, пали дотла, гори, гори ясно, 
светло, прорвавшее засыпь, забытое, гневное, огненное слово 
‘совесть’ (Под ним черта, продравшая местами бумагу.) [ . . . ]
 ‘В первый, в первый раз с далеких детских лет я сгораю’” (зачер-
кнуто все).
 Новая попытка. Письмо остается неотосланным. (PSS 3:28)
Oppressed by disunity, the poet does not merely wail in self-pity (“I still 
understand nothing. So strange it is, so terrible” [Ничего еще не понимаю. 
Так странно; так страшно] [CSP 121; PSS 3:28]). The emphasis upon horror 
may not be, after all, so much out of place: the young poet in the story and, 
by extension, his young author, understand on this night—with absolute clar-
ity—that they are destined to fulfill their vocation in hostile historical times 
among hostile co-travelers, from whom they are, at this point, indistinguish-
able: “‘Colleague,’ the scum had said. Yes, indeed, and he was right! Here was 
the witness’s evidence for the prosecution” [‘Коллега,’—сказал этот подо-
нок. Да. Прав. Это свидетельское показательство обвинения] (CSP 122; 
PSS 3:29). This sense of reality acquires the force of a prison sentence (“the 
witness’s evidence for the prosecution”), and the echoes from Plato’s cave may 
not be altogether out of place. What is demanded now from the young poet is 
not so much a unified perception, but rather a decision to accept his alienation 
 56. For the intertextual echoes of the flaming heart, “cor ardens,” tradition in the Russian 
Silver Age, see Proskurina (2001, 196–213).
146 | Chapter 4
and to suspend all the nominations and ambitions that belong to the sur-
rounding world.57 Thus, “a line [underneath the word conscience] that tears 
through the paper” [под ним черта, прорвавшая местами бумагу] (CSP 
121; PSS 3:28) has turned into a fire58 that burns “through all the accumulated 
dross” [прорвавшая засыпь] (CSP 121; PSS 3:28), operating in the text as a 
significant textual marker: burning through the protective construction of 
the first person, it levels the field of perception. Indicating the birth of a new 
genre,59 the fire reduces to ashes Romantic self-aggrandizement (and senti-
mental self-pity) and brings the poet to a new artistic vision—a third-person 
discourse, conceived, or so it seems, as a cure for the language of his own time 
that so favors the presumptuous pose of the poet.60 While reformulating the 
poet’s future, the fire does little, however, to his surroundings, indicating that 
the personal call of conscience has not as yet begun its hopeless task of dis-
pelling the oppressive “putrefaction” of the surroundings where the strips of 
light,61 nonetheless, do not arrest their assault on darkness:
While these lines were being written, nothing changed in the entire space 
of conscience. From it rose smells of putrefaction and of clay. Far, far away, 
from its farthest extremity, a birch tree gleamed and a cavity in the swamp 
showed up like a fallen earring. Strips of light broke from within the waiting 
room and [ . . . ] squirmished, revolting together. (CSP 123; trans. altered)
Ничто не изменилось на всем пространстве совести, пока писались 
эти строки. От нее несло гнилостностью и глиной. Далеко, далеко, с 
того ее края, мерцала березка, и, как упавшая серьга, обозначался в 
 57. See Fleishman on Pasternak’s disagreement with Mayakovsky about the public role of 
the poet (1990a, 94–95).
 58. Here Pasternak brings several philosophical traditions together. The fire imagery in 
(and outside of) Plato’s cave as well as Kant’s notion of moral categories ingrained upon the 
transcendental ego and understood as moral imperatives, contribute here to a complex literary 
intertext.
 59. Zholkovsky notes the correlation between flame and ecstatic awakening in Pasternak’s 
poetry, his “transformation: passage into a new state, taking off the mask and, on occasion, 
metamorphosis, connected with fire” [преображение: переход в новое, срывание маски, 
иногда перевоплощение, связанное с огнем] (1994, 286).
 60. See Fleishman’s view that the poet sees in the actors “the same falseness he has detected 
in himself. The conclusion he reaches is devastating: he must break immediately with poetry, 
since it distorts the truth” (1990a, 93).
 61. In “Letters from Tula” Pasternak appears to experiment with the descriptions of sev-
eral forms of energy, with inflaming, magnetic, and electrifying forces: departing sunlight, the 
power of the train engine in the beginning of the story, the flame of conscience, a “lever that sets 
the whole scene in motion,” the dance of compass needles, the putrefying smell of corruption, 
and the rebellion of the strips of light.
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болотце продав. Вырываясь из зала наружу, падали полосы света на 
коночный пол [ . . . ]. Эти полосы буянили. (PSS 3:30)
The image of the flame of conscience, born out of the pressure of contradic-
tory impulses within the poet and still too weak to pierce the darkness, clari-
fies to some extent the identity of the force that Pasternak often discusses in 
his work: the force, distinct from the force of light, born, nonetheless in cre-
ative perception in response to the accumulated challenging multiplicity of 
surrounding phenomena. Its power of ignition, its combustible intensity,62 
assisted Heine in his journey in Pisa; in the darkness of “The Mark of Apelles,” 
as he himself attests to Camilla: “a man flares up in the light of the flickering 
rays” [человек вспыхивает, озаренный тревожными огнями] (CSP 110; 
PSS 3:16; emphasis added). In “Some Propositions,” sections 2 and 3, Pas-
ternak discusses the piercing power of phosphorescent light from within (or 
behind the perception) and then compares the book to the fire of conscience:
[ . . . ] It should always be one of the audience and have the clearest, tru-
est, most perceptive view of all [ . . . ] hiding in the gallery, unrecognized, 
hardly aware that it cannot fail to give itself away and that when it hides in 
the corner it is stricken with translucency and phosphorescence as though 
with some disease [and that hiding and biting nails, it illuminates and 
blinds, from its back x-rayed by Lord God].
[ . . . ]
A book is a cube-shaped chunk of blazing, smoking conscience—nothing 
more. (CSP 260)
[ . . . ] Ему следует всегда быть в зрителях и глядеть всех чище, вос-
приимчивей и верней [ . . . ] тонуть в райке, в безвестности, почти не 
ведая, что на нeм шапка горит и что, забившееся в угол, оно поро-
ждено светопрозрачностью и фосфоресценцией, как некоторой 
болезнью [и что таясь и кусая ногти, оно сверкает и слепит, из-за 
спины рентгенируемое Господом Богом].63
[ . . . ]
Книга есть кубический кусок горячей, дымящейся совести—и 
больше ничего. (PSS 3:24)
 62. See here the beginning of the poem “Marburg”: “I shuddered, I was afire, I was switched 
off, I shook” [Я вздрагивал. Я загорался и гас. Я трясся] (PSS 1:110).
 63. This image of divinely sent X-ray forces remained in Pasternak’s drafts, clearly unac-
ceptable for the Soviet press (PSS 5:523).
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And years later, the young Yuri Zhivago, echoing this emphasis on the shared 
contents of perception, will attempt to prove to Anna Gromeko that the fire 
of thought has to be turned not into oneself, but outwards. In other words, 
the light of consciousness, in order not to harm itself, should not be directed 
toward an autonomous experience:
Consciousness is a poison when we apply it to ourselves. Consciousness is 
a light directed outward. It lights up a way ahead of us, so that we do not 
stumble. It’s like the headlights on a locomotive—turn them inward and 
you will have a crash.
 [ . . . ] your consciousness [ . . . ] your soul, your immortality, your life 
[ . . . ] have always been in others and will remain in others. (Zhivago 68)
Сознание яд, средство самоотравления для субъекта, применяю-
щего его на самом себе. Сознание—свет, бьющий наружу, сознание 
освещает перед нами дорогу, чтоб не споткнуться. Сознание это 
зажженные фары впереди идущего паровоза. Обратите их светом 
внутрь и случится катастрофа.
 [ . . . ] Вот что вы есть, вот чем дышало, питалось, упивалось всю 
жизнь ваше сознание. Вашей душою, вашим бессмертием, вашей 
жизнью в других. И что же? В других вы были, в других и остане-
тесь. (PSS 4:69)
As one returns to “Letters from Tula,” it appears plausible, therefore, that the 
fire of conscience and the ensuing switch to the third person (indicating alien-
ation from the poet’s old self) operate in the story as the only possible unify-
ing step for a writer at this point in the journey, a choice simultaneously moral 
and artistic64 on the path toward an ever sterner understanding of oneself and 
one’s time.
 The vision, however, is not only that of moral perseverance. As the poet 
pledges to his beloved, speaking of himself by now in the third person, his 
future art and moral stance will not be the testament of an onlooker. The 
observer is to become the observed, and as the object and focus of the percep-
tions (and judgments) of others, he will need to find inner strength, even at 
the price of utter loneliness and self-sacrifice, not to be one face among many, 
not to be lost in the crowd among these colleagues:
He swears to you, that when he someday sees The Time of Troubles on the 
screen (it will be shown eventually, one imagines), the sequence on the 
 64. On Pasternak’s “lengthy farewell to Romanticism,” see Gorelik (2000, 39).
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River Upa will find him utterly alone, if actors have not reformed by then 
[ . . . ]. (CSP 122; emphasis added)
Он клянется тебе, что когда–нибудь, когда он увидит с экрана 
«Смутное время» (ведь поставят его когда–нибудь), экспозиция 
сцены на Упе застанет его совсем одиноким, если не исправятся к 
тому времени актеры [ . . . ]. (PSS 3:29)
In terms of the philosophical motifs that traverse the story, the poet’s deci-
sion signals an acceptance of responsibility for the world inhabited, if not by 
shadows, then by imitators and reflections—all of which in Plato’s cave indi-
cated danger—a situation that might well end in the philosopher’s death. In 
Pasternak’s narrative, however, the choice, once made, immediately recovers 
a new sense of belonging and association. In contrast to Pasternak himself, 
who admitted his theoretical underpinnings in his letter to his parents [там 
будет много теории (PSS 7:322]), the poet in the story—in his moral awak-
ening—aligns himself neither with Kant’s view that a “mental attunement [is] 
favorable to moral feeling” (Third Critique, §42, 298–99), nor with Cohen’s 
upholding of “moral culture” (Ethic 37), but with Lev Tolstoy, who is intro-
duced as “an occurrence on the territory of conscience, in its gravitational and 
ore-bearing sector” [случай на территории совести, на ее гравитирую-
щем, рудоносном участке] (CSP 122; PSS 3:29).
 Tolstoy’s presence is the nourishing (“ore-bearing”) force in the soil of 
memory in the poet’s surroundings, able to transform the weight of moral 
responsibility into an artistic decision65—a possibility to emerge from the dis-
united data of impressions and convictions towards the authorship of a new 
world inhabited by the diverse viewpoints of other living characters, in short, 
a fictional narrative populated by others. This artistic reorientation begins 
with a jolt. Out of a shared layer of darkened memory emerges a re-awakened 
recollection of Tolstoy’s funeral, as the writer’s power escapes a finite sen-
tence. For the poet, this recollection spurs the confirmed recognition of the 
self in a third-person narrative, a self situated among others, and not all of 
them alien:
 65. Mossman speaks of the interrelationship between Tolstoy and Pasternak’s “facility of 
vision” and art as an “act of conscience.” He also quotes the following “unsent” letter of Paster-
nak: “the central and most undying aspect of Tolstoy, that which is greater than the teaching 
on Good and broader than his immortal artistic individuality (perhaps that which makes up 
his true being) is a new kind of inspiration” (1972, 291). Mossman identifies the addressee of 
the letter as Sergei Durylin. In fact, the letter was sent to N. Rodionov on March 27, 1950 (PSS 
11:603).
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At this point something new occurred—a mere trifle, but the one that in its 
way shivered all the events and all he had experienced in the waiting room 
up until this moment.
 “The poet” at last recognizes the person strolling by the baggage office. 
He has seen that face before. From somewhere locally. He has seen it on 
several occasions [ . . . ]. It was when they were assembling a special train 
at Astapovo [ . . . ].
 In an instant, realization now weighs in on all that has so far happened 
to the ‘poet’ in the waiting room, and it acts as a lever to set the whole 
revolving stage in motion. And why?—Indeed, this is Tula! This night is a 
night in Tula. Night in a place bound up with the life of Tolstoy. Is it any 
wonder that compass needles start to dance here? Such events are in the very 
nature of the place. This is an occurrence on the territory of conscience, in 
its gravitational and ore-bearing sector. There will be no more of the ‘poet.’ 
(CSP 122; emphasis added)
В это время происходит новое, сущий пустяк, по-своему сотрясаю-
щий все случившееся и испытанное в зале до этого момента.
 «Поэт» узнает наконец прогуливавшегося по багажной. Лицо 
это он видел когда-то. Из здешних мест. Он видел его раз, не одна-
жды, в течении одного дня, в различные часы, в разных местах. Это 
было, когда составляли особый поезд в Астапове [ . . . ].
 Тут мгновенное соображение наваливается на все, что было 
в зале с «поэтом», и как на рычаге поворачивает сцену, и вот как. 
Ведь это Тула! Ведь эта ночь—ночь в Туле. Ночь в местах толстов-
ской биографии. Диво ли, что тут начинают плясать магнитные 
стрелки? Это случай на территории совести, на ее гравитирующем, 
рудоносном участке. ‘Поэта’ больше не станет. (PSS 3:29)
The discovery of Tolstoy’s power in a highly charged layer (a magnetic force in 
fact) among the multiple layers disclosed to perception—“Is it any wonder the 
compass needles start to dance here?” [Диво ли, что тут начинают плясать 
магнитные стрелки?] (CSP 122; PSS 3:29)—finally realigns these landscapes. 
In contrast to Kant’s “synthetic unity of experience,” Tolstoy’s heritage does 
not unify the disparate elements, but makes them live and speak in an ever-
widening multiplicity of characters and voices.
 The inner expansion into different voices, associated with the presence 
of Tolstoy, explains, in turn, the structure of the story. In the second part of 
“Letters,” the old actor is conceived of not merely as a Tolstoyan character and, 
thus, a tribute to Tolstoy: he is also explicitly the protagonist of a story within 
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a story, a powerful indication that the outcome of the poet’s turmoil is the act 
of writing with a distinct other protagonist who, nonetheless, comes into exis-
tence woven out by the poet from his own experience, reassembled into a new 
design from the poet’s disjointed thoughts, emotions, and artistic attempts to 
speak through the voice of the other, spearheaded by the example of Tolstoy. It 
is in order to emphasize this creative birth that Savva’s first appearance in the 
story66 is accompanied by the whispers of the disheveled poet, who is finally 
thinking about his ticket toward his morning destination:
It was only then that in his apartment in town on Posolskaya Street an 
extremely strange man finally settled down to sleep. While the letters were 
written at the station, this apartment had quivered with soft footsteps and 
the candle at the window had caught a whisper broken by frequent silences. 
It was not a voice of the old man, though apart from him there was not a 
soul in the room. It was all amazingly peculiar. (CSP 123–24)
Только тогда улегся наконец в городских номерах на Посольской 
чрезвычайно странный старик. Пока писались письма на вокзале, 
номер подрагивал от легких шажков, и свечка на окне ловила шепот, 
часто прерывавшийся молчанием. То не был голос старика, хотя, 
кроме него, не было души в комнате. Все это было удивительно 
странно. (PSS 3:30)
And even though the old man, having entered the story, starts operating as 
an independent agent, reversing some of the themes associated with the poet, 
and is more successful in incorporating “otherness” than his author, both his 
entrance and departure from the narrative emphasize his fictional status. 
Eventually, the authorial intrusion announces his belonging to a fictional text, 
just as it celebrates the actor’s ability to transform himself so fully into another 
self and achieve silence: “He was the only one in the story to find it, having 
made another to speak through his own lips” [Он тоже, как главное лицо, 
искал физической тишины. В рассказе только он один нашел ее, заста-
вив своими устами говорить постороннего] (CSP 126; PSS 3:32; emphasis 
added). This shock of authorial intrusion, coming as it does at the end of the 
narrative, signals the need for disclosure (akin to what Shklovsky termed the 
“baring of the device”—обнажение приема) in a story somewhat baffling in 
its subtextual intensity.
 66. See Fleishman: “the ‘actor’ in the second part may well be seen as a transformed ‘poet’ 
of the first part” (1990a, 94).
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 Pasternak in this instance states directly what he considers to be the only 
possible synthetic unity—the story’s end, or telos—the artistic goal, both for 
the narrative, and also more generally for his own future as an artist: all the 
turmoil of multiple perspectives and viewpoints must finally come together 
not in an autonomous transcendental self, but in the birth of art—the attain-
ment of those rare occasions when real inner silence permits another or others 
to speak through one’s own self. His young poet, as we catch our last glimpse 
of him, dreams precisely about this future, hoping that his own voice will 
eventually give way to a very different inner state, a theater-stage for the voices 
of others:
He supposed that everything would begin again when he ceased to hear 
himself, and when there was complete physical silence within his soul. Not 
an Ibsen silence, but an acoustic one. (CSP 123; emphasis in original)
Он предположил, что все начнется, когда он перестанет слышать 
себя и в душе настанет полная физическая тишина. Не ибсеновская, 
но акустическая. (PSS 3:30)
The notion of silence at the edge of chaos was, in fact, one of the key themes 
noted in “The Mark of Apelles”; it also operated as a definitive theme of Pas-
ternak’s early lyrical poetry where the word “stikh” (it quieted) is used as a 
double-entendre for the poem, also “stikh.” But here in “Letters from Tula,” 
Pasternak speaks about the search for a new form of art—a multivoicedness 
of narrative, which captures the multiplicity of viewpoints, the whole range of 
the “rhapsody of perceptions” giving way to the “synthetic unity of the phe-
nomena” (KTE 101), conceived as an artistic direction on the very ground 
traversed by Tolstoy. Moreover, if an acoustic silence, a potential, comes as 
the final desired end of multiple perspectives, then Pasternak’s heteronomous 
understanding of “apperception” also offers a definitive correction to the Kan-
tian theory of the autonomous self.
4.5  Tolstoy, the Tolstoyans, and  
the living characters of fictional space: 
  Autonomous transcendental consciousness versus a  
created living world of perceived and perceiving selves
As generally agreed by philosophers, in developing the notion of appercep-
tion Kant insists upon the autonomous unity of experience and views it as a 
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necessary precondition for knowledge, or for any real sense of what it means 
to be a self:
Kant argues that one of the most basic rules of this activity is that the self 
organizes its experience in such a way that it always recognizes them as its 
own experience. The rule is that we must always “synthesize” our various 
experiences into a unity, for we could not come to any knowledge whatever 
of a scattering of various impressions and sensations without this synthesis. 
(Solomon 2005, 277; emphasis added)
On the basis of “Letters from Tula” and the development of the themes of 
the story in subsequent years, it appears most likely that Pasternak, in con-
trast to Kant, did not believe in the possibility of an autonomous, unified, and 
self-dependent “ego-self,” but rather conceived of synthetic consciousness as 
a transformative space for the birth of many voices and visions. This means 
that although his philosophical training supplied for Pasternak an initial way 
of approaching consciousness, he moved quickly into his own direction of 
thought. Kant’s autonomous self was in some complex way contrasted with 
Tolstoy’s example, for throughout Pasternak’s life (and as late as the 1956 Sketch 
for an Autobiography) the figure of Tolstoy demonstrated for him a paradoxi-
cal contrast between a man of multiple and conflicting interests searching for 
a wholeness of vision and invariably coming short, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, a horde of followers who thought of that vision as straightforward, 
unified, clear, and complete.67 Hence, the relationship between Tolstoy and 
his followers—“those who were the most un-Tolstoyan in the world—the Tol-
stoyans” [те, что было самым нетолстовским на свете,—толстовц[ы]] 
(Remember 67; PSS 3:320)—would signify in time a contrast between the 
pseudo-peacefulness of a unified consciousness, lacking any creative charge, 
and the powerful consciousness of the artist, characterized as an ever vigorous 
space for the birth of new visions and voices.
 For Pasternak, therefore, the impossibility of the unification of thought 
into one clear, autonomous vision, even if it has the force of transcendence,68 is 
of paramount importance for the writer. Doctor Zhivago, in its very first chap-
ters, speaks of “one of those followers of Tolstoy in whom the ideas of a genius 
 67. See Pasternak’s emphasis on Tolstoy’s individuality being “beyond measure” and alto-
gether new [«главное и непомерное», «больше проповеди добра», «шире его бессмер-
тного художественного своеобразия», «новый род одухотворения»] (PSS 11:603).
 68. When Pasternak speaks about artists and writers continuing “the Revelation of St. John” 
(Zhivago 90; PSS 4:91), he states his deepest belief that no living vision is complete. On “Creation 
as dopisyvanie,” see Witt (2000a, 57–94).
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who had never known peace had settled down to enjoy a long unclouded 
rest, growing hopelessly shallow in the process” [oдин из тех последова-
телей Льва Николаевича Толстого, в головах которых мысли гения, 
никогда не знавшего покоя, улеглись вкушать долгий и неомраченный 
отдых и непоправимо мельчали] (Zhivago 40–41; PSS 4:42). Significantly 
in Sketch for an Autobiography, Tolstoy’s relationship with his wife—a separate 
area of familial intimacy that Savva Ignatievich of Tula only begins to recol-
lect and accept as his own in the final stages of his life—is viewed by Paster-
nak as essentially distinct, an area of Tolstoy’s personality within which Sofia 
Andreyevna retains a deservedly separate, autonomous voice. Revisiting her 
quarrel with her husband’s followers, Pasternak emphasizes the importance of 
her role as Tolstoy’s other, as yet alienated self: by contrast with the Tolstoyans, 
she testifies to the full range of organic spaciousness and living contradictions 
in Tolstoy’s world and refuses to harmonize peacefully69 with it: “In a room lay 
a mountain like Elbrus, and she was one of its large, detached crags [она была 
[ . . . ] большой отдельной скалой]; the room was filled by a storm cloud the 
size of half the sky, and she was one of its separate lightings [она была [ . . . ] 
отдельною молнией]” (Remember 67; PSS 3:320). Moreover, these distinct 
spaces within personality are an indication for Pasternak that personality is 
living and human, and its work has not as yet been completed.
 Alongside Kant’s autonomy of apperception, therefore, Pasternak offers 
heteronomy; against the synthetic unity of experience within the autonomous, 
isolated consciousness, he proposes a transformative gap, or silence produced 
by the incommensurate—a space for art, which gives birth to another land-
scape or landscapes70 and becomes a force that can influence and realign 
other consciousnesses. If for Kant “transcendental apperception is a linkage 
between spontaneity and receptivity” [Тр[ансцендента]льная апперцеп-
ция содержит соединенными спонтанность и рецептивность] (Lehr-
jahre II:89), Pasternak, as a young student, already argues with Kant in his 
notes that the gap in perception created by the antagonism between the tran-
scendental a priori and logical thought processes cannot be easily filled: “The 
significance of ‘the forms of perception’ is unveiled in contrast to the ‘forms of 
thought’” [Значение “форм воззрения” раскрывается в противоположе-
 69. Moreover, there is in the same passage a significant irony directed at the modern man 
who expects a measured normality from the poet: “Poor Pushkin! He should have married 
Shchegolev and the latest Pushkiniana and everything should be perfect” (Remember 67; PSS 
3:321).
 70. This pattern is stated with exactness of formulation in the first lines of the poem “Ham-
let”: “The sound is hushed. / I stepped forward on the stage” “Гул затих. Я вышел на подмост-
ки” (PSS 4:515).
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нии “ф[ормам] мышления”] (Lehrjahre II:89). The role of this contrast or 
gap is to disturb and yet to awaken creative force in consciousness:
[ . . . ] through the soil of this antagonism there awakens in us creativity in 
its different forms—as an aspect of antagonism between the associations of 
judgments and transcendental synthesis.
[ . . . ] eсть антагонистическая встреча творчества в потенции [ . . . ] 
на почве которого в нас [?] это творчество так или иначе пробу-
дилось, в роде антагонизма между ассоциацией представлений и 
трансценд[енталь]ным синтезом. (Lehrjahre II:139–40)
“Letters from Tula,” in this regard, is a unique artistic document: it actually 
elucidates what Pasternak means when he says he plans to write a story that 
contains “much theory” (PSS 7:323). The poet’s piteous complaints about the 
disturbing picture that meets his sight is only the beginning of visual adjust-
ment. The fire of conscience that can burn him to cinder “through all accu-
mulated dross” and “tear through the paper” (CSP 121; PSS 3:322) indicates 
that in response to the multiplicity of challenging data crushing upon and 
against perception, there emerges in the darkness of Tula an alternative force, 
an energy, which was able in Tolstoy’s case to ignite vision, “a passion that by 
its flash illuminates an object, intensifying its appearance” [глаз наш должна 
направлять страсть. Она-то именно и озаряет своей вспышкой пред-
мет, усиливaя его видимость] (Remember 69; PSS 3:322). As a result of its 
magnetism, this force will affect the consciousness of numerous readers.
 “Letters from Tula” is only the beginning of this meditation, but this mul-
tilayered text is highly significant not least insofar as it contains a startling 
number of themes and images that will remain in Pasternak’s art, to be trans-
formed certainly, but never abandoned. The example of Tolstoy’s death as the 
death of an artist, whose vision still “acts as a lever to set the whole revolving 
stage in motion” [как на рычаге поворачивает сцену] (CSP 122; PSS 3:29), 
changes the direction of the young poet’s life. But what is it that he remembers 
most? His recollection is not merely of the dead body of an artist, surrounded 
by railway lines. What catches his vision is the railway lines that bring together 
individual consciousnesses and perceptions, impossible to enumerate and 
unify within a tortuous and uneven landscape, and also the multiplicity of dif-
ferent worlds crisscrossing in Astapovo as a final but never-ending farewell:
It was when they were assembling the special train in Astapovo, with a 
freight car as a hearse, and when the crowds of strangers left the station in 
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different trains, which then wheeled and crossed the whole day around the 
unexpected turns of the tangled junction where four railroads converged 
and parted, returned and split again. (CSP 122)
Это было, когда составляли особый поезд в Астапове, с товарным 
вагоном под гроб, и когда толпы незнакомого народа разъезжались 
со станции в разных поездах, кружившихся и скрещивавшихся весь 
день по неожиданностям путаного узла, где сходились, разбегались 
и секлись, возвратясь, четыре железных дороги. (PSS 3:29)
In his 1956 memoirs, just after he summarizes the theses of “Symbolism and 
Immortality” and writes about the primacy of individual perceptions, Pas-
ternak returns to this portrayal of Tolstoy’s death and depicts again the many 
railway lines meeting around Astapovo and the trains which in “Letters from 
Tula” carried “an enormous crimson sun [  .  .  .  ] along the bodies of many 
sleeping passengers” (CSP 126; PSS 3:33). In 1956, however, Pasternak goes 
directly for the hidden dynamic center of the image. Tolstoy’s art is viewed as 
the celebration of the numerous pathways of perception, which has not merely 
recognized the great multiplicity of viewpoints within the larger cosmos, but 
made each a reality to be communicated to the world at large. So in 1956, Pas-
ternak recollects his earlier narrative in “Letters from Tula,” effectively rewrit-
ing the landscape of this “territory of conscience” with a surer hand. And even 
though he professes to have rejected his earlier style, he honors this important 
insight of 1918 by recreating the gathering of a great variety of ever-changing 
observers traversing Russia by means of those multi-layered and multi-direc-
tional railway lines surrounding, yet again, the reality of Tolstoy’s death. All 
those who trespass or bypass the station are drawn into a process of a differen-
tiated and diverse, yet continuous moment of “seeing.” As they look unknow-
ingly over the material evidence of the landscape, they are emphatically not 
unified, but continue to live their own lives immortalized by what has become 
the now departed observer, who finds his rest near the crossroads of uninter-
rupted communication:
It was natural, somehow, that Tolstoy was at peace and that he should have 
found peace by the wayside, like a pilgrim, near the main lines of commu-
nication of the Russia of those days, which his heroes and heroines con-
tinued to fly past and pass and repass, looking through the windows of the 
train at the insignificant railway station they were passing through, with-
out realizing that the eyes which had watched them all their lives, the eyes 
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which had seen through them and immortalized them, had closed forever in 
it. (Remember 68; emphasis added)
Было как-то естественно, что Толстой успокоился, успокоился у 
дороги, как странник, близ проездных путей тогдашней России, 
по которым продолжали пролетать и круговращаться его герои и 
героини и смотрели в вагонные окна на ничтожную мимолежащую 
станцию, не зная, что глаза, которые всю жизнь на них смотрели, 
и обняли их взором, и увековечили, навсегда на ней закрылись. (PSS 
3:321)
he year 1918 proved to be a highly significant one in Pasternak’s cre-
ative life. His collection of poetry Over the Barriers [Поверх барьеров] 
was published in 1917; My Sister Life [Сестра моя жизнь], finally published 
in 1922, was subtitled “Summer of the Year 1917,” which “indicated when 
most of its poems were written” (Barnes 1989, 228). “Letters from Tula” was 
completed in April 1918; by the summer of 1918 the manuscript of what is 
now known as The Childhood of Luvers [Детство Люверс] was also ready for 
publication. Pasternak worked on this novella as part of a larger novel, provi-
sionally entitled Three Names, during the winter of 1917–18. By all accounts, 
he wrote “rapidly, with the same impetus that produced the lyrics of 1917 
and ‘Letters from Tula’” (Barnes 1989, 268). In 1918 Pasternak also com-
pleted “Some Propositions” [Несколько положений], which encapsulated 
his understanding of creativity, reasserted as his “credo” [две странички, за 
которые стою головой] to Marina Tsvetaeva during their passionate letter 
exchange in 1926 (May 23; PSS 5:683). By the fall of 1918, the deteriorating 
social conditions of Russia finally arrested this tremendous upswing: “under-
fed and in poor health” like the rest of his country, “he had survived creatively 
longer than some, but he now needed to find employment to help maintain 
the family” (Barnes 1989, 273).1 The Childhood of Luvers was published only 
 1. As Barnes notes in this context, Pasternak, in a short biographical note of 1923, states 
that “serious creative work came to an end in 1918, and there followed a four-year interval 
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in 1922 in Moscow in the almanac Our Days [Наши дни] and was warmly 
received by critics (even Maxim Gorky wrote an enthusiastic introduction in 
the 1920s for “an American translated edition” [PSS 3:543]).2 However, enthu-
siastic support from Russia’s foremost scholars and writers does not mask the 
curious disjuncture between the focus of these critical assessments and Paster-
nak’s own plans for this work, evident in several passages that were eventually 
excised from the published version of the novella. These “purely philosophical 
digressions”3 are echoed in many of his observations, including letters to his 
family and friends. Chapter 5 will address this dislocation prior to an analysis 
of this central early work4 in Chapters 6 and 7, focused sequentially on two 
parts of Luvers, “The Long Days” and “The Stranger.”
 In the passages excised from the published novella, Pasternak contrasted 
the artistic and philosophical touch of the artist. The philosophical touch, 
according to the authorial voice, has no sensual characteristics and emits no 
smell, but opens up from within into “clear and distinct” ideas, while the artis-
tic touch smells of “human meat”—“noble, sacred, philosophizing, slowly lib-
erating oneself from the pernicious power of fate” [Каким же мясом несет 
от идей при всяком художническом прикосновении? Человеческим. 
То есть: благородным. Святым, философствующем, постепенно осво-
бождающемся от вредной власти судьбы] (PSS 3:515). Cartesian echoes 
in the phrase “clear and distinct” ideas point to the emergence of subjectiv-
ity in the history of philosophy,5 a resonance that blends only too well with 
the emphasis on “human touch” and “human meat.” The overall dilemma for 
the interpreter of The Childhood of Luvers stems, however, from the uncer-
tain character of this philosophical-artistic interplay, and from the fact that 
although Pasternak had abandoned philosophy as a career path, philosophy’s 
influence clearly lingered in his approach to art. The philosophical undercur-
rent, nonetheless, is not easy to demonstrate; he tends to “camouflage” philo-
sophical issues6 not by eschewing them, but rather by embedding them deeply 
whose greater part was taken up with verse translation work on commission from TEO and 
World Literature publishers” (1989, 273, 443).
 2. See Fleishman (1990a, 120; 147).
 3. In Fleishman’s view, these “digressions were injected into the original narrative, only to 
be deleted, apparently by the editors” (1990a, 104).
 4. Pasternak names Luvers as his central work in the “Questionnaire of Profsoyuz of 1919” 
(PSSCom 3:542).
 5. Philosophical ideas opening up “clearly and distinctly” points to the “clear and distinct” 
ideas of Descartes’s Meditations, and especially to the primacy of the philosopher’s clearest but 
most puzzling idea of infinity in Meditation 3. In “On the Object and Method of Psychology,” 
Pasternak points to Descartes’s thoughts on the Cartesian consciousness and the emergence of 
the subject, as replacing Aristotelian objectivity (PSS 5:304).
 6. See Dorzweiler (1993, 25–31), and particularly his commentary on Pasternak’s descrip-
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within his realistic prose narrative. It is, therefore, unclear what issues of phi-
losophy—be they the emergence of Cartesian subjectivity, a quasi-Humean 
emphasis on perception and impressions, Kantian apperception or its treat-
ment by the Neo-Kantian school, or more generally images and ideas familiar 
from Plato—should be expected to underlie this new completed work. And 
all of this must have been fodder for an altogether new start in prose, so that 
Pasternak’s statement to Marina Tsvetaeva about writing “a love intrigue and 
a heroine in it—like Balzac” (Barnes 1989, 269) is cited frequently in order 
to demonstrate Pasternak’s departure from his other prose works. But was it 
really a departure? And, equally important, a departure from what? In 1921, 
in a letter to V. P. Polonsky, Pasternak admitted that in this work he had tried, 
in contrast to his previous prose pieces, to open his hand and share with his 
readers the focus of his technical and theoretical experimentation; in the same 
letter he also acknowledged that in the past he had kept formulations of these 
concerns “outside” the text, never fully explaining his goals:
I decided to make a sharp turn. I decided I would write as people do write 
letters, and not in the current manner, revealing to the reader all that I 
think and intend to tell him, refraining from technical effects fabricated 
outside his field of vision and served up to him in a ready form, hypnoti-
cally. [ . . . ] I began to write about a heroine, a woman, with her psychologi-
cal genesis and a scrupulous account of her childhood. (trans. in Barnes 
1989, 270)7
Thus, Pasternak searched for a new start, accompanied by open-handed 
intellectual disclosure—a path, one may note, altogether alien to his artistic 
temperament.
 Consequently, his desire to abandon his hitherto habitual camouflage was 
not realized, due either to his decision or to that of his publishers. Lazar Fleish-
man in the 1970s, while sifting through the drafts of Luvers, uncovered these 
singular pages, excised from the final version,8 which announced the author’s 
theoretical intentions, but they were—for all Pasternak’s intentions—never 
included in the text when it was published in 1922.9 The overall problem for 
tion of Kleist’s studies of philosophy in the 1911 essay “G. Fon Kleist. Ob asketike v kul’ture” 
(PSS 5:294–301).
 7. The letter to Polonsky is dated “Summer 1921” (PSS 7:370–72).
 8. See Fleishman (1975) and (1977, 18–129).
 9. The novella was set to be published in the summer of 1918, but the publication was 
cancelled because of “the general crisis” and appeared only in 1922 (Fleishman 1990a, 104, 
111). In 1921, in a letter to Polonsky, Pasternak complained about the weighty digressions in the 
text: “It is simplified to the extreme and filled with long digressions and asides” [перегружена 
Contextualizing the Intellectual Aims of 1918 | 161
the interpreter of his prose is, thus, clear. With the exception of these passages, 
the early Pasternak tended not to include abstract philosophical issues or to 
display them as easily identifiable layers of his fictional texts. Since, however, 
it is the view of this study that there were never two distinct Boris Pasternaks 
(the philosopher and the artist), it is necessary to elucidate a deeper layer of 
integration in his prose between his artistic goals and his philosophical train-
ing, all the more so because Pasternak’s “manner of thought always remained 
independent and original” (Fleishman Lehrjahre 133).
 In such a context, the pages deleted from Luvers constitute an important 
document, and this chapter seeks, as its first step, to examine the theoreti-
cal overlap between Pasternak’s asides and disclosures in earlier drafts of the 
novella and the philosophical themes (“много теории”) of “The Mark of 
Apelles” and particularly “Letters from Tula” (5.1). Our next step is to exam-
ine the structure of one of Pasternak’s earliest prose sketches, “Ordering a 
Drama” [Заказ драмы], which portrays the development of artistically gifted 
children, a topic of direct relevance to The Childhood of Luvers (5.2). The 
sketch was composed under the pen-name of Reliquimini in 1910, that is, one 
year after the beginning of his philosophical studies.10 The chapter then pro-
ceeds to examine this earliest attempt on the part of Pasternak to speak about 
the child’s psychological development by placing this theme into the context 
of his philosophical interests. His student notes on psychology and his single 
surviving philosophical essay “On the Object and Method of Psychology” [O 
предмете и методе психологии]11 are invaluable at this stage (5.3). Blend-
ing these multiple angles of inquiry adds a significant theoretical perspective, 
hitherto unsuspected, to established readings of The Childhood of Luvers (5.4) 
and provides a cohesive context for the analysis of the novella in the next two 
chapters.
5.1 The “spirituality” of prose: 
 “It is important to visit a person when he is whole”
In contrast to Akhmatova’s characterization of Pasternak’s poetry as conceived 
“before the sixth day of creation” or without a human being in view (Bykov 
2007, 92),12 The Childhood of Luvers, Pasternak’s first critically acclaimed prose 
сентенциями и длинотами] (PSS 7:371).
 10. Pasternak “formally commenced philosophy studies [ . . . ] in the autumn of 1909” (CSP 
1989, 120).
 11. Fleishman dates the essay to 1912–13 (Lehrjahre 120–21). However, there is a possibil-
ity that the paper was written in December 1911 (PSSCom 5:641).
 12. Lydia Chukovskaya jotted down this statement of Akhmatova’s in the 1940s.
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work, is dedicated explicitly to the psychological development of the person. 
In discussing the context of Pasternak’s paper “On the Object and Method 
of Psychology,” Fleishman emphasizes that his whole period of philosophical 
studies is colored by his examination of “psychology and psychologism” (Lehr-
jahre 121),13 an interest Pasternak reaffirmed in his letter to Polonsky as late as 
1921 (“I began to write about a heroine, a woman, with her psychological gen-
esis” [quoted from Barnes 1989, 270]). Furthermore, as aptly noted by Bykov, 
1918 and 1919 were years when Pasternak, moved by the complexity of revolu-
tionary experience, was particularly taken with the idea of the human self; he 
suspended his work on poetry and planned a book based on his 1913 lecture 
“Symbolism and Immortality”14 and then “Articles about Personhood” [Ста-
тьи о человеке], for which he considered the title Quinta Essentia, reflecting 
a premise of the Italian humanists who added the fifth element—man—to 
the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) found in nature (Bykov 2007, 169).15
 Thus, Akhmatova’s curt remark helps to identify, albeit unintentionally, 
the curious orientation of Pasternak’s thought in 1918, namely, his drawing an 
unusual distinction between poetry and prose in “Some Propositions” (writ-
ten, as observed above, also in 1918). Here he characterizes poetry’s task as 
the search for “the melody of nature,” while the primary goal of prose is for 
him nothing less than “finding” the individual (человек) who is then placed 
in the maelstrom of contemporary life. Writing, with its two poles of poetry 
and prose, connects nature and human beings, with the latter as the “spiritual” 
focus and destiny of prose:
Poetry and prose are two polarities, indivisible one from another.
 Through its inborn hearing, poetry seeks out the melody of nature 
amid the noise of lexicon, and picking it up like some motif, it proceeds to 
improvise on that theme. By its feeling, through its spirituality, prose seeks 
and finds man in the category of speech. And when man is found lacking in 
an age, then it re-creates him from memory and sets him there and pretends 
for the good of mankind to have found him in the present. These two prin-
ciples do not exist separately. (CSP 261–62; emphasis added)
Неотделимые друг от друга поэзия и проза—полюса.
 13. Fleishman writes: “the whole period of the philosophical interests of Pasternak is col-
ored by the discussions of psychology, psychologism, and poetic creativity” (Lehrjahre 121). I 
leave aside here Aristotle’s notion of aether as a fifth, more divine element.
 14. This lecture, by many accounts, was related to Pasternak’s dissertation, the text of which 
has not survived (Fleishman 1977; CSP 1989, 148; PSSCom 5:644).
 15. “Some Propositions” [Несколько положений] was a part of this projected book (CSP 
1989, 256).
Contextualizing the Intellectual Aims of 1918 | 163
 По врожденному слуху поэзия подыскивает мелодию природы 
среди шума словаря и, подобрав ее, как подбирают мотив, предается 
затем импровизации на эту тему. Чутьем, по своей одухотворенно-
сти, проза ищет и находит человека в категории речи, а если век его 
лишен, то на память воссоздает его, и подкидывает, и потом, для 
блага человечества, делает вид, что нашла его среди современности. 
Начала эти не существуют отдельно. (PSS 5:26)
Emerging, therefore, from the much wider context of his interest in the 
human being as “the fifth essence,” this “proposition” may help to explain his 
zeal (persisting from 1918 onwards) for writing prose as well as his seemingly 
inexplicable emphasis upon prose’s “spiritual nature” and the observation that 
there are ages in which the individual (человек) may not be found. This star-
tling connection between the human being and the spirit(edness) of prose 
[одухотворенность] was clearly meant to be noticed.
 As one searches for an explanation, the bridge between Neo-Kantian 
apperception and psychology may provide a plausible missing link. In “The 
Object and Method of Psychology,” Pasternak focuses on Natorp’s view that a 
series of impressions can be unified only by apperception, and that the whole 
field of consciousness belongs to apperception. Any subjective impression 
and, indeed, all particularized contents of experience must become subject to 
this all uniting principle:
Let us note that not one single content can enter consciousness without 
entering the act of apperception in one manner or another. [ . . . ]
 This consideration will bring us forcefully to the sought-for principle. 
Indeed, the principle of connectivity is essentially a generic characteristic: 
this becomes clear from the fact, that apperception covers the whole arena 
of consciousness. In the same manner, it is a psychological principle.
Заметим, что ни одно содержание не может войти в сознание не 
апперцепируясь так или иначе. [ . . . ]
 Эти соображения сильно приблизят нас к искомому признаку. 
В самом деле, признак связи, прежде всего—признак родовой: это 
явствует из того хотя бы, что апперцепцией покрывается все поле 
сознания. В одинаковой мере это признак чисто психологический 
[ . . . ]. (PSS 5:311)
Thus, the Kantian transcendental ego in the work of apperception, the major 
interest of Pasternak’s studies in psychology, here resurfaces as a central uni-
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fying principle of human psychology and this also becomes in 1918 the char-
acteristic of prose whose work it is to find and place the human being “in the 
category of speech.” This philosophical resonance explains, in turn, why the 
very notion of prose writing appears to Pasternak not merely spiritual, but 
also rather an act of “spirit-creation” [o-духо-творенность] (that is, an activ-
ity possessing the literal ability to create other spirits) or “spirit-embodiment” 
within a “whole, but fictional individual.”16 By remaining a personal or lyrical 
vehicle of expression, poetry does not pursue this goal of creating other selves 
as clearly; it does not explicitly move, like the poet in “Letters from Tula,” from 
the first to the third person.
 Thus, it should be noted that alongside the Kantian transcendental con-
sciousness (or transcendental ego) capable of uniting disparate elements 
because of its spiritual essence, Pasternak tends to see the unifying principle as 
essentially a creative act directed outwards. When the description of the “spir-
itedness of prose” is put into the context of those pages excised from the final 
manuscript of The Childhood of Luvers, the emphasis that Pasternak places in 
his notes on the young girl discovering her wholeness becomes much clearer. 
“It is important to visit a person when he is whole” [Надо заходить к чело-
веку в те часы, когда он целен] (PSS 3:515), observes Pasternak, in a passage 
excised from the concluding pages of “The Long Days,” and this emphasis on 
wholeness is hardly new in the writer’s corpus. In fact, Pasternak’s search for 
wholeness is often misunderstood when it is placed into the context of the 
cubo-futuristic “projection of different objects into one plane” (Rudova 1994, 
139) or when viewed as a “chain of ‘riddles’ and ‘solutions,’” dependent on the 
characters’ solution of linguistic puzzles (Fleishman 1979, 48). Any solution 
to the series of impressions at different levels of intensity or intellectual depth 
and power is for Pasternak invariably an awakening of a deeper “apperceptive” 
self, and it is in this sense that he opposes his work in the letter to Polonsky to 
“the sea of violence that stands behind all our neo-aesthetism” and that afflicts 
him “with sea sickness” (PSS 7:371).
 When his early prose is examined in this light, it is striking to what extent 
his writing is guided by the theme of grasping the human being as a uni-
fied movement—a sketch, line, or stroke that is not a “collage” or “deliberate 
semantic confusion” (Rudova 1994, 140)17 but that expresses a singular feature 
 16. Barnes connects this theme, also central in “Symbolism and Immortality,” not merely 
to Husserl, as does Fleishman, but also to Andrey Bely’s use of the Kantian “transcendental 
subject” and Berdyaev and Frank’s view that creativity involves a “supra individual form of 
consciousness” (1989, 151).
 17. A similar view to Rudova’s insistence on Pasternak’s aesthetic closeness to cubo-futur-
ism is expressed by Wiegers (1999). Olga Hasty, however, suggests, on the basis of her analysis 
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which can then be viewed as an organizing principle for the whole personal-
ity. “The lyrical agent […] is first of all a principle of integration” [начало 
интегрирующее прежде всего] (PSS 5:9), said Pasternak, arguing with Sher-
shenevich in 1913, and he  never abandoned this position. When, for example, 
in “The Mark of Apelles,” Camilla appears to succeed in her intuitive grasp of 
Heine, Pasternak’s Heine praises (somewhat too emphatically) her capacity 
to grasp his nature in a unified gesture, proclaiming it to be the only artistic 
accomplishment worthy of Apelles’ line. The gift of “vital” perception, of life 
itself, and the intoxication of deep love are required for drawing such a line:
How perceptive you are! At one stroke, with the line of Apelles, you con-
veyed my whole essence, the whole crux of the situation. [ . . . ]
 [ . . . ] You possess such vital vision. You have already mastered a line 
as unique as life itself. [ . . . ] (CSP 110; trans. altered)
Что за проницательность! Одною чертой, чертой Апеллеса, передать 
все мое существо, всю суть положения! [ . . . ]
 Но вы умеете глядеть так животворно. И уже овладели линией, 
единственной, как сама жизнь. [ . . . ] (PSS 3:15–16)
Consciousness in the act of creativity turned toward others, a “vital vision” 
enhanced and intensified by passion, had been Pasternak’s antidote to the 
disunited layers of impressions and ideas within the individual; this act of 
turning discloses a permeable boundary where the holistic emergence of self 
can be located in his works prior to Luvers. As noted in earlier chapters, this 
theme also tends to be interwoven with images of electrified illumination, in 
which inspiration is presented as a flash that illuminates and clarifies the real 
outlines of personality.18 As Pasternak asserts in “Some Propositions,” artistic 
vision (or the intense dramatization of apperception, we may add) is insepa-
rable from “some unearthly, transient, yet forever vernal thunderstorm . . . [as 
it begins] to spread and roar through consciousness stroke by stroke, like the 
convulsions of lightning on dusty ceiling and plaster” [как мах за махом, 
напоминая конвульсии молний на пыльных потолках и гипсах, начи-
of “The Black Goblet,” that “Pasternak senses that for all their hyperbolized enactments of 
breaking with tradition, the Futurists contribute nothing essentially new to that perennial ques-
tion that stymied the Symbolists of how the fleeting and the eternal are to be negotiated” (2006, 
120).
 18. Hasty speaks of the image of the “flash” as “the age-old quest to reconcile the fleet-
ing and the eternal” (2006, 123). On Tsvetaeva’s themes and variations of Pasternak’s light in 
darkness, as well as his androgynous masculine-feminine self, “flooded and overwhelmed,” see 
Ciepiela (2006, 41).
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нает ширять и шуметь по сознанью отраженная стенопись какой-то 
нездешней, несущейся мимо и вечно весенней грозы] (CSP 262; PSS 5: 
27). And as I argued in Chapters 3 and 4, this vernal storm in the early Pas-
ternak is aligned with the theme of artistic competition with the sun’s energy 
(and for this reason the theme of light or electric illumination remains an 
important focus for the examination of all his works).19
 However, these grandiose themes of “storm and stress” cannot be devel-
oped in Luvers, for here Pasternak is engaged in a task altogether different 
from a vision accompanied by the “dance of compass needles” or “vernal 
thunderstorm”: the perceptions of a child cannot be imbued with, or accom-
panied by, either creative passion or the presence of intensive creative light, 
as supplied in “The Mark of Apelles” by the genius of the wandering Heine. 
“Apperception” and the “transcendental ego” in Kant indicate personal matu-
rity, just as in Pasternak creative vision and all-transforming poetic power are 
themes by definition outside the purview of the experiences narrated in the 
novella.
 Recalling, perhaps, his experience in writing Luvers, Pasternak in Safe 
Conduct emphasizes that the perception of the child has very little to do with 
the Romantic earth-shattering sublime, for the child does not experience any 
Romantic aggrandizement of self and does not exaggerate the extraordinary 
nature of extraordinary experiences:
It [antiquity] was insured against this because it prescribed entirely for 
childhood the whole dose of extraordinariness contained in the world. 
And when, after taking it, a person entered with gigantic strides into a 
gigantic reality, both his strides and the world round him were accounted 
ordinary. (CSP 28–29)
От этого она [античность] была застрахована тем, что всю дозу нео-
бычного, заключающуюся в мире, целиком приписывала детству. И 
когда по ее приеме человек гигантскими шагами вступал в гигант-
скую действительность, поступь и обстановка считались обыч-
ными. (PSS 3:156)
One may suggest, then, that when compared with the earlier stories, Paster-
nak’s thematic shift in Luvers is considerable: the writer must work with the 
many developmental stages occurring within a protagonist who is not yet an 
 19. See Greber: “In Pasternak, as in classical mnemotechnics, an almost literal illumination 
is required to light up the imaginés so that they become recognizable” (1997, 33).
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artist, poet, or musician—stages that precede any serious artistic engagement 
even though childhood constitutes, according to Safe Conduct, an indepen-
dent unity, “like a central nucleus of integration” [детство замкнуто и само-
стоятельно, как заглавное интеграционное ядро] (CSP 28–29; PSS 3:156).
 Thus, in his second prose work of 1918, Pasternak chose a challenging 
subject-matter, and one where any Kantian notion of apperception could not 
function as a straightforward guiding principle: the growing child, and this 
is very clear in Luvers, is only learning how to synthesize her impressions 
and thoughts. It is possible then that it was precisely the open-endedness and 
incompleteness of the developmental psychological states of the child that 
attracted Pasternak,20 allowing him room for artistic experimentation and 
innovation, all the more so because Andrey Bely, also deeply influenced by 
Neo-Kantianism, had just finished “his own account of a childhood, Kotik 
Letaev, [that] was serialized in the Scythian journal Skify (no.1, 1917 and no. 
2, 1918)” (Barnes 1989, 271–72). Here, then, is the crux of the problem for the 
interpreter, yet it remains altogether unclear how Pasternak could have com-
bined the portrayal of a child’s developing perception with the realization of 
his intention to “visit a person when he is whole,” especially if in his artistic 
exploration he was aiming to compete with Bely.
 Pasternak, of course, was the first to admit this challenge. In 1917–18, 
as he was working on Luvers, he explicitly discussed—in the same excised 
passages—the difficulty associated with any holistic presentation of a grow-
ing self. Lamenting the previous failures of this enterprise (particularly the 
exclusive concentration on the issues of sex by novelists and doctors), Pas-
ternak reaffirmed the need to encapsulate the fullest range of phenomena, 
apprehended by and realigned within the individual self. In fact, in labeling 
his approach “artistic materialism,” he compared it to the judgment of a textile 
producer who wants to see the texture of the material as a whole and rejects 
any tests on isolated pieces of the fabric:
Physicians facilitated this task of the novelists. They concentrated the lat-
ter’s attention on sexual maturation. A novelist sees a male and a female. He 
writes a novel and promises the reader a novel of love. A novelist must know 
that the one who cuts and amputates puts an equals sign between a textile 
product and a separate textile sample. [ . . . ] But this is a cheap, naively cyni-
cal, and lazily trusting materialism. The textile producer, however, checks the 
 20. See here also Pasternak’s insistence in his student notes that for the Neo-Kantian 
school only apperception “in contrast to perceptions deals with a unified consciousness” 
[Апперцепция в отличии от перцепции; единство сознания как особенность сознания, а 
не содержаний] (Lehrjahre I:268).
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full product and often finds it wanting. He is not brought up on separated 
samples. He doubts.
 Thus, we too doubt. We doubt that an animal develops according to 
the principles of the separated living parts, all the more so because these 
separated parts decay. 
 We doubt the correctness of the boundaries, placed by doctors to 
direct writers’ materialism. We doubt the value of such materialism and we 
doubt its satisfactory depth. [ . . . ]
 It is important to visit a person when he is whole.
Врачи облегчили романистам их задачу. Они сосредоточили вни-
мание последних на созревании пола. Романист видит женщину и 
мужчину. Он пишет роман и обещает читателю повесть любви. 
Романист должен знать, что тот, кто умеет ампутировать, при-
вык отожествлять кусок с образцом. [ . . . ] Но это—дешевый, цини-
чески-наивный, лениво-доверчивый материализм. Производитель 
пропускает весь кусок перед собой и часто бракует. Он не воспитан 
на лоскутках. Он сомневается.
 Мы тоже сомневаемся сейчас. Мы сомневаемся в том, чтобы 
животное развивалось по законам разложения животного на части, 
и тем более по законам разлагающегося животного.
 Мы сомневаемся в правильности границ, положенных врачом 
материализму писателя. Мы сомневаемся в достоинствах такого 
материализма, в достаточной его глубине. [ . . . ]
 Надо заходить к человеку в те часы, когда он целен. (PSS 3:514–15; 
emphasis added)
However, in presenting this version of the emergence of the “whole individual” 
whom he expected to “visit” in his novella, Pasternak blends idealist philoso-
phy and Humean materialism, a mixture that appears under the formulation 
of “artistic materialism.”21 Attacking throughout the insufficient “materialism” 
 21. Athough Pasternak would later tell Polonsky that he had revealed “to the readers all 
that he thinks and intends to share” (quoted from CSP 1989, 270), he does misdirect his readers 
when he speaks of his own materialism. There is perhaps an unintentional confusion of terms, 
but a confusion nevertheless: while explaining his views as materialistic in principle, Pasternak 
continues to stress not so much his materialistic premises, but rather materialism’s philosophi-
cal antonym—the classical idealistic position, the world of thought influenced by Platonic and 
Neo-Platonic arguments within which the notion of the form or idea can never be found as 
such in sensible reality but belongs instead to the realm of the intelligible world. According to 
classical idealism (if, for argument’s sake, one speaks of idealism more broadly so as to avoid a 
Cartesian split between the finite and the infinite), the form of personhood, that is, the human 
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of other practitioners of the craft, Pasternak carefully places the word “soul” 
into the mix and emphasizes the spiritual context of his “full-blooded” com-
mitment to the soul’s material development:
We doubt the value of such materialism and we doubt its satisfactory depth. 
We permit ourselves to believe that decisively all psychological (soul’s) con-
tent—the whole without exception—is maturing in the human soul with 
the same gravity and full-blooded materiality as, with the easy blessing by a 
doctor, the emphasis in the novel is placed on a small sample—sex.
Мы сомневаемся в достоинствах такого материализма, в достаточ-
ной его глубине. Мы позволяем себе думать, что весь решительно 
душевный инвентарь, весь, без изъятья, назревал и назрел в челове-
ческой душе с той же тягостной, кровавой матерьяльностью, какую, 
с легкой руки врача, натуралистам в романе угодно сосредоточить в 
небольшом куске романического мяса—в поле. (PSS 5:514; emphasis 
added)
In these same excised pages22 he admits to the reader that “the world of the 
human soul” will be ultimately examined in the context of the values and ideas 
born within it, and that the full range of the self, the whole of the personal-
ity, cannot be grasped until the self is situated in the environment of ideas 
that open up “clearly and distinctly” [ясно и отчетливо]. In intimating this 
Cartesian context,23 Pasternak proclaims that for his work he has chosen an 
idea that is the most common and “nameless,” while demanding from it not a 
philosophical, but an artistic touch:
The most diverse, the most abstract ideas of the living person [ . . . ]. We 
speak here about the artistic touch. There still exists another—philosophi-
cal. Then the ideas do not smell, but they open up clearly and distinctly.
 To be true to our word, we will narrate presently in what circumstances 
there was once born, on a particular occasion, within the world of a human 
soul, as the organizing principle of personality, remains intangible on the level of material sub-
stance; it is both invisible and indivisible in the sensible world while being in itself the principle 
of wholeness and the expression of the person’s sacred essence. To find its material principles 
artistically is, thus, not a simple task at all.
 22. The length of these excised passages suggests that Pasternak was aware that the reader 
would need further direction: one can sense here both his simultaneous desire and reluctance 
to give explicit articulation to the direction of his thought.
 23. See n. 4 above.
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soul one of the most popular and unnamable ideas. It will demand time. It 
will be a lengthy passage, full of facts and descriptions.
Самые различные, самые отвлеченные идеи живого человека [ . . . ]. 
Мы говорим о прикосновении художественном. Существует другое, 
философское. Тогда они не пахнут. Тогда они не смеют пахнуть, но 
должны распахиваться ясно и отчетливо.
 Верные слову, мы расскажем теперь, в какой обстановке роди-
лась однажды в такой-то и такой раз в мире человеческой души одна 
из распространеннейших и безымяннейших идей. Это потрeбует 
времени. Это будет пассаж продолжительный, ряд фактов и описа-
ний. (PSS 5:514–15)
The crucial role of abstract ideas in the formation of the human self is also 
reiterated in Pasternak’s letter to Bobrov of July 16, 1918 (the only surviving 
letter of this period that discusses Luvers directly). Not only does Pasternak 
insist in this letter that the growth of human beings and their subsequent 
destinies are inextricably connected with what he calls an “abstract moment,” 
but he also states that any moral development in the life of the individual is 
directly related to the world of ideas, among which he chooses “the idea of a 
third person” or the independent other as the most significant first step:
[ . . . ] the second and third portions, fastened together (as the notebooks), 
are all connected together by an attempt to show how there takes shape in 
consciousness an abstract moment, to what it leads in consequence and how 
it is reflected in the character of the personality. Here it is shown through the 
idea of the third person.
[ . . . ] вторая и третья скрепленные порции (тетради) связаны вое-
дино попыткой показать, как складывается в сознании момент 
абстрактный, к чему это впоследствии ведет и как отражается на 
характере. Тут это показано на идее третьего человека. (PSS 7:348; 
emphasis added)
This letter, then, adds further clarification to those excised statements dis-
cussed above which aimed to explain Pasternak’s intention in working with 
Luvers: his task of “visiting a person when he is whole” includes the portrayal 
of a meeting space between the world of thought and the child’s forming per-
sonality, or, in his own terms, a meeting place between abstract reality, the 
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world of ideas, and what he calls in earlier drafts “the world of the human 
soul” [мир человеческой души] (PSS 3:515).
 Such themes as personhood, the human soul, the role of ideas, and the 
specific idea of the “third person” can be further elucidated by recalling Pas-
ternak’s experience in Marburg and the focus of Cohen’s ethics on the “person, 
specifically on the unity of person [ . . . ] born through ethics and nourished 
by it” (cf. Fleishman Lehrjahre 97). Cohen, in fact, augments Kant’s view of the 
unified self by insisting that moral growth begins when the external freedom 
of the individual “is broken down in relation to an other person” (Gibbs 2005, 
206). Cohen’s emphasis upon the other, singled out later by Levinas,24 denotes 
the conditions for the development of a moral self, that is, the self ’s purifica-
tion of will:
For the will and for action self-consciousness cannot mean the conscious-
ness of the self as a unique person. This self must not so much include 
the other, but rather be related to him. [ . . . ] No one can be regarded as 
expanded by the other. Both must remain standing isolated. But precisely 
then they do not remain isolated; rather they are related to each other and 
build self-consciousness in this correlation. Self-consciousness is in the first 
case determined through the consciousness of the other. The uniting of the 
other with the one generates self-consciousness for the first time as that 
of a pure will. (Ethics 212–13; 10a–b; trans. Gibbs 2005, 206–7; emphasis 
added)
It is very probable that precisely this position—the awakening of the self ’s 
ethical dimensions in regard to the other—was endorsed by Pasternak and 
identified as “the most common and nameless idea” in the drafts of Luvers and 
named as “the idea of the third person” [идея третьего человека] in his letter 
to Bobrov (PSS 7:348).
 In this manner, The Childhood of Luvers helps to clarify that Pasternak was 
one of the first writers to grasp the importance of Cohen’s insight, an insight 
destined to become a major focus of postmodernity, even when not attributed 
to Cohen directly,25 for the idea of “the other” is combined in Pasternak with 
 24. In current philosophical studies, there is a renewed interest in Cohen’s development of 
the principle of the other, and his possible influence on Levinas. Levinas, however, saw Cohen 
as primarily a Platonist, but this meant that Cohen’s “love” for the world of ideas was also a 
relationship with otherness: “Hermann Cohen (in this a Platonist) maintained that one can love 
only ideas; but the notion of an Idea is in the last analysis tantamount to the transmutation of 
the other into the Other (de l’autre en Autrui)” (Levinas 68; trans. Levy 1997, 138).
 25. Levinas’ concept of the Other may not owe any direct debt to Cohen’s concept of the 
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an artistic awareness that the unity of the personality cannot be experienced 
without a creative move toward another self. Luvers, then, follows directly 
upon the philosophical preoccupations of his earlier prose, including Camilla’s 
marvelous glance directed toward Heine, and his world effectively changed 
thereby and his own vision redirected both toward and because of her. In “Let-
ters from Tula” the poet’s moral growth is also signaled by the narrative switch 
from the first to the third person, while the story’s actor triumphs when he 
makes “another . .  . speak through his own lips” [заставил своими устами 
говорить постороннего] (CSP 126; PSS 3:32). One hears the development of 
this thematic emphasis at the closing of Luvers (in the story’s second part, tell-
ingly entitled “The Stranger” [Посторонний]—that is, “outside” any imme-
diate personal boundary), when the authorial voice observes that Zhenya’s 
significant transformation is marked not by the fact that she has experienced 
“sexual maturity” and fallen in love (as her tutor had assumed upon seeing a 
“little woman” in her bearing),26 but by her painful stumbling upon an uncon-
trollable new principle, as yet unfocused (туманный) and featureless—a gen-
eralized outline of the other self, “a third person”:
“How is one to explain this excessive sensitivity?” the tutor reflected. Evi-
dently the dead man meant something special to the girl. She had changed 
greatly. He had been explaining decimals to a child, whereas the person 
who had just sent him into the classroom. . . . And this was only a matter of 
one month! Obviously at some time the dead man had made an especially 
deep and indelible impression on this little woman. [ . . . ]
 He was mistaken, for the impression he imagined did not fit the case 
at all. But he was right in that the impression that lay behind it all was 
indelible. Its depth was even greater than he imagined. . . . It lay beyond 
the girl’s control, because it was vitally important and significant, and its 
significance consisted in the fact that another human being had entered her 
life—a third person totally indifferent, with no name, or only a fortuitous 
one. (CSP 178)
Чем объяснить этот избыток чувствительности?—размышлял репе-
титор.—Очевидно, покойный был у девочки на особом положении. 
“neighbor,” but, as Levy indicates, there are expanding “new vistas for a better understanding 
of the main ethical views of the two philosophers” and for “Cohen’s and Levinas’ conceptions 
of the other man and the stranger as a mediating idea in their understanding of man” (Levy 
1997, 136–37).
 26. In this, Pasternak clearly places himself in opposition to the “novelists and psycholo-
gists” and their emphasis upon “sexual maturation.”
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Она очень изменилась. Периодические дроби объяснялись еще 
ребенку, между тем, как та, что послала его сейчас в классную . . . и 
это дело месяца! Очевидно, покойный произвел когда-то на эту 
маленькую женщину особо глубокое и неизгладимое впечатление. 
[ . . . ]
 Он ошибался. То впечатление, которое он предположил, к делу 
нисколько не шло. Он не ошибся. Впечатление, скрывавшееся за 
всем, было неизгладимо. Оно отличалось большею, чем он думал, 
глубиной .  .  . Оно лежало вне ведения девочки, потому что было 
жизненно важно и значительно, и значение его заключалось в том, 
что в ее жизнь впервые вошел другой человек, третье лицо, совер-
шенно безразличное, без имени или со случайным, не вызывающее 
ненависти и не вселяющее любви. [ . . . ] (PSS 3:84–85)
However, this conclusion, for all its echoes of Hermann Cohen and its spiritual 
and ethical overtones, appears only at the story’s end—as a shock or revela-
tion, and it remains unclear whether or not (and by what means) this principle 
of the other has previously guided both the narrative and the child’s personal-
ity (or even the developing soul) toward individual unity or individualization.
5.2 “Three groups”: 
 Three levels of reality in “Ordering a Drama” 
The puzzle of the novella is deepened further by a startling resonance, fre-
quently overlooked in critical literature,27 between the three-layered organiza-
tion of the worlds of Luvers and one of Pasternak’s earliest sketches composed 
under the pen-name of Reliquimini. “Ordering a Drama” [Заказ драмы], 
whose composition coincides with those years when his devotion to philoso-
phy was still wholeheartedly enthusiastic,28 is dedicated to the portrayal of 
the minds of growing children. While the sketch places major emphasis on 
music rather than poetry (in Luvers, Zhenya is not a musician, but an avid 
 27. Ljunggren observes the similarity between “Ordering a Drama” and Luvers, the empha-
sis of both works on the inanimate objects as the needy recipients of the action, an image that 
she traces to Rilke (1984, 99–101). See also Gorelik (2000).
 28. Fleishman Lehrjahre 120. See also CSP’s eloquent summation of the period: “[H]e 
formally commenced. His capacity for abstract thought was remarked upon [ . . . ]. After mas-
tering the rudiments of a subject, he and his like-minded companions worked semi-indepen-
dently in the University library and pursued their private philosophical enthusiasms” (1989, 
121).
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reader), the major emphasis of the narrative is upon the formation of per-
sonalities pierced (or “sewn” together) by art and thought.29 In pre-setting 
the stage for the as yet unknown event of the future (“ordering a drama”), 
Pasternak isolates three layers of reality30 that are not without some bearing 
on the construction of Luvers: (1) the inanimate objects of the room that live 
“like well-attended children” [вещи в комнате (как одаренные вниманием 
дети)] (PSS 3:458); (2) the first lyricism of music, a constant “movement with 
no materiality” [движение без действительности]; and (3) the spirit of the 
street in winter directly associated with the composer Shestikrylov (the Six-
Winged One),31 the children’s tutor (PSS 3:460–64).
 If we return, ever so briefly, to Pasternak’s letter to his uncle Mikhail Fre-
idenberg in December 1913, we will find, to our surprise, precisely the same 
three levels in the portrayal of Freidenberg’s working space. The levels appear 
in a descending order: (3) Petersburg, city-spirit; (2) a dramatic movement 
of thought and engagement; and (1) the inanimate objects in his room that 
absorb the intensity of the man at the desk:
I would think of your serene capacity, instinctually, to take control of that 
chaotic and close to dream impression, which leaves behind itself Peters-
burg, city spirit.
 [ . . . ] how you fantasize over your work place, in the evening, with 
bloodless nothingness behind your back.
 And how you transmit this dramatically performed life to the sur-
rounding objects, to the whole mystery of furnishings and rooms.
Я думал бы о том, как невозмутимо и с каким странным неведением 
об этом завлaдеваете Вы тем хаотическим и близким к грезе впечат-
лением, которое оставляет по себе Петербург, как город-дух.
 29. Livingstone in translating “Ordering a Drama” says the following about these earliest 
sketches: “This odd, dense prose is rich in motifs characteristic of the poet’s later work; here they 
appear in their intensest, primary form. It is clear from them that Pasternak was possessed by a 
single vision and was developing a single main cluster of images for it which would evolve and 
settle but not radically change” (MG 56).
 30. See Livingstone: “‘Ordering a Drama’ sets out to construct something like a philosophi-
cal system. [ . . . ] Not all of this is clear, but certain things are clear enough. It is clear that the 
life of a particular man is needed to combine the three categories” (MG 59).
 31. In Safe Conduct, Pasternak attaches the same epithets to Scriabin: “So, it was winter 
out of doors. The street was chopped a third shorter by dusk and was full of errand-running 
all day long. A whirl of streetlamps chased along after the street, lagging behind in the whirl 
of snowflakes” [Итак, на дворе зима, улица на треть подрублена сумерками и весь день 
на побегушках. За ней, отставая в вихре снежинок, гонятся вихрем фонари] (CSP 23; PSS 
3:50).
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 [ . . . ] как [ . . . ] фантазируете Вы над своими станками, вечером, 
с бескровною пустотой за спиной.
 И о том, как заражается этой, драматически разыгранной Вами 
жизнью мир предметов вокруг, вся эта тайна обстановки и комнат. 
(PSS 7:157)
Shestikrylov’s portrait is, of course, considerably more dramatic than the 
sketch of the uncle in the letter: the composer “sews” together the three levels, 
while he himself is “sewn by life”; in the manuscript of “Ordering a Drama”32 
he is also a mysterious eternal figure—an almost Hegelian spirit of history in 
transition (as well as a literary reminiscence of Pushkin’s poem “The Prophet,” 
with its Six-Winged Seraphim).33 Awaited eagerly by the children, surrounded 
by storms and lit-up windows, and dressed in fur coats, the composer is eter-
nally in search of himself, either lifted up by music (when he becomes god-
like) or descending into the lives of others34 and, although he has a room where 
he teaches and performs, he does not really have a place. Not unlike Heinrich 
Heine in “The Mark of Apelles,” Shestikrylov is a presence that belongs to 
infinity,35 as he both recollects and forgets his immediate factual reality. He is 
essentially a unifying principle, even while being always in motion:36
 32. Gorelik suggests the Nietzschean echoes (e.g., the emergence of drama, The Birth of 
Tragedy from the Spirit of Music) in the title and the overall conception of the sketch, and 
speaks also of the Apollonian and the Dionysian opposition (2000, 10–12). Since, in my view, 
Shestikrylov is a portrait of Scriabin’s influence on Pasternak’s childhood (Gorelik indicates as 
much: 2000, 9), the Nietzschean overtones should not be discounted, but in themselves they 
are not sufficient. Shestikrylov is a multilayered image.
 33. The sleep of Shestikrylov that Gorelik reads as an Apollonian dream (2000, 13) can be 
also read as a reminiscence of Pushkin’s “prophet” falling asleep as he meets his Six-Winged 
Seraphim: “And the Six-Winged Seraphim / Appeared to me at the roads’ crossing / With the 
fingers light as sleep / He touched my eyes” [И шестикрылый серафим / На перепутье мне 
явился. / Перстами легкими как сон / Моих зениц коснулся он] (Pushkin 3:30).
 34. Cf. Scriabin in Safe Conduct: “On the way home from school, the name Scriabin, cov-
ered with snow, skipped down from a poster onto my back” (CSP 23:150).
 35. Cf. also Freidenberg’s gift of time in the letter of December 1913: “But there exists a 
reality of a special gift of rare individuals which I would like to name as the gift of time. [ . . . ] 
However, I have met several individuals, who appear to breathe with their own time, and the 
indication of whose clocks is only a concession to the common order. What does this signify? 
It signifies, first, a certain feature of immortality that has entered into their movement. And 
it also speaks of their kindredness with their destiny” [Дело, может быть, в особом даре 
нескольких редких людей, который я бы назвал дар времени. [ . . . ] Однако я встретил 
несколько личностей, которые как бы дышат своим собственным временем, у которых 
показанья их часов, может быть, только—уступка общественному порядку. Что это 
означает? Это означает, во-первых, некоторую черту бессмертия, проникающую их 
движения. И затем это говорит о какой-то одинокой их близости со своей судьбой] 
(PSS 7:157).
 36. In “Letters from Tula,” the poet forgets or places some of his belongings in the pawn-
shop while traveling (CSP 120; PSS 3:27).
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The three layers were being sewn together by the life of the composer, so 
that one whole should result; and according to which layer he was piercing, 
the composer Shestikrylov would at one moment be fretting and worrying, 
feeling the inanimate weight of guilt and need, while, at the next, uplifted, 
he would gaze around: “Where are the kneelers?” But most often of all, 
life was being stitched and embroidered by means of the composer, and 
together with it he would fling himself into the search for himself. [ . . . ] 
All too often he forgot he had taken himself along with him once and for 
all. But is it possible to bear this in mind eternally? (MG 28)
Жизнью композитора сшивали эти три слоя, чтобы вышло целое, 
и, смотря по тому, какой слой прoкалывал, композитор Шести-
крылов то не находил себе место и чувствовал неодушевленную 
тяжесть вины и нужду неодушевленную, то, вознесенный, огляды-
вался: где же коленно-преклоненные? Но чаще всего композитором 
шили, вышивали жизнь, и вместе с нею он бросался искать самого 
себя [ . . . ]. Слишком часто он забывал, что захватил себя с собою 
навсегда. Но разве можно вечно помнить это? (PSS 3:461)
Moreover, all three levels, about to be sewn right through and coexisting in 
the same room, are permeated by expectation, with life as their eventual guest 
(Впоследствии к ним стучалась жизнь [PSS 4:462]).37 The presence of the 
three levels is essential for the young children’s instruction in art,38 for those 
who “think further than others and become unrecognizable as a result,” as they 
learn all the while that in order to confront the requests of all three levels of 
reality as themselves, they must discover their own art:
Thus. Three groups. First: a true story, reality as a great immobile legend 
of wood and cloth, objects in need, twilight in need, like a church parish 
that has grown stale from waiting. And lyricism, music, this is the sec-
ond. [ . . . ] The first is—reality without movement, the second—movement 
without reality. And the third: the music down there in the snowflakes, 
the music of people going in and out of their homes, in brief the street’s 
music [ . . . ] the movement of reality which tosses about and desponds and 
stretches itself over temporal layers [ . . . ].
 So, life is the third element. And the composer Shestikrylov, who gave 
lessons in the winter twilight, the composer Shestikrylov, who was waited 
 37. See here Ljunggren (1984, 75–78).
 38. Gorelik emphasizes the relationship between children and objects, for, like children, 
objects are unable to reveal their potential unaided (2000, 13).
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for by his pupils in the salon a long, long time [ . . . ]. The Composer Shes-
tikrylov was the surgical thread for the stitching up of the world order that 
was operated upon. [ . . . ]
 Now I shall unobtrusively tell a small truth: a drama has been prom-
ised, and like all dramas it begins with a scenario, a description of objects 
[ . . . ].
 Here is the scenario: twilight in the composer’s apartment—and either 
there is no meaning in it or else it’s to be followed by a drama. This was 
how it was in life too—there stood the inanimate principles, demanding 
to be set in motion, and people would start off here at a run, and some of 
them, and ones who always thought further than others, and more quickly 
became unrecognizable to their acquaintances, they endured this delicious 
suffering: to work, to think upon the inanimate objects. [ . . . ]
 Later they became artists. (MG 28–29)
Вот. Три группы. Первое: быль, действительность, как великое 
неподвижное предание из дерева, из тканей, нуждающиеся пред-
меты, нуждающиеся сумерки, как церковный зачерствевший в 
ожидании приход. И лиризм, музыка—это второе. [ . . . ] Первое—
действительность без движения, второе—движение без действи-
тельности. И третье, там, внизу,—музыка в хлопьях, музыка тех, 
которые идут домой и из дома, словом уличная музыка, [ . . . ] дви-
жение действительности, которое мечется и грустит, и тянется по 
временам [ . . . ].
 Итак, жизнь—это третье. И композитор Шестикрылов, даю-
щий в зимние сумерки уроки, композитор Шестикрылов, которого 
долго, долго ожидали ученики в зале [ . . . ]. Композитор Шестикры-
лов был той терапевтической нитью, которaя должна была сшивать 
оперированный миропорядок [ . . . ].
 Теперь я украдкой скажу маленькую правду: тут обещается 
драма, и начинается она, как вообще драмы, сценарием, описанием 
предметов [ . . . ].
 Вот тут сценарий: сумерки в квартире композитора, и они или 
не имеют смысла, или за ними должна следовать драма; так и было в 
жизни,—стояли неодушевленные начала и требовали разбега; люди 
разбегались здесь, и некоторые из них, те, которые думали всегда 
дальше других и скорее становились неузнаваемыми для знако-
мых—они выносили это сладостное страдание: работать, думать за 
неодушевленное. [ . . . ]
 Впоследствие, они стали художниками. (PSS 3:460–62)
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The necessity of abstract thought and of ideas that allow future artists to think 
for the inanimate objects in the room is therefore the ultimate destination of 
the children’s growth: it is a crucial stage of their childhood—a time of growth 
and transformation.39
 The organization of Zhenya Luvers’s world is nuanced, of course, around 
different emphases (for example, the story’s script is no longer situated within 
a single room, and it extends throughout every season of the year, rather than 
taking place exclusively in winter); yet there is a surprising number of com-
mon themes between the two texts, the most prominent of which is the ques-
tion of “inanimate foundational principles” (or “reality without movement”), 
for which the children must think and which they need to animate40 so that 
the emergence of a world of constant movement (movement without reality) 
can replace the static restfulness of inanimate reality. Also common to both 
texts is the presence of art in the children’s lives, and while there is no com-
poser Shestikrylov with his echo of Pushkin’s prophetic Six-Winged Seraphim, 
there is the mysterious Tsvetkov, the “stranger” who emerges with “an atlas or 
an album” just as Zhenya reads Lermontov’s “Demon” in the early fall and who 
disappears during a winter storm, breaking the chronological precision of the 
story in his last appearance.
 “Thus. Three groups,” Pasternak writes in “Ordering a Drama” and adds, 
“These three layers were being sewn together by the life of the composer” 
(MG 27–28). The world of The Childhood of Luvers eschews the simplicity 
of a three-level structure, and yet Pasternak was seriously thinking of calling 
the work “Three Names” (see Chapter 7.5). Moreover, both narratives start 
with an analysis of the children’s impressions, synthesizing the presence of 
inanimate objects and eternal significances,41 and both texts appear to point 
to thought and thinking as the transforming axis of the children’s lives (one 
finds a similar emphasis in the portrait of Mikhail Freidenberg). In contrast to 
 39. In Pasternak’s poetry Fateeva discerns two layers, or rather two circles: “the first circle 
of Pasternak—the initial stage set for growth,” the organic processes; the second circle is the 
place of “Divine tragedy” where Dante’s hell is inhabited (2003, 190). This pattern, characteristic 
of My Sister Life and The Childhood of Luvers, should be reconsidered in the context of the three-
layered world of “Ordering a Drama.”
 40. See here Fateeva: “the category of the development in him is, in the final analysis, 
three-dimensional [категория трехмернa]. It is, first of all, the development along the vertical 
axis [ . . . ] synthesizing the idea of growth: natural, spiritual, historical” (2003, 111). Similarly 
Faryno speaks about the scale of transformation from the “material” into “spiritual” [разница 
позиций на общей шкале транcформаций ‘материального’ в ‘духовное’] in Luvers (1993, 
12).
 41. Faryno observes the correlation between “a great immobile legend of wood and cloth, 
objects in need, twilight in need” and “the puzzles of the wood, wool, and metal” at the end of 
Luvers (1993, 12).
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Hume, therefore, for whom impressions are the most vital aspects of human 
apprehension (see Chapter 2.2 above), Pasternak’s children-protagonists in 
both texts not only undergo stages in the development of their perception and 
impressions; they also come to maturity in the context of the artistic ideas they 
embrace.
 When all of the above is situated in the context of Pasternak’s philosophi-
cal studies, this three-layered organization reverberates with deeper precision, 
and the world of the children can be identified as the layers of the inanimate, 
the world of animation, and the movement of the spirit or ideas. “Spiritualism,” 
Pasternak wrote while at Moscow University about the thought of Leibniz, “is 
comprised of monads [which are] the gradation of the clarity of perception,” 
while the human organism is “a compound of monads within a hierarchical 
relationship” (Lehrjahre I:174). While the first layer, namely, material reality 
apprehended through perception, is a world more than adequately grasped by 
Hume, Hume’s model, according to Pasternak’s notation, denies the existence 
of the monads of the soul:
Herbart: realia. One of the realia is soul.
Contemporary spiritualism: soul—spiritually simple, [ . . . ] unchangeable 
in the foundation of its occurrences, its modulation. An argumentation: 
the unity and self-identity of consciousness, a substance, denied by Hume, 
but a principle which is not analogous to impressions.
The analytical insight of Hume is incomparable. But the subject which is 
thus examined, cannot be approached as a fully philosophical, consciously 
placed dilemma [ . . . ]. 
Гербарт: реалии. Одна из реалий—душа [ . . . ]
Совр[еменный] спиритуализм: [душа]—духовн[ое] простое, [ . . . ] 
неизменная в основании явлений, ее модусов. Аргум[ентируют]: 
единство и тожество сознания, субстанция отрицаемая Юмом, но 
понятие, которое не соответсвует впечатлениям. (Lehrjahre I:174)
Аналитическая зоркость Юма не знает ничего равного себе. Однако 
предмет, на который она направлена, не может быть назван фило-
софскою, сознательно поставленною проблемой [ .  .  . ]. (Lehrjahre 
I:222)
And, as observed above, it is of the child’s “soul” that Pasternak intends 
to speak in those excised passages of Luvers, insisting that the moment of 
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transformation takes place while the soul is visited by the idea,42 and if not 
“sewn” through by it, then at least it is so shaken that its impressions become 
“indelible.”
 The first two realities of “Ordering a Drama” suggest, then, the world of 
material reality and that of soul entering into the surrounding world: the pro-
cess of the “inanimate” undergoing “animation.” Moreover, if Hume’s philoso-
phy cannot clarify for Pasternak the world of “soul,” his synopsis of Plato and 
the ancient Greek philosophers more than adequately make up for the gap. 
His Lehrjahre notes dedicated to Plato correspond directly to what he employs 
as the second stage of “Ordering a Drama”—its “movement without reality” 
[второе—движение без действительности] (PSS 3:460), already prefigur-
ing the dynamism of animation that Pasternak employs so centrally in Luvers. 
Thus, Pasternak carefully notes in his diary the view of soul (in the Greek, 
Ψ[υχή]) as unceasing movement, constant renewal of content, possessing no 
material reality of its own and directing itself, as also in Pasternak’s world, 
toward the world of ideas:
Ψ[υχή] = the beginning of self-directing motion (The inanimate is distinct 
from the animate precisely because it contains the source of its motion. 
Ψ[υχή] (in a self-dependent motion) moves always, cannot arrest itself; its 
life is without cessation. Ψ[υχή] is the beginning of movement of other 
objects; as a consequence it cannot have a beginning.
Ψ[υχή]—is invisible and intangible.
 [ . . . ] Ψ[υχή] lives and moves of itself. The complex is always chang-
ing. Ψ[υχή]—turning away from sensible objects and concentration on the 
intelligible, elevating itself to the unchangeable, self-identical condition.
Ψ[υχή] = начало самоопределяемого движения. (Одушевл[енное] 
отлич[ается] от неодушевл[енного] тем, что носит в себе источник 
своих движений). Ψ[υχή] (как самостоятельное движущееся) дви-
жется всегда, не может сама себя остановить: ее жизнь неистре-
бима. Ψ[υχή] начало движения других предмeтов, след[овательно] 
не мож[ет] само иметь начало. [ . . . ]
Ψ[υχή]—невидима и неосязаема.
 42. Cf. the passage that is excised from the final draft: “To be true to our word, we will 
narrate presently in what circumstances there was once born, on a particular occasion, within 
the world of a human soul one of the most popular and unnamable ideas.” [Верные слову, 
мы расскажем теперь, в какой обстановке родилась однажды в такой-то и такой раз в 
мире человеческой души одна из расспространеннейших и безымяннейших идей] (PSS 
5:514–15).
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 [ . . . ] Ψ[υχή] живет и движется от себя. Сложное непрерывно 
изменяется. Ψ[υχή], отвращаясь от чувственных вещей и сосредото-
чившись на умопостиг[аемом], возвыш[ающемся] до неизменного, 
тождественного себе состояния. (Lehrjahre I:361)
The third layer of the story in “Ordering a Drama,” inhabited by the composer 
of Six-Wings, a layer independent of inanimate objects and the world of ani-
mation, is actually the reality or spirit of the street, coming to pierce the silence 
of the room’s furniture. “The spirit,” observes Pasternak in his philosophical 
notes, “always comes from the outside” [Дух приходит извне] (Lehrjahre I: 
174), obviously referring to the Aristotelian nous thurathen (the mind-spirit 
from out of doors).43 Moreover, the real character of a person, according to his 
notes on Plato, cannot be found unless it is sought in the world of ideas and 
layers of the spirit:
Ψa = Spirit, personal in a human being, his/her ‘I.’ It contemplates the 
world of ideas. It is similar to that world.
Ψa = Дух, личн[ое] в человеке, его Я. Оно созерцает мир идей. 
Подобно ему. (Lehrjahre I:361)
The juxtaposition of “Ordering a Drama” and Pasternak’s student diaries sug-
gests, therefore, that the children’s psychological progression articulates the 
following sequence: (1) the life of material objects as it is grasped by the chil-
dren’s perception, (2) the animating power of soul, and (3) instruction by the 
Spirit from outdoors.44 Whether a similar progression is to be found in Luvers 
cannot be confirmed without a more careful analysis of the text, the goal of 
Chapters 6 and 7.
 What can be observed without further examination, however, is the fact 
that apart from Freidenberg’s ability to live in the presence of the city-spirit, 
both Safe Conduct and Sketch for an Autobiography are explicit in their empha-
sis upon the power of the “spirit” [дух],45 rather than upon psychological (or 
 43. For the nous thurathen see De Gen. An. Book II, ch. 3, 736b15–29. Thurathen also oc-
curs later in De Gen. An. Book II, ch. 6, 744b21.
 44. There are more than sufficient philosophical precursors for this layered eclectic world 
in Pasternak, but it is also necessary to point to Mikhail Gershenzon, one of the closest friends 
of Leonid Pasternak (CSP 1989, 251), whose opposition of the layers of consciousness into 
“soul” and “spirit” must have been well known to Boris Pasternak. See Gershenzon’s articulation 
of this position (1918).
 45. See also the image of city-spirit or gorod-dukh in Pasternak’s letter to Mikhail Freiden-
berg in Dec. 1913 (PSS 7:157).
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“soulful”) reality, when Pasternak speaks about the people who influenced 
his deeper formation as an artist. In his description of Alexander Scriabin 
(as mentioned above, Scriabin undoubtedly was an actual “historical” proto-
type of the “Six-Winged Composer” or Shestikrylov), the theme of “spiritual” 
power is suggested with mild irony. Nonetheless, if in Safe Conduct Scriabin’s 
name, in a demon-like manner, jumps on the child’s back in wind-swept Mos-
cow and the composer himself becomes the boy’s idol rather than God,46 then 
in the Sketch for an Autobiography Pasternak is less evasive; the “spiritual” des-
ignation of “dukh” is clearly there:
In general he cultivated general forms of inspired lightness and unencum-
bered motion on the borderline of flight. [ . . . ] But Scriabin won me by the 
freshness of his spirit. (Remember 37–38)
Он вообще воспитывал в себе разные виды одухотворенной легко-
сти и неотягощенного движения на грани полета. [ . .  . ] Скрябин 
покорял меня свежестью своего духа. (PSS 3:303)
Hermann Cohen’s portrait in Safe Conduct leaves no ambiguity on this 
account, even though the “spirit” assisting Cohen in his movements is that of 
science, rather than art or philosophy:
Talking with him was rather frightening, and going for a walk with him 
was no joke at all. Beside you, leaning on a stick and moving along with 
frequent stops, went the very spirit of mathematical physics, which had 
assembled its basic principles, step by step, by way of such a gait as this. 
(CSP 59)
Беседовать с ним было страшновато, прогуливаться—нешуточно. 
Опираясь на палку, рядом с вами с частыми остановками подви-
гался реальный дух математической физики, приблизительно путем 
такой же поступи, шаг за шагом подобравшей свои главные осново-
положенья. (PSS 3:191)
Nor is there any uncertainty in feeling and vocabulary in Pasternak’s initial 
attitude to Mayakovsky, whose portrait, like that of a “spiritual horizon,” care-
fully blends the finite character of machines and the infinity and endless depth 
of space, open to perception:
 46. Pasternak in Safe Conduct speaks of his love for music as a cult [музыка была для 
меня культом] and calls Scriabin “his idol” [мой кумир] (CSP 28; PSS 3:153).
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Far off, locomotives roared like grampuses. At the very same unconditional 
distance as upon the earth was there in the throaty territory of his creation. 
This was that immeasurable inspiration without which there is no original-
ity, the infinity that can open out in life from any point and in any direc-
tion, and without which poetry is merely a misunderstanding that has not 
yet been clarified. [ . . . ]
 I had made a god of him. He was a personification of my spiritual hori-
zon. (CSP 79, 81; emphasis added)
В горловом краю его творчества была та же безусловная даль, что 
на земле. Тут была та бездонная одухотворенность, без которой не 
бывает оригинальности, та бесконечность, открывающаяся с любой 
точки жизни, в любом направленьи, без которой поэзия—одно 
недоразуменье, временно не разъясненное. [ . . . ] 
 Я его боготворил. Я олицетворял в нем свой духовный гори-
зонт. (PSS 3:218, 220)
And to Rilke in a letter of 1926 Pasternak was, perhaps, even less ambigu-
ous: “I am indebted to you by the general features of my character, by the 
overall cohesiveness of my spiritual life. You have created them” [Я обязан 
Вам чертами моего характера, всем складом духовной жизни. Они 
созданы Вами] (PSS 7:648; emphasis added). These evocations of a lexicon 
of “spiritual” gifts also point to Pasternak’s careful effort to place the “mea-
sureless” properties within everyday language, but the force of these portray-
als explains even in retrospect what Pasternak might have meant in 1910 
when he insisted that the composer Shestikrylov was the needle and thread 
that was sewing the children’s world into one cloth—the composer clearly left 
an indelible impression on his pupils’ psychological make-up.
5.3  The limitations of psychology: 
 Neo-Kantians in dispute with David Hume
Thus, Pasternak’s “artistic materialism” and its evocation of spirit and infinity 
seem to have coalesced into an unusual genre, nourished by a highly eclectic 
philosophical substratum. However, how precisely did his studies of psychol-
ogy assist him in his attempts in Luvers to reconstruct the tangible qualities of 
the ever more intricate and widening layers of the child’s understanding? Pas-
ternak’s disappointment in psychology—and the ironic dismissal of its subject 
matter—is stated in Luvers by means of an authorial voice, reminiscent in this 
of similar evocations that were deleted from the final draft. The following 
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pronouncement, however, was kept, placed centrally as a conclusion to the 
episodes of early childhood, and it contained the word “soul”—one of its first 
appearances in the text:
[I]f a tree was entrusted with the care of its own growth, [ . . . ] it would 
forget the surrounding universe which should serve as a model [ . . . ].
 And to guard against the dead branches in the soul—to prevent its 
growth from being retarded and man from involving his own stupidity 
in the formation of his immortal essence—several things have been intro-
duced to divert his banal curiosity from life, which dislikes working in his 
presence and tries every means to avoid him. For this purpose all proper 
religions were introduced, all general concepts and human prejudices, and 
the most resplendent of these, and the most entertaining—psychology. (CSP 
135–36; trans. altered; emphasis added)
Если доверить дереву заботу о его собственном росте [  .  .  .  ] она 
забудет о вселенной, с которой надо брать пример [ . . . ].
 И чтобы не было суков в душе,—чтобы рост ее не застаивался, 
чтобы человек не замешивал своей тупости в устройство своей 
бессмертной сути, заведено много такого, что отвлекает его пош-
лое любопытство от жизни, которая не любит работать при нем и 
его всячески избегает. Для этого заведены все заправские религии и 
все общие понятия и все предрассудки людей и самый яркий из них, 
самый развлекающий—психология. (PSS 3:37)
In this dismissive observation, psychology is actually not badly damaged, for 
it is put aside together with “all proper religions” and “all general concepts and 
human prejudices.” Nonetheless, this semi-humorous disavowal of psychology 
indicates Pasternak’s desire in Luvers to inform his readers of a major gap in 
knowledge concerning the development of the individual self, a gap psychol-
ogy is unable to fill or reach.
 Pasternak’s disappointment with psychology during his university years 
has been well documented, and his pronouncements that art is more psy-
chologically astute than psychology [психологичнее психологии], carefully 
noted.47 However, the deeper cause of his disappointment still needs to be 
 47. On Pasternak’s disappointment in psychology as ultimately “subjectless,” a position that 
contrasted with a much more optimistic assessment of the discipline’s potential by his Moscow 
teachers, see Fleishman Lehrjahre 122. See also PSSCom 5:641–42, which contains the evalua-
tion of Pasternak’s essay “On the Object and Method of Psychology” by a renowned psycholo-
gist S. G. Gellershtein. Gellershtein’s conclusion: the work of Natorp was for young Pasternak 
a catalyst; it directed him to address the deeper concerns of the psychological make-up of the 
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elucidated. According to the weight of existing documentation, the following 
objections were formulated by the young Pasternak during his initially fer-
vent studies of Heinrich Rickert and Paul Natorp’s Einleitung in die Psycholo-
gie nach kritischer Methode.48 While his essay “On the Object and Method of 
Psychology” shows that he agreed wholeheartedly with the Neo-Kantian pos-
tulation that “apperception covers the whole field of consciousness” [аппер-
цепцией покрывается все поле сознания] (PSS 5:311), this position also 
leads him, according to his diary notes, to suggest together with Natorp that 
psychology should make the study of apperception the content of its discipline 
[единство содержания  .  .  .  не в сознанности, а в ап[ерцепц]ии к[ак] 
содержании—задача псиxологии] (Lehrjahre I:268; emphasis in original). 
At the same time, he is aware that methodological explorations, armed with 
scientific categories and analytical principles, will block the metaphysical con-
tent of apperception and choose instead “consciousness” as its focus of study, 
while consciousness, in turn, will pose its own imponderable challenges:
[Scientific psychology], of course, critically rejects metaphysics <?>—for 
consciousness for psychology as a science—is a series of flowing, raw phe-
nomena, waiting for its explanation, account, placement or description.
[Научная психология], конечно, критически отворачивается от 
метафизического литья <?>—для нее сознание—ряд тякучиx, нeо-
бработанных фeноменов, ожидающих своего объяснения, учета, 
размещения или описания. (Lehrjahre I:278)
The surviving text of “On the Object and Method of Psychology” rather masks 
this problem, while his diary notes, for all the incompleteness and disjoint-
edness of the note-taking process, point to his awareness of the inabilities 
of psychological methods to grasp spatial and temporal series as they strike 
consciousness. Since space and time (in their a posteriori and a priori range) 
challenge any mechanistic or purely analytical approach, spatial and tempo-
ral phenomena, when grasped sensually, will only intensify the impression of 
indefiniteness.49 In other words, the subject-matter of psychology will resist 
individual (PSSCom 5:642).
 48. See here Loks’s unforgettable portrayal of young Pasternak: “More and more often I was 
noticing in him some deeply seated despair, hidden behind this flow of unfinished speech, so 
gifted, and somehow cut from within. I began to look for the cause of this and soon found it. It 
was a fear of himself, an uncertainty in his chosen path” (1993, 37).
 49. See here Loks’s statement that, while emerging from a different context, is still highly 
significant: “Pasternak loved this clarity [of the university lectures], but at the same time I 
saw that such thinking was alien to him. In this difficult battle one could sense that a right to 
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the schematizations of mechanical logical quantifications, limited by “the 
realism of mechanical understanding.” As a result, phenomena, open to con-
sciousness in all its fullness, will escape analytical objectivization:
It is impossible to explain causally sensual impressions (impossible to 
[deduce] psychological from physical), <cf. Natorp, 1888, S. 80> because 
a mechanism, as a causal system, can give only a mechanical effect, and 
the causal dependency is a synthetic unity of sameness. At the same time 
there exists an objective reality, expressed in mechanical terms—it is a 
measurable, quantified multiplicity of space and time. The purity of such 
measurements necessitates the self-identical precision of their intellectual 
understanding. Such understanding unifies in itself also the irrationality of 
time and space. But if one applies a sensual evaluation of time and space, 
they will appear indefinite; only intellectual understanding identifies them. 
But such understanding can signify and identify a certain qualitative unity 
[ . . . ] within which, on the causal side, we will be thinking by applying 
pure mechanistic terms. [ . . . ]
 This finality of the impossibility to convert psychological data into a 
physical measurement is founded upon the impossibility of analyzing the 
phenomena in purely objective terms.
Нельзя причинно объяснить ощущения (вообще психическое 
из физического), <cf. Natorp, 1888, S. 80.> т<ак> к<ак> механизм, 
к<ак> причиняющая система, мож<ет> дать механический лишь 
эффект; причинн<ая> зависимость есть синтетич<еское> единство 
однородности. [ . . . ] Объективное, выраженное в мехническ<их> 
терминах, есть измеренное, квантифицированное многообра-
зие пр<о>стр<анства> и времени. Чистоту этому измерению дает 
идентичность и точность понятия в нем. Оно скрепляет как бы—
иррациональность врем<ени> и пр<о>стр<анства>. Если остаться 
при чувственной оценке врем<ени> и пр<о>стр<анства>,—то они 
окажутся неопределенными; понятие—вот что однозначно и тоже-
ственно определяет их. Но понятие мож<ет> обозначить и тожест-
венно закрепить изв<естное> качественное образование [ . . . ] где 
на стороне причинного обусловления мы будем мыслить чистые 
механистич<еские> термины. [ . . . ]
Последн<ий> смысл заявляем<ой> невозможности психологиче-
ское свести на физическ<ое>—лежит в невозможности разложения 
indefiniteness was for him—a crucial question [право на неясность для него—решающий 
вопрос]” (1993, 37).
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явления целиком на объективность. (Lehrjahre I:279–80; emphasis in 
original)
The limitations of psychology, however, go, according to his notation, much 
further.
 In order to explore the status of personality as that of an independent self, 
psychology has to confront the reality of subjective understanding—the sub-
jective “I”—which unifies initially disunited phenomena.50 However, the con-
tent of the multiple series of impressions, the diversity of the “synthetic flow,” 
will distract the investigation from the unified consciousness, which will need 
to be constantly superimposed upon the data of impressions:
In order for the multiplicity to become consciousness, one consciousness, 
it is not only necessary, but is already evidently present, that the multiplic-
ity is unified in the emotive life of consciousness and that this unity is the 
characteristic moment of the subjective experience. [ . . . ]
This is characteristic for every ‘I’; ‘I itself ’ is denoted by the particular-
ity, even by the solitariness of its experience, but it is based on the unified 
nature of such memories in one’s recollections—that is—it exists as a com-
plex interweaving of the general connections of temporal and simultane-
ous experiences only because this ‘I’ remains the same.
Как многообразие становится сoзнанием, одним сознанием—необ-
ходимо; но очевидно, что оно—едино в переживании сознания и 
что это единство характеристич[еский] момент субъективн[ого] 
переживания. [  .  .  . ] Это свойственное каждому «Я» или «Я сам» 
 50. To this problem Natorp adds his own question as to whether or not psychology can be 
that science:
But it is necessary to find a common principle signifying all these contents, which 
is capable a) to unite these contents under one task of a separate science [ . . . ].
 This principle—a connection between constantly complex contents: [in which] 
one separate elementary act is differentiated from, as well as unified with another 
elementary act in a temporal sequence; linked everywhere as its contents are sig-
nified by temporality and locality.
Но требуется найти общий всем этим содержаниям признак, кот[орый] 
был бы способен а) объединить эти содержания под одной задачей особой 
науки [ . . . ].
Этот признак—связь, связность постоянно сложных содержаний: 
отдельн[ый] элементарн[ый] акт времен[ым] обр[азом] отличается и 
связывается с друг[им] элем[ентарным] [актом]; связность повсеместно: 
все содержания простр[анственно] и врем[енно] обусловл[ены]. (Lehrjahre 
I:268)
188 | Chapter 5
характеризовало через особенность, даже одинокость его пережи-
ваний, оно основывается на непрерывности этих воспомин[аний] в 
его воспоминании, т.е. к[а]к очень сложное [complexion] сплетение 
общих связей (временн[ых] и единовременн[ых]); только благодаря 
этому Я—тот же. (Lehrjahre II:206–7)
The principle of “synthetic flow,” a recurrent theme in his notes, is accompa-
nied by the reiterated assertion that personality cannot be built up from the 
summation of subjective impressions as its constitutive elements, but must 
incessantly synthesize the ever new impressions that enter into the human 
purview: “Selfhood (or personality) is the unity of consciousness, in which 
every newly added element starts playing the role of a connecting princi-
ple” [Личность есть такое единство созн[ания], в кот[ором] каждый 
последний элемент оказывается связью] (Lehrjahre I:276). This “synthetic 
flow,” however, cannot be grasped in stillness; it is realigned with the addition 
of every new element, and it necessitates, therefore, the presence of a living 
active consciousness [текущеe сознаниe]:
A personality does not consist of elements; rather there exist elementary 
and complex connections, not separate members of these mixtures: the 
non-breakable unity of subjective consciousness rests on this and only this 
paradox. [ . . . ]
 This function of connectivity, its differentiated features, are character-
ized by the processes of the flowing active consciousness.
У личности нет элементов: есть элементарн[ые] и более сложн[ые] 
связи, но не члены этих сочленений: на этом и только на этом пара-
доксе связи держится непрерывность субъективн[ого] сознания. 
[ . . . ]
Понятием текущего сознания характеризуется функция связи, 
отличительные ее стороны. (Lehrjahre I:276)
This thought is reflected in drafts of Luvers in Pasternak’s otherwise startling 
assertion: “We doubt that an animal develops according to the principles of 
the separated living parts” [Мы сомневаемся в том, чтобы животное раз-
вивалось по законам разложения животного на части] (PSS 3:514).
 Herein lies the crux of an irresolvable paradox. The individual character of 
the synthetic processes, imponderable subject-object compound, reflects the 
dynamic unity of thought and perception.51 As Pasternak insists that the sub-
 51. As Pasternak’s notes indicate in numerous entries, Leibniz’s monads were for Pasternak 
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jectivity of impressions is determined not by the materiality of the compound, 
but by the character and dynamism of the thought processes in conscious-
ness, his position moves beyond the boundaries of psychology.52 Pointing to 
Natorp and Rickert in his notes, Pasternak explains the limitation of the disci-
pline: the content, power, and value of intellectual ideas cannot be examined 
and evaluated by the methodology of psychology. Not only is psychology’s 
approach to the events of the soul (душевные явления) ultimately insuf-
ficient, but also psychology lacks a system of values in its examination of ideas, 
and for this reason cannot exist without philosophy:
The objective nature [of the science of psychology], in its attempt to explain 
causal connections (rather than discuss their real signification) of world 
events, finds also that emotional occurrences (events of the soul) constitute 
an aspect of the data for objective examination. But soon it is evident that 
the world becomes more and more obscure when examined by means of 
the objective method. [ . . . ]
 A question arises: how can a subject, as a simple object among objects, 
have any connection to the values that bring meaning to his/her life? Thus, 
there emerges the necessity of subjective understanding of the world based 
upon the pre-existent dilemma of values. [ . . . ]
 The work of objectivizing sciences on reality, if it is to take into consid-
eration pre-existing theoretical values and their meaning—such work can 
only be the subject of philosophy and value theory [cf. Rickert’s article in 
Logos, pp. 20–31].
important guiding principles in this regard. In Pasternak’s notes, this idea is clearly stated and 
reintroduced multiple times among the many pages of his philosophical diary. The following 
is his discussion of Leibniz’s monads and the confusion resulting from the nature of the com-
pound in the perceived phenomena: “From this confusion—matter; this phenomenon is well 
founded. [ . . . ] As soon as there is a mixture of confused thoughts, there is the meaning, and 
then there is the matter. But this is not an illusion. For the phenomena are real. But the reality 
does not lie in matter. It is opened by the mind through the opening of the monads. The matter 
is an appearance, which is firmly situated in the monad. The monad is the reality in the objects. 
But the real substance is in opposition to the sensible atoms: it is located in the substantial 
forms” [Из этой confusion—материя, этот phaenomenon bene fundatum. [ . . . ] Aussitôt qu’il 
y a un mélange de pensées confuses, voilà le sens, voilà la matière. Но не иллюзия. Nam et 
phaenoma sunt realia. Но реальность лежит не в материи. Открывается разумом через 
открытие монад. Материя—видимость, хорошо обоснованная в монаде. Монада—ре-
альное в вещах. Истинная субстанция в противоположн[ость] чувств[енным] атомам: 
formes substantielles] (Lehrjahre II:61).
 52. As observed already, this idea is reflected, in the initial topic of his Marburg disserta-
tion—“the laws of thought as the category of a dynamic material object” [работa о законах 
мышления как о категории динамического предмета] (Kudriavtseva 66).
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Объективизм, стремясь причинно объяснить ([a] не истолковать с 
т[очки] зр[ения] смысла) миров[ые] явления, находит и душевн[ые] 
явл[ения] как объект или к[ак] содержания, доступные объектива-
ции. Но в дальнейшем выясняется, что мир становится все непонят-
нее в объяснении объективн[ого] метода. [ . . . ]
 Вопр[ос]: каким образ[ом] субъект, к[ак] простой объект среди 
объектов, может иметь отношение к ценностям, придающим смысл 
его жизни. Так потребность в субъективирующ[ем] понимании 
мира вырастает из предшествующей ей проблемы ценности. [ . . . ]
 Работа объективирующих наук о действительности с точки зре-
ния лежащих в ее основе теоретических ценностей и присущего ей 
теоретического смысла = предмет философии и теории ценностей 
[cf. Риккерт, статья в Логосе, с. 20–31]. (Lehrjahre I: 274–75)
On its own, therefore, psychology deals only with the most partial and mecha-
nistic of experiences. Moreover, this view reflects a deeper seated philosophi-
cal conflict—that between the followers of David Hume and Immanuel Kant 
concerning the role of impressions and ideas in perception.53 The insistence 
that the self cannot be discovered purely through its impressions, but that the 
events of the soul [душевные явления] depend to a great degree on the value 
and reality of ideas which are integrated within the human self—this view 
contradicts the position of David Hume that ideas are “pale copies of impres-
sions,” for they lose the vitality, “force and liveliness” with which impressions 
first “strike upon the mind” (Treatise, 1.1.1; 2000, 7).
 Thus, for all the incompleteness of the archival materials, one begins to 
sense an emerging picture whose reality is reinforced by Pasternak’s philo-
sophical interests prior to 1913. The concomitant strands of documentation 
suggest that Pasternak’s understanding of the constituents of a unified per-
sonality is directly related to the individualized, unrepeatable capacity of each 
human being for synthesizing in a subjective manner both inanimate and 
animate phenomena, as well as the world of intellectual and spiritual ideas. 
In this, he accepts Hume’s focus on the importance of perception and sen-
sation, but insists, nonetheless, that artistic ideas, in capturing the vitality 
of sensations, remain dynamic energies fighting against the limitations of a 
 53. The most recent echoes of the debate prove that passions surrounding it are still intense: 
“We have seen that on Hume’s account, the perception of an event must be a complex impres-
sion [  .  .  .  ]. An act of mind is only required subsequently [  .  .  .  ]. Nevertheless, I think it is 
doubtful that the experience of the event can be adequately characterized in this manner. What 
it leaves out is a dynamic element in such experience, which is emphasized by Kant” (Allison 
2008, 110).
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particularized time and space. As pointed out earlier (4.1), art for Pasternak 
goes further than psychology in grasping the individual character of the “syn-
thetic flow,” a position of his youth that he acknowledges as late as 1957 in the 
Sketch for an Autobiography. According to his recollection of “Symbolism and 
Immortality,”54 the subjectivity of artistic impressions becomes an all-endur-
ing symbol that survives death and destruction:
My paper was based on the idea that our perceptions are subjective [ . . . ]. 
In my paper I argued that this subjectivity was not the attribute of every 
individual human being, but was a generic and suprapersonal quality [ . . . ] 
though the artist was of course mortal like the rest of mankind, the joy of 
living experienced by him was immortal, and that other people a century 
later might through his work be able to experience something approaching 
the personal and vital form of his original sensations. (Remember 63–64)
Доклад основывался на соображении о субъективности наших вос-
приятий [ . . . ]. В докладе проводилась мысль, что эта субъектив-
ность не является свойством отдельного человека, но есть качество 
родовое, сверхличное, что это субъективность человеческого мира, 
человеческого рода. [ . . . ] хотя художник, конечно, смертен, как все, 
счастье существования, которое он испытал, бессмертно и в неко-
тором приближении к личной и кровной форме его первоначаль-
ных ощущений может быть испытано другими спустя века после 
него по его произведениям. (PSS 3:319)
All of this suggests that Pasternak’s work in Luvers on the perceptions of the 
little girl, who was expected to become the heroine of a much longer tale, 
emerged out of a larger vision that had been developing for many years. In 
preparing for a focused examination of the novella, one can draw at this stage 
the following conclusions:
  1.   The Childhood of Luvers is directly related to Pasternak’s interest in a 
human self: the story is conceived from within the wider context of his 
interests in perception and apperception, extending as far back as 1910.
 54. See here Fleishman’s characterization of the paper: “it was semi-literary and semi-
philosophical in nature. Thus it was reminiscent of the paper on Natorp that Pasternak had just 
written” (1990a, 51). See also Livingstone’s commentary about the surviving theses of the paper: 
“Why such difficult concepts? Pasternak was writing for listeners who had spent some three 
years studying problems of symbolism and to whom his philosophical language would not be 
daunting” (MG 65).
192 | Chapter 5
  2.   It appears more than probable that Pasternak was particularly inter-
ested in establishing a paradigm for the development of awareness, as 
the young girl advances beyond her earlier ability to register impres-
sions toward the act of understanding and absorbing “indelible” ideas. 
The earlier texts suggest a progression from (a) material inanimate 
objects confronting consciousness; to (b) the animating work of soul; 
and finally to (c) the unifying presence of “spirit” and the world of 
ideas “from the outdoors,” the dynamic spiritual centers characterized 
by power, which enter reality with a force equal to the power of the 
sun. Further analysis is needed to determine the extent to which this 
structure is reflected in Luvers.
  3.   This three-layered progression is particularly evident in “Ordering a 
Drama” with its invitation to the children to “bear this sweet pain: to 
work; to think for the inanimate objects” [они выносили это сладост-
ное страдание: работать, думать за неодушевленнoe], an invita-
tion that reflects almost verbatim Pasternak’s many philosophical notes.
  4.   It also seems incontestable that in describing this process of an ever-
deepening and expanding apprehension, Pasternak is interested in 
the synthetic quality of Zhenya’s perception as she synchronizes the 
experiences that are both immediate and very distant оr unfocused 
(туманный). In this, Pasternak echoes some of the major premises 
of Hume, but as expanded and questioned by Kantianism and Neo-
Kantianism. There is a further debt to Hermann Cohen and his insis-
tence that “the finite is not happy to remain finite, but has the courage 
to overcome the distance from infinity” (ARG I:266–67; trans. Poma 
1997, 144).
  5.   There is, thus, an overall impression in Pasternak that consciousness 
is affected most strongly not only by what is immediate, but also by 
what is still “outside experience.” As Pasternak observes in describing 
Zhenya’s stumbling on the “idea of the third person,” the impression is 
all the more strong because its full reality remains outside of her range 
of understanding: “the impression that lay behind it all was indelible. 
[ . . . ] It lay beyond the girl’s awareness, because it was vitally important 
and significant” [Впечатление, скрывавшееся за всем, было неиз-
гладимо. [ . . . ] Оно лежало вне ведения девочки, потому что было 
жизненно важно и значительно] (CSP 178; PSS 4:86; trans. altered; 
emphasis added).
  6.   Pasternak undoubtedly experiments in this passage with the artis-
tic means of blending categories that both proceed from and pre-
cede experience—in short, the Kantian categories of a posteriori and 
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a priori, a pattern which also indicates that Pasternak in Luvers may 
be taking the child in her development toward her first experience 
of apperception whose spiritual and moral context is supplied by the 
authorial voice and its reference to the commandments.
  7.   As Pasternak searches for a paradigm for the child’s growth that can 
address the gap existing in the psychology of his day, he is focused on 
the artistic means that can portray how a developing personality syn-
chronizes the categories of immediate reality and the phenomena of a 
much wider range, starting from impressions and addressing itself to 
ideas and questions of morality. In this pursuit he is unrestricted in his 
artistic work and feels free to select and apply any insight of which he 
approved before leaving philosophy. Cohen’s emphasis on the “other” 
becomes a powerful moral guide, and the ancient Greek understand-
ing of soul and spirit, augmented by the analytical insight of Hume, is 
there to be brought into the purview of his own experimentation.
  8.   In short, he considers the landscape of the developing self as territory 
only partially explored in philosophy, and his training in this regard 
presents something of a treasure trove for thematic and technical 
experimentation.
  9.   It is also possible then that the last name of the heroine in the Child-
hood of Luvers is a play upon this never-ceasing work of conscious-
ness flowing toward “something” or “someone” to be realigned within 
itself—Lu-vers or vers le—a movement of perception that overtakes 
and synthesizes the ever new data that informs, and is informed by, 
“the essential self.”55
10.  Thus, in working on Luvers, Pasternak pursues an ambitious and com-
prehensive goal, with many uncertainties and unknowns—all ripe for 
artistic exploration. The very range of these intentions may, in fact, 
have been responsible for the puzzling discordance between Paster-
nak’s artistic aims and the critical reaction to his work.
5.4 Beyond the metonymous self: 
 Moving beyond traditional readings of the novella
In contrast to the reception of Pasternak’s earliest prose works, The Childhood 
of Luvers was noted and celebrated, but the focus of the critics (so many of 
 55. This interpretation’s sense of ever-expanding journey is supported by a somewhat dif-
ferent etymological route. Fateeva speaks of Luvers (люверс) as a ring in a sail, and by extension 
with “wind,” “sail,” “boat” (2003, 225).
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whom were Russia’s most eminent and perceptive readers) had very little to 
do with any of the concepts mentioned by Pasternak in the above passages. 
This situation has hardly changed for the contemporary reader who is often 
bewildered by Pasternak’s theoretical pronouncements, couched in difficult 
and evasive language. Boris Gasparov, one of the most perceptive contempo-
rary critics, observed that Pasternak’s “artistic metaphysics” is a singular blend 
of Tolstoyan vision and Futurism;56 yet it appears that it was only the latter 
aspect—Pasternak’s avant-garde or abstract qualities—that was immediately 
seized upon after the publication of Luvers.57 Sensing the remarkable dyna-
mism of his technical experimentation, critics have focused on Pasternak’s 
ability to present a montage of differentiated details. What fascinated critics 
was not the writer’s search for the pathways of unification of phenomena in an 
evolving self-consciousness, but rather the break-up of the whole into parts, 
and eventually—a spectacular series of metonymies and synecdoches. Per-
haps reflecting the spirit of the country in upheaval, critics ignored Pasternak’s 
capacity to unify the immediate and infinite, while being drawn to his ability 
to describe the disunited and broken. In short, critics were fascinated by the 
disrupted diary of Zhenya Luvers’s impressions. The issues of soul and spirit 
in this regard interested very few.
 Thus, while reconnecting Pasternak to Tolstoy’s Detstvo, Yuri Tynianov 
sensed the originality of the work and its unprecedented “newness” as he 
focused his analysis upon the multitude of inanimate objects, broken and 
reassembled elements, united not by organic life but by artistic montage, rem-
iniscent of abstract or Cubist art:58
Everything is given under the microscope of adolescent transition, which 
changes phenomena under observation and makes them more brittle, 
breaks them into a thousand pieces, turns them into living abstractions.
 An object of everyday life (вещь быта) must be broken into a thou-
sand pieces and glued together again, in order to become a new thing in 
 56. Witt (2000a, 135); B. Gasparov (1992a, 110–11).
 57. Kuzmin’s reaction to the novella is an exception, rather than the rule: “The interesting 
aspect of Pasternak’s novella lies not so much, perhaps, in the child’s psychology, as in the wave 
of love, warmth, open-heartedness and unusual sincerity of the author’s emotional response to 
the world.” [Интерес повести Пастернака не в детской, пожалуй, психологии, а в огром-
ной волне любви, теплоты, прямодушия и какой-то откровенности эмоциональных 
восприятий автора] (PSSCom 3:543).
 58. Malmstad, sharing this view, accepted by a greater number of critics, cites Pasternak’s 
conversation with Zoia Maslenikova about poetry of 1917: “At that time I was very caught up 
with cubism” (1992, 301)
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literature. In literature, so it seems, a glued together object is stronger than 
an unbroken whole one. (1977, 161)
Similarly, Konstantin Loks, praising the story, spoke of “a manner of story-
telling, moving forward by means of descriptions of particularized detailed 
accounts” [так обуславливается особый способ рассказывания, движу-
щегося описанием частностей и деталей] (1925, 286–87). This enthusi-
astic welcome not only avoided the issue of wholeness of the self, but shared 
an implicit critical consensus: Pasternak’s protagonists, invariably engaged in 
observation, were simply too passive, and the narrative itself was intrinsically 
descriptive, with no interest in plot or action. “He is a writer without kith or 
kin” [без роду и племени], proclaimed Zamyatin, and immediately observed 
that Pasternak, for all his brilliant innovations in syntax, could not develop 
a plot: “His own contribution is not in the area of plot (his work is plotless)” 
[Новое у него не в сюжете. Он бессюжетен] (Zamyatin 1923; [1967, 203]).
 Roman Jakobson in 1935 proposed a critical framework59 that situated 
these approaches within a wider theoretical view that identified the highly 
specific quality of Pasternak’s artistic gift (see also Chapter 2). In contrast to 
the metaphoric images of Mayakovsky, Pasternak’s hero, in Jakobson’s view, 
blends into the environment. His unification is with the world: he is “con-
cealed in a picture puzzle [  .  .  .  ] broken down into a series of constituent 
and subsidiary parts” (1969, 146). Pasternak thus presents cut-up parts of 
the abstract world:60 “Show us your environment and I will tell you who you 
are. We learn what he lives on, this lyric character outlined by metonymies, 
split up by synecdoches into individual attributes, reactions, and situations” 
(Jakobson 1969, 147). Jakobson’s seemingly incontrovertible assessment of 
Pasternak as “emphatically lyrical” identified the writer’s range as unsuited 
to an epic theme (or possibly any theme outside his own or his heroes’ lyrical 
feelings61) for the simple reason that his “lyricism, both in poetry and prose, 
is imbued with metonymy; in other words, it is association by contiguity that 
predominates” (Jakobson 1969, 141).62 This meant, in turn, that Pasternak’s 
 59. In Malmstad’s view, Jakobson’s position of 1935 became “that overcoat out of which has 
come most of the commentary on the writer” (1992, 302).
 60. Jakobson thereby echoes Tynianov’s image of “living abstractions” broken “into a thou-
sand pieces” (Tynianov 161).
 61. “This attitude of childhood towards appearances corresponds perfectly to Pasternak’s 
own. An epic attitude to his environment is naturally out of the question for a poet who is con-
vinced that, in the world of prosaic fact, the elements of everyday existence fall dully, stupidly, 
and with crippling effect upon the soul” (Jakobson 1969, 139).
 62. Mikhail Gasparov, as I have noted already, refuted Jakobson’s position, having analyzed 
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characters were happiest when dissolved into the world they observe, and 
most uninteresting and banal when they had to think or be active:63 “The 
hero’s activity is outside Pasternak’s sphere. When he does deal with action, 
he is banal and unoriginal, defending in the theoretical digressions his right 
to triviality. [ . . . ] Pasternak’s stories are similarly empty of action” (Jakobson 
1969, 149). Jakobson’s judgment—the triumphant acme of Russian theoretical 
criticism—was a decisive step for Pasternak studies. With the return of inter-
est in Pasternak’s work following the Nobel Prize fiasco, The Childhood of 
Luvers was hailed as highly innovative and exceptionally well suited to Paster-
nak’s temperament, а view spearheaded by Jakobson’s observation that “this 
attitude of childhood towards appearances corresponds perfectly to Paster-
nak’s own” (1969, 139). Michel Aucouturier64 and Angela Livingstone, fol-
lowed by a generation of critics in the 1970s and 1980s, developed Jakobson’s 
position further by working with the concept of “the receptive hero,” a person 
capable of absorbing and reflecting the world by becoming a metonymous 
part of his surroundings. The most brilliant discoveries in the construction 
of Pasternak’s world, including Faryno’s demonstration of Luvers’s “archepo-
etics” (1993), the quantitative analysis of Mikhail Gasparov (1995), and the 
postulations of “metatropes” by Fateeva (2003), proved not strong enough to 
overturn the critical consensus that Pasternak’s preoccupations in his early 
prose were directed by his cubo-futurist experimentations and metonymous 
relations.65
quantitatively the use of metaphors and metonymies in the poetry of Mayakovsky and Paster-
nak (1995).
 63. See Glazov-Corrigan (1991, 137). Strictly speaking, Jakobson is not always consistent 
in this regard. Occasionally he also insists that there is lack of agency, rather than lack of action, 
in Pasternak’s narrative world: “The active voice has been erased from Pasternak’s poetic gram-
mar. In his prose ventures he employs precisely that metonymy which substitutes the action for 
the actor. [ . . . ] The agens is excluded from his thematic material” (1969, 147).
 64. In Aucouturier’s view, Zhenya Luvers as an artistic self is not yet an individual or a 
metonymous self—rather she is a receptive generic concept: “Zhenya Luvers unites in herself 
all the ideal conditions for a receptive attitude towards the world; a child who perceives things 
directly without the screen of words, solidified concepts, habit; a woman who in her very body 
is sensitive of the mysteries of life and creation. However, precisely because these are generic 
and not individual qualities which mark her for the incarnation of the Pasternakian concept of 
the personality, one cannot consider her as the first metonymous hero of the poet” (1978, 45).
 65. As far as the understanding of Pasternak’s concept of personality is concerned, Jakob-
son’s influence proved decisive, insofar as it ignored and dismissed a whole range of evidence as 
ultimately banal. Jakobson acknowledges, for example, Pasternak’s “acute awareness of Symbol-
ism” (1969, 137) as well as the writer’s emphasis upon the phenomenon of “soul,” but he treats 
both in passing and covertly suggests that metonymy as a principle provides here a sufficient 
key for the indebtedness in question: one pattern, a grammatical formula of artistic vision, once 
recognized and named, explains all other constructions. Thus, instead of a concept of personal-
ity whose highest idea is to overcome fate (Pasternak’s intention for the direction of his work), 
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 Thus, the model of the metonymic or receptive self triumphed, and while 
it captured some essential features of Pasternak’s prose, it cut out a whole 
range of narrative themes and tropes, as well as the novella’s philosophical 
undertones. It is my position in the present investigation that the critics who 
accepted the metonymous model for the construction of Pasternak’s protago-
nists made assumptions that mistook the very scope of Pasternak’s ambition. 
In the next two chapters I challenge this prevailing view and argue instead 
that the fuller picture is far more complex: even if Pasternak’s university stud-
ies might no longer direct his thought, this earlier training carries the force of 
initial blueprints for the understanding of reality nourished decisively by the 
methodology of philosophical inquiry. In short, the goal of the subsequent 
chapters is to address the rather formidable dislocation between Pasternak’s 
plans “to visit a human self when she is whole” and the picture of Zhenya as 
a “childlike spontaneity and a feminine receptivity” (Aucouturier 1978, 45) in 
order to suggest a novel approach to Pasternak’s first major prose work.
Jakobson’s powerful analysis supplies a picture in which “the genuine agent has no place in 
Pasternak’s poetic mythology” (1969, 148).
he analysis of “The Long Days” (Part I of Detstvo Luvers) will pursue sev-
eral interconnected aims. Its principal goal is to emphasize the novella’s 
overall design, which has hitherto escaped critical notice. The Kantian notion 
of a posteriori and a priori ranges of perceptions will be approached as fun-
damental to the organization of the novella: the analysis will explore how the 
sense of finite and infinite, known and unknown, changes and expands at 
every major stage of the child’s growth, while some key elements of Zhenya’s 
world, reintroduced into this ever renewed context, gain a deepened signi-
fication. Thus, the chapter will argue for the presence of meticulously orga-
nized narrative layers (reflected in a series of Tables 6a–6d)—the sequential 
expansion of the phenomenal world as it captures and restructures Zhenya’s 
perception. These layers will be approached as evidence of Pasternak’s nar-
rative strategy that goes beyond metonymic paradigms: each major event of 
the novella, signifying yet another of Zhenya’s rites of passage, will be viewed 
as a familiar, everyday occurrence, disrupted nonetheless by the expanding, 
startlingly new, and eventually unlimited range of phenomena—a design 
reminiscent of the three worlds in “Ordering a Drama.” While unveiling this 
narrative pattern, this chapter will emphasize the gradual realignment of met-
onymic or contiguous series within a taut metaphoric structure that grows 
ever more elaborate and complex, just as the novella approaches a paradigm 
198
“The Long Days” in
The Childhood of Luvers
Chronology of a Permeable Self
6
T
“The Long Days” in The Childhood of Luvers | 199
shift in Part II, “The Stranger.” Table I, entitled “Chronology of a Permeable 
Self,” will conclude the chapter. As it collects the evidence of Tables 6a–6d 
(and looks forward to completion in Chapter 7), Table I facilitates the demon-
stration of the philosophical vision underlying the expanding patterns of the 
child’s sensations as they are carefully aligned not only with different seasons 
of the year, but also with the gradual approach of the as yet unknown external 
world of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century.
6.1 Transition from infancy to early childhood: 
 Zhenya’s first awareness of the world beyond
The first scene of the novella, so familiar to all readers of Pasternak—Zhenya 
Luvers’s transition from infancy to early childhood (выход из младенче-
ства)—is often understood by critics as an emblem for much of the writer’s 
early prose.1 As I argued in Chapter 4, this scene is focused on the impressions 
of an as yet undeveloped self and, for this reason, its emblematic character 
must by definition be limited. Nonetheless, the scene presents a series of star-
tling portrayals of the synthetic nature of perception into whose purview enter 
images that may appear somewhat accidental. The most arresting of these, 
however, are destined to follow Zhenya throughout her life in the novella 
and, consequently, to play an important part in the organization of the nar-
rative. The centerpiece of the scene is the contrast between the child’s vague 
understanding of things and images which (for all their baffling appearances) 
already possess names and her dawning awareness of a reality beyond what 
is grasped, named, and known.2 More important still, this unknown world 
is introduced as more kindred to Zhenya than what is known and familiar. 
This design is carefully steeped in an overall state of confusion: the child is 
both drawn to and frightened by everything that has no name and no clear 
 1. See here, for instance, Björling (1982, 141–43) and Faryno: “this whole novella is born 
if not from its first paragraphs, then at least from its first chapter” (1993, 1–2).
 2. In Faryno’s reading almost all images of the opening scene have continuous resonances 
throughout the narrative. For a lack of time “to explore all,” he selects certain “key” images 
or motifs [я остановлюсь лишь на тех мотивах, которые могут рассматриваться как 
отправные]. Hence, he argues that the mention of Zhenya’s childhood toys—ships and dolls 
[кораблики и куклы]—already contains the notion of the journey and navigation, while 
dolls indicate motherhood and home, and both of these are the central themes of the narrative 
(1993, 2). In this context it is all the more important to find the dynamic pathways of the im-
ages’ realignment—layers of transformation that indicate a direction beyond that of intertex-
tual and intratextual echoes.
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delineation,3 while at the same time everything known that has a name is also 
characterized by a kind of delirium:
In those days Zhenya was put early to bed. She could not see the lights 
of Motovilikha. But once something scared the Angora cat, and it stirred 
suddenly in its sleep and woke Zhenya up. Then she saw grown-ups on the 
balcony. The alder overhanging the railings was dense and iridescent as 
ink. The tea in the glasses was red. [ . . . ] It was like a delirium—except that 
this one had its name, which even Zhenya knew: They were playing cards.
 However, there was no name of determining what was happening far, 
far away on the other bank. That had no name, and no precise color or defi-
nite outlines. And as it stirred it was familiar and dear, and was not deliri-
ous as was the thing that muttered and swirled in clouds of the tobacco 
smoke [ . . . ]. (CSP 133; emphasis added)
Женю в те годы спать укладывали рано. Она не могла видеть огней 
Мотовилихи. Но однажды ангорская кошка, чем-то испуганная, 
резко шевельнулась во сне и разбудила Женю. Тогда она увидала 
взрослых на балконе. Нависавшая над брусьями ольха была густа 
и переливчата, как чернила. Чай в стаканах был красен. [ . . . ] Это 
было похоже на бред, но у этого бреда было свое название, известное 
и Жене: шла игра.
 Зато нипочем нельзя было определить того, что творилось на 
том берегу, далеко-далеко: у того не было названия и не было отчет-
ливого цвета и точных очертаний; и волнующееся, оно было милым 
и родным и не было бредом, как то, что бормотало и ворочалось в 
клубах табачного дыма [ . . . ]. (PSS 3:34)
The frightening nameless principle that makes Zhenya cry is the dark factory-
village, Motovilikha, at night, appearing in the reflected light of either the set-
ting sun, electric lights, or the moon;4 it is an arresting image of the unknown 
world surrounded by a halo of light. Equally significant, however, is the fact 
that the factory produces “cast iron”; metal makes its marginal entry here into 
an otherwise pastoral home5 with the “iridescent alder overhanging” its rail-
 3. Jakobson notes: “For Khlebnikov, as for the little heroine in Pasternak’s story, a name 
possesses the complete and comforting significance it has in childhood” (1969, 139). The em-
phasis, however, is not so much upon naming, but upon sensing an infinite, as yet unnamed 
space that retreats behind the name.
 4. Gorelik observes that the theme of light always accompanies the description of night in 
Pasternak (2000, 67).
 5. See Faryno: “In the poetic system of Pasternak the motif of the ‘factory’ becomes one 
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ings.6 This emergence of an unfamiliar world7 (which contains, in the clos-
est of proximities, a great number of details ready to spring into symbols)8 is 
dearer to the child than the house, the alder, and the alien but habitual (and 
already named) card game of the adults. Thus, Motovilikha at night is Zhenya’s 
first unnamed presence, introduced pointedly in order to set up a metaphoric 
place-holder for the new and expanding impressions of the unknown and 
unreachable9 that will appear in the narrative each time the child approaches 
a new stage of growth and traverses a new boundary between what is familiar 
and what is “beyond” her knowledge or frame of reference.
 It should also be noted that the card game, mentioned in the scene as if 
in passing, is by no means accidental. As Zhenya leaves infancy, Pasternak 
underscores the importance of the transition by acknowledging and display-
ing his debt both to the Symbolists and to Rainer Maria Rilke: the playing 
hands of fate, surrounded by the colors of a masquerade,10 appear as the child 
enters the world whose arbitrary and yet significant design will from now on 
be imprinted on her memory. Moreover, the image of hands will become a 
recurrent motif throughout Luvers, operating as another marker, changing its 
position and signification every time it denotes the approach of a new stage in 
Zhenya’s growth (see Table 6a below).
of the variations of his transformative chains” (1993, 11). In contrast to Faryno’s emphasis on 
the “alchemic” nature of these transformations, the image of metal appears to us as threatening, 
preparing the image of nature imprisoned and “in chains” [волоча сверкающие цепи ветвей] 
at the conclusion of the novella (PSS 3:84).
 6. Faryno’s reading of the “iridescent alder” as kindred (in its reflections of light and thick-
ness of color) to the appearance of the Kama River opens up, in our view, a larger theme of the 
role of nature in the novella (1993, 15). Fateeva, in citing Pasternak’s letter of May 1912, suggests 
that the garden in Pasternak is always linked to a crossing into the world of his “inner infinite 
garden” (2003, 127).
 7. Both Faryno and Fateeva emphasize the etymology and mythological overtones of 
Motovilikha (motki and motivilo—the spools of wool and the instrument for their unveiling) 
(Faryno 1993, 12–13; Fateeva 2003, 128). Faryno observes that Motovilikha’s role is broken 
into two counterparts: “unseen” and “not understood” (1993, 15), while these qualities appear 
to readers not as opposed, but rather as interconnected. Fateeva notes that the “inanimate”–
“animate” world in Pasternak constantly changes its form and calls for an indefiniteness in nam-
ing and appearance, so that the text is oversaturated with indefinite neuter pronouns, variations 
of “some-thing” [что-то, нечто] (2003, 125).
 8. Gorelik, following Yuri Lotman and B. A. Uspensky, speaks about post-symbolism as 
a genre, and of a symbol as a type of a sign that creates “methodological situation” (2000, 6). 
Fateeva, following Barthes’s Mythologies, speaks about a creation of a “personal mythology of 
the author” wherein every detail of the world assumes its own compositional function in the 
narrative (2003, 137).
 9.  Gorelik notes about the role of Tsvetkov, “He incarnates an appearance as yet unre-
vealed [нераскрытое явление] as Motovilikha or the street without a name” (2000, 107).
 10.  In a somewhat different context Ljunggren observes that the hand was the most “be-
loved” of Rilke’s synecdoches; further, she traces the role of Rilke’s hand—“Die hastige Hand”—
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 In Pasternak’s narrative, then, Zhenya does not simply notice an unknown 
reality; she internalizes its mystery, and the formation of her character reflects, 
as in a mirror,11 the external outlines of this new experience:
That morning she emerged from the state of infancy she had still been in 
at night. For the first time in her life she suspected that was something that 
the phenomena kept to themselves [ . . . ]. For the first time, like this new 
Motovilikha, she did not say everything she thought, but kept to herself what 
was most essential, vital, and stirring. (CSP 134; emphasis added)
В это утро она вышла из того младенчества, в котором находилась 
еще ночью. Она в первый раз за свои годы заподозрила явление в 
чем-то таком, что явление либо оставляет про себя. [ . . . ] Она впер-
вые, как и эта новая Мотовилиха, сказала не все, что подумала, и 
самое существенное, нужное и беспокойное скрыла про себя. (PSS 
3:35)
Here, then, is Pasternak’s first emblem of the child’s consciousness in the pro-
cess of change. While the focus upon new materials entering consciousness is 
intentionally obscured, the lines of kindredness are most clearly established 
between the child’s inner sense of self and the marginal and indefinite content 
of her experience. The focus of this complex passage, the vague indefiniteness 
that appears at the boundaries of consciousness, produces in the girl a parallel 
awareness of a similarly vague and as yet unknown inner world.
 Moving further and further away from his studies of philosophy, Paster-
nak nonetheless signals here his indebtedness to Kant’s “synthetic judgment,” 
as the child’s awareness of spatial and temporal categories (outer and inner 
forms of intuition) is introduced as an act of perception that blends and syn-
thesizes both a priori (the kindredness with the unknown) and a posteriori 
(impressions already established by experience). This recognition of the unfa-
miliar and yet kindred as both inner and outer constitutes the first temporal 
boundary that Zhenya crosses, herself unaware of any dividing line, moved 
only by an inborn sympathy of the obscure for the obscure, of the hidden for 
the equally hidden and mysterious.
 In this portrayal of emergence from infancy, one finds Pasternak’s charac-
teristic and well-analyzed “contiguous series” or “metonymous relations,” that 
is, patterns of narrative that establish ties of kindredness between the girl and 
 11. Fateeva proposes that “mirror” and “reflection” in Pasternak are invariably intercon-
nected with the transformation of the “face” of the lyrical subject (2003, 160).
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the external world, obscuring the outlines of personhood. Such descriptions, 
proposed by Jakobson as comprising Pasternak’s essential technique,12 will, as 
we shall see, dominate the author’s early portrayals of Zhenya’s childhood, but 
they will not characterize her life at the time of her meeting with the myste-
rious Tsvetkov. At the beginning of the story, however, the contiguous series 
are a dominant device, for even her passage from childhood is introduced by 
means of a kindredness between herself and the world, and yet it is just as 
important to emphasize that while the girl’s consciousness synthesizes the sur-
rounding world, her feeling of kindredness is attached not to the familiar, but 
to the mysterious, unnamed, and unknown.
6.2 Childhood: 
  Acquaintance with still life and the  
quiet plasticity of the northern daylight
The first: a true story, reality, as a great immobile legend of wood and 
cloth, objects in need, twilight in need, like a church parish that has grown 
stale from waiting. [ . . . ] The first is—reality without movement [ . . . ].
 —“ordering a Drama” (MG 27)
As observed by critics, every major scene in the story’s first pages rejects the 
possibility of agency and draws instead a de-animated human being sur-
rounded by the kindred series of inanimate objects.13 However, it is equally 
important to observe that acquaintance with the inanimate world is char-
acteristic only of Zhenya’s early childhood, and that a few scenes operate in 
this regard as emblem-images or emblem-sequences that exemplify the child’s 
earlier state of mind in her instinctual interaction, through perception, with 
 12. Cf. “However rich and refined Pasternak’s metaphors may be, they are not what deter-
mines and guides his lyric theme. It is metonymical, not the metaphorical passages that lend 
his work an ‘expression far from common.’ Pasternak’s lyricism, both in poetry and in prose, 
is imbued with metonymy; in other words, it is association by contiguity that predominates” 
(Jakobson 1969, 141). 
 13. See here Jakobson: “The hero is [  .  .  .  ] replaced by a chain of concretized situations 
and surrounding objects, both animate and inanimate” (1969, 146–47). Fleishman similarly 
observes that the focus of the prose is “landscape descriptions, interiors and still lives”: “Regis-
tration of shifts in the semantics of the world that describes the thing prevails over the conflict 
of characters, and the movement of the ‘word’ is more noticeable than the movement of the 
‘character’” (1979, 48). Rudova echoes: “The reality that Zhenya sees through relationship of 
things becomes the stream of images” (1997, 55). Wiegers concludes, accepting Jakobson’s 
position that the absence of active agent [отсутствие деятеля] is the result of Pasternak’s met-
onymic prose style (1999, 288).
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the material objects around her. Perhaps the most arresting emblem14 of these 
earlier sections is another episode involving the movement of hands. The very 
slow motion of the impersonal hands of the strict English governess as she 
presides over the dinner table asserts balance between the inner and outer 
worlds in concentric, ever-widening circles: from the food to the mood of the 
children, to the pieces of furniture and rooms in the house, and to the quiet 
and softly lit day. The governess’s hands, introduced as a replacement for the 
parents’ card game, reorder the initial memory that Zhenya carries with her 
upon leaving infancy. Orderly in themselves, the governess’s hands no longer 
play: their focus is a movement from inanimate objects to the world of the 
growing children, and they belong to a person dehumanized by her proximity 
to orderly, inanimate reality. Lit by the diffused northern day and herself an 
emblem of orderly balance, the woman occupies a space next to the “graying” 
oak sideboard cabinet and a “severe” collection of heavy silver. By contrast 
with the governess, then, these surrounding objects are almost humanized 
while the governess, at the center of this design, metes out neither pleasure 
nor happiness, but a well-ordered, emotionless, tepid universe which prom-
ises to last without limit in the narrative section, fittingly entitled “The Long 
Days”:
The quiet northern daylight streamed through the curtains. It was unsmil-
ing. The oaken sideboard seemed gray. And the silver lay piled there heavy 
and severe. The lavender washed hands of the governess moved above the 
tablecloth. She always served everyone his fair portion and had an inex-
haustible supply of patience, and a sense of justice was germane to her to 
the same degree as her room and her books were always clean and neat. 
The maid who brought the food stood waiting in the dining room and only 
went to the kitchen to fetch the next course. It was pleasant and comfort-
able, but dreadfully sad. (CSP 134)
Сквозь гардины струился тихий северный день. Он не улыбался. 
Дубовый буфет казался седым. Тяжело и сурово грудилось серебро. 
Над скатертью двигались лавандой умытые руки англичанки, она 
никого не обделяла и обладала неистощимым запасом терпенья; а 
чувство справедливости было свойственно ей в той высокой сте-
 14. According to Wiegers, the infantilism of Luvers is directly linked to the fragmentary 
nature of the narrative and the fact that her parents are deeply indifferent to her (1999, 232). 
However, the parents are kept outside of her interests particularly in the first part of the story 
when her consciousness is developed in relation to objects. This pattern is not general; it will 
change in other episodes of the novella.
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пени, в какой всегда чиста была и опрятна ее комната и ее книги. 
Горничная, подав кушанье, застаивалась в столовой и в кухню 
уходила только за следующим блюдом. Было удобно и хорошо, но 
страшно печально. (PSS 3:35)
On the whole, then, this everyday comfortable life of Zhenya’s early childhood 
continues to imitate the movements of the governess’s hands. The events move 
out of the center to the periphery and never back—from the governess’s hands 
to the world outside, but not the other way round, just as the governess’s hands 
only serve, give, measure, but rarely receive.
 One should note that there exists—against this balanced, well-measured 
space—a disorderly and irrational residue that threatens the established order: 
the electricity of the parents’ presence and feelings. However, just like Motovi-
likha at night at the beginning of the story, the parents’ inexplicable irritability 
remains very much on the outskirts of the children’s consciousnesses—experi-
enced on this occasion “within” as a kindred weight of resentment and guilt:15
Totally vulnerable, and somehow unrecognizable and pathetic, this father 
was genuinely terrifying, unlike the merely irritated stranger. He produced 
more effect on the little girl; his son was left moved.
 But their mother bewildered them both. [ . . . ]
 Everything that passed from parents to children came inopportunely 
and from outside, elicited not by them but by some external cause—and as 
is always the case, it had a touch of remoteness and mystery, like whimper-
ing outside the city gates at night when everyone is going to bed. (CSP 135; 
emphasis in original)
Ничем неуязвимый, какой-то неузнаваемый и жалкий,—этот 
отец был—страшен, в противоположность отцу раздраженному,—
чужому. Он трогал больше девочку, сына меньше. 
 Но мать смущала их обоих. [ . . . ]
 Все, что шло от родителей к детям, приходило невпопад, со 
стороны, вызванное не ими, но какими-то посторонними причи-
 15. Gorelik observes the correlation between poor relations of parents and children and the 
narrative focus upon objects and, just like Wiegers, considers these to be characteristic of the 
world of Luvers (2000, 104–5). However, this correlation is characteristic only of the first part 
of the narrative, of the world characterized by the English governess, when the space, as Gorelik 
notices, appears comfortable but cold to Zhenya. Parents in this section replace the unknown 
distant qualities of Motovilikha, awakening in the children not merely the inner concealment 
of curiosity, but the concealment of resentment.
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нами, и отдавало далекостью, как это всегда бывает, и загадкой, как, 
ночами, нытье по заставам, когда все ложатся спать. (PSS 3:36-37)
The parental presences are kept very much at a distance; their actions are liter-
ally at the boundary of the children’s consciousnesses; the temporal and spatial 
markers are those of outsiders to the routine of everyday: “like whimpering 
outside the city gates at night when everyone is going to bed” [нытье по заста-
вам, когда все ложатся спать] (CSP 135; PSS 3:37; emphasis added). These 
most “kindred” and immediate people are at this point only strangers who 
threaten to undermine (but never do) the horizontal symmetry of the chil-
dren’s world while widening and deepening it with a sense of danger—with an 
unconscious hidden uncertainty of the external and distant, reflected in the 
unexpected bouts of irritability and guilt, experienced by the children, who 
otherwise remain surrounded by what is, on the whole, a world of animated 
objects and de-animated humans (see Table 6b).
 As Fleishman aptly observes, this manner of writing destroys the dividing 
line between subjects and objects (1977, 19–21). Indeed, as noted above, it is 
not really the governess, but her hands, and more precisely her rooms that 
continue to inscribe order in the Luverses’ house. The subject seems to have 
no power over objects: objects move in unison with human beings, echoing 
their thoughts, impulses, and states.16 The symmetry of subject-object—which 
slows down time by arresting and even reversing the possibility of incontro-
vertible action or agency—indicates, however, not merely Pasternak’s techni-
cal penchant for a weakened agent,17 but also something of the magical quality 
of childhood, its wonder and sadness. As human consciousness expands, how-
ever, and the subject perceives the world and sees herself reflected in objects,18 
the established balance ensures—at this stage, at least—that no event or action 
can take place in this world as it continues to hide from the children the reality 
of their own powerlessness or, what is equally possible, their as yet unknown 
power.
 In the meantime, Zhenya, after lingering for a very long time in the world 
without clearly defined agents—with its “playing and squabbling, writing and 
eating in completely empty, solemnly deserted rooms” [Но все чаще и чаще 
 16. See Glazov-Corrigan: “the loneliness and uneventfulness of the children’s early years 
[ . . . ] is described as an interaction, an acquaintance with the inanimate world around them” 
(1991, 139). See also Barnes: “Both Pasternak and his heroine thus emerge as enraptured pas-
sive observers, rather than demonstrative masculine doers” (1989, 271).
 17. See Glazov-Corrigan (1991, 140); Rudova (1997, 55); Wiegers (1999, 288). 
 18. Glazov-Corrigan (1991, 157 n.11) also emphasizes that in the first part of the “Long 
Days” Pasternak avoids the question of the interaction between brother and sister by observing 
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игралось и вздорилось, пилось и елось в совершенно пустых, торже-
ственно безлюдных комнатах] (CSP 134; PSS 3:35)—will finally transgress 
this boundary19 and turn toward a singular confrontation, this time with the 
forces of nature. On this new boundary, however, the new kindredness of pat-
terns will continue to preclude major changes, permitting the state of child-
hood to last for a while longer, with the deceptive and comfortable promise of 
uninterrupted permanence.
6.3 The boundary of spring and the outlines of soul: 
 New kindredness with nature at the appointed time
It is characteristic for Pasternak that the textual marker for soul is presented 
as underlying (rather than coinciding with) expanding consciousness. Soul 
in Luvers appears initially as an incidental place-holder for misnamed moral 
concepts, an inner self of which the growing children are aware very par-
tially, being otherwise guided by superstition and prejudice. It is also note-
worthy that “soul” makes its first appearance in the context of the children’s 
suppressed irritation at their “distant” parents, an irritation, accompanied by 
a vague sense of guilt:20 “the concepts of punishment, retribution, reward, 
and justice had in a childish way already penetrated their souls, while distract-
ing their consciousness” [понятия кары, воздаяния, награды и справед-
ливости проникли уже по-детски в их душу и отвлекали в сторону их 
сознание]21 (CSP 136; PSS 3:37; emphasis added). The children’s “souls” in 
 19. Gorelik, in the chapter “The image of a line, frame, boundary in the youthful prose 
works” [Образ линии, оправы, границы в юношеских прозаических набросках] (2000, 
17–27), suggests the interrelation between boundary and childhood (2000, 17) and notes 
(2000, 23) Pasternak’s letter to Olga Freidenberg of July 23, 1910, where the writer speaks of 
boundary and city outposts [границы и заставы] as an entry into a “spiritual spaciousness” 
[духовные пространства] (PSS 7:49). In the context of this, the appearance of the phrase 
“howling at city gates” [нытье по заставам] in the novella signals a presence of the boundary 
and its openness to a “spiritual spaciousness.”
 20. It is noteworthy that the major change in Zhenya’s relationship with her mother, which 
coincides with the coming of spring, remains unnoticed in criticism. For Pasternak’s critics, 
Zhenya’s moral development either remains generic, rather than individual (Aucouturier 1978, 
45); or it is interconnected exclusively with Tsvetkov (Barnes 1989, 272); or “Pasternak saw 
Christianity at that time as only one cultural system among many” (Fleishman 1990a, 104). 
Faryno (1993), while emphasizing the connection between Zhenya’s early years and the apoc-
ryphal accounts of Mary’s childhood, does not note the mother–daughter transformation, while 
Björling discounts the reality of the sudden warmth: “Zhenya is in all senses an unenlightened 
if not neglected child” (2010, 132).
 21.  There is a slight alteration of the translation (cf. in CSP “had in a childish way already 
penetrated their souls, distracting their consciousness”). “While” was placed between “soul” and 
“distracting” in order to emphasize that the two concepts are not identical in the narrative.
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Luvers, then, enter the narrative as independent principles associated with 
the concepts of spiritual life, which, initially ill-fitting and misdirected, are 
blended with unconscious resentment, pain, and misunderstanding, and 
remain on the outskirts of the children’s consciousness—a deepening of an inner 
world by an as yet unnamed, unclear though distant force. Kantian influ-
ence is again clearly in evidence here, as the concept of soul is introduced as 
another example of the synthetic blending of a posteriori (diverse threads of 
poorly understood Christian teachings and dogmas) and a priori (a weight or 
a force for which there is—as yet—no name).
 The proximate cause of this inner weight is the children’s literally clos-
est kin—their estranged parents—who tend to destroy the orderly symmetry 
of their lives, otherwise carefully guarded by the English governess. In their 
disruptive acts and emotions, the parents stand for a painful and unwelcome 
connection to the external world, as well as to the children’s future that still 
awaits discovery. The emphasis on “soul” is, thus, consistently re-introduced 
into the context of the direct interrelation between anger at parents and the 
children’s conscience:
And often, when a calm of rare clarity came to their souls and they ceased 
inwardly to feel they were criminals—when their consciences were relieved 
of all the mystery that evaded discovery, like fever before a rash, they saw 
their mother as aloof, remote from them, and irascible without cause. 
[ . . . ]
 At first they would cry; later, after one especially sharp outburst, they 
began to take fright; then, over the years, it turned into a concealed and 
increasingly deep-rooted antagonism. (CSP 135; emphasis added) 
И часто, когда в их душах наступал на редкость ясный покой, и 
они не чувствовали преступников в себе, когда от совести их отле-
гало все таинственное, чурающееся обнаруженья, похожее на жар 
перед сыпью, они видели мать отчужденной, сторонящейся их и без 
поводу вспыльчивой. [ . . . ]
 Сначала, случалось, они плакали; потом, после одной особенно 
резкой вспышки, стали бояться; затем, с течением лет это перешло 
у них в затаенную, все глубже укоренявшуюся неприязнь. (PSS 3:36)
Soul as terminology and concept appears first in a world that is almost 
automaton-like in its orderly balance: the soul’s emergence, spearheaded by 
erratic and inexplicable events, disrupts the world’s comfortable but joyless 
routine. On this occasion the absent-minded animation of the “ensouled” 
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lamps22 signals the appearance of this new principle, approaching from the 
outer distances and from the inner, as yet unexamined depth of resentment, 
hurt, and pain, a principle that psychological terms and religious categories 
suggest as an ill-fitting, but orderly and symmetrical system of rewards and 
punishment. Thus, Pasternak compares the children’s growing shame with 
“what in French might be called christianisme (because none of this could be 
called Christianity)” [что хочется обозначить по-французски “христиа-
низмом,” за невозможностью назвать все это христианством] (CSP 134; 
PSS 3:36). This state of superstition and guilt,23 as Pasternak emphasizes, has 
a particularly strong effect on the girl, for it “sometimes seemed to her that 
things could be no better—nor, indeed, ought they to be so in full view of 
her perversity and impenitence—and that it all served her right” [то иногда 
казалось ей, что лучше и не может и не должно быть по ее испорчен-
ности и нераскаянности; что это поделом] (CSP 134; PSS 3:36).
 The focus on the girl permits Pasternak to develop a startling psycho-
somatic sequence, within which the hidden inner weight of guilt and anger 
begins to operate as a physical ferment, the hormonal imbalance of a maturing 
organism: “their whole beings shuttered and fermented, utterly bewildered by 
their parents’ attitude to them” [все их существо содрогалось и бродило, 
сбитое совершенно с толку отношением родителей к ним] (CSP 134; 
PSS 3:37). Moreover, the young girl’s guilt for the great number of unnamable 
sins is no longer supervised by the cold and fair English governess, but by an 
erratic French woman, obviously the bearer of “le Christianisme.” She dis-
trusts and torments the young child, already perplexed and burdened by her 
sense of sinfulness. The French woman has no name, but, in Zhenya’s mind, 
this governess looks like a fly, an instinctual life that has no memorable or 
intelligible significance. Thus, if the development of the children’s conscious-
ness is coordinated in the first part of the narrative with the balanced motion 
of human beings in relation to inanimate objects, then this new stage includes 
not only inanimate objects, but also emotional, physical, and instinctual forces 
inside and outside the body of the child.
 22. The absence of the parents is matched by the absent-mindedness of the lamps whose 
soul is outside: “The lamps only highlighted the emptiness of the evening air. [  .  .  . ] In their 
souls they were out in the street [ . . . ]. Here was where the light disappeared for the evening. 
Their parents were away” [Лампы только оттеняли пустоту вечернего воздуха. [  .  .  .  ] 
Душой своей они были на улице. [ . . . ] Вот где вечерами пропадали лампы. Родители 
были в отъезде” (CSP 137; PSS 3:38; trans. altered). 
 23. Pasternak’s opposition between Christianisme and the Russian word for Christian-
ity—христианство—is quite a peculiar one. His jab at the French is here a signal of his own 
attraction to Christianity as a living mystery, rather than as a list of dogmatic rules. In this he 
never changes. See, e.g., Bodin (1990).
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 Zhenya’s first menstruation, playing a role of purgation on several levels 
of the narrative, is presented, therefore, as a spectacular series of contiguous 
relationships, the gathering of an oversaturated synthetic unity that signals 
the approach of a new and highly meaningful boundary. The initial onset of 
the blood-flow, just like the French governess, has no name at first and cor-
responds to a multiplicity of carefully garnered textual layers: Zhenya’s fear 
of the French governess, her growing dislike of her parents, her painful and 
secretive body (which reflects her own stubborn and instinctual secretive-
ness), and, finally, the gathering intensity of the Kama River as yet blocked 
by cold and ice. As in the earlier part of the narrative, all these contiguous 
motifs appear to possess similar characteristics of inner swelling, sickness, 
secrecy, concealment, and guilt, evident in the whole spectrum of details, 
which include:24
a) the description of the lamps in the room:
They gave no light but swelled up inside like sickly fruits, with a 
clear and lackluster dropsy that distended their dilated shades. 
(CSP 137)
Oни не давали света, но набухли изнутри, как больные 
плоды, от той мутной и светлой водянки, которая разду-
вала их одутловатые колпаки. (PSS 3:38)
b) the psychological state of the child:
For the girl, these were years of suspicion, solitude, and a sense 
of sin [ . . . ]. [I]t therefore sometimes seemed to her that things 
could be no better—nor, indeed, ought they to be so in full view 
of her perversity and impenitence. (CSP 134)
А так как для девочки это были годы подозрительности и 
одиночества, чувства греховности [ . . . ] то иногда казалось 
ей, что лучше и не может и не должно быть по ее испорчен-
ности и нераскаянности; что это поделом. (PSS 3:36)
c) the girl’s behavior during the onset of menstruation:
She could only deny it and stubbornly disavow the thing that was 
 24. Here, the argument restates the findings of Glazov-Corrigan (1991, 141–42). 
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most vile of all [ . . . ]. She could only shudder, grit her teeth, and 
press herself against the wall, choking with tears. (CSP 137)
Приходилось только отрицать, упорно заперевшись в том, 
что было гаже всего [ . . . ]. Приходилось вздрагивать, сти-
снув зубы, и, давясь слезами, жаться к стене. (PSS 3:39)
d) the physical, actual state of the body:
Her joints ached and fused in a total hypnotic suggestion. Tor-
menting and enervating, this suggestion was the work of her 
organism, which concealed the meaning of everything from the 
girl, and behaving like a criminal, made her imagine this bleed-
ing was some foul and revolting form of evil. (CSP 136)
Суставы, ноя, плыли слитным гипнотическим внушением. 
Томящее и измождающее, внушение это было делом орга-
низма, который таил смысл всего от девочки и, ведя себя 
преступником, заставлял ее полагать в этом кровотечении 
какое-то тошнотворное, гнусное зло. (PSS 3:40)
e)  and the external, natural world—the onset of spring and the initially 
slow melting of the Kama River:
Sickly and ripening laboriously, spring in the Urals later bursts 
through broad and vigorous in the course of a single night, and it 
continues broad and vigorous thereafter. (CSP 136–37)
Трудно назревающая и больная, весна на Урале прорыва-
ется затем широко и бурно, в срок одной какой-нибудь 
ночи, и бурно и широко протекает затем. (PSS 3:38)
The above juxtaposition of parallel motifs further emphasizes a new symmet-
rical (or almost symmetrical) relationship that expands far beyond the sym-
metry between subject and object in the earlier section: the text presents the 
physical growth of the young girl as inseparable from her psychological devel-
opment, accompanied by yet another parallel, and this time external, natural 
event—the onset of spring. The contiguous series, in fact, only multiply, as the 
surrounding world is about to be awakened and animated.25
 25. As Fateeva observes, “the metonymic hero” is a reflection of the creative process, or 
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 Thus, contrary to critical observations about the lack of agency in the early 
Pasternak, this part of the narrative supplies a surprisingly long list of agents 
of action, with one important caveat: all of them are, in a strict sense, pseudo-
agents.26 The unshakeable darkness of the night is first pierced by the twin-
kling of an impatient star, then by Mrs. Luvers’s threatening demeanor, and 
then by the emphatic urgency of gesture—by the hand of the French govern-
ess resting on her watch. Whereas the hands of the English governess used to 
direct the children’s lives by exuding order and solemnity, the French govern-
ess’s gesture propels the world toward an irreversible breakthrough. Through 
darkness and cold, her hand on the clock shows an urgent pathway from the 
forms of the passé to the futur antérieur [cреди форм passe и futur anterieur] 
(CSP 136; PSS 3:38), and possibly for the first time in the narrative draws 
Zhenya’s attention to the reality and urgency of chronological time, even if the 
young girl is oblivious to the recognition that the night in question is also the 
tempestuous beginning of spring:
The ice was moving downstream and, presumably, crackling. A star shim-
mered. The deserted night showed rough and black and was malleable, 
chill, but unchanging. Zhenya looked away from the window. A note of 
threatening impatience sounded in her mother’s voice. The French girl 
stood against the wall, all solemnity and concentrated pedagogy. Her hand 
was in an adjutant pose, resting on her watch ribbon. (CSP 138; emphasis 
added)
Шел и, верно, шумел лед. Блистала звезда. Ковко и студено, но без 
отлива, шершаво чернела пустынная ночь. Женя отвела глаза от 
окна. В голосе матери слышалась угроза нетерпенья. Француженка 
стояла у стены, вся—серьезность и сосредоточенная педагогич-
ность. Ее рука по-адъютантски покоилась на часовом шнурке. (PSS 
3:40; emphasis added)
the relationship of the reflections through the mirror between the poet and the world (2003, 
50). This reflective function does characterize Zhenya, but only at a very particular time in her 
life—in the spring and summer in Perm.
 26. See here Fateeva who, summing up the argument of Arutiunova (rpt. 1972) and Kovtu-
nova (1986, 148), sides with Kovtunova’s conclusion. Thus, while it may appear that the “lyrical 
subject” in Pasternak is eliminated, the obverse, in fact, takes place. The predicative relation-
ships of the “subject” become attached to the objects of the external world, and as a result 
the whole of the text becomes dynamic and filled with predicative action [текст становится 
“сплошь предикативным”]. In the meantime, the lyrical subject moves to the foreground, 
reinforced at least twice as a reflection of what was reflected from him into the world (2003, 51).
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It must also be emphasized that among a whole series of pseudo-agents, the 
text clearly points to Zhenya as the ultimate agent of change.27 Zhenya seems 
to start a whole chain of events—the flow of the Kama River, the spring in the 
Urals, and the family’s happiness—by her courageous confession, when almost 
like the ice on the river she decides to move forward, or rather to jump into 
her words, as if she were jumping into the Kama and moving with the ice:
Zhenya once more glanced at the stars and at the Kama. She had made 
up her mind. Despite the cold and the ice floes. And—she plunged. Getting 
tangled in her words, she gave her mother an unlikely and terror-stricken 
account of it. (CSP 138; emphasis added)
Женя снова глянула на звезды и на Каму. Она решилась. Несмотря 
ни на холод, ни на урывни. И—бросилась. Она, путаясь в словах, 
непохоже и страшно рассказала матери про это. (PSS 3:40)
Mrs. Luvers’s reaction to Zhenya’s words points within this section to yet 
another important agent revealed in the process—the birth-like emergence 
of Zhenya’s soul, recalled into the world out of darkness as if propelled into 
external reality by her menstrual blood:
Mother let her finish only because she was struck by how much soul the 
child put into her story. To understand—she understood everything from 
Zhenya’s very first word. No, not even from that; from the way the little girl 
gulped deeply as she started her tale. Mother listened, rejoicing, loving, and 
consumed with tenderness for this slender little body. She felt like throwing 
her arms around her daughter’s neck and weeping. (CSP 138; trans. altered; 
emphasis added)
 27. Fateeva poses a direct question regarding the status of the process by means of which 
the “soul” in Pasternak’s works assumes the qualities of its surroundings. Working initially 
with the poem “The Definition of the Soul” [Определение души], Fateeva gives a three-fold 
answer. First, she emphasizes the fluidity of referential correspondences: the referential signifi-
cations of the “soul” are not fixed. Second, the word into which the speaker (or the hero in this 
case) puts in his/her soul becomes not merely a vehicle of a trembling soul, but a soul as such. 
There is therefore a transformation, evident in Luvers, from “вложил душу” to “бьешься” and 
“душа.” Third, Pasternak, sensitive to the vegetative meaning of his name, collates natural and 
spiritual growth. A leaf of the tree becomes a leaf of the page, and both are life and soul. In The 
Childhood of Luvers, one observes an interesting combination of these: Zhenya’s “putting of the 
soul” begins the process wherein the animation of the surrounding world is to spring up as a 
celebration of awakening nature after winter (2003, 61–62).
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Mать дала договорить ей до конца только потому, что ее поразило, 
сколько души вложил ребенок в это сообщение. Понять поняла-то 
она все по первому слову. Нет, нет: по тому, как глубоко глотнула 
девочка, приступая к рассказу. Мать слушала, радуясь, любя и изны-
вая от нежности к этому худенькому тельцу. Ей хотелось броситься 
на шею к дочери и заплакать. (PSS 3:40)
This new qualitative addition28 to the Luverses’ world changes once and for 
all the mother–daughter relationship, announcing a new animation, a living 
relatedness, pierced by love, and incomparably preferable to the mechanical 
symmetry of the previous interactions between human beings. The former 
weight of resentment against the parents becomes in this context not a fault, 
but rather a necessary psychosomatic weight defining the reality and outlines 
of the concealed and as yet unconscious soul. Thus, Zhenya’s confession does 
not merely animate her stilted relationship with her mother; Zhenya redefines 
the world and all its relations by sharing this newborn energy with the still 
world around her.29
 In short, it is not only the spring, or the physical maturation of Zhenya’s 
body, that “sickly and ripening laboriously” has come to fruition: a real tri-
umph occurs as a new vitality pierces the icy cold water, resentment, and 
shame, and bursts “through broad and vigorous in the course of a single night” 
to continue flowing “broad and vigorous thereafter” [трудно назревающая 
и больная, весна на Урале прорывается затем широко и бурно, в срок 
одной какой-нибудь ночи, и бурно и широко протекает затем] (CSP 
137; PSS 3:39). The text carefully underscores the triumph that follows upon 
Zhenya’s courageous jump, indicating that the event in question is a tangible 
spiritual victory: as Zhenya finishes her “plunge,” the French governess is van-
quished and, instead, the mother’s voice speaks no longer of winter, but of 
the coming summer, just as the lamps at home immediately lose their absent-
minded indifference. The new warmth of lamps awakens or, more precisely, 
animates the static object—the mother’s sable collar—and all of these, in turn, 
point to the “blessed” coming of Easter, to Holy Week and the spirit of bless-
 28. Fateeva suggests that Pasternak’s style—its dual reflection—the dynamism of the predi-
cation travelling from the hero to the objects and back to the hero—generates a mythological 
context: the generation of the authorial myths (2003, 51). Cf. Pasternak’s own words in the 
theses of “Symbolism and Immortality” (1913): “The poet submits to the direction of his search, 
takes them into himself and behaves as the objects around him” [Поэт покоряется направле-
нию поисков, перенимает их и ведет себя, как предметы вокруг] (PSS 5:318).
 29. In Fateeva, this act of unintentional or intentional self-disclosure of “putting the soul” 
[вкладывать душу] into nature creates Pasternak’s allegorical “code” starting from his earliest 
works (2003, 62).
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edness “blagodat”30 (according to the words of the telegram that announce Mr. 
Luvers’s return to his family):
Zhenya could not see the French girl. Only tears, only her mother—filling 
the whole room. [ . . . ]
 “Zhenya dear, go to the dining room . . . and I’ll tell you what a lovely 
dacha Daddy and I have taken for you . . . for us for the summer.”
 The lamps were again themselves, as in winter, at home with Luvers—
warm, zealous, faithful. Mama’s sable frisked across the blue wool table-
cloth. “Won—remaining Blagodat—Await end Holy Week.” (CSP 139)
Женя не видела француженки. Стояли слезы—стояла мать,—во всю 
комнату. [ . . . ] 
 “Женичка, ступай в столовую, детка, я сейчас тоже туда приду, 
и расскажу тебе, какую мы чудную дачу на лето вам—нам на лето с 
папой сняли.”
 Лампы были опять свои, как зимой, дома, с Люверсами,—горя-
чие, усердные, преданные. По синей шерстяной скатерти резвилась 
мамина куница. “Выиграно задержусь на Благодати жди концу 
Страстной если.” [ . . . ] (PSS 3:41)
In this victorious state of the girl’s deliverance,31 reflected in the return of 
her mother’s understanding, the family’s happiness, and the spring with its 
promise of the summer, there is a clear indication that the unburdening of the 
 30. Blagodat, etymologically “blessedness” or grace, is a mountain with an adjacent mining 
settlement in the Eastern part of the Urals (PSSCom 3:543). 
 31. Gorelik observes that the space in the novella is coordinated very precisely. However, 
uncharacteristically perhaps, the narrative at the end of the “daughter–mother” reconciliation 
episode moves forward to the occurrence six months later (beyond the forms of the passé to 
the futur antérieur [CSP 136; PSS 3:38]) toward another of Zhenya’s major spiritual or rather 
intellectual victories when she passes the entrance exams into the lycée. The compressing of 
time indicates a capacity to see the future at a glance, akin to the soul in flight: “Zhenya sat 
down on the end of settee, tired and happy. She sat down modestly and correctly, just as she 
sat six months later on the end of the cold brown bench in the corridor of the Ekaterinburg 
lycée, when she gained top marks for her answer in the Russian orals and was told she ‘may 
go’” [Женя села на край дивана, усталая и счастливая. Села скромно и хорошо, точь-в-
точь как села полгода спустя, в коридоре Екатеринбургской гимназии на край желтой 
холодной лавки, когда, ответив на устном экзамене по русскому языку на пятерку, 
узнала, что “может идти”] (CSP 139; PSS 3:41). 
  There is, however, another methodology for formulating the process in question: Pas-
ternak’s reaction to both Hume and Kant. For Pasternak, impressions and perceptions are in-
variably synthetic; they blend the immediate and indefinite, and as the indefinite begins to 
unveil its hidden qualities, replaced by other aspects of indefiniteness, entering into a purview, 
the space opens up into a mythopoetic structure.
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body is contiguous with the unburdening and purgation of all the previously 
collected psychological weight underlying the developing consciousness (see 
Table 6c). It is at this point in the narrative, then, that the contiguous motifs 
are garnered explicitly within a “natural” all-embracing metaphor that has 
emerged organically32 out of the preceding textual strategies. As the woman’s 
body, just like nature in spring, comes into its own and throws away darkness 
and cold shadows, a deeper ritual of inner cleansing is being effected—deliv-
ered and washed not only by the visiting doctor, but by a medicinal light, the 
new leading agent of change—bright direct sunlight—that is announced to the 
expanding world:
And this is how the story of her maidhood’s first maturity imprinted herself 
on her memory: the resonant echo of the chirruping morning street, which 
lingered on the stair and freshly penetrated into the house, the French girl, 
the maid and the doctor—two criminals and the one initiate, bathed and 
disinfected by the daylight, chill, and sonority of shuffling steps. (CSP 139; 
emphasis added)
Так и запечатлелась у ней в памяти история ее первой девичьей 
зрелости: полный отзвук щебечущей утренней улицы, медлящей на 
лестнице, свежо проникающей в дом; француженка, горничная и 
доктор, две преступницы и один посвященный, омытые, обеззара-
женные светом, прохладой и звучностью шаркавших маршей. (PSS 
3:41)
The pattern of contiguous series surrounding Zhenya’s entrance into adoles-
cence is, therefore, more complex than a pattern identified by metonymic 
constructions. If, in the preceding section, the presence of inanimate objects 
de-animated humans, then in this part of the narrative, human beings share 
agency with natural forces, participating themselves in the incontrovertible 
power of natural events and yet expanding the capacity of human agency. In 
 32. As Pasternak suggests in “The Wassermann Test,” only the contiguities can nourish 
“the intimacy of the individually fostered device” developed in “the lyrical space of the initial 
conception” [лирик[y] замысла согретого интимностью лично взлилеянного приема] 
(PSS 5:6). Indeed, his series of metonymies in The Childhood of Luvers begin to generate his own 
metaphoric structures, or, as Fateeva would have it, “Pasternak’s allegorical code,” consistently 
nourished starting from his earliest works (2003, 62). See here also Gorelik’s position that if for 
the Symbolists the symbol is immaterial, for Pasternak it is developed “on the basis of liberated 
object” (2000, 140). Fateeva refers to this process as the dynamism of the predication that trav-
els from the hero to the objects and back to the hero, generating in the process a mythological 
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creating this almost symmetrical series of contiguous states, Pasternak con-
ceives a narrative where human consciousness, expanded together with the 
triumphant emergence of soul, can be depicted as not merely linked to objects, 
physical events, and natural phenomena, but as an animating principle that 
has just manifested its glorious power within both the child and the external 
world.33 Moreover, and only in this part of the narrative, there are no hidden 
shadows on the margins of consciousness—all, even the French governess 
who looks like a fly, are temporarily “bathed and disinfected by the daylight” 
(CSP 139; PSS 3:41).
 As spring comes to Perm, Pasternak’s Zhenya is to enjoy a dizzying hap-
piness with the boundaries between inner and outer worlds totally erased; 
assisted by spring, she will experience an animated world where her moth-
er’s sable collar, racing upon the bed cover, will not be the only inanimate 
object coming to life: even the rooms will rise “clean and transformed”; sigh-
ing “sweetly with relief,” and echoed by the courtyards, they will announce the 
“overthrow of night,” “reiterating that there would be no more evenings, and 
that no one would be allowed to sleep” [они объявляли ночь низложенной 
и твердили, мелко и дробно, день-деньской, с затеканьями, действо-
вавшими как сонный отвар, что вечера никогда больше не будет, и они 
никому не дадут спать] (CSP 140; PSS 3:42).
6.4 The boundary of summer: 
  An infinitely expanding world approaching limits  
within the unlimited
Apart from Zhenya plunging into the Kama River with her confession, the 
unexpected happiness that enters the children’s lives after that memorable 
spring night is also given a more realistic explanation. The Luvers family is 
clearly becoming prosperous: Mr. Luvers’s business no longer oppresses him 
 33. In this sense there is definitely room for the debate with the critics’ position, summa-
rized best by Gorelik as she argues, on the basis of The Childhood of Luvers, that in opposition to 
the Symbolists, the material and the spiritual in Pasternak’s world are from the very beginning 
inseparably united [материальное и духовное изначально и неразрывно слиты] (2000, 
143). For Pasternak, however, the spiritual manifests the dynamism of its landscape in time: 
there is a periodization and progression of the unveiling in this regard, parallel to a vegetative 
growth (see here Fateeva 2003, 61–62). In other words, the Kantian vision of a priori and a 
posteriori is common to Pasternak and the Symbolists, and the synthetic unity of spiritual and 
material is shared by all these artists. In Pasternak, however, there is a singular periodization of 
the spiritual unveiling that the critics tend to ignore.
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and makes him a stranger to his children; instead, the family’s affairs are flour-
ishing, and some of the constant parental anxiety is finally lifted.34
 This factual explanation, however, remains on the margins of the text—
to emerge as a new reality later on—and what is presented centrally instead 
is the unrestricted passage of joy not only between nature and humans, but 
also between the Luvers family home, other houses, streets, trees, neighbors, 
with the piercing light reflected in the relieved air that makes it impossible to 
distinguish who it is that rushes in, who is hungry, who breathes in, and who 
speaks out:
The boring chatter of the courtyards continued around the clock. [ . . . ] 
“Feet! Feet!”—but they arrived hotfoot. They came in intoxicated from 
the open air with ringing in their ears, so they failed to understand 
properly what was said and rushed in to gulp and chew as fast as pos-
sible before . . . running back into that souring daylight that forced its way 
through suppertime . . . where the blue chirruped piercingly and the earth 
gleamed greasily like the baked milk. The boundary between house and 
courtyard was erased. The floor-cloth failed to erase all the footprints. 
Floors were streaked with dry, light colored daubs and crunched under-
foot. (CSP 140)
Круглые сутки стоял скучный говор дворов. [ . . . ] “Ноги, ноги!”—
но им горелось, они приходили пьяные с воли, со звоном в ушах, 
за которым упускали понять толком сказанное и рвались поживей 
отхлебать и отжеваться, чтобы, с дерущим шумом сдвинув стулья, 
бежать снова назад, в этот навылет, за ужин ломящийся день, где 
просыхающее дерево издавало свой короткий стук, где пронзи-
тельно щебетала синева и жирно, как топленая, блестела земля. 
Граница между домом и двором стиралась. Тряпка не домывала 
наслеженого. Полы поволакивались сухой и светлой мазней и 
похрустывали. (PSS 3:42)
 34. One senses this from the parts of the telegram Zhenya sees just before the mother’s 
sable collar comes to life (CSP 139: PSS 3:41). As Wiegers observes, the fragmented nature of 
the novella is founded on Zhenya’s ignorance of the adult world (1999, 31). In contrast to Wieg-
ers’s view (which he shares with Rudova) that the fragmented world is projected onto the same 
plane as in a cubist painting, it is possible to argue for a formation of several layers in the child’s 
world, which, like the layers in “Ordering a Drama,” reflect the worlds of inanimate, animate, 
and spiritual spheres of existence. In other words, Pasternak controls the disclosure of the frag-
mented details for the sake of an “organically grown” metaphoric design.
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Once again, the overall principle of the narrative construction is no longer 
pure metonymy or even a phenomenological shift of perception. The agents in 
the contiguous series—which now include inanimate objects, natural events, 
forces of light, and feelings of humans for each other—reflect and even replace 
each other;35 they cross boundaries and cross-fertilize, intensifying in the pro-
cess the warmth of spring that started with Zhenya’s entry into womanhood.
 While Pasternak is cautious not to overuse the concept of the mani-
fested soul during this dizzying spring,36 he emphasizes nonetheless the pro-
cess by means of which each newly animated object awakens into life. Thus, 
in the startling textual emblem, the inanimate stones, the gift of Mr. Luvers 
to his children, are awakened by this all-reigning call into life. These tradi-
tional representatives of the lowest group of inanimate nature announce their 
appearance as if secreted or bornе by the unfolding paper, emerging out of 
its “frothing” folds. These newborn beings, like blind rabbits (the alliteration 
suggests that корольки are, in fact, кролики), exude new color and warmth, 
preparing to breathe and move:
Moistly rustling, the stones gave warning of their appearance through the 
gradually coloring tissue paper, which grew more and more transparent 
as these packets, white and soft as gauze were unwrapped layer by layer. 
Some of them were like drops of almond milk, others—like splashes of 
blue watercolor, while others resembled a solidified tear of cheese. Some were 
blind, somnolent, or dreamy, while others had a gay sparkle like the frozen 
juice of blood oranges. One feared to touch them. They were lovely, displayed 
on the frothing paper, which exuded them like the dark juice of the plums. 
(CSP 140; emphasis added)
В доме стало чудно хорошо. Камни с влажным шелестом предупре-
ждали о своем появлении из папиросной, постепенно окрашивав-
шейся бумаги, которая становилась все более и более прозрачной 
 35. It is precisely this landscape that Fateeva, drawing upon the works of Arutiunova 
(1972) and Kovtunova (1986, 148), calls a “predicative relationship” of the whole landscape of 
images and motives [текст становится “сплошь предикативным”] (2003, 51). See also Fate-
eva’s conclusion that the process of blending the motives associated with soul, tree, leaf, branch, 
and a plant’s first growth [душа, дерево, лист, ветка, побег] is used very widely in Pasternak 
(2003, 64).
 36. One must stress that the term “soul” is used very cautiously in “The Long Days” as if in 
passing through the figures of speech, but always strategically and precisely. Altogether before 
the Luverses’ arrival in Ekaterinburg, the word “soul” is used six times: five times in the context 
of the pain and joy experienced in the relationship with parents, and once in a train when she 
observes in their compartment.
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по мере того, как слой за слоем разворачивались эти белые, мягкие, 
как газ, пакеты. Одни походили на капли миндального молока, дру-
гие—на брызги голубой акварели, третьи—на затверделую сырную 
слезу. Те были слепы, сонны и мечтательны, эти—с резвою искрой, 
как смерзшийся сок корольков. Их не хотелось трогать. Они были 
хороши на пенившейся бумаге, выделявшей их, как слива свою 
тусклую глень. (PSS 3:42)
This animation of still life can also be sensed in the overflow of mutual sup-
port between the parents, an unclouded breakthrough of affection and love, 
first appearing as sunlight in the eyes of the father, and then reflected through 
the mother’s glance and flowing onto the children:37
[W]hen Mother on odd occasions cast a playfully reproachful glance at 
Father, it seemed as though she drew tranquility from his small and ugly 
eyes in order then to pour it forth from her own, large and beautiful, upon 
the children and those around them. (CSP 140)
[И] когда мать урывками, с шутливой укоризной взглядывала на 
отца, то казалось, она черпает этот мир в его глазах, некрупных и 
некрасивых, и изливает его потом своими, крупными и красивыми 
на детей и окружающих. (PSS 3:42–43)
The intimation of reflected sunlight, which now lives among the Luverses 
and enters into all aspects of their surroundings, is finally defined as a spirit 
of the family—the first mention in the text of the word “spirit” or “дух”—a 
unified family principle, so tangibly real in the parents during those summer 
months: “Most of all, both were serene in spirit, even-tempered and friendly” 
[А главное, оба были спокойны, духом ровны и приветливы] (CSP 140; 
PSS 3:42). This first mention of “spirit,” a force destined to grow in complexity 
after Zhenya reads Demon on an autumn afternoon in Ekaterinburg, is at this 
point of the narrative just another magnificent gift of the happy spring and 
summer months.
 Initially, then, the family move from Perm to Ekaterinburg also encapsu-
lates the theme of space and time that surpasses all actual temporal and spatial 
 37. The correlation between eyes, reflection, and soul is observed in Fateeva in the context 
of tree leaves becoming the eyes of the soul (2003, 63). Here, however, the eyes of the parents 
reflect the sun, and the narrative moves to the new stage—not that of the soul, but that of the 
spirit—dukh. For the correlation of the images of the spirit, air, wind, danger, battle, and inspira-
tion [одухотворение], see again Fateeva (2003, 187ff).
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measurements. Within the precise chronology of a one-day train ride, Zhenya 
discovers “that the day that had all this packed into it—this actual day, now in 
Ekaterinburg—was still not over yet,” and feels in the process “as if she too had 
assisted in shifting and removing all that weight of beautiful objects and had 
overstrained herself ” [день, вместивший все это—вот этот самый, кото-
рый сейчас в Екатеринбурге, и тут еще, не весь, не кончился еще. [ . . . ] 
Будто и она участвовала в оттискивании и перемещении тех тяжелых 
красот, и надорвалась] (CSP 146; PSS 3:46). The lack of clear boundaries 
between human beings, nature, and still-life is also reflected in the lack of geo-
graphical boundaries, a dissipation of the borderline between Europe and Asia 
(even when a major move from one part of the country into another is being 
undertaken).
 It must be emphasized, nevertheless, that this unlimited vast happiness is 
itself placed within a precisely defined temporal period: it starts in the early 
spring with Zhenya’s entry into “maidhood” and ends just before her sexual 
awareness. This temporal space will always be for the later Pasternak some-
thing of a signature for understanding the future of the personality,38 as well as 
the key to poetic formation. In his poem “So they begin” [Так начинают], the 
immeasurable space of adolescence equals the unlimited vision of Faust:39
. . . How can a child allow
A star to exceed his grasp
If he’s Faust? If he’s a dreamer?




Так начинаются цыгане. (PSS 1:189)
And in Safe Conduct, Pasternak speaks about the “vastness” of adolescence, 
identifying it as the part that “exceeds the whole,” something of a “mathemati-
cal paradox.” Returning to the fate of Faust, Pasternak insists (contrary to all 
the evidence) that Faust has gained his understanding of infinity because he 
has relived his adolescence twice:
 38. As Lara observes to Zhivago, she lost that essential time of adolescent purity, that is, 
the time of transition between childhood and youth: “I think that to see it [beauty] your imagi-
nation has to be intact, your vision has to be childlike. That is what I was deprived of ” [Мне 
кажется, чтобы ее увидеть, требуется нетронутость воображения, первоначальность 
восприятия. А это как раз у меня отнято] (Zhivago 399; PSS 4:396).
 39. See here Livingstone (1994).
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And everyone knows the vastness of adolescence. [ . . . ] In other words, 
these years in our life constitute a part that exceeds the whole, and Faust, 
who lived through them twice, lived something utterly unimaginable, to be 
measured only in terms of the mathematical paradox. (CSP 24; emphasis 
added)
A как необозримо отрочество, каждому известно. [ . .  . ] Другими 
словами, эти годы в нашей жизни составляют часть, превосходя-
щую целое, и Фауст, переживший их дважды, прожил сущую невоо-
бразимость, измеримую только математическим парадоксом. (PSS 
3:151–52)
In Luvers, however, during the summer “with its parts that exceed the whole,” 
there pass now and again occasional and fleeting suggestions of danger, as, for 
example, in the reflected world of a train window, “more serious and gloomy 
than the one here” [за окном не улица, а тоже комната, только серьезнее 
и угрюмее] (CSP 145; PSS 3:44), or the expectation of pumas beyond the 
imagined barrier, suggestions remaining, on the whole, on the outskirts of the 
text—a new placeholder for a future that is still only an unimportant and very 
minor detail.
 Thus, in this unlimited happy world where parts “exceed the whole,” the 
notions of limit and border emerge in a momentary sense of danger, a “mis-
nomer,” in fact, whose fictional unreality is emphasized when in the train the 
children imagine the borderline between Europe and Asia:40
In her enchanted head, the “frontier of Asia” arose in the form of some 
phantasmagoric barrier, like those iron bars, perhaps, which laid down a 
strip of terrible, pitch black, stinking danger between the public and the 
cage with pumas in it. (CSP 144).
В очарованной ее голове “граница Азии” встала в виде фантасма-
горического какого-то рубежа, вроде тех, что ли, железных брусьев, 
которые полагают между публикой и клеткой с пумами полосу гроз-
ной, черной, как ночь, и вонючей опасности. (PSS 3:47)
 40. For Faryno, the “cage with pumas” is the thematic development of the kitten who wakes 
up Zhenya in the beginning of the novella and the skin of the “white she-bear” in her nursery. 
This image of the furry animal is developed later into the lioness from Lermontov in “The 
Stranger” (1993, 9ff.). Faryno also identifies here the transformational series of curtains: the 
alder handing over the country house in the novella’s opening is now replaced by yet another 
curtain (1993, 20).
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Zhenya’s fears (and her sense of enchantment) are immediately allayed: there 
is no barrier and no curtain “rising on the first act of a geographical tragedy” 
[поднятaя занавеса над первым актом географической трагедии] (CSP 
144; PSS 3:48), not even a promised “post on the frontier of Asia and Europe” 
with “Asia written on it,” but instead there is only a renewed animation among 
the train passengers, an excitement that for a short time manages even to ani-
mate the train, but there is simply no corresponding significant or tangible 
spatial border:41
Zhenya was annoyed by dull and dusty Europe for sluggishly withholding 
the appearance of the miracle. And how put out was she when, as if in 
answer to Seriozha’s furious shriek, something resembling a small tomb-
stone flashed past the window, turned sideways to them, then rushed away 
[ . . . ]. At that instant, as if by arrangement, several heads leaned out of the 
windows of all classes, and the train came alive as it traced down the slope 
in the cloud of dust [ . . . ]. On and on they flew past the same dusty alders, 
which recently had been European, and were for some time now already 
Asian. (CSP 144; emphasis added)
Женя досадовала на скучную, пыльную Европу, мешкотно отдаляв-
шую наступление чуда. Как же опешила она, когда, словно на Сере-
жин неистовый крик, мимо окна мелькнуло и стало боком к ним и 
побежало прочь что-то вроде могильного памятника [ . . . ]. В это 
мгновение множество голов, как по уговору, сунулось из окон всех 
классов и тучей пыли несшийся под уклон поезд оживился. [ . . . ] и 
летели все, в облаках крутившегося песку, летели и летели мимо 
все той же пыльной, еще недавно европейской, уже давно азиатской 
ольхи. (PSS 3:47)
In Pasternak’s rendering of the move, the boundary is both suggested and 
erased, for as far as the experience of the children’s happiness is concerned, 
there is no tangible difference between the original locale and the new 
destination.
 Similarly, no demarcation lines between past and present can as yet be 
 41. See here Glazov-Corrigan (1991). See also Faryno, who views the boundary in the con-
text of a death resurrection motif (further supported by the image of a gravestone as a marker 
on the border). Faryno also suggests that the image of the train accelerating and flying together 
with the landscape invokes the image of the serpent with many heads, traveling together with 
the miraculous nature and the cloud of alders that had awakened Zhenya in the beginning of 
the story (1993, 18).
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found. Upon arrival, the actual changes in the new locality become blended 
with old memories in an immediate acceptance of the already well-known 
world of Ekaterinburg; instead of a real difference, the children simply regis-
ter a sense of cleanliness and renewed spaciousness, as if the old world is only 
being repaired and cleaned, so that it can now store both the old and the new, 
expanding Europe into Asia:
Everything was fine and spacious. [ . . . ] [Father] unbuttoned his waistcoat, 
and his shirt front curved outward, fresh and vigorous. He said this was 
a splendid European-style town, and he rang for them to clear away and 
serve the next course [ . . . ]. (CSP 145)
Было хорошо и просторно. [  .  .  .  ] Oн расстегнул жилет, и его 
манишка выгнулась свежо и мощно. Он говорил, что это прекра-
сный европейский город и звонил, когда надо было убрать и подать 
еще что-то, и звонил и рассказывал. (PSS 3:48)
In coordination with this theme, Zhenya’s new maid quickly becomes an old 
acquaintance, and the new kitchen imagined as dark turns out to be full of 
light, just as Zhenya believes she has known all along:
And down unknown passages from rooms still unknown there came a 
silent maid in white, all starched and pleated, with neat black hair; she was 
addressed in a formal manner, and though new, she smiled at the mis-
tress and children as though they were already friends. She was given some 
instruction regarding Ulyasha, who was out there in the unknown and 
exceedingly dark kitchen [ . . . ].
 [ . . . ] The kitchen turned out to be fresh and bright, exactly, it seemed 
to the little girl a minute later—exactly as she had guessed and imagined in 
the dining room. (CSP 145)
И по неизвестным ходам из еще неизвестных комнат входила бес-
шумная белая горничная, вся крахмально-сборчатая и черненькая, 
ей говорилось “вы” и, новая,—она, как знакомым, улыбалась барыне 
и детям. И ей отдавались какие-то приказания насчет Ульяши, кото-
рая находилась там, в неизвестной и, вероятно, очень-очень темной 
кухне [ . . . ].
 [ . . . ] Кухня оказалась свежая, светлая, точь-в-точь такая,—уже 
через минуту казалось девочке,—какую она наперед загадала в сто-
ловой и представила. (PSS 3:48)
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The infinitely expandable space and the erasure of chronological borders 
between past and future reflect the spirit of the summer: a sense of the all-pen-
etrating sunlit season visiting the world with no borderlines observed between 
Europe and Asia, between old and new, or between expectation and reality. 
However, within this space, with its quickly fleeting shadows of darkness, Pas-
ternak’s readers are served yet another image of hands—a metamorphosis of a 
recurrent self-transforming emblem. This time it reflects and summarizes the 
atmosphere of the summer trip, its boundless overflowing expansion and yet 
hidden, unknown potentiality of the approaching fall.
 If the hands of the English governess had served food, moving outwards 
in a precise punctual gesture, and those of her French successor had pointed 
directly and urgently to the watch on that memorable spring night, there 
appears during the summer journey another singular human presence, a 
seemingly kind, overweight co-traveler in the train, whose hands are drawn as 
a wave-like expanding surface, directly reflecting the swaying rays of the sun 
and yet holding something back, as if hiding a foreign element. This portly 
man offers an indiscernible presence next to which Zhenya and her brother 
also become unknown and indiscernible, losing their sense of the earth that 
bears the world:
He was a very portly man. He read his newspaper and swayed about. One 
glance on him was sufficient to reveal the swaying, which flooded the 
whole compartment like the sunshine. [ . . . ] She surveyed him and won-
dered where he had come from to sit in their compartment, and when he 
had managed to wash his dress. She had no idea of the real time of the day. 
[ . . . ] He could not see her because occasionally he too glanced up from 
the news or aslant, or sideways, and when he looked up at her bunk, their 
eyes never met. [ . . . ] But Seryozha is not down there either. “So where is 
he?” [ . . . ] “But where is the earth?”—the question gaped inside her soul. 
(CSP 142)
Это был очень полный человек. Он читал газету и колыхался. При 
взгляде на него становилось явным то колыханье, которым, как и 
солнцем, было пропитано и залито все в купэ. Женя [ . . . ] разгля-
дывала его и думала, откуда он взялся к ним в купэ, и когда это 
успел он одеться и умыться? Она понятия не имела об истинном 
часе дня. [ . . . ] Она его разглядывала, а он не мог видеть ее; полати 
шли наклоном вглубь к стене. [ . . . ] и когда он подымал глаза на ее 
койку, их взгляды не встречались. [ . . . ] “А Сережи нет и внизу. Так, 
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This passenger, unbeknownst to himself, represents a reality that for the first 
time in the narrative breaks the parallelisms of the earlier series—Zhenya 
observes him while remaining unobserved herself, as she loses, with a sudden 
yet still fleeting anxiety, the sense of time and space.
 This stranger, then, who carefully explains the boundary between Europe 
and Asia to Zhenya (even if this border proves to be no real border at all) 
absorbs into himself the qualities of the limit, border, boundary. This near-
sighted, overweight, wave-like man brings out a pocket watch and raises it to 
his face as if he is about to swallow whatever he is holding, and yet he does 
not swallow, but instead repeats the gesture back and forth, moving like a 
pendulum, forwards and backwards,42 or like a rubber ball, himself not quite 
Chronos or a Nutcracker, but fully equipped with sighing, giving, and taking 
fingers. He brings a sense of disorientation to the children, as he moves his 
hands to check the time with a gesture, highly suggestive and yet mysterious 
and unclear, becoming himself the measure and signpost, which as yet has no 
real content, but rather remains a point of punctuation—in this case, a ques-
tion mark:
He was amusing and probably a kind man, and as he talked, he constantly 
lifted a plump hand to his mouth. His speech would often swell up and 
then break off, suddenly constricted. It turned out that he himself was from 
Ekaterinburg, had traveled the length and breadth of the Urals and knew 
them well, and when he took a gold watch from his waistcoat pocket and 
lifted it right up to his nose before popping it back, Zhenya noticed what 
kindly fingers he had. As is the nature of the stout people, he took things 
with the gesture of actually giving, and all the time his hand kept sighing as 
if proffered for someone to kiss, and bobbing gently as though bouncing a 
ball on the floor. (CSP 144)
Oн был смешной и, вероятно, добрый и, разговаривая, поминутно 
подносил пухлую руку ко рту. Его речь пучилась и, вдруг спираемая, 
часто прерывалась. Оказалось, он сам из Екатеринбурга, изъездил 
Урал вкривь и вкось и прекрасно знает, а когда, вынув золотые часы 
из жилетного кармана, он поднес их к самому носу и стал совать 
обратно, Женя заметила, какие у него добродушные пальцы. Как 
это в натуре полных, он брал движением дающего, и рука у него все 
время вздыхала, словно поданная для целования, и мягко прыгала, 
будто била мячом об пол. (PSS 3:46)
 42. The movement of the pendulum is suggested rather than clearly stated.
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This almost43 august stranger, whose hands are offered as if for a kiss, becomes 
an emblem of the as yet unknown future—of a summer that gave joy and mer-
riment, and yet took away its gifts, bringing the children to another threshold 
which, once passed, changes them once and for all. This threshold is the real-
ity of other wills, and it is here that Pasternak’s narrative acquires a new, and 
as yet unobserved, complexity.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lthough The Childhood of Luvers is by far the best-known prose work of 
Pasternak’s early period, critics (with some notable exceptions) con-
centrate on the overriding importance of the metonymic series in the earlier 
parts of the narrative, approaching these as prototypical of Pasternak’s early 
style.1 However, in his letter to Sergei Bobrov of 16 July, 19182 (the only sur-
viving letter of this period that discusses Luvers directly), Pasternak, while 
sending the manuscript, directs Bobrov’s attention to the “second and third 
notebooks” [вторая и третья скрепленные порции (тетради)] (PSS 7:348), 
 1. See, for example, the findings of Wiegers (1999): “Only fragments are given in the text, 
for they stand in metonymic (or causal) relationship to the hidden occurrences. The fragmen-
tary nature is a result of a metonymic shift, which is explained in turn by the ignorance of the 
heroine and her childish innocence” (233). Similarly Junggren finds no significant distinction 
between the behavior of Zhenya in Perm and in Ekaterinburg (1991, 489–500). See also Ru-
dova’s view that “the style of his early fiction was marked by metonymy and gravitated towards 
the abstract” (1997, 166). Alongside these views Fateeva introduces “metatropes”: intertextual 
(or rather autotextual) units within the texts of Pasternak that integrate his mythopoetic images 
(2003, 17–21).
 2. A larger question can be posed as to what Pasternak might have meant by this “abstract 
moment” in a cultural context where, quite apart from his own philosophical training, the no-
tion of abstraction already included a wide range of different representations in philosophy, 
literature, Russian symbolism, constructivism, abstract art, cubism, and futurism. This chapter 
will attempt to answer this question.
233
“The Stranger” in 
The Childhood of Luvers
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parts that were collected under the title “The Stranger” [Посторонний].3 In 
the same letter, Pasternak characterizes these parts as an attempt to unveil an 
important shift in the child’s developing personality—her confrontation with 
an “abstract moment”4 that he chose, as he states, to be represented through 
“the idea of a third person” (PSS 7:348).5 The exact meaning of Pasternak’s for-
mulation remains something of a mystery, and yet it exposes the living nerve 
of Pasternak’s youthful interest in human psychology—his belief (supported 
by his studies in Neo-Kantianism) that the formation of selfhood, or the emer-
gence of a unified self, is inexorably tied to intellectual interests that move the 
developing personality ever more decisively away from self-preoccupation.
 In my earlier work on the novella (Glazov-Corrigan 1991), I argued for 
the importance of the figure of Lermontov in the overall construction of the 
story, for in Ekaterinburg, as the weather turns cold and the leaves turn yel-
low, Zhenya reads Lermontov’s long poem Demon in the yard, an event that 
is linked in her mind to several traumatic events that are soon to follow. The 
importance of the Demon-Lermontov theme has now been accepted by sev-
eral critics (Faryno 1993; Fateeva 2003, 120), but the larger framework that 
calls for Demon-Lermontov’s presence in the narrative still remains a mystery, 
especially when Pasternak claimed in the drafts of the novella that his aim 
in writing was to embrace “truly artistic materialism” [истинный художе-
ственный материализм] (PSS 3:515). The popularity of the Demon theme 
in the Silver Age, or the “Lermontov-Vrubel-Blok complex” (Kurganov 2001, 
86), equally does not explain Pasternak’s adoption of the theme,6 even though 
its nuanced and skillful employment presents him as an able and rather crafty 
practitioner of Symbolism. Most problematic in all of this is the figure of 
Tsvetkov, whom Zhenya sees while reading Demon. Tsvetkov (a person one 
never meets, a friend of a friend just beyond one’s grasp, always appearing at a 
distance) carries major weight in the novella—he is simultaneously the instru-
ment of “demonic” powers, an innocent sufferer, and a “third person,” whom 
 3. For the account of the difficulties associated with the identification of the “three parts” 
of The Childhood of Luvers and the loss of the manuscript of a larger novel, see Barnes (1989, 
270–72). See also Fleishman (1975, 119), and finally PSSCom 3:542–43.
 4. For Wiegers (1999), for example, the abstraction of the novella’s fragmentary nature 
is directly linked to cubism and the development of abstract art, and these are determined by 
the young age of the heroine. There is no indication in his analysis that the narrative strategy 
changes as the heroine grows.
 5. See Junggren’s suggestion that the third, the “other” or the stranger, is, in fact, the fe-
male heroine, drawn by the male writer (1991, 489ff).
 6. Fateeva suggests that Pasternak’s leg injury, received in his youth, made him feel this 
connection with “the living spirit” of Lermontov [объединяет его с живым духом Лер-
монтова] (2003, 120). However, as I shall argue in this chapter, there was an earlier and more 
“living” precursor to this image in Pasternak’s work—the composer Shestikrylov in “Ordering 
a Drama,” a figure connected directly to Alexander Scriabin and his effect on the young Boris.
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“the commandments have in mind” (CSP 178; PSS 3:85). The conception that 
could have led to the construction of such a personality is, again, by no means 
transparent.
 In responding to these riddles, the present chapter argues that the nar-
rative of Zhenya’s growth in “The Long Days” (characterized by the hero-
ine’s metonymous relationship with objects, natural forces, and other human 
beings) is altered drastically in “The Stranger.” A highly innovative narrative 
pattern is woven into an earlier, already complex web of relations, and this 
new pattern reflects the formation of Zhenya’s intellectual and moral under-
standing that coincides with the beginning of the processes that will lead to 
the catastrophic realignment of Russian history.7 In this context, Pasternak’s 
employment of ghostly images of a Lermontov-Demon entering reality from 
the pages of Zhenya’s book must be understood not as demonic possession 
as such (Faryno 1993; Fateeva 2003, 225–45), but as a much more assured 
and far-ranging development of the role of the composer Shestikrylov, who 
used to pierce through the children’s lives in “Ordering a Drama,” albeit with 
the following significant difference: references to Pushkin (and his “shesti-
krylyj serafim”) and Scriabin in “Ordering a Drama” are replaced in Luvers 
by Lermontov’s poetry. The intrusion of the writer and his spirit can also be 
approached as a continuation of the themes connected to Heinrich Heine’s 
appearance in modern Italy during the spectacular sunset of “The Mark of 
Apelles,” or again to Tolstoy’s role “as a lever to set the whole revolving stage 
in motion” for the disoriented young poet during one very dark night in “Let-
ters from Tula.” In contrast to the dramatic settings of these earlier works, 
Lermontov’s entry into the narrative is quiet (and for this reason unnoticed by 
critics for many decades)—after all, could anything untoward actually happen 
when a well-protected child reads a book before the onslaught of winter and 
sees in the far distance a lame man whose name, as she eventually finds out, is 
Tsvetkov?8
 7. See in Zhivago: “In this third year of the war the people have become convinced that 
the difference between those on the front line and those at the rear will sooner or later van-
ish. The sea of blood will rise and submerge all who stayed out of the war. The revolution is 
this flood” [На третий год войны в народе сложилось убеждение, что рано или поздно 
граница между фронтом и тылом сотрется, море крови подступит к каждому и зальет 
отсиживающихся и окопавшихся. Революция и есть это наводнение] (Zhivago 182; PSS 
4:180). The image of the unhappy Demon who brings disaster is, therefore, an introduction to 
what is soon to unveil. Thus, in contrast to Fateeva’s brilliant comparison of the narratives of 
Pasternak’s Luvers and Nabokov’s Lolita, I will argue against the image of “deflowering” con-
nected to Tsvetkov-Demon (see 2003, 329–30). It is precisely Pasternak’s view in this story that 
the maturation of the personality can be examined outside of the issues of sex; reading for a 
child may have a prophetic connotation, pointing to events larger than the life of the girl.
 8. There is an ironic parallel here between Zhenya’s reading and that of Tatiana Larina, 
an obedient and quiet girl, initiating a series of most traumatic events, totally unnoticed by her 
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 The call to a child by the intellectual world, its opening into the world of 
the unknown that will form her future character and destiny, comes in “The 
Stranger” at a point when Zhenya, during the unsparing progress of autumn, 
wonders at the facelessness of the people around her (7.1). The intimation that 
only the birth of thought overcomes a generic human “facelessness”9 is articu-
lated by Pasternak in a startling instance of “synthetic blending of impres-
sions,” a masterful fusion of Symbolism and Realism (7.2–7.4), of his personal 
biography and his love of Scriabin (7.5), and, of course, his philosophical stud-
ies (7.6). In Luvers a complex literary intertext redirects the themes of sexual 
longing, associated with Demon’s Tamara (7.3), to what will remain from then 
on the principal impulse in Pasternak’s search for new forms of prose writing: 
the need to find artistic means commensurate with the theme of an unspar-
ing historical reality both destroying and honing a genuine artistic self that is 
fused with the wounded organic life of his/her land (7.7–7.8). In addressing 
the emerging metaphoric or symbolic patterns of the narrative, Chapter 7 
expands and re-aligns the themes of Chapter 6. In order to clarify the chang-
ing narrative strategies of the story and to elucidate further these altogether 
new levels or boundaries that Zhenya crosses in her growth, Table I (6.5) is 
modified and expanded throughout Chapter 7, and a revised Table II is pro-
vided at the chapter’s conclusion (7.9).
7.1  The boundary of fall: 
 Erased faces of others and turpentine sun
It is curious that while critics observe Pasternak’s penchant for “receptive” 
heroes and his inability to create a strong decisive personality,10 they tend 
to overlook Zhenya’s horror during her first autumn in Ekaterinburg as she 
family. At Tatiana’s very young age, as Pushkin notes with mild irony, her father never wondered 
what “secret volume slept under the pillow of his daughter” [Он, не читая никогда, / Их по-
читал пустой игрушкой / И не заботился о том, / Какой у дочки тайный том / Дремал 
до утра под подушкой] (Evgenii Onegin, Ch. II, st. XXIX; Pushkin 1994, 6:44). The reorienta-
tion from Lermontov to Pushkin is actually suggested in the text, just before the tragedy strikes 
(somewhat too late to avert it since the mother is already in the theater): “She glanced out in 
the yard and began to think of Pushkin. She decided to ask the tutor to assign her an essay on 
Onegin” (CSP 168; PSS 3:73). Fateeva argues, for example, that Lara in Zhivago is actually an 
abbreviation of Larina (2003, 226).
 9. It is significant that in the excised passages, describing Zhenya’s life in Ekaterinburg, 
Pasternak emphasizes the emergence of Zhenya’s already recognizable and distinct personal-
ity: “She loved that city because it noticed her, Zhenya” [Она полюбила его за то, что он ее, 
Женю, заметил] (PSS 3:545).
 10. I refer here to the critical tradition that follows upon Aucouturier’s postulation of the 
“metonymous hero” (1978).
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watches how other people blend into each other, lose their faces, and, when 
unchecked, slide out of themselves into another self without ever noticing 
their own disintegration.11 After the triumphant openness of the “outflow-
ing” of nature during the summer months, this realization does not please 
the child; in fact, it comes as a shock. In the meantime, the “soul” of the child 
has not only emerged, it has now “budded” (завязывавшаяся душа), and 
“the elements of everyday existence entered the budding soul” [попадали 
элементы будничного существования в завязывавшуюся душу] (CSP 
147; PSS 3:50). The first sober experience of this maturation is the growing 
girl’s awareness at the end of the summer that she is severely limited by the 
presence of other people and the external forces they appear to command. 
Signs of implicit danger are initially oblique: in Pasternak’s words, these new 
facts and realities, as opposed to the “poetic trifles” of early childhood, enter 
as “metallic presences” into Zhenya’s “budding soul.”12 It is also true that these 
metallic objects do not necessarily stay unchanged. At the end of “The Long 
Days,” the “metal” at the depth of the soul begins to melt as if in a chemical 
reaction, transforming itself into “phantasmagoric ideas”—thus providing the 
first mention of “ideas” in the text and initiating a confusing and disorienting 
process that eventually “burns” through the fabric of nature.13
 11. On the whole, it has been accepted by Pasternak critics and theoreticians that there 
exists an unmistakable transformability and transferability between Pasternak’s images: “The 
interrelationship of mutual transferability brings about a neutralization of similarity-contiguity 
[ . . . ] which was studied in detail in the works of Roman Jakobson about the prose of Paster-
nak” (Fateeva 2003, 31). The question of how this affects the process of individuation, however, 
remains open.
 12. This image was particularly disliked by Roman Jakobson, who used it as conclusive 
proof of Pasternak’s disinterest in factual reality and, thus, as a sign of the writer’s ineptitude 
for writing an epic: “An epic attitude to his environment is naturally out of question for a poet 
who is convinced that, in the world of the prosaic fact, ‘the elements of everyday existence fall 
dully, stupidly and with crippling effect upon the soul and sink to the bottom, real, hardened 
and cold, like drowsy tin spoons,’ and that only the passion of the elect can transform this ‘de-
pressingly conscientious truth’ into poetry. Only feeling proves to be obviously and absolutely 
authentic. [  .  .  . ] Pasternak bases his poetics on the personal, emotional experience—indeed 
even approbation—of reality” (1969, 139). Faryno, on the other hand, argues most persuasively 
about the growing importance of the metal in the story, a theme that starts with the factory 
called Motovilikha (1993, 12ff.).
 13. It is noteworthy that the novella’s “programmatic passages,” later excised from the final 
text, followed immediately after this chapter—that is, after the first mention of the “ideas.” See 
Fleishman (1975, 119) and the fuller text of the excised passages in PSS 3:514 and in the com-
mentaries of E. B. and E. V. Pasternak in PSSCom 3:544–45. Moreover, in the final text, Zhenya’s 
painful awareness of reality after the move to Ekaterinburg is very gradual, but in the drafts 
this transition is more abrupt, and after the image of the “pewter spoons” one reads: “Ekat-
erinburg in her memories became a place occupied by the heart in the thoughts of the heart 
patient” [Екатеринбург занял в ее воспоминаниях место сердца у сердечно больного] 
(PSS 3:544).
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 This difficult process begins in the late summer (at the very end of Part 
I of the novella) when Zhenya has to study with a tutor, pointedly named 
Dikikh (the Wild One), as she prepares for the lycée.14 It is on these occasions, 
mildly reminiscent of Ida Vysotskaya studying with young Boris Pasternak,15 
that Zhenya finds herself highly irritated at so many potentially nightmarish 
forces and faceless people controlling her life:16
It began while it was still summer. It was announced to her that she would 
be going to the lycée. This was entirely pleasant. But it was announced to 
her. She had not invited the teacher into the classroom. [ . . . ] She had not 
given him the ridiculous surname Dikikh. And was it by her wish that 
from now on the soldiers always drilled at midday [ . . . ]? Of course, not 
everything settled so heavily on her soul. There was much that was pleas-
ant, like her forthcoming start at the lycée. But this too was announced to 
her. Ceasing to be a poetical trifle, life began to ferment like a stern, black fai-
rytale, because it had become prose and turned into fact. Dull, painful, and 
somber, as though in an eternal state of sobering up, the elements of everyday 
existence entered the budding soul. They sank deep into it, real, solidified, 
and cold, like sleepy pewter spoons. There at the bottom, this pewter began to 
melt, congealing into lumps, forming into droplets, falling down as obsessive 
ideas. (CSP 147; emphasis added)
Это началось еще летом. Ей объявили, что она поступит в гимна-
зию. Это было только приятно. Но это объявили ей. Она не звала 
репетитора в классную [ . . . ]. Она не позвала его, когда, в сопрово-
ждении мамы, он зашел сюда знакомиться “со своей будущей уче-
ницей.” Она не назначала ему нелепой фамилии Диких. И разве это 
она того хотела, чтобы отныне всегда солдаты учились в полдень 
[ . . . ]. Не все, разумеется, ложилось на душу так тяжело. Многое, 
как ее близкое поступление в гимназию, бывало приятно. Но, как 
 14. In the excised drafts, the boundary that Dikikih and his very name signify is explicit 
and is compared to the dreamlike boundary experienced by Zhenya when she waited on the 
train to enter Asia. The words “his name was reminiscent of that very thing she was expecting 
from the signpost on the pillar put on the boundary between two countries” [похожей на фа-
милию того, чего ждала она от столба на границе двух стран]. See commentaries of E. B. 
Pasternak and E. V. Pasternak in PSSCom 3:544.
 15. Pasternak started to tutor Ida when both were finishing the gymnasium in the winter 
of 1908 (E. B. Pasternak 1997, 88).
 16. Björling comments, “Intimately connected with the concept of ‘other people’s words’ is 
the idea of ‘other people’s ideas,’ second-hand initiation into the facts of life when [ . . . ] she has 
no part in forging her own destiny” (2010, 131).
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и оно, все это объявлялось ей. Перестав быть поэтическим пустяч-
ком, жизнь забродила крутой черной сказкой постольку, поскольку 
стала прозой и превратилась в факт. Тупо, ломотно и тускло, как 
бы в состоянии вечного протрезвления, попадали элементы буднич-
ного существования в завязывавшуюся душу. Они опускались на ее 
дно, реальные, затверделые и холодные, как сонные оловянные ложки. 
Там, на дне, это олово начинало плыть, сливаясь в комки, капая 
навязчивыми идеями. (PSS 3:50)
Very shortly, “obsessive ideas,” all signaling the instability of personal identi-
ties around the young girl, are projected onto her mother: at the beginning 
of autumn, Mrs. Luvers (pregnant like her maid Aksinya, a fact not really 
understood by Zhenya) appears to her daughter to be transforming into her 
illiterate maid:17
Suddenly something strange occurred to her [ . . . ]. It occurred to her that 
recently there had been a certain elusive similarity between Mama and the 
janitor’s wife. Something quite indefinable. She stopped. [ . . . ] Neverthe-
less, it was Aksinya who set the tone of this compelling comparison. The 
association was weighed in her favor. The peasant woman gained nothing 
from it, but the mistress lost. (CSP 152)
Вдруг ей пришло в голову что-то странное. [  .  .  .  ] Ей пришло в 
голову, что с недавнего времени между мамой и дворничихой заве-
лось какое-то неуследимое сходство. В чем-то совсем неуловимом. 
Она остановилась. [  .  .  . ] А между тем именно Аксинья задавала 
тон этому навязывавшемуся сравнению. Она брала перевес в этом 
сближенье. От него не выигрывала баба, а проигрывала барыня. 
(PSS 3:56)
 17. In late autumn, just before the fateful snowstorm, Zhenya asks her mother to repeat 
certain phrases (significantly not only about the loss of face, but of the whole head, as in the 
case of St. John the Baptist). The girl is almost certain that her mother will start speaking like an 
uneducated Aksinya, a thought piercing to her and bewildering for Mrs. Luvers: “She repeated 
it, puzzled. She did not say ‘Babtist.’ That was how Aksinya said it. [ . . . ] But Mama just stood 
there. She could not believe her ears. She looked at it with eyes wide open. This sudden caprice 
had nonplussed her. The question sounded like some mockery; yet her daughter had tears 
in her eyes.” [Мать повторила, недоумевая. Она не сказала: “Предтеича”. Так говорила 
Аксинья. [  .  .  .  ] А мать все стояла. Она ушам не верила. Она глядела на нее широко 
раскрытыми глазами. Эта выходка поставила ее втупик. Вопрос походил на издевку; 
между тем в глазах у дочки стояли слезы] (CSP 164; PSS 3:70).
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In Zhenya’s responses, Pasternak’s knowledge of philosophy is central to the 
depiction of the girl’s discomfort. Zhenya, in fact, is pondering the essential 
dilemma of Post-Kantianism (and Paul Natorp’s work in psychology); the girl 
searches for the tangible outlines of selfhood or the basis of a distinct unified 
personality.18 Unable to find firm individual outlines, Zhenya at the beginning 
of autumn is haunted by the fear of obliteration of all personal identities,19 an 
experience particularly painful in the case of Seryozha’s friendship with his 
classmates, the Akhmedyanovs, whose father just happens to trade in iron.20
 As Zhenya watches, her brother Seryozha’s features become defaced21 just 
as the first cold begins to strip the lusciousness of nature:
The most true to type fourth-formers in the fourth form were the brothers 
Akhmedyanovs [ . . . ]. Seryozha made friends with them in August. By the 
end of September the boy had lost all personality [lit. had no face]. (CSP 
155)
Самыми заправскими четвероклассниками в четвертом классе были 
братья Ахмедьяновы. [ . . . ] Сережа сдружился с ними в августе. К 
концу сентября у мальчика не стало лица. (PSS 3:59)
In other words, what critics see as a fundamental principle of Pasternak’s 
world—its parallel contiguous or metonymous series that both presuppose 
and facilitate the absorption of the hero into his/her surrounding world—is 
 18. In his philosophical diaries, while preparing to travel to Marburg, Pasternak muses at 
Natorp’s view that without a critical intellectual self-examination, without an episteme, there is 
no foundation for the unified personality, no real “I” or selfhood: “Even then the idea is not 
unconditional and presupposes the thinking of the idea and presupposes [ . . . ] one’s own con-
sciousness and “I” as a direction of this self-consciousness” [Но и тогда идея—не безусловна 
и предполагает мышление идеи и предполагает, поскольку он мыслим,—свою сознан-
ность и я как направление этой сознанности] (Lehrjahre I:275 ff.).
 19. See Pasternak’s notations on Natorp’s work about the paradox that exists between mo-
nological self-consciousness and the understanding of the personality of the other (Lehrjahre 
I:275 ff).
 20. A mechanical, rather than natural, force directs the image of the Akhmedyanovs: “The 
Akhmedyanovs’ father traded in iron. [ . . . ] The children were a splendid success insofar as they 
followed the prescribed pattern, and they retained the speed and sweep of their father’s will, 
noisy and destructive as a pair of flywheels set whirling and left to spin by inertia” [Отец Ах-
медьяновых торговал железом. [ . . . ] Дети удались на славу, то есть пошли во взятый 
образчик, и шибкий размах отцовой воли остался в них, шумный и крушительный, как 
в паре закруженных и отданных на милость инерции маховиков] (CSP 156; PSS 3:59).
 21. See here the incisive observation of Fateeva, albeit appearing in a somewhat different 
context: “The conflict of the ‘living’ and ‘death-bearing,’ formulated by Bely and Briusov, [ . . . ] 
became most significant for Pasternak” (Fateeva 2003, 194).
“The Stranger” in The Childhood of Luvers | 241
experienced by Zhenya during her autumn in Ekaterinburg as a nightmar-
ish pattern, at first only troubling, but eventually terrifying. This pattern also 
signals great danger to the identity and power of the “soul,” which lives at this 
point only instinctively, answering the pulse of seasons. Thus, as the chil-
dren’s “budding” selves proceed to blend not only with the world outside, but 
also with other human beings, the awareness of others enters into the girl’s 
consciousness as an increasingly threatening force, disarming and disabling.22 
Moreover, these “other” presences, with all their capacity for obliteration, do 
not preserve their own identities—they too blend and lose their singularity, 
presenting the typical or generic, rather than personal, face.23
 22. The presence of others in Pasternak is always an invitation into battle, which will end 
in a protagonist’s eventual (and often only apparent) defeat (but not after a lifetime of effort 
and even some accomplishment in the process). A sense of danger, for example, overwhelms 
both Heine in “The Mark of Apelles”—“Signora Camilla, you would not have listened to half 
my words if we had not bumped into each other in such a dangerous place” (CSP 110)—and 
the distraught poet of “Letters from Tula” who exclaims to his beloved, “Oh, my dear, they are 
all strangers around me” (CSP 120). Even the adoration of Scriabin in Safe Conduct is described 
as a profoundly devastating, “ravaging” experience, from which young Pasternak is protected 
only by love: “This adoration attacked me more cruelly and undisguisedly than any fever. [ . . . ] 
[A]nd the fiercer it was, the more surely it protected me from the ravaging effect of his inde-
scribable music” [Обожанье это бьет меня жесточе и неприкрашеннее лихорадки. [ . . . ] 
Только оно, и чем оно горячее, тем больше ограждает меня от опустошений, произво-
димых его непередаваемой музыкой] (CSP 23; PSS 3:150). This theme is articulated most 
powerfully, perhaps, in Pasternak’s well-known poem “Mature Hunter” [Рослый стрелок], 
where the outflow of the poet’s soul discloses a presence of a hunter, who will eventually shoot 
the speaker—the question is not that of finding safety, but rather of gaining time for self-real-
ization in the permitted duration of a lifetime:
Mature archer, careful hunter
The ghost with a rifle at the boundaries of the soul’s overflow
Do not collect me as a hundredth victim to make a clean hundred . . . 
Рослый стрелок, осторожный охотник,
Призрак с ружьем на разливе души! Не добирай меня сотым до сотни . . . 
(PSS 1:221)
 23. The faces of the Akhmedyanovs, for example, are slowly erased by cold: “snubbed nose 
self-assurance that peeled away in frost” [они состояли из  .  .  . шелушившейся в морозы, 
краснощекой и курносой самоуверенности] (CSP 156; PSS 3:59). This view of faces and 
the forces that erase their personhood will stay with Pasternak throughout his career and only 
deepen with lifelong exposure to the impersonal ideology of the Revolution. Lara, for example, 
speaks of Strelnikov’s face and her suspicion that it has been marked by depersonalization, 
which signifies the approach of death: “It was as if something abstract had crept into his face 
and made it colorless. As if a living human person had become an embodiment of a principle, 
the image of an idea. My heart sank when I noticed it. [  .  .  . ] It seemed to me that he was a 
marked man and this was the seal of his doom” [Точно что-то отвлеченное вошло в этот 
облик и обесцветило его. Живое человеческое лицо стало олицетворением, принци-
пом, изображением идеи. У меня сердце сжалось при этом наблюдении. [  .  .  .  ] Мне 
показалось, что он отмеченный, и что это перст обречения] (Zhivago 401–2; PSS 4:399).
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 The emphasis on the deeper awareness of others and their will, initially 
so confusing to a child, echoes Hermann Cohen’s insistence on the role of the 
other in the ethical development of the individual [Der Anderer, der Alter Ego] 
(Ethik 201).24 Cohen’s belief that the external freedom of the individual “is 
broken down in relation to an other person” (Gibbs 2005, 206) is transformed 
in Pasternak’s rendering into a new boundary with the “unknown,”25 which 
appears in this text as initially indeterminate and phantasmagoric.26 At the 
beginning of autumn, however, the awareness of other individuals and their 
wills stimulates not so much the expansion of perception as a confused intel-
lectual growth while the same synthetic blending that characterized the previ-
ous themes of the story is now attached to the effect of ideas threatening the 
identity of the growing self.
 The experience is further deepened by the endangered power of the sun,27 
even though the intimation of the approaching bloody battle does not break 
the bounds of the realistic narrative; Pasternak’s “artistic materialism”28 is 
maintained as he presents an unusual but still rather faithful rendition of the 
reddening sunsets of the last summer days. Just as Pasternak’s young heroine 
finds herself restricted in her freedom, the sun holds to the walls of the house 
with what seems to be a crimson effort of will:
 24. See here Fleishman’s summary of Cohen’s view of “the other” (Lehrjahre I:97).
 25. Fateeva points out the long-term importance of this theme, which she connects with 
the image of Adam’s rib, that is, a boundary. Many years later, for example, Pasternak in the 
poem “Eve” speaks of Eve’s creation as a line from the other cycle [Ты создана как бы вчерне, 
/ Как строчка из другого цикла] (Fateeva 2003, 340).
 26. Transitions and boundaries in Luvers seem to receive the epithets of wildness, phantas-
magoria, delirium, named and unnamed reality, and the call of the kindred, and it is not always 
clear at what side of the boundary these epithets fall. The image of Motovilikha, which starts this 
pattern, is described as breaking through the delirium of reality that has a name—the parents’ 
card game—and then appearing as a mixture of fantastic, kindred, and frightening, and the 
same images were excised from the text that follows upon the passage of the “pewter spoons” at 
the depth of the soul, that is, the passage that speaks of Zhenya’s first awareness of the external 
and controlling reality of others: “And the force, capable of foregrounding this mute fever, this 
hidden fairy tale and delirium, was against the same force: the force of daily prose; the force of 
repressive, fantastic ache of existence” [А силой, способной выделить этот особенный глу-
хой жар, эту скрытую сказочность и бред, оказалась все та же сила: сила прозы: сила 
гнетущей, фантастической тоски существования] (PSSCom 3:544).
 27. Fateeva comments on the role of the colors associated with the sunset (закатное 
солнце) in Pasternak’s poetry of this period: “Turning retrospectively to the description of this 
historical process in his poetry, we note the predominance of ‘bloody-maroon’ [кроваво-ку-
мачевый] ‘frozen’ color, symbolizing the spread of ice and the ‘breaking apart’ of the time into 
‘pieces’” (2003, 288). See also Fateeva’s observation that the image of the young girl appears in 
both Pasternak and Nabokov in the rays of the sun “between home and garden” [между сол-
нцем и садом] (2003, 342).
 28. Pasternak is careful not to undermine the realistic account of the child’s impressions. 
See his definition of the artistic style at which he aims as “artistic materialism” [художествен-
ный материализм] in the excised pages of the novella (PSS 3:515).
“The Stranger” in The Childhood of Luvers | 243
It was not she who invited the teacher into the classroom where sunlight 
hues stuck so firmly to the walls with their glue paint wash that only by 
drawing blood was the evening able to rip away the clinging daylight. (CSP 
147)
Она не звала репетитора в классную, где солнечные колера так 
плотно прилипали к выкрашенным клеевою краской стенам, что 
вечеру только с кровью удавалось отодрать пристававший день. 
(PSS 4:51)
This new sense of danger and conflict is then shared with the season, and 
the suggestion of a battle with the sun indicates for readers familiar with the 
opening scene of “The Mark of Apelles” that a phantasmagoria of powerful 
presences is about to begin29—a pattern foregrounded to some degree by the 
title of the story’s second part, “The Stranger” [Посторонний].30
 The theme of others entering into the family home gains gravity almost 
imperceptibly. At first, at the very end of “The Long Days,” the Belgians, 
strangers from afar, replacing the somewhat threatening “wave-like” stranger 
on the train, appear in the house together with the first change of weather. 
The visitors strike the family as both eccentric and almost banal until their 
appearance is placed in the emerging context of the continuing obliteration 
of personal characteristics. The Belgians, who begin visiting the Luvers fam-
ily at the end of August, are indistinguishable from each other, with the mild 
exception of one—Negaraat, a figure closely associated with rain.31 The group 
on the whole is so washed clean that their faces remind the children of soap, 
an image that covertly signals defacement or the emergence of forces that, 
while being defaced themselves, may eventually whitewash and obliterate 
their interlocutors:32
 29. The August–September transition operates, therefore, as an important textual marker, 
appearing first in “The Mark of Apelles” where, as Barnes observes, the importance of the sea-
son’s change is emphasized by the intentional chronological error: “On one of those September 
evenings [ . . . ] why I remember the exact day perfectly well, it was the evening of August 23” 
(CSP 101; PSS 3:6). See here Barnes (1989, 194).
 30. For the formation of the opposition kindred vs. alien [формирование системы про-
тивопоставлений ‘свой—чужой’] as the central “metatropos” of the function of the lyrical 
subject, see Chapter 2 of Fateeva (2003, 110–219).
 31. See, for example: “he always chose nasty, rainy weather” [Иногда он приходил один, 
ненароком, в будни, выбрав какое-нибудь нехорошее, дождливое время] (CSP 147; PSS 
3:50–51). Fateeva observes, following Frank: “In Pasternak water [ . . . ] is signified as two hy-
postases: as ‘living water’ and as ‘dead water’—snow and ice. Snow indicates the freezing of life, 
water—its bloom” (Fateeva 2003, 127; Frank 1962, 245ff.).
 32. Björling proposes a somewhat different reading: “The general tenor of the similes is of 
something new, fresh and satisfying to the needs of children [ . . .]. The narrator has threaded 
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Belgians often began to appear at the house for tea. That was what they 
were called. That was what father called them. “Today the Belgians would 
be here,” he would say. There were four of them. The clean-shaven one came 
only seldom and was not talkative. Sometimes he would pay a chance visit 
on a weekday, and he always chose nasty, rainy weather. The other three 
were inseparable. Their faces resembled cakes of fresh soap, unstarted, 
straight from the wrapper, fragrant and cold. One of them had a beard, 
thick and fluffy, and downy chestnut hair. (CSP 147–48)
У них часто стали бывать за чаем бельгийцы. Так они назывались. 
Так называл их отец, говоря: сегодня будут бельгийцы. Их было чет-
веро. Безусый бывал редко и был неразговорчив. Иногда он при-
ходил один, ненароком, в будни, выбрав какое-нибудь нехорошее, 
дождливое время. Прочие трое были неразлучны. Лица их были 
похожи на куски свежего мыла, непочатого, из обертки, душистые 
и холодные. У одного была борода, густая и пушистая и пушистые 
каштановые волосы. (PSS 4:52)
Whether or not the four guests are meant to remind readers of the four 
remaining months of the year, with September-Negaraat already on the way 
out and the fourth Belgian, denoting December, ritualistically equipped with 
a beard (and thus explaining an earlier reference to reality appearing as a stark 
black fairy tale33); and whether or not the inner group of the three carries a 
deeper echo of the three visitors to Sarah and Abraham, suggesting an unex-
pected pregnancy that on this winter occasion will end in miscarriage—all 
this ultimately amounts in the text only to a fleeting sensation, along with 
many other phantasmagoriae of the fall.
 Within any reading, however, the visitors remain linked to running or 
pouring cold water, to fresh “outdoor” water brought inside the house:
Everyone in the house liked them. They talked like spilling water on the 
tablecloth—noisily, freshly, and all at once, away to one side where no one 
these sensations together by means of the comparison of faces to new pieces of soap, and speech 
to spilled water” (2010, 137).
 33. Faryno tends to see in the Belgians the Trinity from the Old Testament and the fact 
of their learning Russian as the transformation of the immediate reality into the country of 
the miraculous (1993, 55). The textual opposition between a poetic trifle and a stark fairy tale 
is once again noteworthy in this context: “Ceasing to be a poetical trifle, life began to ferment 
like a stern, black fairytale, because it had become prose and turned into fact” [Перестав быть 
поэтическим пустячком, жизнь забродила крутой черной сказкой постольку, посколь-
ку стала прозой и превратилась в факт] (CSP 147; PSS 3:50). For an opposing view of the 
Belgians, see Björling (2010, 137).
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expected, and their jokes and stories, which were always understood by the 
children, always thirst-quenching and clean, left trails behind, which took 
a long time to dry out. (CSP 148)
В доме все их любили. Они говорили, будто проливали воду на ска-
терть: шумно, свежо и сразу, куда-то вбок, куда никто не ждал, с 
долго досыхавшими следами от своих шуток и анекдотов, всегда 
понятных детям, всегда утолявших жажду и чистых. (PSS 4:52)
The emphasis on washing out, coming from the outside—whether it is water 
pouring onto the tablecloth or the visitors’ clean-shaven, washed-out faces—
is one of Luvers’s signature themes of autumn.34 In this construction one 
approaches the crux, even the cause, of the absence of events or actions in 
Part I of the novella.35 In any interactions in the text up to this point, the 
recipient of the others’ actions, presences, or addresses cannot act as an inde-
pendent agent. And in the months of autumn when the outlines of the per-
sonality become more distinct, all personal features are explicitly portrayed as 
overpowered and subjectless, reflecting the quality of the season that itself is 
unable to resist the onslaught of the cold.
 The threat of depersonalization is thus constructed with great care. “The 
Stranger” opens with a depiction of Zhenya in the yard—possibly wrapped 
in a shawl because of the cold weather, yet it is altogether unclear whether it 
is Zhenya or a little Tatar girl or even a small boy, Kolka, who walks up and 
down in the yard:
The little girl’s head and body were wrapped in a thick woolen shawl, which 
reached down to her knees, and she strutted up and down the yard like a 
small hen. Zhenya wanted to go up and talk to the little Tatar girl. At that 
moment the two sides of a small window flew open with a bang. “Kolka” 
called Aksinya. Looking like a peasant’s bundle with felt boots hastily stuck 
into the bottom, the child toddled quickly to the janitor’s lodge. (CSP 149)
 34. As Frank observes, rain (and, by extension, autumn) signifies in Pasternak “the opera-
tion of mysterious, unearthly force upon nature” (1962, 240). Equally suggestive is Fateeva’s 
observation that the rain is a “demonic” “first-born of creation” [первенец творенья] (2003, 
331).
 35. It is in this context that Aucouturier observes that the characterization of Zhenya is 
that of an emphatically “generic” hero: “However, precisely because these are generic and not 
individual qualities which mark her for the incarnation of the Pasternakian concept of the per-
sonality, one cannot consider her as the first metonymous hero of the poet” (Aucouturier 1978, 
45). However, one of the goals of such a narrative is to indicate the boundary where individual-
ization becomes possible. This boundary has not as yet been reached. See also Glazov-Corrigan 
(1991).
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Девочка была с головой увязана в толстый шерстяной платок, дохо-
дивший ей до коленок, и курочкой похаживала по двору. Жене хоте-
лось подойти к татарочке и заговорить с ней. В это время стукнули 
створки разлетевшегося оконца. “Колька,”—кликнула Аксинья. 
Ребенок, походивший на крестьянский узел с наспех воткнутыми 
валенками, быстро просеменил в дворницкую. (PSS 4:54)
This description at the outset of Part II, therefore, introduces a motif that 
dominates a significant layer in “The Stranger”: the disappearance of the 
face in a material world, alongside other disappearing faces. Not only do Mr. 
Luvers, Seryozha, and the visiting Belgians possess no personal features, but 
every personal relationship experiences self-erasure, a process reinforced by 
the fact that Mr. Luvers’s incurable sickness is announced at a point where the 
text is saturated with impersonal pronouns, whose antecedents are intention-
ally vague (the end of Chapter III and the beginning of Chapter IV in Part 
II). Thus, Pasternak’s intimation of Luvers’s sickness appears in the narrative 
at a break between chapters and paragraphs—a technique that foregrounds 
the facelessness and anonymity of personal pronouns with their obscure 
references:
By the end of September the boy lost all personality. [ . . . ]
 Luvers did not try to hinder his son’s friendship. He saw no change in 
him, and even if he did, he ascribed it to the effect of adolescence. Besides 
his head was filled with other cares. Sometime ago he had begun to suspect 
that he was ill and that his illness was incurable.
 IV
She was not sorry for him, though everyone around could only say how 
really awkward and incredibly annoying it was. Negaraat was too compli-
cated even for their parents, and all that the parents felt about others also 
dimly conveyed itself to the children, like spoiled household pets. (CSP 
153–54)
К концу сентября у мальчика не стало лица. [ . . . ] 
 Люверс не препятствовал дружбе сына. Он не видел перемены в 
нем, а если что и замечал, то приписывал это действию переходного 
возраста. К тому же голова у него была занята другими заботами. С 
некоторых пор он стал догадываться, что болен и что его болезнь 
неизлечима.
 IV.
Ей было жаль не его, хотя все вокруг только и говорили, что как 
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это в самом деле до невероятности некстати и досадно. Негарат был 
слишком мудрен и для родителей, а все, что чувствовалось родите-
лями в отношении чужих, смутно передавалось и детям, как домаш-
ним избалованным животным. (PSS 3:59–60)
A sensation of pity is thus evoked by a series of obliterated agents: Mr. Luvers’s 
incurable sickness (again experienced during August and September), 
Seryozha’s loss of face, followed by Zhenya’s compassion for another, “he” this 
time—Negaraat, who is conscripted to war and will leave Ekaterinburg (just as 
September draws to a close).
 Even more startling in this regard is Zhenya’s attempt to understand Nega-
raat’s predicament, an incident narrated again as an act of depersonalization. 
As she grasps the objective facts of military conscription, the narrative, quite 
emphatically—in a telling and difficult passage—presents Zhenya’s very act of 
comprehending others as a demystification and a stripping of color from the 
subjects/objects of her inquiry. In understanding the fate of the conscripts, 
Zhenya depersonalizes not only Negaraat, but all the soldiers she sees in Ekat-
erinburg, just as—paradoxically—she shares in and “animates” [одушевила] 
their state. The steps of comprehension take place as follows: having under-
stood the conscripts’ experience, she inhabits the soldiers’ circumstances and, 
in the process, erases the boundary that has kept them at bay in their initially 
colorful and mysterious aloofness.
The man explained everything so clearly to the girl. Nobody had explained 
things like that before. The veil of soullessness, an amazing veil of obvious-
ness, was removed from the picture of white tents; companies of men faded 
and became a collection of individuals in soldier’s dress, and she began 
to pity them at the very moment when they were animated and elevated, 
brought close and drained of color by their newly acquired significance. 
(CSP 157)
Так хорошо разъяснил девочке все этот человек. Так не растолко-
вывал ей еще никто. Налет бездушья, потрясающий налет нагляд-
ности сошел с картины белых палаток; роты потускнели и стали 
собранием отдельных людей в солдатском платье, которых стало 
жалко в ту самую минуту, как введенный в них смысл одушевил их, 
возвысил, сделал близкими и обесцветил. (PSS 3:61)
The process of the soul’s expansion toward the other, represented as an act of 
understanding, is portrayed emphatically as a loss of color [налет бездушья 
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[ . . . ] сошел [ . . . ] в ту самую минуту, как введенный в них смысл оду-
шевил их [ . . . ] и обесцветил] (PSS 3:61).
 The textual paradox can be presented as follows: the expansion of self that 
animates the inanimate world depersonalizes the other selves. And to rein-
force this unconditional process of defacement set against the background of 
the fall, Zhenya’s friendship with Liza Defendova (a relationship instinctual 
and, because of this, generic) is presented explicitly as a self-extinction moved 
by the instinct of the person in love, a process Pasternak is careful to distin-
guish from any deeper personal influence:
She fell in love with her; that is, she played the passive role in their relation-
ship, became its pressure gauge, watchful and excitedly anxious [ . . . ]. Her 
feeling was as random in its choice of an object as its origins were dictated 
by the powerful demands of instinct, which knows no self-love and can 
only suffer and consume itself in honor of some fetish as it experiences 
feelings for the first time.
 Neither Zhenya, nor Liza had the slightest influence on the other, and 
they met and parted—Zhenya as Zhenya, Liza as Liza—the one with deep 
feelings, the other without any. (CSP 155)
Она влюбилась в Дефендову, то есть стала страдательным лицом в 
отношениях, их манометром, бдительным и разгоряченно-тревож-
ным. [ . . . ] Ее чувство было настолько же случайно в выборе пред-
мета, насколько в своем источнике отвечало властной потребности 
инстинкта, который не знает самолюбия и только и умеет, что стра-
дать и жечь себя во славу фетиша, пока он чувствует впервые.
 Ни Женя, ни Лиза ничем решительно друг на друга не влияли, 
и Женя Женей, Лиза Лизой, они встречались и расставались, та—с 
сильным чувством, эта—безо всякого. (3:59)
In Hermann Cohen’s view of the other, “[n]o one can be regarded as expanded 
by the other. Both must remain standing isolated” (Ethik 212–13; 10a–b; trans. 
Gibbs 2005, 206–7). In this context, it is clear that Pasternak’s contiguous 
series of the narrative organization of the fall presents a dilemma for a person-
ality that knows as yet nothing of individualization. In the fall, the individu-
als that Zhenya meets display patterns of personal relationships that go in the 
opposite direction from Cohen’s thought; they do not present their person-
alities as “isolated,” but show instead depersonalized faceless subjects merg-
ing into each other or consuming themselves, all overtaken at the same time 
by the unconditional power of leaden facts. Thus, as the text approaches the 
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limits of the power of the animated soul, reinforced by the loss of fertility and 
warmth in nature, it is altogether unclear whether the self-effacing process can 
ever be arrested or reversed.
7.2  Metaphoric narrative and spirits meeting  
at the threshold: 
 Reading Lermontov’s Demon at sunset
It is clear, nonetheless, that this erasure of human identities, often viewed as a 
leading characteristic of Pasternak’s prose, cannot dominate the entire length 
of the novella. The landscape of the fall as a psycho-physical reality is explic-
itly portrayed as limited in time36—with the full realization on the part of the 
reader that an important boundary has been reached. Thus, as the narrative 
approaches the conflict in human relationships and human destinies, con-
tiguous parallel series reach an impasse. For this reason, the opening passages 
of “The Stranger,” directly following upon the image of the featureless child, 
“wrapped in thick woolen shawl,” point to the threshold of the Luvers’s house 
and to mysterious presences facing each other, the most recognizable of which 
is “the house spirit” that seems to the child eternally safe and guarded by the 
house furniture.37 In the very next paragraph of the opening of “The Stranger,” 
however, Pasternak informs his readers of an approach of a very different 
spirit in opposition to the house guardian—“this time it was Lermontov” (PSS 
3:53). The passage, like all the previous descriptions of the thresholds and 
boundaries, is intentionally confusing, presenting an intermingling of views 
and perspectival angles, but this time, perhaps, the text is most disorienting, 
and it is altogether unclear which spirit belongs indoors and which comes “out 
of doors,” and how precisely Lermontov, taken out of doors, is connected to 
this chaotic narrative.
The rooms inside seized one at the doorstep with their peculiar semi-gloom 
and chill, and with that peculiar, always unexpected peculiarity of furniture 
that has taken up an allotted position once and for all and remained there. 
 36. About the importance of seasons for the themes of the child’s maturation in Pasternak, 
see Glazov-Corrigan (1991) and Fateeva (2003, 118).
 37. This confusing description is by no means accidental. There is a clear parallel between 
the house spirit supervising the “unexpected peculiarity” of the house furniture and the life of 
the children in “Ordering a Drama” (1910) that takes place inside “the dear, perhaps, dearest of 
all, inanimate world” [дорогой, может быть, самый дорогой неодушевленный мир] (MG 
28; PSS 3:461).
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[ . . . ] One could not foretell the future, but it could be seen entering the 
house from outside. Here its scheme is already in evidence—a distribution 
to which it would be subject despite its recalcitrance in all else. And there 
was no dream induced by the moving outdoor air that could not be shaken off 
quickly by the fatal and alert spirit of the house, which struck one of a sudden 
from the threshold of the hall.
 This time it was Lermontov. (CSP 149–50; emphasis added)
Они разом, с порога прохватывали особым полумраком и прохла-
дой, особой, всегда неожиданной знакомостью, с какою мебель, 
заняв раз-на-всегда предписанные места, на них оставалась. [ . . . ] 
Будущего нельзя предсказать. Но его можно увидеть, войдя с воли 
в дом. Здесь на-лицо уже его план, то размещенье, которому, непо-
корное во всем прочем, оно подчинится. И не было такого сна, наве-
янного движеньем воздуха на улице, которого бы живо не стряхнул 
бодрый и роковой дух дома, ударявший вдруг, с порога прихожей.
На этот раз это был Лермонтов. (PSS 3:53)
The text introduces—with a jolt—the world of spirit, the in-door and out-of-
door confrontation, which points to an altogether new layer of textual organi-
zation, a layer described by Pasternak to Bobrov as the story’s most significant 
“abstract moment,” “taking shape in consciousness” to be “reflected in the 
character of the personality” (PSS 5:542). This transition is introduced by Pas-
ternak as a series of startling metaphoric images that undermine the estab-
lished patterns of the contiguous relationships, and, what is equally important, 
appear in the narrative when the sphere of the “spirit” begins to expand (or 
even subsume) the power of the soul.
 Reminiscent of the indoor-outdoor layering of “Ordering a Drama” with 
the composer Shestikrylov “eternally” sewing together the layers of the chil-
dren’s world,38 the text of Luvers places a carefully concealed emphasis on the 
long-term effects of the introspective quietness of reading.39 This seemingly 
imperceptible moment of inner expansion also reflects Pasternak’s belief, 
reinforced by his study of psychology with Natorp, that the development of 
 38. Ljunggren is one of the few who observes the correlation between the youthful “Order-
ing a Drama” and “The Stranger” (1984, 101–2).
 39. The notion that the real personal face emerges only in response to the intellectual or 
artistic tradition is emphasized in Safe Conduct when Pasternak speaks of his own adolescent 
love for Scriabin and muses on the contrast between face and facelessness: “To personality they 
preferred nonentity, afraid of the sacrifices tradition demands from childhood” [Оно лицу 
предпочло безличье, испугавшись жертв, которых традиция требует от детства] (CSP 
24; PSS 3:151).
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the individual is singly dependent on ideas and values he or she is about to 
adopt (Lehrjahre I:274–75).40 Thus, having forgotten the featureless Tatar girl, 
Zhenya “creases up the book with its binding folded inward,” entering yet 
another a new space, characterized by a careful synthetic blending of mul-
tiple contradictory impressions.41 Too lazy to read Lermontov’s Demon, she 
observes nonetheless how the river Terek, “springing like a lioness with shaggy 
mane on the back” (CSP 150; PSS 3:53),42 is accompanied by (or accompanies) 
“the devilish, blustering bark of the general’s little hairless dogs” [клубящийся 
дьявольский лай голеньких генеральских собачек] in the yard next door 
(CSP 150; PSS 3:53; emphasis added). This new instance of the blending of 
impressions is very carefully nuanced: the child, struck by an image in the 
book, gazes at the soldier and the dogs next door while the dogs’ “devilish, 
blustering bark” signals something more than an autumn day.43 Two reali-
ties begin to co-exist and merge in such a manner that “the golden clouds 
from the southern lands afar” hardly have time to accompany the river Terek 
“northward,”44 but manage to bring with them an unexpected guest, another 
“he” (unless the pronoun refers to the river Terek, which has simultaneously 
turned into water in the bucket carried by the soldier, Prokhor, in the general’s 
yard next door). Within this syntactical confusion, which suggests the pres-
ence of a new indefinable male figure who has traveled with the clouds and 
now upsets the dogs, there is also a new complex interaction of two sets of 
hands confronting each other, one set washing out the colors and the other 
holding up the book and changing everyday reality.
 The soldier Prokhor’s hands (or, perhaps, syntactically even the hands of 
the traveling clouds) clean, wash, and whitewash, armed with a bucket of water 
and bast scrubber, assisted by the “turpentine” sun that bleaches Prokhor’s 
 40. Fateeva, in an altogether different context, comments on “the girl with a book” as a step 
toward maturity [растение-растление] (2003, 329).
 41. See Pasternak’s student notes developing his view that the life of self-identical and uni-
fied consciousness consists of a constantly renewed series of changing impressions: “A knot of 
impressions. Unity and self-identity of selfhood—abstract equivalency of changing contents, 
does not have absolute character” [Пучок пр<е>дст<а>влений. [Единство и] Тождество 
личности подрывают его абсолютный характер] (Lehrjahre I:174). Hume, as Pasternak is 
careful to point out in the same passage, did not accept the unity and self-identity of conscious-
ness.
 42. This passage, a citation from Lermontov’s Demon, happens to be Lermontov’s famous 
error, as any zoologist would be happy to point out. Only lions, not lionesses, have manes. Pas-
ternak obviously uses this passage to point to a longevity and reality of a fictional construction.
 43. Fateeva points here to Kurganov’s treatment of the theme of the Demon and the 
“Lermontov-Vrubel-Blok complex” in the literature of Silver Age (Kurganov 2001, 86; Fateeva 
2003, 329).
 44. On the unstable identity of Lermontov, Demon, Terek, the house, and the garden, see 
Fateeva (2003, 329).
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uniform. As the images of washing, whitewashing and bleaching echo the pro-
cesses Zhenya confronts everywhere during the fall, her own hands crease the 
poems of Lermontov, exposing its contents to the adjacent world:
This time it was Lermontov. Zhenya creased up the book with its binding 
inward. Had Seryozha done it indoors, she herself would have been up in 
arms about this “disgraceful habit.” Outside it was quite another matter. 
[ . . . ]
 Meanwhile the river Terek, “springing like a lioness with shaggy mane 
on the back,” continued to roar [ . . . ]. She was too lazy to follow the book, 
and “golden clouds from the southern lands afar” had hardly had time to 
“accompany the Terek northward” when there they were to meet him45 at 
the general kitchen’s doorstep holding a bucket and a bast scrubber in [their 
/ Prokhor’s?] hands.
 The batman set down the bucket, bent over, and after taking apart the 
freezer, proceeded to wash it. The August sunlight burst through the tree 
foliage and came to rest on the soldier’s hindquarters. It settled, red, in the 
faded clothes of his uniform and greedily impregnated it, like turpentine. 
(CSP 150; trans. altered; emphasis added)
На этот раз это был Лермонтов. Женя мяла книжку, сложив ее пере-
плетом внутрь. В комнатах она, сделай это Сережа, сама бы восстала 
на ‘безобразную привычку.’ Другое дело—на дворе. [ . . . ]
 Между тем, Терек, прыгая как львица, с косматой гривой на 
спине, продолжал реветь[ . . . ]. Справиться с книгой было лень, и 
золотые облака, из южных стран, издалека, едва успев проводить 
его на север, уже встречали у порога генеральской кухни с ведром и 
мочалкой в руке.
 Денщик поставил ведро, нагнулся и, разобрав мороженицу, 
принялся ее мыть. Августовское солнце, прорвав древесную листву, 
засело в крестце у солдата. Оно внедрилось, красное, в жухлое мун-
дирное сукно и как скипидаром жадно его собой пропитало. (PSS 
3:53–54)
A few minutes later, the young heroine meets a new man, perhaps the very 
male presence, identified by the personal pronoun “he” that was delivered into 
 45. The pronoun in question without an antecedent points to yet another unaccounted 
presence.
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the story by “the golden clouds from southern lands afar.”46 One of the strang-
er’s textual names is Tsvetkov (color and flower),47 and even in this naming he 
already sends a clear challenge to the general loss of color and natural growth 
in Ekaterinburg—a rebellion against more than the northern weather of the 
fall.
 The presence of Tsvetkov, the stranger, who comes from across the bound-
ary (по-сторонний), suggests a major thematic shift: Zhenya meets this lame 
man as she reads a specific Lermontov text that will have a bizarre link to the 
house spirit of the Luvers family, ably protected until now, at least in the eyes 
of the little girl, by the house furniture. The Demon of Lermontov’s poem—
“the sad demon, the exiled spirit” [печальный демон, дух изгнанья]—was 
invisible to mere mortals, but very much active in the unhappy destinies of 
their households. And as Zhenya hears the roar of the Terek River intermin-
gling with the bark of the dogs next door, Pasternak initiates a whole chain of 
remarkable passages (within which the symbolic presences, characteristically 
muffled, are nonetheless worthy of a virtuoso Symbolist writer, and certainly 
not expected from an author who has been regarded primarily as a virtuoso 
of the metonymic series). As the imaginative and real worlds of the girl begin 
to superimpose and clash, she observes at first only a commonality of rhythm 
and visual echoes in these separate spheres, just as Pasternak warns in Safe 
Conduct: “And when, after taking it, a person entered with gigantic strides into 
a gigantic reality, both his strides and the world round him were accounted 
ordinary” [И когда по ее приеме человек гигантскими шагами вступал в 
гигантскую действительность, поступь и обстановка считались обыч-
ными] (CSP 28–29; PSS 3:156).
 How then do Lermontov and his Demon appear in this barely perceptible 
manner in the world of Zhenya Luvers? Just as Zhenya, while reading the 
book, begins to occupy herself with the animal roar of the river Terek and 
finds herself distracted by the similarly noisy “devilish, blustering bark of the 
general’s little hairless dogs” (CSP 150; PSS 3:53), Pasternak carefully unveils 
 46. See here Faryno’s nuanced treatment of the scene, suggesting Zhenya eventually sees 
the Demon (1993, 30ff.).
 47. Here, one may also solve the enigma of “The Three Names,” the title considered by 
Pasternak for these parts of the narrative: the lame Tsvekov, who enters Zhenya’s life from the 
cautiously lit stage of a street hidden behind the Luvers’s house, is not alone. He travels with 
Lermontov, and very possibly with Lermontov’s Demon—and in a manner not dissimilar from 
Pasternak’s Henrich Heine, who appeared in modern Italy during the spectacular sunset of “The 
Mark of Apelles,” or from Tolstoy acting “as a lever to set the whole revolving stage in motion” 
for the disoriented young poet during one very dark night in “Letters from Tula.” Lermontov’s 
complex entry is enacted in the context of one of the most elaborate settings of Pasternak’s early 
prose, constructed as carefully as Pisa’s sunset or the dance of compass needles in Tula.
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the uncanny events underscored by the sun’s rays spreading from Lermon-
tov’s Demon to Zhenya’s actual world. With open book in hand, Zhenya trav-
els around the garden and finds a rarely visited corner between “the janitor’s 
lodge and the coach house,” “overgrown with short curly grass, which in the 
afternoon emitted the sort of bitter medicinal smell that hangs around hos-
pital in hot weather” (CSP 150; PSS 3:54).48 Inundated by piercing hypnotic 
smells, she finds the woodpile, leaves the book, slides down to an uncomfort-
able but interesting perch “on the middle rung,” and then discovers, “open-
mouthed and entranced,” an entry—if not onto a theatrical stage, then into 
what appears to be a totally separate reality, a separate world, not so very dif-
ferent, one may add, from the pathway once indicated by the Golden Bough, 
but now introduced by the “yellow acacia, drying, curling up and shredding”:
There were no bushes in the other garden, and as the age-old trees raised 
their lower branches up into the foliage as though into a night sky, they laid 
the garden bare below, even though it stood there and never emerged from 
its permanent state of solemn, airy semi-gloom. Fork-trunked, mauve as a 
thunderstorm, and covered with gray lichen, they provided a good view of 
the little-used deserted alleyway that the other garden gave on to on the far 
side. There was yellow acacia growing there. Now the shrubbery was drying, 
curling up and shredding.
 Borne through the gloomy garden from this world to the other, the far-
away alley glowed with the light that illuminates events in a dream—very 
brightly, very minutely and noiselessly, as if the sun over there had put on 
spectacles and was fumbling among the buttercups.
 But what was Zhenya gaping at so?—She was gazing at her discovery, 
which intrigued her much more than those who had helped her to make it. 
(CSP 150–51; emphasis added)
Кустов в чужом саду не было, и вековые деревья, унеся в высоту, к 
листве, как в какую-то ночь, свои нижние сучья, снизу оголяли сад, 
хоть он и стоял в постоянном полумраке, воздушном и торжествен-
ном, и никогда из него не выходил. Сохатые, лиловые в грозу, покры-
тые седым лишаем, они позволяли хорошо видеть ту пустынную, 
малоезжую улочку, на которую выходил чужой сад тою стороной. 
 48. Pasternak is careful to suggest the smell of ether coming from the grass—the boundary 
to the world of the dead [булыжник густо порос плоской кудрявой травкой, издававшей 
в послеобеденные часы кислый лекарственный запах, какой бывает в зной возле боль-
ниц] (PSS 3:54).
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Там росла желтая акация. Теперь кустарник сох, скрючивался и осы-
пался.
 Вынесенная мрачным садом с этого света на тот, глухая улочка 
светилась так, как освещаются происшествия во сне; то-есть очень 
ярко, очень кропотливо и очень бесшумно, будто солнце там, надев 
очки, шарило в курослепе. 
 На что ж так зазевалась Женя? На свое открытие, которое зани-
мало ее больше, чем люди, помогшие ей его сделать. (PSS 3:54)
Drawing with great precision Zhenya’s movements in the garden, Pasternak 
presents the already well-practiced scene of the bridge or crossing between the 
two worlds—the carefully lit stage which in “The Mark of Apelles” appeared 
in the middle of a city with its spotlights directed upon the intruder.49 On this 
occasion, surrounded by a bucolic world, Zhenya too discovers a separate and 
separated world, with sharp spotlights focused upon a constructed stage in the 
middle of its semi-gloom.
 In this emphatically natural setting behind a dark garden that opens onto 
“another world” [вынесенная мрачным садом с этого света на тот] (PSS 
3:54), Zhenya meets four figures. At first, it is only a group of three women, at 
which Zhenya “gazes” because “her discovery [ . . . ] intrigued her much more 
than those who had helped her to make it” [свое открытие, которое зани-
мало ее больше, чем люди, помогшие ей его сделать]. The three women, 
black hermits or anchorites, Pasternak tells us, move in unison, and at this 
particular moment seem to be united by a kind of “filial dozing” [состояние 
дружной сонливости] until, once again, all together they turn their heads 
toward something still outside Zhenya’s vision:50
“Happy people!” she envied those unknown girls. There were three of them.
 They showed up black, like the word “anchorite” in the song. The three 
even necks with hair combed up under three round hats leaned as if the 
one at the end, half hidden by a bush, was sleeping propped on her elbow, 
while the other two also slept, huddling against her. The hats were a dark 
gray-blue and kept flashing in the sun, then fading, like insects. They were 
 49. cf. Heine’s protestation: “Yes, it is a stage again. But why not let me stay a little in this 
pool of bright light? [ . . . ] Everything else is sunk in gloom. On such a bridge, let us say a stage, 
a man flares up in the light of the flickering rays as if he had been put on show, surrounded by 
a railing against the backdrop of the town, of chasms and signal lights in the river bank” (CSP 
109–10; PSS 3:15–16).
 50. Here, as in several other aspects of this chapter, I draw on my earlier work (Glazov-
Corrigan 1991).
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tied about with black crepe. At the moment the three strangers all turned 
their heads the other way. Something had, no doubt, attracted their atten-
tion at the far end of the street. (CSP 151)
“Счастливые,” позавидовала она незнакомкам. Их было три.
 Они чернелись, как слово “затворница” в песне. Три ровных 
затылка, зачесанных под круглые шляпы, склонились так, будто 
крайняя, наполовину скрытая кустом, спит обо что-то облокотясь, а 
две другие тоже спят, прижавшись к ней. Шляпы были черно-сизые, 
и гасли и сверкали на солнце, как насекомые. Они были обтянуты 
черным крепом. В это время незнакомки повернули головы в дру-
гую сторону. Верно, что-то в том конце улицы привлекло их внима-
ние. (PSS 3:54–55)
The women’s position on the enchanted street strikes a familiar note: “Lucky 
people” [счастливые], thinks Zhenya, that is, blessed, makarioi or beati, 
classical epithets for Gods, Immortals, or Fates, while the women’s glance, 
unperturbed by the sun, slightly expands the frames of both time and space, 
reintroducing a summer note into the autumnal air:
For a minute they looked toward the far end—just as people look in sum-
mer when an instant is dissolved in light and extended, and you have to 
screw up your eyes and shield them with the palm of your hand—for just a 
minute they looked; then they relapsed into their former state of filial dos-
ing. (CSP 151; trans. altered)
Они поглядели с минуту на тот конец так, как глядят летом, когда 
мгновение растворено светом и удлинено, когда приходится 
щуриться и защищать глаза ладонью—с такую-то минуту погля-
дели они, и впали опять в прежнее состояние дружной сонливости. 
(PSS 3:55)
Like the three Graces (à la Canova, only in black), the three women gaze, and 
their momentary contemplation brings out another enchanted figure—a lame 
man:
One by one in turn they came through the gate. A short man followed after 
them, walking with a strange crippled gait. Under his arm he carried an 
enormous album or atlas. (CSP 151)
“The Stranger” in The Childhood of Luvers | 257
Они поодиночке, друг за дружкой прошли в калитку. За ними 
странною, увечной походкой следовал невысокий человек. Он нес 
под мышкой большущий альбом или атлас. (PSS 3:55)
The three women in black usher a lame man onto this rural stage and into 
Zhenya’s life, a stranger who carries not only with his hands, but with his 
whole torso “an enormous album or an atlas”—that is, a mysterious object, 
representing either the world or art or both (an ambiguous object, indicating, 
among a multiplicity of other meanings, the merging layers of Zhenya’s pres-
ent vision).51
 Struck forcibly by this annunciation, Zhenya considers the situation: “So 
that was what they had been doing, peering over each other’s shoulders. And 
she had thought they were asleep” [Так вот чем занимались они, загляды-
вая через плечо друг дружке, а она думала—спят] (CSP 151; PSS 3:55). 
The overdetermination of this last remark also permits several readings; the 
unknown women are either dreaming the lame man into existence, or watch-
ing him emerge, or helping this apparition emerge in their contemplation, or, 
finally, dressed in black, they are grieving over his fate and his fateful presence 
in the world of other people. In the meantime, however, the mysterious lame 
man attracts the attention not only of the three female companions who, after 
this occasion, depart from the story. His first brief appearance indicates his 
connection to the elemental forces of nature, while his entry into Zhenya’s life 
signals the passing of day into night, a change of setting accompanied by a 
mysterious music in the air. He also appears to give Zhenya temporary power 
over the garden, for bending to pick up the Lermontov volume she had earlier 
forgotten, she too commands the beginning of the dusk, and, as the evening 
 51. Analyzing this scene, Faryno concentrates on the opposition between sexual love that 
the Demon brings to Tamara and the education in pre-fallen love in the text of Pasternak: 
“Since the direct exchange between Zhenya and the Demon leads to the fact that from her ‘log’ 
Zhenya can see the Demon (and actually does see him), the movement to the ‘pre-text’ leads 
to the ‘genesis’ of the Demon [ . . . ]. This has a sanction in Lermontov’s text: Lermontov’s De-
mon is ‘sinful lover-tempter.’ Pasternak, inheriting the ‘eroticism’ of the Demon reconstructs, 
so to speak, its pre-fallen invariant” (1993, 30–31). This reading overlooks altogether the role 
of the three Graces who usher the mysterious man, carrying “an enormous album or an at-
las” onto the scene. A parallel reading of the scene would suggest Pasternak’s announcement 
of his debt to the Symbolists and his own rendition of the programmatic image of Briusov’s 
“pantheon, temple of all Gods” [Пантеон, храм всех богов] and particularly the three gifts or 
counsels that a young poet receives in “To the Young Poet” [Юному поэту]. The last admoni-
tion, “Safeguard the third: worship art, / Art alone, without thought or goal” [Третий храни: 
поклоняйся искусству, / Только ему, безраздумно, бесцельно], is, perhaps, the central 
theme of Luvers, and the power of art is viewed as equivalent to the highest, all-embracing and 
life-changing gift.
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descends, its enchantment is deepened by the rising and falling melody, imi-
tating even in this detail the movements of the lame man.
 Thus, “the stranger” appears as night falls, welcomed by the strumming 
of a balalaika as its sounds move up and down, in a pattern reminiscent of “a 
strange crippled gait,” repeated by the swarming movement of the midges:52
The sun was already sinking. As she retrieved her book, Zhenya disturbed 
the stack of logs. The whole pile awoke and stirred as though alive. A few 
logs rolled down and fell onto the turf with a gentle thump. This served as 
a signal, like the night watchman’s rattle. Evening was born, and with it a 
multitude of noises, soft and misty. The air began to whistle some old-time 
melody from across the river.
 Low down, just above the grass, here spread the melancholy twang and 
strumming of a soldier’s balalaika. Above her a fine swarm of quiet midges 
weaved and danced, plunged and fell, hanging in the air, fell and hung again, 
then without touching the ground rose up once more. But the strumming of 
the balalaika was finer and quieter still. It sank earthward lower than the 
swarm of midges, and without getting dusty soared aloft again more easily 
and airily than they, shimmering and breaking off, dipping and rising unhur-
riedly. (CSP 151–52; emphasis added)
Уже низилось солнце. Доставая книжку, Женя потревожила полен-
ницу. Сажень пробудилась и задвигалась, как живая. Несколько 
поленьев съехало вниз и упало на дерн с легким стуком. Это 
послужило знаком, как сторожев удар в колотушку. Родился вечер. 
Родилось множество звуков, тихих, туманных. Воздух принялся 
насвистывать что-то старинное, заречное.
 Двор был пуст. Прохор отработал. Он вышел за ворота. Там, 
низко-низко над самой травой струнчато и грустно стлалось брен-
чанье солдатской балалайки. Над ней вился и плясал, обрывался и 
падал, замирая в воздухе, и падал, и замирал, и потом, не достигнув 
земли, подымался ввысь тонкий рой тихой мошкары. Но бренчанье 
балалайки было еще тоньше и тише. Оно опускалось ниже мошек к 
земле, и не запылясь, лучше и воздушней, чем рой, пускалось назад в 
высоту, мерцая и обрываясь, с припаданьями, неспеша. (PSS 4:56–57)
 52. The last stanza of John Keats’s “To Autumn” is another suggestive Romantic intertext 
for this scene: “Where are the songs of Spring? Ay, where are they? / Think not of them, thou 
hast thy music too,— / While barred clouds bloom the soft-dying day, / And touch the stubble 
plains with rosy hue; / Then in a wailful choir the small gnats mourn” (434–35).
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The man who enters the narrative in this bucolic setting later receives the 
name of Tsvetkov, and the importance of his appearance is summarized by 
Pasternak at the end of the story as an ethical lesson, an education in learning 
how to act alongside indefinable and uncontrollable reality, just as “the Com-
mandments have in mind”:
“As a living individual human,” they say, “you must not do to this feature-
less generalized man what you would not wish for yourself as a living indi-
vidual.” (CSP 178; emphasis in original)
Не делай ты, особенный и живой,—говорят они—этому, туман-
ному и общему, того, чего себе, особенному и живому, не желаешь. 
(PSS 3:85) 
Fated to vanish under the hooves of Mrs. Luvers’s horse and depart several 
nights later from the house across from the Defendovs, Tsvetkov (tsvetok, a 
flower53 destined to die in winter and, thus, already mourned by the Graces) 
manages, however, like the three women dozing in unison, to extend and even 
break the duration of temporal measurements within the chronology of the 
story. The indefinable object he carries under his arm—“an enormous album 
or an atlas”—indicates that his art, the work of his hands, is indistinguishable 
from the events in the world at large. Thus, displaying physical characteristics 
that connect him directly to the author of Demon,54 his very appearance and 
posture strongly suggest that he has stepped out of the book folded inside out 
and that he promises, at this moment only indirectly, that his future effect on 
the Luverses’ house will be that of the master of shadows and storms sweeping 
over the world at large.
 53. Fateeva links the vegetative aspects of the name both to My Sister Life and to the vegeta-
tive meaning of Pasternak’s last name, suggesting (see here also the next note) that Tsvetkov is 
linked not merely to Lermontov or his Demon, but to Pasternak as well: “To remind the reader, 
the name ‘Zhenya’ is paronomasically linked to zhizn’ (life) and zhenschina (woman), and if in 
My Sister Life the concept of ‘sister-life’ is connected to Lermontov, then in The Childhood of 
Luvers this coordination in embodied in the compositional line—Girl-Tsvetkov-Dikikh (the 
Wild One)-Lermontov, where Tsvetkov becomes an analogue of the ‘vegetative’ name and a 
replacement of Pasternak’s ‘I’” (2003, 330).
 54. Lermontov’s lameness in his mind linked him to Byron, and was in Lermontov’s mind 
a sign of his chosenness. In Pasternak’s mind, however, his accident with the broken leg must 
have, in time, become a connection to Lermontov. See Faryno (1993).
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7.3 What does Tsvetkov do? 
 The world of the indefinable other
For all the ambiguity surrounding Tsvetkov’s identity, both in itself and as it 
is enhanced by Lermontov’s poem, the stranger’s every appearance turns out 
to be significant, and even his name magnetizes the most trivial events with a 
sense of an impenetrable mystery. It is possible, then, that in conceiving this 
“postoronnyj” (or stranger) who brings excitement to the fading reality of the 
natural world, Pasternak constructs a mildly ironic pun on Victor Shklovsky’s 
“ostranenenie”—a quality of “estrangement” or defamilarization proposed by 
the theoretician in his 1916 essay “Art as Technique”:55
Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear 
of war. ‘If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, 
then such lives are as if they had never been.’ And art exists that one may 
recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the 
stone stony. [  .  .  . ] The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ 
to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception 
because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be 
prolonged. (1988, 19–20)
Pasternak would never agree, of course, that any specific artistic method or 
technique can return animation and vitality to what has been “habitualized” 
and discolored. Thus, the covert reference may equally indicate an implicit 
debate with Shklovsky and not only by means of an alliteration that implies 
at the very least an apposition of terms: estrangement versus the appearance 
of a stranger (остранение vs. посторонний). What defamiliarizes reality 
in Luvers is not a specific technique, but rather a suggestion of the immate-
rial mystery that Tsvetkov exudes during the very season when the process of 
nature’s fading is all-embracing.
 It is noteworthy, then, that Tsvetkov’s name is mentioned for the first time 
just as Zhenya, in her understanding, discolors Negaraat, and yet the young 
Belgian regains his previous mysterious indefinability when he promises, on 
leaving Ekaterinburg, to leave “some books with Tsvetkov” (a friend, about 
whom apparently he has before told “so much” to everyone). The name Tsvet-
kov, appearing for the first time directly after the girl’s act of understanding, 
“de-glamorizes” and “decolors” her interlocutor and calls the reader’s atten-
 55. “Art as Technique,” published in 1917, “remains the most important statement made of 
early Formalist method” (Leon and Reis 1965, 4)
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tion to the multiple meanings of Tsvetkov’s name, which points etymologi-
cally not only to a flower (цветок), but also to color (цвет).56 Thus, Tsvetkov 
reestablishes a connection to the infinite and immeasurable; literally his role 
is to return mystery and color to a discolored world,57 and this means that 
Zhenya’s expanding understanding, accompanied by her action of turning 
the book inside out, reaches toward a new stage in the apprehension of her 
surrounding—beyond both the inanimate landscape and nature’s animation, 
all embracing, but limited in time—toward the “infinity” of art and the very 
world it represents—the very object, in fact, carried by the stranger, the “enor-
mous album or atlas” [большущий альбом или атлас] (CSP 151; PSS 3:55).
 The change in the construction of the narrative when compared with 
“The Long Days” (see Table I in 6.5) is considerable, particularly since sev-
eral narrative worlds (rather than one, albeit ever-expanding) appear to blend 
together in “The Stranger.” The images of hands, presented with crisp pre-
cision in “The Long Days,” still remain significant, but they lose clarity of 
depiction in the highly condensed text. The shifts of narrative paradigms are 
presented in Table 7A.
 The interplay with the Demon, therefore, plays a very specific role. In con-
trast to the Tamara of Lermontov’s poem, the extraordinarily beautiful young 
woman on the threshold of marriage, seduced by her immortal visitor, thir-
teen-year old Zhenya does not long for a sexual embrace.58 What is of principal 
 56. It is curious that Fateeva, who dedicates a whole chapter of her book to “The Colors of 
Boris Pasternak’s World” (2003, 282–93), emphasizes mostly the etymological significance of 
the flower in Tsvetkov’s name, viewing it as “an analogue of the ‘vegetative’ last name” (2003, 
330). See Zholkovsky (1999) addressing the dialogue between Tsvetaeva and Pasternak within 
the context of their vegetative last names. For a potential interconnection between the last name 
of Tsvetkov and the “flowers” of St. Francis, see Gardzonio (1999).
 57. Witt, in a chapter entitled “Creation as Zhivopis’,” examines the question of color in 
Zhivago and suggests that the loss of personality, observed by Yuri during his pre-revolutionary 
work in the hospital, a phenomenon he names “igra v ljudej,” is counteracted only by the themes 
of color painting, connected to iconography and the Book of Revelation (2000a, 30–47).
 58. Pasternak, as already noted (see Chapter 5.1), objects in the drafts of Luvers to psy-
chologists and novelists who concentrate upon the sign of maturity of characters only in terms 
of sexual maturation: “We permit ourselves to think that absolutely the entire psychological 
inventory, totally without exception, was maturing and had matured in the human soul with 
the very same painful full-blooded materiality that (with the help of physicians) was focused by 
the naturalist-practitioners of the novel on a very limited piece of novelistic meat—on matters 
of sexuality” [мы позволяем себе думать, что весь решительно душевный инвентарь, 
весь без изъятия, назревал и назрел в человеческой душе с той же тягостной, кровавой 
матерьяльностью, какую, c легкой руки врача, натуралистам в романе угодно было 
сосредоточить в небольшом куске романического мяса—в поле] (PSS 3:514–15). Fateeva, 
in fact, develops Faryno’s insistence that Zhenya’s fascination with the Demon is pre-sexual into 
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significance, however, is a comparison rather than a contrast: the fact that 
Tamara’s awareness of the Demon, for all its erotic overtones, figures a long-
ing59 for the infinite and eternal:
A familiar image sometimes
Moved without sound and trace
In the light mist of incense 
It was shining quietly, like a star:
It was inviting and calling, but where?
 . . . Знакомый образ иногда
Скользил без звука и следа
В тумане легком фимиама:
Сиял он тихо, как звезда:
Манил и звал он, но куда? (Lermontov 2:363)
Thus, given the differences in the texts, the emphasis on the presence of mys-
tery unifies the sensibilities of both heroines, and Zhenya, like Tamara, cannot 
really define this new presence in her life, but watches for it and guards it. In 
the meantime, Tsvetkov, an indefinite stranger, does not simply enhance the 
mystery of Ekaterinburg’s streets. Promising the beginning of something new 
and unknown, Tsvetkov also indicates the passing of an occasion, an ending 
either of the day or of good weather or health, or, again, of the transformation 
of autumn into winter, and, finally, of the passing of Zhenya’s childhood.
 The language of longing, confusion, ecstasy, sinfulness, fatality, demonic 
visitation, satanic jubilation, and tragic denouement travel from Lermontov’s 
Demon to The Childhood of Luvers, but it denotes in these texts expressly dif-
ferent meanings. Only the drama of the Demon’s feelings—the longing of the 
immortal, suffering, and conflicted loner—is kept in Luvers quite faithfully, 
although this gamut of feelings is suggested, rather than fully articulated. 
Without sustaining the virtuosity of the scene where Tsvetkov appears in the 
yard for the first time, Pasternak is nonetheless consistent in developing a sig-
nificant inner division in the nature of the mysterious stranger, characterized 
by a serious philosophical tension at the heart of the figure (see 7.5 and 7.6). 
To sketch a chronology, a dramatic crescendo of sorts, associated with Tsvet-
kov’s appearances is to trace an intensification of meanings that pull simul-
taneously in opposed directions. On the one hand, as someone remaining 
outside Zhenya’s comprehension and control, Tsvetkov represents an impulse 
 59. The philosophical resonances of this longing for the infinite will be discussed in 7.6.
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of mysterious energy, a gathering snowstorm falling upon the earth and sub-
duing it. On the other hand, as a flower in the winter months, he is bound by 
the forces he initiates and brings with him, and in this Tsvetkov becomes a 
prophetic and suffering figure.
 In contrast to all the previous boundaries in Luvers that appear initially 
confusing but that were eventually clarified and resolved in the earlier parts 
of the novella, the role of Tsvetkov is to deepen confusion until it is conflated 
with (and swept away by) the elemental chaos of the winter blizzard. The first 
indication of Tsvetkov’s disorienting influence is signaled when Zhenya and 
Seryozha see him walking behind Dikikh, while the tutor seems to be arguing, 
proving something emphatically “with all ten fingers” (CSP 159; PSS 3:64). The 
spirit of argumentation and intangible conflict spreads across the straight-
forward journey of Zhenya and Seryozha—the children’s walk begins to 
exhibit one complication after another, even though all these first instances of 
approaching chaos are merely trifles. First, the shopkeeper thinks that Tsvet-
kov, and not Dikikh, is their tutor (CSP 159; PSS 3:63–64); then the children’s 
outing, connected to their meeting with Dikikh and Tsvetkov, ends in their 
total loss of orientation: they leave the store literally with nothing (пошли 
ни с чем), although Zhenya at this point finally—and not without Seryozha’s 
reference to a light in the window (пьют, свет в окне)—links Tsvetkov to the 
man she saw on the hidden street. It is also at this moment that the mysterious 
street proves not to be hidden at all, but to be located, according to Seryozha’s 
explanation, at the center of all their walks, right next to the smithy, that is, 
side by side with the world of metal:60 “Why, we’ve been past it today already. 
[ . . . ] And we’ll be going by it again soon. [ . . . ] You know the coppersmith’s 
[ . . . ] on the corner” (CSP 160; PSS 3:63–64). On the way back, the street is 
missed yet again, and only the smell of “brass knobs and candlesticks” indi-
cates the presence of the coppersmith’s shop, adjacent to the street in question, 
which makes Zhenya somehow understand “that [the] Tsvetkov mentioned by 
the bookseller was the same man with the limp” [что тот Цветков, о кото-
ром говорил книгопродавец, и есть этот самый хромой] (CSP 160; PSS 
3:65).
 A sense of disruption is intensified in the rather disquieting chapter VI 
of “The Stranger,” which presents a bewildering description of a man mov-
ing with all his belongings, undermining Zhenya’s earlier sense that the inner 
spirit of the house is solid and inviolate, with its furniture settled in “its 
allotted position once and for all” (CSP 149; PSS 3:53). While it is altogether 
unclear whether it is Tsvetkov who moves into Negaraat’s quarters or Nega-
 60. Cf. the room in Moscow where Zhivago lives before his death.
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raat’s own belongings that are now being moved, the emphasis of the passage 
is upon the contents of the house being emptied into the outside world in a 
chaotic and disorderly manner: “the meager equipment of the study was not 
loaded but simply placed on the dray just as it stood in the room” (CSP 161; 
PSS 3:66). Nonetheless, as Zhenya visualizes the lame man’s movements in 
his new home, the emphasis on color returns. In contrast, then, to all the ear-
lier passages that describe Zhenya’s interaction with other people, emphasiz-
ing the inevitable fading of the glamorous novelty of the world, the processes 
associated with the presence of Tsvetkov present the opposite, obverse condi-
tion. Coldness, nastiness, and rain, so forcefully emphasized in this passage, 
cannot dilute the piercing whiteness of the cart:
[A]t every jolt of the cart the armchair casters peeping from beneath their 
white covers trundled around the dray as if on a parquet floor. Despite the 
fact that they were sodden through and through, the covers were white as 
snow. So sharply did they catch the eye that when one looked at them every-
thing else became the same color: cobblestones gnawed by the foul weather, 
shivering water beneath the fences, birds flying from stable yards and trees 
flying after, chunks of lead, and even that ficus in its tub, which swayed and 
bowed awkwardly from the cart to everybody as it flew past.
 It was a crazy cartload. It could not help but draw attention. (CSP 161; 
emphasis added)
[К]олесца кресел, глядевшие из-под белых чехлов, ездили по полку, 
как по паркету при всяком сотрясении воза. Чехлы были бело-
снежны, несмотря на то, что были промочены до последней нитки. 
Они так резко бросались в глаза, что при взгляде на них одного 
цвета становились: обглоданный непогодой булыжник, продро-
глая подзаборная вода, птицы, летевшие с конных дворов, летев-
шие за ними деревья, обрывки свинца и даже тот фикус в кадушке, 
который колыхался, нескладно кланяясь с телеги всем пролетав-
шим.
 Воз был дик. Он невольно останавливал на себе внимание. (PSS 
3:66)
The duality of the image, however, is startling. While the whiteness is pre-
served in any constitution, the lame man (introduced yet again as “unknown” 
to Zhenya) will not, according to Zhenya’s expectations, be well and healthy. 
Threatened by the elements he resists but to which he also belongs, he will 
eventually become ill:
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“When he unpacks his things he will catch a chill,” she reflected, thinking 
of an unknown owner. And she imagined the man—any man, in fact, with 
a shaky and uneven gait—setting his belongings out in different corners. 
She vividly pictured his mannerisms and movements, and especially how 
he would take a rag and hobble around the tub as he started wiping down 
the drizzle-clouded leaves of the ficus. Then he would catch a cold, a chill 
and fever. (CSP 161; emphasis added)
“Он простудится, только разложит вещи,”—подумала она про неиз-
вестного владельца. И она представила себе человека,—человека 
вообще, валкой, на шаги разрозненной походкой расставляющего 
свои пожитки по углам. Она живо представила себе его ухватки 
и движения, в особенности то, как он возьмет тряпку и, ковыляя 
вокруг кадки, станет обтирать затуманенные изморосью листья 
фикуса. А потом схватит насморк, озноб и жар. (PSS 3:66–67)
The scene of the house turned upside down no longer seems banal or trifling; 
it presages approaching sickness and disaster, even though, at first, it will be 
Zhenya, and not the lame man, who will become seriously ill, “lying in fever 
for two weeks,” as if stung by a serpent (CSP 162; PSS 3:67–68).
 As the snowstorm replaces the rain and fog in the next section, Tsvetkov 
is no longer named, and Seryozha’s insistence that they have seen the stranger 
during their outing to observe the gathering snowstorm provokes Zhenya’s 
outburst:
“When we went out, we saw Negaraat’s friend. Do you know him?”
 “Evans?” Father inquired distractedly.
 “We don’t know that man!” blurted Zhenya hotly. (CSP 166)
‘Как выезжать, мы видели Негаратова знакомого. Знаешь?’—
‘Эванса?’ рассеянно уронил отец. ‘Мы не знаем этого человека,’ 
горячо выпалила Женя. (PSS 3:72)
Tsvetkov becomes, therefore, the unnamable spirit of the snow blizzard, for 
the narrative of the outing, while painstakingly concentrating on the children’s 
impressions during the short coach journey, never mentions their seeing any-
one at all. Instead, their perceptions are totally arrested by their premoni-
tion of the gathering storm: “Her vague premonitions came true [ . . . ]. But 
they had not had time to reach beyond the bridge when separate snowflakes 
ceased to be and a solid, fused coagulum came heaving down” [Смутные 
ее предчувствия сбылись. [  .  .  .  ] Но не успели они выехать за мост, 
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как отдельных снежинок не стало и повалил сплошной, сплывшийся 
лепень] (CSP 165; PSS 3:70). Zhenya’s protection of Tsvetkov’s strangeness, 
then, indicates that while powerful elemental forces are now reaching their 
crescendo, Zhenya is somehow implicated in the process by welcoming and 
guarding the spirits of the approaching whirlwind, the visitors from worlds 
that have nothing to do with the earth:
The heavens quivered, and down from them tumbled whole white kingdoms 
and countries. They were countless, and they were mysterious and dreadful. 
It was clear that these lands falling from goodness knows where had never 
heard of life and earth: coming blind from the northern darkness, they 
covered them over without ever seeing or knowing of them.
 They were ravishingly dreadful, those kingdoms—quite satanically 
entrancing. Zhenya was breathless as she looked at them [ . . . ]. Everything 
was confused. The night rushed at them, infuriated by the low swept gray 
hair that flogged and blinded it. Everything was scattered, shrieking, and 
unable to discern the road. (CSP 165; emphasis added)
Небо тряслось и с него валились белые царства и края, им не было 
счета, и они были таинственны и ужасны. Было ясно, что эти неве-
домо откуда падавшие страны никогда не слышали про жизнь и про 
землю, и полуночные, слепые, засыпали ее, ее не видя и не зная.
 Они были упоительно ужасны, эти царства; совершенно сата-
нински восхитительны. Женя захлебывалась, глядя на них. [ . . . ] Все 
смешалось. Ночь ринулась на них, свирепея от низко сбившегося 
седого волоса, засекавшего и слепившего ее. Все поехало врозь, с 
визгом, не разбирая дороги. (PSS 3:71)
And just like Lermontov’s heroine, Zhenya becomes a magnet for a disaster 
brought about by expectations of meetings with her extraordinary visitor in a 
world that can be schematized as in Table 7b.
 In Tamara’s case a fiery horse brings its dead master, Tamara’s unfortu-
nate bridegroom, home from battle, while, in Luvers, the frightened horse 
tramples the stranger (Tsvetkov), and the horrific scene leads to Mrs Luvers’s 
miscarriage. And just like Tamara, Zhenya cannot shake off the burden of 
responsibility as she weeps over her own reckless persistence in seeing Tsvet-
kov everywhere and thus bringing him, together with all the presences associ-
ated with him, into the family:
And Zhenya wept because she considered herself to blame for everything. 
For it was she who had brought him into the life of the family that day 
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when she noticed him on the far side of someone else’s garden. And, hav-
ing noticed him quite needlessly, without sense or purpose, she had then 
started meeting him at every step, constantly, directly, or indirectly, and 
even, as on the last occasion, quite contrary to all possibility. (CSP 178)
А плакала Женя оттого, что считала себя во всем виноватой. Ведь 
ввела его в жизнь семьи она в тот день, когда, заметив его за чужим 
садом, и заметив без нужды, без пользы, без смысла, стала затем 
встречать его на каждом шагу, постоянно, прямо и косвенно и даже, 
как это случилось в последний раз, наперекор возможности. (PSS 
3:85)
The decisive difference between the female protagonists of Lermontov and 
Pasternak is located, nonetheless, not only in Pasternak’s rejection of sex-
ual maturation as the threshold upon which personality becomes unified. 
If Lermontov’s emphasis is upon the suffering of the supernatural Demon 
and his power over the life of mortals whom he despises and for whom he 
longs, Pasternak works with those layers in human perception that take his 
heroine seemingly naturally and realistically outside material, measured, and 
ultimately discolored impressions. Her longing for the infinite and distant 
(evident already when as a little child she cried for the unknown Motovilikha, 
dearer to her than her known and named surroundings) is at the center of 
Pasternak’s interest. However, the fact that Tsvetkov is both the spirit and the 
victim of the forces he brings with him indicates something of a conceptual 
contradiction between an all-powerful master of the shades and a suffering 
servant (for further clarification of this hidden contradiction, see also 7.5–7.6 
below). And while some critics believe that Pasternak in both My Sister Life 
and The Childhood of Luvers says good-bye to the “demonism” of his child-
hood years (Fateeva 2003, 330), the longing for the infinite sets the compass 
of his artistic inquiry, for it is only with this longing and the quest for the 
unknown, he suggests, that one can defamiliarize the surrounding discolored 
world.
7.4 In the sanctuary of the sacristan Defendov
With all their differences in conception, Lermontov’s Demon, as a tale about 
the Spirit who brings disaster to those he visits, emerges as the clearest coun-
terpoint for the structure of both the plot and narrative in “The Stranger.” In 
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wrought by the storm, is taken from her home to the house of the sacristan 
Defendov who, just as his name and occupation indicate, is chosen to protect 
the girl from the outside world and from its demonic realities. Defendov is 
by no means the holy angel who finally reclaims the soul of Zhenya, cleanses 
it of her former memories, and offers a heavenly sanctuary from the hellish 
spirit. Nonetheless, the sacristan clearly, if unsuccessfully, wants to bring joy 
into Zhenya’s life, and it is in his home that Pasternak portrays his heroine as 
finally reaching the “line” that serves as a basis for her integral selfhood.
 As one might have expected, while portraying this major change in his 
heroine’s awakening, Pasternak takes time to establish Zhenya’s absolute igno-
rance of sexual matters, thus refusing to equate sexual and emotional matu-
rity. When Zhenya discusses the process of birth pangs with Liza Defendov, 
the power of the “sanctuary” ensures that Liza “spared her [Zhenya’s] igno-
rance because she never suspected that one could tell her about it without 
using expressions that could not be spoken here at home” [ее неведение она 
пощадила потому, что и не подозревала, чтобы об этом можно было 
рассказать иначе, чем в тех выражениях, которые тут, дома, перед зна-
комой, не ходившей в школу, были не произносимы] (CSP 174; PSS 3:80). 
The change in Zhenya is spearheaded not by sexual knowledge, but rather by 
a decisive inner transformation. In Pasternak’s description, Defendov searches 
for Zhenya’s soul, attempting to find that singular, “unmistakable” and tan-
gible “trait” (or actual line—черта, as in “Апеллесова черта”) that might 
be a beginning or turning. Moreover, this explicit awareness of the soul’s 
“outlines” is no longer masked or hidden in the text by colloquial or habitual 
turns of phrase. Instead, the whole episode of Defendov’s actions appears sur-
prisingly out of place, drawing the reader’s attention by their unquestionable 
awkwardness:
Defendov realized what was the matter. He tried to amuse her. [ . . . ] In 
the darkness he was groping the soul of his daughter’s friend, as if he were 
asking her heart how old it was. When once he had caught one of Zhenya’s 
traits unmistakably, it was his intention to work on this observation and 
help the child to forget about home—but by his probings he had reminded 
her that she was in a strange home. (CSP 171)
Дефендов понимал, что с ней. Он старался развлечь ее. [ . . . ] Это 
он ощупывал впотьмах душу дочкиной подруги, словно спраши-
вал у ее сердца, сколько ему лет. Он вознамерился, уловив безоши-
бочно одну какую-нибудь Женину черту, сыграть на подмеченном 
и помочь ребенку забыть о доме, и своими поисками напоминал ей, 
что она у чужих. (PSS 3:78)
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Even if Defendov’s attempts to find her single essential feature are unsuccess-
ful, it is in the sacristan’s home that Zhenya begins to enter a new stage of her 
life; and it is equally meaningful that it is in the house of the Defendovs, where 
the vocabulary of the soul is reintroduced, that Tsvetkov—or rather a ghost 
(призрак), or the Demon associated with him—finally departs.
 To emphasize the deeper significance of Zhenya’s transition, three new 
sets of hands are introduced into the narrative, and their movements play out, 
as if within a cameo frame, the significance of these seemingly insignificant 
occurrences whose every detail constitutes, nonetheless, a symbolic gesture. 
First, Defendov’s hands, old and shaking, attempt to adjust the light inside a 
room pervaded by remnants of organic life, beauty and horror, house plants 
and cockroaches. The movements of the hands, turning on the light, appear to 
raise the overfilled but invisible wine glass—a sacramental gesture, successful 
in its aim, and yet attracting every kind of insect:
They were sitting down for supper at the Defendovs. Their grandmother 
crossed herself and flopped into an armchair. The lamp burned dimly and 
kept smoking. At one moment it was turned down too far, and the next 
they let it out too much. Mr. Defendov’s dry hand would often reach out 
for the screw and when he slowly settled in his seat, his hand quivered 
minutely, not like an old man’s hand, but as though he were lifting a glass 
filled to the brim. His fingernails and fingertips trembled. [ . . . ]
 The bulbous neck of the lamp flared, edged about by the tendrils of 
geranium and heliotrope. (CSP 171)
У Дефендовых садились ужинать. Бабушка, крестясь, колтыхнулась 
в кресло. Лампа горела мутно и покачивала; ее то перекручивали, то 
чересчур отпускали. Сухая рука Дефендова часто тянулась к винту, 
и, когда медленно отымая ее от лампы, он медленно опускался на 
место, рука у него тряслась, маленько и не по-старчески, будто он 
подымал налитую через рюмку. Дрожали концы пальцев, к ногтям. 
[ . . . ]
 Припухлое горлышко лампы пылало, обложенное усиками 
герани и гелиотропа. (PSS 3:77)
The complex syntax of the narrative minimizes the successful completion of 
the action, but implies, nonetheless, that Defendov—in a sacred gesture—
reclaims both space and time from their external, cold and evil-smelling dura-
tion, exposing in the process a new ripeness: the swelling of time ready to be 
lanced—as if an infectious boil is finally ready to burst. And just as Defendov’s 
hands touch the lamp,
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Cockroaches ran to congregate by the glowing glass, and the hands of the 
clock stretched out carefully. Time moved at a hibernal crawl. Here it was 
swelling, festering. Out in the yard it was numb and malodorous. Outside 
the window it scuttled and scurried, doubling and trebling in the gleaming 
lights. (CSP 171)
К жару стекла сбегались тараканы и осторожно тянулись часовые 
стрелки. Время ползло по-зимнему. Здесь оно нарывало. На дворе—
коченело, зловонное. За окном—сновало, семенило, двоясь и троясь 
в огоньках. (PSS 3:77)
At this very moment, looking over Defendov’s books on the shelves (a forbid-
ding set of North magazines and the dingy gold of Karamzin’s complete works 
suggest the significations of space and time, geographical directions, and his-
torical narratives), Zhenya finds that she can regain inner balance only by 
recollecting her mother; and here she experiences the first real barrier of dif-
ferentiation and separation in her life—a rebirth through which she reclaims 
her separation and identity.
 As cockroaches run toward the light and away from Zhenya’s space, she, in 
her mind, returns to the train station, which in summer, during the animation 
of the surrounding world, admitted no boundaries and farewells. However, 
this time Zhenya sees her mother as a figure left behind on the platform, a 
departing memory separated temporally and spatially:
And something in her turned over, releasing tears at the very same moment 
when mama emerged in her memories: suffering and left standing in the 
chain of yesterday’s events like one of a crowd who were seeing her off, 
and now set spinning back there by the train of time, which was bearing 
Zhenya away. (CSP 172)
И что-то в ней перевернулось, дав волю слезам в тот самый миг, как 
мать вышла у ней в воспоминаниях: страдающей, оставшейся сто-
ять в веренице вчерашних фактов, как в толпе провожающих и кру-
тимой там, позади, поездом времени, уносящим Женю. (PSS 3:78)
Precisely at this moment, however, Zhenya is pierced by her recollection of 
her mother’s glance, a moment when Zhenya’s empty hands—in the second 
highly significant motif of hands in these passages—receive an invisible heavy 
weight. This time, however, Zhenya’s hands are in control of the situation. 
The text meanwhile is saturated with multiple reconstructions of (and depar-
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tures from) the Kantian experience of apperception: the mother’s glance from 
a recent mother-daughter conversation reaches Zhenya’s inner vision. Two 
instances of inner eyesight meet at this crossing, awakening Zhenya’s inner 
self and its personal, genetic (rather than generic) outlines.61 Thus, Pasternak 
finally draws Zhenya’s entry into maturity as a moment when she actually car-
ries, in her empty hands, a past that henceforth lives in her, full of separated 
spatial and temporal measurements, invisible and intangible, yet offering in 
her a new intelligible life. It is here that she is finally able to re-enact another 
as herself.62 Her mother’s tears, held back on that memorable night in Perm 
when the spring was breaking through and the Kama River was ready to burst, 
are now Zhenya’s tears, and mother begins to live in daughter, in a significant 
metaphoric replacement, intended, it would seem, to be a moment of textual 
maturity that accompanies the maturation of the protagonist:
But utterly, utterly unbearable was the penetrating glance that Madame 
Luvers had fixed on her yesterday in the classroom. It was carved deep in 
her memory and would not go. Everything that Zhenya now felt was bound 
up with it. As though it were something that should have been taken and 
treasured, but which was forgotten and neglected.
 This feeling could have made her lose her wits. Its drunken, crazy bit-
terness and inescapability spun her so giddily. Zhenya stood by the window 
and wept silently; tears flowed and she did not wipe them away: Her hands 
and arms were occupied, though she was holding nothing in them. Something 
caused them vehemently, impulsively, and obstinately to strengthen.
 A sudden thought dawned on her. She suddenly felt that she was ter-
ribly like Mama. This feeling was combined with a sense of vivid certainty, 
capable of turning conjecture into fact (if the latter were not established), 
and of making her like her mother by the mere strength of the striking, sweet 
condition she was in. This sensation was piercing, sharp enough to make her 
groan. It was a sensation of woman perceiving from within, or inwardly, her 
outward appearance and her charm. Zhenya was incapable of realizing what 
it was. She was experiencing it for the first time. In one thing she was not 
mistaken. This was just how Madame Luvers had once been as she had 
stood by the window, turning away from her daughter and the governess 
in agitation, biting her lips and tapping her lorgnette against a kid-gloved 
palm. (CSP 172–73; emphasis added)
 61. See Aucouturier’s analysis of Zhenya’s “generic and not individual qualities” (1978, 45).
 62. Cf. the description of the old man in “Letters from Tula”: “He was the only one in 
the story [who] made another to speak through his own lips” [В рассказе только он [  .  .  . ] 
застави[л] своими устами говорить постороннего] (CSP 126; PSS 3:32).
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Но совершенно, совершенно несносен был тот проникновенный 
взгляд, который остановила на ней госпожа Люверс вчера в клас-
сной. Он врезался в память и из нее не шел. С ним соединялось все, 
что теперь испытывала Женя. Будто это была вещь, которую следо-
вало взять, дорожа ей, и которую забыли, ею пренебрегнув.
 Можно было голову потерять от этого чувства, до такой степени 
кружила пьяная шалая его горечь и безысходность. Женя стояла у 
окна и плакала беззвучно; слезы текли, и она их не утирала: руки у 
ней были заняты, хотя она ничего в них не держала. Они были у ней 
выпрямлены, энергически, порывисто и упрямо.
 Внезапная мысль осенила ее. Она вдруг почувствовала, что 
страшно похожа на маму. Это чувство соединилось с ощущением 
живой безошибочности, властной сделать домысел фактом, если 
этого нет еще на-лицо, уподобить ее матери одною силой потряса-
юще-сладкого состояния. Чувство это было пронизывающее, острое 
до стона. Это было ощущение женщины, изнутри или внутренне 
видящей свою внешность и прелесть. Женя не могла отдать себе в 
нем отчета. Она его испытывала впервые. В одном она не ошиблась. 
Так, взволнованная, отвернувшись от дочери и гувернантки, стояла 
однажды у окна госпожа Люверс и кусала губы, ударяя лорнеткою 
по лайковой ладони. (PSS 3:79)
True to his conception, Pasternak immediately establishes Zhenya’s innocence 
in sexual matters in the conversation “about it” with Liza Defendov. Then Pas-
ternak moves to another farewell and yet another significant instance of this 
symbolic gesture of hands.
 Across from the Defendovs’ house, Zhenya, ignorant of Tsvetkov’s death, 
observes his departure; or rather the hands of the departing Ghost at midnight 
carry a lamp, except that these are not real hands, but the empty sleeves of a 
light-bearing or Luciferic Demon who finally moves on, partially because this 
new Zhenya is no longer fascinated by him, and lets go of the apparition, of 
the lighted window, the shadows, the snow, and even the horse:
In a small window across the way a lamp was burning. Two bright stripes 
fell beneath the horse and settled on its shaggy pasterns. Shadows moved 
across the snow; the sleeves of a phantom moved, wrapping a fur coat around 
itself; the light moved in a curtained window. But the little horse stood 
motionless and dreaming.
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 Then she saw him. She recognized him immediately by his silhouette. 
The lame man lifted the lamp and began to walk away with it. The two 
bright stripes moved after him, distending and elongating, and behind the 
stripes—a sleigh, which quickly flashed into view and plunged back into 
the gloom even faster as it slowly went around the house to the porch.
 It was strange that Tsvetkov should still appear before her gaze even 
here in the suburbs. But it did not surprise Zhenya. She was hardly con-
cerned with him. Soon the lamp appeared again. It passed steadily across 
the curtains and was at the point of retreating again when suddenly it 
turned up once more behind the same curtain on the windowsill from 
which it had been taken. (CSP 175; emphasis added)
В окошке через дорогу горела лампа. Две яркие полосы, упав под 
лошадь, ложились на мохнатые бабки. Двигались тени по снегу, дви-
гались рукава призрака, запахивавшего шубу, двигался свет в занаве-
шенном окне. Лошадка же стояла неподвижно и дремала.
 Тогда она увидала его. Она сразу его узнала по силуэту. Хромой 
поднял лампу и стал удаляться с ней. За ним двинулись, перекаши-
ваясь и удлиняясь, обе яркие полосы, а за полосами и сани, кото-
рые быстро вспыхнули и еще быстрее метнулись во мрак, медленно 
заезжая за дом к крыльцу.
 Было странно, что Цветков продолжает попадаться ей на глаза 
и здесь, в слободе. Но Женю это не удивило. Он ее мало занимал. 
Вскоре лампа опять показалась и, плавно пройдясь по всем зана-
вескам, стала-было снова пятиться назад, как вдруг очутилась за 
самой занавеской, на подоконнике, откуда ее взяли. (PSS 3:82)
The return of the lamp to its proper place and the end of the play of shadows 
do not constitute a romantic interlude equal in splendor to the description, in 
Demon, of the secret life of shadows at night in an abandoned castle,63 but this 
scene in Luvers does imply a finality, even closure, as dark superhuman pres-
ences depart and a young girl enters upon a new stage of maturity that prom-
ises further upheavals, since Zhenya’s world (see Table 7c) has been already 
punctured, from childhood, by fatality and impending danger.
 63. See Demon: “There are no imprints of the former years: the hand of centuries was 
clearing them for a long time” [нет нигде следов / Минувших лет: рука веков / Прилежно, 
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7.5  “Three Names” and the construction of the 
“Demonic” or spirit-bearing protagonist
In his letter to Bobrov of July 16, 1918, Pasternak mentions his plans for the 
title of the novel—Three Names. This provisional title, which on the surface 
has very little to do with the text of The Childhood of Luvers, suggested to crit-
ics that the title is connected to the rest of the work, lost in subsequent years.64 
However, since this is the only title that Pasternak mentions to Bobrov while 
sending him the earlier part of his future novel, it is very probable that Three 
Names and the text published later as The Childhood of Luvers were more 
directly linked than hitherto thought, and that the conception responsible 
for the title was to reflect the multifaceted role of Tsvetkov (and, perhaps, 
any other protagonist constructed along similar lines at future points of the 
novel).65
 Several considerations support this view. In more recent studies, Russian 
scholars have begun to approach Pasternak’s construction of lyrical subjects 
as a reflection of the wide spectrum of “that natural and cultural universe, in 
which he or she is initially reflected, as in the part of the whole” (Han 1988, 
99). The lyrical subject, then, “possesses, on the one hand, a multiplicity of 
expressions, and, on the other, indefiniteness as a textual category” (Fateeva 
2003, 87). The transformation of Pasternak’s poetic subject into the protago-
nist of a prose narrative remains a highly disputed question, and the multifac-
eted figure of the indefinable Tsvetkov helps to disclose Pasternak’s aims in 
this regard. In the personality of Tsvetkov, Pasternak hones his earlier tech-
nique of constructing the protagonist by bringing together and superimposing 
several themes and presences, and it is highly important that these presences 
are not drawn from the immediate surrounding world, from the proximities 
to which critics tend to point in their characterization of Pasternak’s “meton-
ymous heroes.”66 Rather, in a manner similar to the formation of Heinrich 
 64. Pasternak’s letter is somewhat elusive in this regard, for sending to Bobrov only a part 
of the future novel, he still lets him know only one title—that of Three Names (and then in 
his characteristic manner insists that this is hardly important: “The novel will be called Three 
Names or something of the kind. At this point it’s unimportant” [Роман будет называться 
“Три имени” или что-то в этом роде. Пока что это неважно] (PSS 7:348). Still he gives no 
other title to the work (Barnes 1989, 269ff).
 65. Fateeva’s summary of Tsvetkov’s role in the text is apt (though in this chapter I tend 
to disagree with her stress on the “synthesis” and “naturalness” of Zhenya’s growth in “The 
Stranger” and view the process instead as contradictory and counterpointed): “The synthesis 
of the idea of spiritual and organic growth as a reflection of the ‘naturalness’ of the individual 
development can be seen in the name ‘Tsvetkov’” (2003, 225). 
 66. According to Michel Aucouturier, the character based on the metaphoric relations, 
“by analogy or opposition, connects the entire universe to the ‘I’ of the poet, while the art of 
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Heine in “The Mark of Apelles,” where Heine is simultaneously a traveling 
stranger, a poet, a character in a manuscript, an ahistorical figure appearing 
at sunset, a power able to pierce darkness, and finally a great German poet, 
Tsvetkov becomes shaped not merely by his last name, or by the fact that he is 
associated with the approach of winter blizzards, but also by Lermontov and 
Lermontov’s supernatural Demon (see Glazov-Corrigan 1991; Fateeva 2003, 
225). In other words, Tsvetkov becomes the focus of multiple lines of rela-
tionship during the fall, as well as by their indefinite residue, and his trio of 
personalities—Lermontov, his Demon, and Tsvetkov—surely must bear some 
relation to the mysterious title planned for the larger novel.
 Tsvetkov, it should be noted, belongs to a group of characters in Paster-
nak’s world that simply do not fit the profile of the metonymic hero (who 
tends to dissolve into the surrounding world);67 the outlines of selfhood in 
Tsvetkov’s case present him as a receptacle of presences from “lands afar,” 
that is, from very distant worlds. And even though the existence of the tri-
adic relationship Tsvetkov-Lermontov-Demon has begun to be accepted in 
criticism,68 the implications of this artistic technique are far from straightfor-
ward. The indefinite Tsvetkov has an everyday life that ultimately does not 
interest his author, apart from the fact that Tsvetkov, like Lermontov, is a lame 
artist; what interests Pasternak instead is how to construct a narrative subject 
who is, in effect, a psychopompos—a spirit or soul carrier.69 The choice of the 
title Demon is itself an indicator of this aim, and because of the multilayered 
nature of this narrative construction, Tsvetkov’s entry into the text opens an 
altogether new world in front of Zhenya’s eyes. To emphasize the new layer of 
vision, a vocabulary of spirits gathering at the threshold of the Luvers’s house 
is introduced at the very beginning of “The Stranger,” but with all the Symbol-
ist echoes that such a construction may suggest, the originality of Pasternak’s 
Pasternak, founded upon metonymy, on the contrary dissolves the ‘I,’ and generally any kind of 
conscious or self-willed agent, in the image of a world where the “subject” is nothing but a gram-
matical fiction because there exists only one single real subject, life, whose essence is supra-
individual” (1969, 222; emphasis added). The relationship of Tsvetkov is, in fact, created by 
oppositions—to Lermontov, the Demon, storms, winter, discoloration—and if the protagonist 
is dissolved, it is definitely not in the surrounding world, but in other literary and intellectual 
universes of discourse.
 67. See previous note.
 68. Faryno (1993, 30ff) and Fateeva (2003, 329ff).
 69. Pasternak actually indicates as much in “Some propositions” through his unusual 
emphasis on the relationship between the spirituality of prose [oдухотворенность] and the 
emergence of the individual in the narrative: “By its feeling, through its spirituality, prose seeks 
and finds man in the category of speech. And when the man is found lacking in an age, then it 
recreates him from memory [ . . . ]” [Чутьем, по своей одухотворенности, проза ищет и 
находит человека в категории речи, а если век его лишен, то на память воссоздает егo] 
(CSP 261–62; PSS 5:23–24).
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narrative lies in his ability to fold the narrative world of spirits that crosses 
time and space into the framework of his earlier metonymous constructions. 
These layers are fused, and yet they are also distinct and bear different artis-
tic attributes. Thus, the “strange little street,” never to be visited or found by 
Zhenya again,70 is a simple street crossed by others every day, and the three 
grieving women in black—Graces, Muses, or Fates, who suggest the presence 
of a Romantic poet destined to die young—might for other spectators simply 
be strange next-door neighbors. Seryozha’s innocent reference to the lame 
man’s “light in the window, late gatherings, and all night celebration” [Пом-
нишь, я рассказывал—собирает людей, всю ночь пьют, свет в окне] 
(CSP 159, PSS 3:64) suggests to the Russian ear an unmistakable echo of Ler-
montov’s “Tamara” and her illumined window’s invitation to nightly visitors 
[И там сквозь туман полуночный / Блистал огонек золотой / Кидался 
он путникам в очи], as well as the feast in the darkness of night [шипели 
два кубка вина], to which she welcomes her visitors before destroying them 
with her caresses. And yet Seryozha can be (and is) totally unaware of the 
implication of these words. If Zhenya’s life and character are to be changed by 
this “abstract moment,” it is important to note that its narrative design pursues 
at least two interrelated goals. First, it suggests an altogether distinct world of 
symbolic presences and forces; and, second, it ensures that this other world 
remains masked and barely perceptible in the everyday reality of Ekaterin-
burg’s life. To say that Pasternak simply tries to reconstruct the universe of the 
book in the child’s mind is to trivialize a much more complex vision. For him 
such a narrative reflects a philosophical understanding of reality which has 
also become an artistic program that he is free to explore with all the artistic 
means within his power.
 In a letter to Eugene Kayden (August 22, 1958) after the success of Zhivago 
awakened in the West interest in his early work, Pasternak carefully recon-
structs the nature of Lermontov’s presence in his own life of 1917. He writes 
to Kayden not of Lermontov’s influence or of his memory, but of Lermontov’s 
reality as a living person and (what is equally important) as an active living 
spirit, who had entered contemporary life and art, in order to assert the poetic 
freedom of everyday reality:
 70. In the earlier draft of the scene of Tsvetkov’s first appearance, Pasternak crosses out a 
passage with Seryozha and the Akhmedyanovs appearing on this hidden street as they return 
from “unknown destinations” [они прошли той дорогой, и, значит, не из дому, а неведомо 
откуда] (PSS 3:545–46). Zhenya’s surprise at the boys’ appearance is followed by the authorial 
voice observing that Zhenya was never able to find a way to that street (PSS 3:546). In the final 
text of Luvers, Pasternak emphasizes the “unfindability” of the street when the children return 
from a bookstore and meet Dikikh with the stranger (CSP 160; 3:64–65).
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I dedicated My Sister Life not to the memory of Lermontov but to the poet 
himself as though he was living in our midst—to this spirit still effectual in 
our literature. What was he to me, you ask, in the summer of 1917?—The 
personification of creative adventure and discovery, the principle of free poeti-
cal statement. (Kayden 1959, ix; emphasis added)
Я посвятил “Сестру мою жизнь” не памяти Лермонтова, но самому 
поэту, точно он сам жил среди нас—его духу, все еще действенному 
в нашей литературе. Вы спрашиваете, чем он был для меня летом 
1917 года. Олицетворением творческой смелости и открытий, 
началом свободного поэтического утверждения повседневности. (PSS 
10:380)
In the same letter, Pasternak asserts that every historical period possesses “two 
time sequences”: “the one known to all and the other that has not as yet taken 
place, infinite and concealed, for the future is always part of this ungrasp-
able and unknown infinity [два времени —известное и еще не настав-
шее, бесконечное и неведомое, посколько будущее всегда—часть этой 
неизведанной и незвестной бесконечности] (PSS 10:379). In the world of 
Pasternak in 1957 it is, perhaps, no longer appropriate to seek echoes of Kan-
tian a posteriori and a priori time, and yet it is also clear that this philosophical 
manner of approaching reality never left the writer. His rendition of Lermon-
tov’s influence is to be understood in that context—the Romantic poet was for 
Pasternak in 1917 a necessary writer, a compatriot in acquiring a poetic voice 
and yet also a reminder of an “immeasurable” larger force of spirit, unfolding 
an otherwise impenetrable future.71
 According to Pasternak’s curious admission, Lermontov’s entry into his 
own world in 1917 was tantamount to a huge biographical and artistic event. 
By contrast, however, Tsvetkov’s entry into the life of Zhenya is of a some-
what different nature, for the child is only forming, and one cannot speak 
in her case about the discovery of a new poetic voice. This difference72 may 
 71. See in Luvers at the beginning of “The Stranger,” prior to the introduction of Lermon-
tov: “One could not foretell the future, but it could be seen entering the house from outside. 
Here its scheme is already in evidence—a distribution to which it would be subject despite its 
recalcitrance in all else” [Будущего нельзя предсказать. Но его можно увидеть, войдя с 
воли в дом] (CSP 149; PSS 3:53).
 72. Neither Faryno nor Fateeva comments on Lermontov’s very different roles in Paster-
nak’s poetry and prose of the period, an emphatic versus covert appearance (Faryno 1993). 
In fact, Fateeva believes that, in their textual references to Lermontov, both My Sister Life and 
Luvers express a similar position, namely, the author’s farewell to the demonic sense of life, char-
acteristic of childhood: “Pasternak says farewell to this child-like “demonic” sense of life in My 
Sister Life when he opens the poetic cycle with the poem “In the Demon’s memory” [Памяти 
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explain why the subtlety of the correlation between Tsvetkov and Lermontov 
has no parallel in Pasternak’s poetry of this period. In contrast to the evocative 
and indefinite resonances in the novella, Pasternak’s My Sister Life is not only 
dedicated to Lermontov but opens with a clear celebration of Lermontov’s 
storms73—a poem entitled “To the Memory of the Demon” [Памяти Демона] 
that depicts the Demon’s elemental power in the ensuing chaos of nature after 
his nightly visits to Tamara:
He came at night,
With blue ice, from Tamara,
With two wings he marked
Where the nightmare would begin and end.
Приходил по ночам
В синеве ледника от Тамары
Парой крыл намечал,
Где гудеть, где кончаться кошмару. (PSS 1:114)
In poetry, Pasternak accepts unconditionally Lermontov’s spirit and his long-
ing for the storm, as in the poem “The sail” [А он мятежный ищет бури 
/ Как будто в буре есть покой] as a new guide in the eventful summer of 
1917. In the case of Pasternak’s young fictional protagonist, however, there 
is a covert link to Lermontov, and the girl’s momentary embrace of the ele-
mental power of the winter blizzard is followed almost immediately by death 
and devastation in her family (see 7.6 below). In other words, the biographi-
cal intrusion of Lermontov into Pasternak’s life and art is of a very differ-
ent character than that visited on his heroine, and it is very possible that in 
this highly nuanced difference one finds a further key to Pasternak’s manner 
of constructing his prose. The writer’s own childhood may also provide an 
important textual clue.
7.6  Alexander Scriabin and “the freshness of his spirit”
Lermontov or his Demon enters Zhenya’s life as both a living person and a 
spirit, emerging during the sunset from the enchanted street behind her house. 
демона] while The Childhood of Luvers ends with “And without another word Lermontov was 
returned by the same hand and pushed back into the little slanting row of classics” (2003, 330). 
 73. After the dedication to Lermontov in My Sister Life, there follows the epigraph from 
Nicolaus Lenau within which the face of the beloved is intertwined with storms and clouds.
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These presences will be superimposed on Tsvetkov and will have a profound 
effect upon the girl, while bringing her no happiness and signaling instead 
the approach of turmoil and disaster. As observed above (5.2), the composer 
Shestikrylov, whose very name suggests the image of a spiritual messenger, a 
Six-Winged Seraphim, is the closest textual prototype in this regard, for, just 
like Lermontov, Shestikrylov enters the inanimate world of the children’s lives 
in “Ordering a Drama” with a storm of snowflakes and makes the children 
unrecognizable by awakening their self-consciousness and preparing them for 
the oncoming drama of life (and their future in art):
Here is the scenario: twilight in the composer’s apartment—and either 
there is no meaning in it or else it is to be followed by a drama. This is 
how it was in life too—there stood the inanimate principles, demanding 
to be set in motion, and people would start off here at a run, and some of 
them, the ones who always thought further than others, and more quickly 
became unrecognizable, they endured this delicious suffering: to work, to 
think upon the inanimate. And grew conscious of it. [ . . . ]
 Later, they became artists. (MG 29)
Вот тут сценарий: сумерки в квартире композитора, и они или не 
имеют смысла, или за ними должна следовать драма; так и было в 
жизни,—стояли неодушевленные начала и требовали разбега; люди 
разбегались здесь, и некоторые из них, те, которые думали всегда 
дальше других и скорее становились неузнаваемыми для своих зна-
комых, они выносили это сладостное страдание работать, думать за 
неодушевленное. И сознавали его. [ . . . ]
 Впоследствии они стали художниками. (PSS 3:462)
The authorial insistence that the future speed of thought was initially found at 
this juncture [люди разбегались здесь], and the phrase “this was how it was 
in life” [так и было в жизни], constitute a valuable signal, simultaneously 
textual and autobiographical.
 There was, in fact, only one artistic figure who influenced Pasternak’s char-
acter in his adolescence with such force—the composer Alexander Scriabin.74 
 74. Barnes notes the interconnection between the role of Scriabin in Pasternak’s life and 
his unpublished “Story of Counter-Octave,” but omits altogether the references to the composer 
in “Ordering a Drama.” He insists, nonetheless, that “Pasternak’s early fascination with music, 
as well as the influence of Scriabin’s personality and artistry, was not easily—nor was it ever 
completely—eradicated” (Barnes, 1977, 14).
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“Ordering a Drama,” then, can be viewed as Pasternak’s first quasi-autobio-
graphical sketch, as well as his first articulation of a three-layered universe, 
the creation of the necessary frame to explain Scriabin’s power. Similarly to 
Scriabin’s role, described in both of Pasternak’s published autobiographies, 
Shestikrylov uncovers for his young pupils a layer of reality that was mute and 
invisible until his appearance, or rather until the entry of his music, which he 
always carries with him and by means of which he starts all the motion and 
commotion. Scriabin’s link to Tsvetkov appears unlikely until one recollects 
that the very meaning of the name Tsvetkov must have a direct link to Scri-
abin’s so-called “synesthetism,” the composer’s famous ability to hear musical 
notes as colors, and to his well known experiments with light-color-music 
synthesis.75 Even the lameness of Tsvetkov, this clear reference to Lermontov, 
may yet refer to Scriabin, since, according to some critics, it was Scriabin’s 
effect on the Pasternaks and their household in 1903 that resulted in Boris’s 
fall from the horse76 and his subsequent handicap: one of his legs considerably 
shorter than the other.
 There is further biographical evidence to consider. In contrast to “Order-
ing a Drama,” there is no mention of music in Luvers, but there is a poet and a 
spirit of his poetry. The enchanted street, opening a pathway “from this world 
to the other” is actually a reconstruction in fiction of the childhood event that 
both Pasternak and his brother Alexander narrated in their memoirs—namely 
their roaming in the park-like forest in the late spring of 1903 at the dacha 
at Obolenskoe and hearing the sound of a piano—their first introduction to 
what would prove later to be piano pieces from the Divine Poem (the Third 
Symphony), composed by their as yet unknown neighbor, Alexander Scriabin. 
Alexander Pasternak’s recollection of the event is straightforward and factual:
Unexpectedly, amidst the surrounding silence, which was deepened fur-
ther by the singing of birds and the crackling sounds of the squirrels, we 
heard, very much from the distance, constantly breaking separated pieces 
of piano music. [  .  .  . ] We began to find our way towards the sounds. 
[ . . . ] In the forest’s meadow, where we finally arrived, there were the thick 
impenetrable bushes. On the meadow in the sun’s rays, there appeared a 
country house (dacha), the same as ours.
 75. For documentary material on Scriabin’s “color hearing,” see Galeev and Vanechkina 
(2001).
 76. See here Boris Gasparov’s 1995 article in which he links Pasternak’s fall from a horse 
on August 6, 1903, to Scriabin’s “polyrhythmia” [полиритмия]. Gasparov views the rhythm of 
gallop ending in a fall as the imagery emblematic of Pasternak’s prose, embodying an arrival of 
catastrophe intermixed with a “secret voice”—a call to transcendence.
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 It was from that house that the music was coming; it sounded as though 
someone were deciphering a new piece, but for that it sounded strange, 
unusual, without uncertain pauses at the more difficult parts. [ . . . ] My 
brother, who understood music more than I did, said, that without a doubt 
someone was composing there, and not memorizing or studying a new 
work. (PSS 11:11)
In Boris Pasternak’s own recollection of the event in the Sketch for an Auto-
biography (May-June 1956), the setting of the mysterious street in Luvers is 
anticipated by the portrayal of an opening among the trees and the alteration 
of “the light and shade [that] followed each other in the forest” (Remember 36; 
PSS 3:302). There is once again an emphasis on the spirit of the artist’s art—an 
elemental force, a fallen angel, not unlike Lermontov’s Demon, but more play-
ful and mischievous, and there emerges also the theme of eventual destruc-
tion, “the tragic force of the composition,” corresponding to the character of 
the time:
Lord, what music it was! The symphony was continually crumbling and 
tumbling like a city under artillery fire, and was all the time growing and 
being built up out of debris and wreckage. It was brimful of ideas worked 
out to the point that was indistinguishable from frenzy, and at the same 
time as new as a forest, breathing life and freshness and, indeed, arrayed, 
surely, in the morning of a spring foliage of 1903 and not of 1803. [ . . . ] 
[T]he tragic force of the composition in the process of creation put out 
its tongue triumphantly at everything that was decrepit and generally 
accepted and majestically obtuse, and was bold to the point of frenzy, to a 
point of mischievousness, playfully elemental. And free like a fallen angel. 
(Remember 36–37)
Боже, что это была за музыка! Симфония беспрерывно рушилась и 
обваливалась, как город под артиллерийским огнем, и вся строи-
лась и росла из обломков и разрушений. Ее всю переполняло содер-
жание, до безумия разработанное и новое, как нов был жизнью и 
свежестью дышавший лес, одетый в то утро, не правда ли, весенней 
листвой 1903-го, а не 1803 года. [ . . . ] [Т]рагическая сила сочиняе-
мого торжественно показывала язык всему одряхлело признанному 
и величественно тупому и была смела до сумасшествия, до мальчи-
шества, шаловливо стихийная и свободная, как падший ангел. (PSS 
3:302–3)
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The spring setting in the memoirs of both brothers contrasts with the fall-
winter world of “Ordering a Drama” and “The Stranger,” but the portrait of 
Scriabin in Safe Conduct emphasizes both the winter blizzard and the evoca-
tion of the rebellious and destructive spirits in his art. Pasternak’s adoration of 
Scriabin is animated through the description of the little demon who jumps 
from music posters onto young Pasternak’s back as the boy walks through 
Moscow streets, while the power of adoration is not only “fierce” and “cruel,” 
but “feverish” and “ravaging”:
So it was winter out of doors. The street was chopped a third shorter by 
dusk and full of errand running all day long. A whirl of streetlamps chased 
along after the street, lagging behind in the whirl of snowflakes. On my way 
home from school, the name Scriabin, covered with snow, skipped from a 
poster onto my back. [ . . . ] This adoration attacked me more cruelly and 
undisguisedly than any fever. [ . . . ], and the fiercer it was, the more surely 
it protected me from the ravaging effect of his indescribable music. (CSP 
23; emphasis added)
Итак, на дворе зима, улица на треть подрублена сумерками и весь 
день на побегушках. За ней, отставая в вихре снежинок, гонятся 
вихрем фонари. Обожанье это бьет меня жесточе и неприкрашен-
нее лихорадки. Дорогой из гимназии имя Скрябина, все в снегу, 
соскакивает с афиши мне на закорки. [ . . . ] [Э]то именно то безот-
ветное, неразделенное чувство, которого я и жажду. Только оно, и 
чем оно горячее, тем больше ограждает меня от опустошений, про-
изводимых его непередаваемой музыкой. (PSS 3:150)
In fact, in The Childhood of Luvers, as in both of his memoirs, Pasternak’s 
meditation on the demonic aspect of these artistic intruders and on the spiri-
tual reality they unfold is ultimately ambiguous. If in Safe Conduct Pasternak 
is still in awe of his “idol” and his compositions’ “lyrical dwelling [ . . . ] mate-
rially equal to the whole universe, which had been ground down to make its 
bricks” [вымышленное лирическое жилище, материально равное всей 
ему на кирпич перемолотой вселенной] (CSP 25; PSS 3:152), then in the 
Sketch for an Autobiography his assessment of Scriabin’s developing “super-
man” influence is very carefully nuanced.
 Given that Scriabin had won him over “by the freshness of his spirit” 
[Скрябин покорял меня свежестью своего духа] (Remember 38; PSS 
3:303), there is a distancing on Pasternak’s part from the spiritual reality 
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sought by the composer. The Pasternak of Sketch for an Autobiography clearly 
resists the Nietzschean direction of Scriabin’s world view,77 but the very man-
ner in which Pasternak describes Scriabin’s “superman” influence resonates 
with the depiction of Tsvetkov, particularly the belonging of both the fictional 
protagonist and the composer to a heroic “other world” that brings sorrow, 
and both figures’ ability in their otherworldliness to define the situations they 
touch:
That was the negative side of Scriabin’s influence, which in everything else 
became decisive for me. His egocentric nature was appropriate and justi-
fied only in his case. The seeds of his views, childishly misinterpreted, fell 
on favorable ground.
 [ . . . ] Almost since the night described by Rodionov, I had believed in the 
existence of a higher heroic world, which must be served rapturously, it might 
bring suffering. [ . . . ]
 Actually not only must music be supermusic to mean anything, but 
everything in the world must excel itself to be itself. Man, man’s activity must 
include an element of infinity which lends form and character to everything. 
(Remember 40–42; trans altered; emphasis added)
Это была оборотная сторона скрябинского влияния, в осталь-
ном ставшего для меня решающим. Его эгоцентризм был уместен 
и оправдан только в его случае. Семена его воззрений, по-детски 
превратно понятых, упали на благодарную почву.
 [  .  .  .  ] Чуть ли не с родионовской ночи я верил в существова-
ние высшего героического мира, которому надо служить восхищенно, 
хотя он приносит страдания. [ . . . ]
 Действительно, не только надо быть сверхмузыкой, чтобы что-
то значить, но и все на свете должно превосходить себя, чтобы быть 
собою. Человек, деятельность человека должны заключать элемент 
бесконечности, придающий явлению определенность, характер. (PSS 
3:305–6)
 Thus, a most singular blend of Pasternak’s autobiographical and inter-
textual resonances defines Tsvetkov’s featureless presence, his “fog and mist” 
[туманное и общее],78 while the superman motif of Scriabin’s vision clearly 
 77. See here Barnes (1977, 15ff); Levi (1990, 21–23; 42–43).
 78. See Demon: “This was not a horrifying spirit of Hell, / a sinful sufferer – oh, no. / He 
looked like a bright evening/ neither day, nor night / —neither darkness, nor light!” [То не был 
ада дух ужасный, / Порочный мученик—о нет! / Он был похож на вечер ясный: / Ни 
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had a conduit to Lermontov’s Demon, “a speechless stranger of the fog” [при-
шлец туманный и немой] (Lermontov 2:361). In all of this, Pasternak’s 
conception of the human being resonates with the a priori of infinity and 
indefiniteness that underlies sensation, in Luvers brought into the open and 
given reality by the world of poetry and art that emerges when Zhenya reads 
Lermontov.
7.7 Philosophical overtones of the indefinable Tsvetkov
In Sketch for an Autobiography, Pasternak describes Marina Tsvetaeva in a 
somewhat puzzling manner, but one that is not exactly irrelevant to the issue 
at hand: “in her work she rushed impetuously, eagerly, and almost rapaciously 
toward the achievement of finality and definiteness” [В жизни и творчестве 
она стремительно, жадно и почти хищно рвалась к окончательности и 
определенности] (Remember 110; PSS 3:340). It is very probable that in this 
oblique fashion Pasternak establishes his difference from Tsvetaeva, for ever 
since his student notes the question of indefiniteness in art and in sensations 
was a concept he tended to emphasize. The question of the indefinable residue 
associated with human destiny is evident, for example, in Pasternak’s student 
notes on Kant, Cohen, and Natorp, particularly when he speaks about psy-
chology and the need to “break” through the limits of materiality to introduce 
the human self whose teleological “end” is antagonistic to the material “thing-
ness” in the sphere of experience:
Тhe more clear is our organism as an object of study, the more mysterious 
it is as a unity of life; and then considering its living principle, we break its 
material thingness, its sphere of experience. And separating it, on the one 
side, from its belonging to the laws which constitute material thingness, we 
grant to it, on the other side, its own empirical law, as we return it to the 
unity of the subject, which as an object, in its own idea, is not constituted, 
but regulated and teleological. In other words, its teleological principle is 
antagonistic to the material thingness. 
Чем яснее нам организм, как предмет познания, тем он непонятнее, 
как единство жизни; и тогда мысля его жизненность, мы прорываем 
сферу предметности, сферу опыта. И лишая его, с одн[ой] стороны, 
причастности всеобщему закону, конституирующему предметность, 
день, ни ночь,—ни мрак, ни свет!] (Lermontov 2:362).
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с друг[ой] стороны наделяя его собств[енным] эмпиpич[еским] 
законом, возврaщаем его единству субъекта, кот[орый] как пред-
мет, в своем мыслимом происхождении не конститутивен, а регу-
лятивен и телеологичен. Т.е. телеологический принцип антагоничен 
принципу предметности. (Lehrjahre II:141)
The question of the indefiniteness and incompleteness in a human being is 
reflected most strongly in Cohen’s “ethical ideal,” which the founder of the 
Marburg school described in the following terms: “The ethical ideal contains 
three moments: completeness, fulfillment, the incompleteness of fulfillment” 
(ERW 424; trans. Poma, 2006, 151). From within this context one can approach 
the ethical education of Zhenya, which emphasizes the power of command-
ments toward “a third person, totally indifferent, with no name, or only a for-
tuitous one, neither arousing hatred nor inspiring love” (CSP 176; PSS 3:84). 
This manner of defining an ethical pathway in otherwise indefinable territory 
reflects Cohen’s insistence that the foundational principle of selfhood is the 
“yearning of the self ” for the subject beyond material experience, the yearning 
for the indefinable “other” which—and this is highly important—possesses 
no clear outlines and remains a receding, teleological goal that is invariably 
incomplete:
Yearning (Sehnsucht) is above all an expansive feeling of the Ego; it spreads 
the Ego beyond the limits within which it must move and feel itself. [ . . . ]
 Thus the monologue of yearning becomes a dialogue, a duel between 
lovers, or even that of a single partner in the various phases of his love or 
under the different connected effect of other feelings. (ARG 2, Bd. 1, pp 
26ff; trans. Poma 2006, 377–78)
The importance of the indefinite range within the human self (both in 
Zhenya’s growth and in the human subject who becomes the indefinable focus 
of her interest), which can be thus only regulated by laws and commandments, 
both corresponds to and reflects Cohen’s emphasis on the overlap of ethical 
and religious frameworks.
 There is more than an accidental overlap between Pasternak’s introduc-
tion of the Commandments concluding his portrayal of the “featureless man” 
and Cohen’s philosophical postulation of laws. While Cohen insists: “Better 
a man who acts because he received a commandment than a man who has 
not received a commandment and acts” (RV 381; trans. Kajon 114), Pasternak 
concludes with respect to the theme of Tsvetkov:
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[T]he impression [ . . . ] lay beyond the girl’s control, because it was vitally 
important and significant, and its significance consisted in the fact that was 
the first time another human being had entered her life—a third person, 
totally indifferent, with no name, or only a fortuitous one, neither arous-
ing hatred, not inspiring love, but the person whom Commandments have 
in mind, addressing men with names and consciousness, when they say: 
“Thou shall not kill.” “Thou shalt not steal.” et cetera. . . . (CSP 176; empha-
sis added)
То впечатление [ . . . ] заключалось в том, что в ее жизнь впервые 
вошел другой человек, третье лицо, совершенно безразличное, без 
имени или со случайным, не вызывающее ненависти и не вселя-
ющее любви, но то, которое имеют в виду заповеди, обращаясь к 
именам и сознаниям, когда говорят: не убий, не крадь и все прочее. 
(PSS 3:84)
Pasternak’s concluding insistence that there is “no name for such an impres-
sion” corresponds to Cohen’s argument that the preservation of the inex-
haustible potential in every human activity must be preserved in perception, 
knowledge, and art:
The concept is a question and remains a question, nothing but a question. 
The answer which it contains must also be a new question, it must raise a 
new question. This is precisely the intimate methodological relation which 
exists between question and answer: that every question must itself be an 
answer; therefore every answer also can and must be a question. It is a new 
type of reciprocal conditioning, of reciprocal action, which is question and 
answer. No solution can be regarded as definitive. The concept is not an 
absolute totality. (LRE 378; trans. Poma 2006, 151)
There is, however, a further theme in common between Cohen and Pasternak: 
this “infinite” or “incomplete” principle of selfhood is connected in Cohen 
with the notion of suffering as a characteristic of the human subject, a theme 
reflected in Pasternak in the death of Tsvetkov. Readers of Cohen identify this 
emphasis on suffering with his “anti-eudaimonism” or with Cohen’s radical 
opposition to Nietzsche’s Superman.79 As Cohen writes in Die Messiasidee,
 79. For Cohen’s dislike of Nietzsche, see Renz (2005, 308) and Poma (1997, 242).
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[  .  .  . ] the entire cult of heroes must be destroyed. This gives birth to 
the moving image of the servant of God, who, like a miserable, afflicted, 
despised man of pain and suffering, with neither appearance nor beauty, 
is led, like a lamb, to the slaughter, and, like a sheep, falls dumb before its 
shearers. (Die Messiasidee, J1:114; trans. Poma 2006, 243–44)
In opposition to the triumph of power in Nietzsche, Cohen—who, one should 
add, would never shake the hand of a Jew who had accepted Christianity—
viewed this overlapping emphasis on the suffering man in both the Jewish and 
Christian religious traditions as history’s deepest puzzle:
It is truly an unparalleled irony of history that the story of Jesus Christ’s life, 
sealed by his death, should have become the source of the main difference 
between Christianity and Judaism. The history of this passion is an imita-
tion of the messianic imagination of the Deutero-Israel, while the latter, as 
is now commonly agreed, anticipated the history of ‘the remnant of Israel.’ 
And hence, according to this poetic image, the history of Christ is actually 
the history of Israel. The philosophy of history of future generations will 
have to consider and fathom the riddle of the most intimate history of the 
spirit, as far as it has unfolded up to this time. (RoR, 439–40)
This philosophical context underlies the principle of the indefinite “other” in 
human life, introduced in Pasternak in his seemingly vague sketch of the lame 
stranger.
7.8 Sensing transition: 
 Temporal and spatial complexities of the conclusion
When Zhenya returns home after her mother’s miscarriage and subsequent 
sickness, she suddenly notices that the spirit of her house no longer guards its 
inhabitants against the enclosing threat of external darkness. This darkness is 
now ominous; the sounds of mangling linen echo like the rumbling of a vio-
lent attack,80 and the dark forest outside the windows is slowly surrounding 
her family and moving step by step toward her hitherto protected world:
 80. Faryno approaches the sound of the mangling of clothes as an important part of the 
burial rite for Tsvetkov (1993, 37). It is more probable, however, that the rhythms attached to 
this repetitive washing are linked with the upcoming endangerment of the house. The house 
spirit, inviolable at the beginning of the fall, is now clearly under attack.
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The curtains reached down to the floor, and down to the floor the starry 
night also hung through the window, and low down, waist deep in the 
snow-drifts, two thick, dark trees rambled into the clear light of the win-
dow, trailing the glittering chains of their branches through deep snow. 
And somewhere through the wall the firm rumble of the mangling went up 
and down, tightly constricted by the sheets. (CSP 177)
Гардины опускались до полу и до полу свешивалась зимняя звезд-
ная ночь за окном, и низко, по пояс в сугробах, волоча сверкающие 
цепи ветвей по глубокому снегу, брели дремучие деревья на ясный 
огонек в окне. И где-то за стеной, туго стянутый простынями, взад-
вперед ходил твердый грохот раскатки. (PSS 3:84)
With great care, Pasternak sets the final scene of the story in such a way that 
both temporal and spatial descriptions appear to become porous, pervaded 
by invisible presences. The temporal chronology has already been twisted by 
the appearance of Tsvetkov after his death at Defendov’s house and by all of 
Zhenya’s experiences with him “at every step, constantly, directly or indirectly, 
and even, as on the last occasion, quite contrary to all possibility” [на каждом 
шагу, постоянно, прямо и косвенно и даже, как это случилось в послед-
ний раз, наперекор возможности] (CSP 178; PSS 3:85). Time as a single 
unit, like the death of Tsvetkov, contains a hidden multiplicity of presences, 
and this new elasticity of time is perhaps Zhenya’s last lesson from Tsvetkov. It 
also marks the stranger’s last appearance in the story, when Zhenya realizes as 
she talks with Dikikh that her quantitative count of deaths was faulty:
“Do you have some sorrow too? So many deaths—and all of a sudden!” 
she sighed.
 But he was about to tell her his story when something quite inexplica-
ble occurred. The young girl suddenly changed her ideas about this quan-
tity, and clearly forgetting the evidence provided by the lamp she had seen 
that morning, she said anxiously, “Wait. One time you were at the tobac-
conist’s—Negaraat was leaving—I saw you with someone. Was it he?”—She 
was afraid to say “Tsvetkov.” (CSP 177)
—И у вас тоже горе? Сколько смертей—и все вдруг,—вздохнула она.
 Но только собрался он рассказывать, что имел, как произошло 
что-то необ’яснимое. Девочка внезапно стала других мыслей об их 
количестве, и видно забыв, какою опорой располагала в виденной 
в то утро лампе, сказала взволнованно: “Погодите. Раз как-то вы 
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были у табачника, уезжал Негарат; я вас видала еще с кем-то. Этот?” 
Она боялась сказать: “Цветков?” (PSS 3:85)
The room where Zhenya meets Dikikh offers an equally porous firmament. 
The floor has become a receptacle for multiple worlds, so much so that Dikikh 
has to step very gingerly across the dark room, and Zhenya warns him of the 
corner chest that might as well be a mountain because of the linguistic double-
entendre (горка-гора):
Dikikh [  .  .  . ] stood up and looked like a stork. He stretched his neck 
and raised one foot, ready to fly to her aid. He rushed to look for the girl, 
deciding there was nobody at home and that she had fainted. And all the 
time he bumped in the dark in the puzzles made of wool, wood, and metal, 
Zhenya was sitting in the corner weeping. But he continued to rummage 
and grope, and in thought he was already raising her from the carpet in a 
dead faint. He shuddered when a voice sounded loudly at his elbow, amid 
whimpers: “I am here. Be careful, there is the cabinet [mountain] there. 
Wait for me in a classroom. I’ll come in a moment.” (CSP 177)
Диких [  .  .  .  ] встал, похожий на аиста. Вытянул шею и припод-
нял ногу, готовый броситься на помощь. Он кинулся отыскивать 
девочку, решив, что никого нет дома, а она лишилась чувств. А тем 
временем, как он тыкался впотьмах на загадки из дерева, шерсти 
и металла, Женя сидела в уголочке и плакала. Он же продолжал 
шарить и ощупывать, в мыслях уже подымая ее замертво с ковра. 
Он вздрогнул, когда за его локтями раздалось громко, сквозь всхли-
пывание: “Я тут. Осторожней, там горка. Подождите меня в клас-
сной. Я сейчас приду.” (PSS 3:84)
These temporal and spatial layers, gathered in a single unit and a single per-
son, are reflected in the theme of the commandments addressed to the living 
self and yet concerned with the “featureless generalized man.” This theme 
appears on the last page of the story, and is completed by the indefinable 
hand of the author shaking the row of classics, as Dikikh and Zhenya prepare 
for a new lesson and she abruptly refuses to read the book pointed out by her 
tutor.
When she saw which book Dikikh was taking from the shelf, she frowned 
and said, “No, I can’t answer on that today. Put it back in its place. Excuse 
me, please . . . .”
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 And without another word Lermontov was returned by the same hand 
and pushed back into the little slanting row of classics. (CSP 178)
Когда она увидела, какую книгу берет Диких с полки, она нахмури-
лась и заявила: “Нет. Этого я сегодня отвечать не стану. Положите 
на место. Виновата: пожалуйста.”
 И без дальних слов, Лермонтов был тою же рукой втиснут назад 
в покосившийся рядок классиков. (PSS 3:85)
The fact that the row of classics is shaken at the story’s conclusion intimates 
Pasternak’s indirect celebration of his own artistic achievement, emphasizing 
the final movement of a hand that has completed the story—a hand whose 
textual identity is unknown since its syntactical antecedent cannot be located 
within the narrative. As a result, the image points indirectly to the hand of the 
story’s author while it also recapitulates all the “hands” that signal transitions 
in Zhenya’s growth (see 7.8).
 Zhenya Luvers’s story ends surrounded by darkness—Pasternak’s only 
direct reference to the immediate historical reality of 1917–18. This theme 
is stated in Safe Conduct with more emphasis, as Pasternak points to a world 
in need of color and remembers his tutoring of Inna Vysotskaya on the eve 
of unparallelled and fateful changes. Reconstructing this once peaceful set-
ting, he speaks of white space in need of color, of a blackboard with traces of 
instruction, and of time impregnated by its as yet invisible content, collect-
ing twelve years later so many themes that appeared first in The Childhood of 
Luvers:
It was the time of year when people dissolve paint in pots of boiling water, 
and gardens, left to their own devices, warm themselves idly in the sun-
shine, all cluttered with snow shovelled down from everywhere. [ . . . ]
 I do not know why all this impressed itself on me in the image of a 
school blackboard with the chalk not quite rubbed off. Oh, if we had been 
made to stop then, and the blackboard wiped to a gleaming wetness, and if 
instead of theorems about isometric pyramids, they had expounded to us 
in fine copperplate, with carefully thickened strokes of the pen, just what 
lay ahead of us both. Oh, how dumbfounded we should have been. (CSP 46)
Это было то время года, когда в горшочках с кипятком распускают 
краску, а на солнце, предоставленные себе самим, праздно греются 
сады, загроможденные сваленным отовсюду снегом. Они до краев 
налиты тихою, яркою водой. [ . . . ]
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 Не знаю, отчего все это запечатлелось у меня в образе классной 
доски, недочиста оттертой от мела. О, если бы остановили нас тогда 
и, отмыв доску от влажного блеска, вместо теорем о равновеликих 
пирамидах, каллиграфически, с нажимами изложили то, что нам 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































asternak did not like his early style and rarely spoke about the influence 
of philosophy upon his thought. For the last three years of his life, he 
was openly distressed when his publishers in the West, in order to capture the 
interest of the market after the success of Doctor Zhivago, proceeded to seek 
out, translate, and publish his early prose. These prose works generated very 
little critical debate even when they were read by Russia’s expert readers, and 
they could promise their author no change in this regard, especially after the 
critical exegeses of Zhivago that he so often found disappointing. Thus, he 
expected nothing good from unearthing works that he assessed not merely 
as immature, but as aesthetically and morally opposed to what he tried to 
do in his later art. This was altogether a harsh judgment. As far as this study 
is concerned, it also presents a formidable problem. In the process of analy-
sis, it has been established (not without an element of surprise) that many of 
Pasternak’s later ideas, metaphors, and symbols were already present in their 
essential and even intricately developed form in these earlier stories. How 
then can one explain Pasternak’s explicit negativity, and how does this affect 
the status of the underlying philosophical themes that pervade so many of 
Pasternak’s earlier images and symbols? In drawing conclusions and evaluat-
ing our findings and premises in a focused manner, we must re-evaluate not 
only the metaphor–metonymy opposition so central to the issue of Pasternak’s 
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symbolic language; we must also discuss, where appropriate, the unexpected 
longevity of these earlier images and paradigms within his later style known 
for its simplicity of expression. However, as we draw conclusions, it is equally 
important to determine, as far as possible, the deeper reasons for his rejection 
of these earlier stories.
8.1 Assessing Pasternak’s later view of his early prose
In his letter to the German musicologist Renata Schweitzer (December 1958),1 
Pasternak insists that the very intensity of the spirit of Zhivago was under-
mined by the republication of his earlier prose, which had participated, or so 
he claims, in the overall “destruction of form,” characteristic of the beginning 
of the twentieth century:
It is all tarred with the brush of the expressionist era, of the disintegration of 
form, of half-baked content, abandoned to the mercies of the manner that 
was adventitious, poorly understood, weak, and empty. The reason Zhivago 
rises above all this is because it is a spiritual act—a spiritual achievement. 
(Ivinskaya 1978a, 308; trans. altered)
Все это носит на себе клеймо . . . эпохи экспрессионизма, распада 
формы, невыдержанного содержания, отданногo на произвол слу-
чайности неполного понимания, слабого и пустого. Именно потому 
поднимается Ж. над всем этим, что в нем есть сгущение духа, что 
он является духовным подвигом. (quoted from Ivinskaya 1978b, 329)
He finds it ironic, he writes to Natalya Sologub in June 1959, that his efforts 
to address the madness of the century and his earlier acquiescent role of fol-
lower have resulted in new interest in the very works he wants most to forget. 
Participation in the “destruction of forms” is mentioned again:
In the years of turmoil which we all went through together, I managed, 
through the lack of seriousness, to commit very many errors and sins. How 
 1. Pasternak’s letters to Renate Schweitzer were published by her in German in 1963. The 
Russian original has not survived, and scholars question on occasion the authenticity of some 
of the letters published by Schweitzer (see PSSCom 10:486). Ivinskaya, however, kept copies of 
some of Pasternak’s letters, so several letters to Schweitzer (both originals and English transla-
tions) are cited from Ivinskaya’s memoirs.
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terrible and inexpressibly sad that not only Russia, but the whole “civilized 
world” was afflicted by this disintegration of forms and concepts during 
several decades. [ . . . ]
 The success of the novel, with its evidence of my wish to contribute to 
the belated work of bringing our age to its senses, has meant that every-
where people are rushing to translate and publish all the stuff put out by 
me in those years when we lapsed into folly and barbarism [ . . . ] (quoted 
from Ivinskaya 1978a, 308)
В годы основных общих нам всем потрясений я успел, по несерьез-
ности, очень много напутать и нагрешить. Как страшно и непо-
правимо грустно, что не одну Россию, а весь “Просвещенный мир” 
постиг этот распад форм и понятий в течение нескольких десяти-
летей. [ . . . ]
 Успех романа и знаки моей готовности принять участие в позд-
нем образумлении века повели к тому, что везде бросились перево-
дить и издавать все, что я успел пролепетать и нацарапать именно в 
эти годы дурацкого одичания. (PSS 10:509)
However, while writing to George Reavey (December 10, 1959), he not only 
admits his own “inexpressibly painful” reaction to the publication of his ear-
lier prose, but he explicitly isolates the causes of his weariness: the immaturity 
of the prose and its schematic, deadening execution:
My inexpressible pain and grief are caused by the fact that again and again 
I am reminded about those rare grains of life and truth that are intermixed 
with great quantities of deadening schematic nonsense and unreal and raw 
material. I am surprised at the reason that makes you and Kayden attempt 
to save works clearly destined to perish.
Moe невыразимое горе и боль в том, что мне вновь и вновь напоми-
нают, что эти редкие зерна жизни и правды перемешаны с огромным 
количеством мертвой, схематичной бессмыслицы и несуществу-
ющего сырья. Я удивляюсь, зачем Вы и Кайден пытаетесь спасти 
вещи, заведомо обреченные на гибель. (PSS 10:550)
For the purposes of analysis, epithets like “schematic nonsense” and “unreal 
and raw material” present the clearest point of departure: for even a cur-
sory comparison between what he expected from art as a young man and 
his expressed aims during the composition of Zhivago indicate a major con-
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trast. In “The Black Goblet” (1914), Pasternak argues that an artistic text is a 
tightly packaged parcel, made up of symbols placed in intense proximity to 
each other and exhibiting a controlled multi-layered space—a craft for which 
he thanked the Impressionists. The artistic narrative becomes in this rendition 
a “coffre volant,” filled with carefully selected goods, ready to travel through 
the centuries:
You [impressionists] have brought up the whole generation of skillful pack-
aging experts. You began by inviting from abroad the most experienced 
teachers—symbolists—to wrap up with symbols the whole oversaturated 
globe in the blue valleys. And you opened your own school.
 You, impressionists, have taught us how to roll the paintings, roll the 
evenings, to lower into the cotton of twilight the fragile objects of fancy.
Вы воспитали поколение упаковщиков. Вы стали выписывать из-за 
границы опытных учителей: des symbolistes pour emballer la globe com-
blée dans les vallées bleues des symboles. И открыли собственную школу.
 Вы, импрессионисты, научили нас сверстывать версты, свер-
стывать вечера, в хлопок сумерек погружать хрупкие продукты 
причуд. (PSS 5:12)
Already in Safe Conduct he denigrates this earlier form of expression as a 
handicap that “forces a person into performing acrobatics” [как иное увечье 
обрекает на акробатику] (CSP 31; PSS 3:159). And in Sketch for an Auto-
biography he expresses dislike for his style prior to 1940 and proceeded to 
inform his readers that, as a young artist, he had been far too attached to 
the fashionable mannerisms of artistic expression. The “break up of forms” 
appears again:
The general disintegration of forms in those days, the impoverishment of 
thought, the uneven and impure style are foreign to me. (Remember 81)
Everything spoken in a normal way rebounded from me. I forgot that words 
by themselves can mean and contain something apart from the cheap toys 
with which they are strung. [ . . . ] It was not the essential I looked for in 
everything, but some additional spice. (Remember 105)
Мне чужд общий тогдашний распад форм, оскудение мысли, засо-
ренный и неровный слог. (PSS 3:327)
Все нормально сказанное отскакивало от меня. Я забывал, что слова 
сами по себе могут что-то заключать и значить, помимо побряку-
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шек, которыми их увешивали. [ . . . ] Я во всем искал не сущности, а 
посторонней остроты. (PSS 3:338)
The Pasternak of Doctor Zhivago, of course, would never speak of the narra-
tive text as a carefully packaged parcel; nor would he seek additional “spice.” 
As he tells Gladkov in June of 1948, he is dreaming about a covert, thoroughly 
“camouflaged” originality; he conceives of a prose where images contain clear 
thought with no need for further translation, schematization, or explanation:
No—I am not by any means saying I am for giving up originality of expres-
sion, but I aim at a kind of originality unobtrusive, concealed in a simple 
and familiar form, restrained and unassuming—so that the subject matter 
is absorbed by the reader without noticing. I dream of a form by virtue of 
which the reader becomes, so to speak, one’s co-author—an inconspicuous 
style in which nothing intervenes between the idea of a thing and its depic-
tion. (Gladkov 1977, 133)
A similar goal is pursued by his protagonist Yuri Zhivago:
It had been a dream of his life to write with originality so discreet, so well 
concealed, as to be unnoticeable in its disguise of current and customary 
forms; all his life he had struggled for a style so restrained, so unpreten-
tious that the reader of the hearer would fully understand the meaning 
without realizing how he assimilated it. He had striven constantly for unos-
tentatious style, and he was dismayed to find how far he still remained 
from this ideal. (Zhivago 440)
Всю жизнь мечтал он об оригинальности сглаженной и приглушен-
ной, внешне неузнаваемой и скрытой под покровом общеупотре-
бительной и привычной формы, всю жизнь стремился к выработке 
того сдержанного, непритязательного слога, при котором читатель 
и слушатель овладевают содержанием, сами не замечая, каким спо-
собом они его усваивают. Всю жизнь он заботился о незаметном 
стиле, не привлекающем ничьего внимания, и приходил в ужас от 
того, как он еще далек от этого идеала. (PSS 4:438)
These passages are as famous as they are elusive (for all their insistence on 
simplicity). The apparent unpretentiousness of his hoped-for narratives 
expects from writing an organic transformation and natural growth, free life, 
and air—hence Pasternak appears to reject his early prose for being too much 
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governed by abstract and schematic intellectual constructions. Yuri Zhivago, 
for example, attributes to the works of Pasternak’s favorite writer, Chekhov, a 
natural ability to ripen with time as if they were apples, getting ready for har-
vest and acquiring ever more sweetness and sense [подобно снятым с дерева 
дозревающим яблокам сама доходит в преемственности, наливаясь все 
большею сладостью и смыслом] (PSS 4:284). The natural metaphor thus 
employed is not accidental; the emphasis on living narrative is everywhere, 
including the very name of his protagonist, Zhivago. “I would landscape my 
poems as a garden, with all the tremor of my veins” [Я б разбивал стихи как 
сад /Всей дрожью жилок], says Pasternak in 1956 (PSS 2:149). His own ear-
lier works, he truthfully thought, did not possess this quality—they were, just 
as he had announced in “The Black Goblet,” highly complex, intensely layered 
and carefully controlled texts.
 And yet it is also true that the leopard never really changes its spots. If 
in Zhivago Pasternak is trying to camouflage originality by writing a love 
story full of events and collisions, Pasternak’s earlier prose camouflages its 
tightly packaged thought, the precision of its construction, and its philosophi-
cal intensity by a certain eccentricity of expression. The intensity of his ear-
lier writing is startling, but it puzzles rather than illuminates, tending on the 
whole, as Pasternak admitted to V. P. Polonsky in 1921 (PSS 7:370–72), to keep 
“the technical effects outside the reader’s field of vision and serve them up to 
him in a ready form, hypnotically” (quoted from Barnes 1989, 270). Paster-
nak’s later writing exhibits, by contrast, a simplicity of narrative style and an 
engrossing speed, but again it leaves the reader perplexed about the apparent 
obliqueness of its symbolic vision and its “concealed originality”; over time 
critics have found it easier to assess these experimentations as evidence of 
political and historical, rather than artistic value. Thus, both periods (earlier 
and later) employ a covert strategy with different aims, but, perhaps, with 
similar results—the symbolic language of his narratives throughout his life 
brought their author much disappointment, as far as their critical reception 
was concerned. Whether in 1918 or in the 1950s, Pasternak misjudged his 
readers and critics: all too frequently in both periods he met with the incom-
prehension of his contemporaries.
 Moreover, philosophy played a definitive role in both periods, even 
though Pasternak was very reluctant to elucidate or clarify this. The late 1950s 
were no different. Only when thoroughly downhearted about the reception 
of Zhivago did Pasternak start to admit to his Western correspondents that 
the key to his symbolism was “a philosophical rendition of reality.” In a letter 
to Jacqueline de Proyart of May 20, 1959, frequently cited by critics, Paster-
nak states unequivocally that the essence of Zhivago’s symbolism consists in 
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presenting “reality as a philosophical category” [реальность как явление 
или как философскую категорию] (PSS 10:489). In clarifying his aims, he 
stresses that his prose argues for the existence of “a particular kind of reality,” 
unified as a single movement, an inner impulse. Such reality, he insists, has 
been known to philosophers of different ages under different names and dif-
ferent approaches:
One should not think that it is something totally new, that earlier no one 
had such a goal. On the contrary, “larger art” always attempted to com-
municate the unified picture of life, life in its wholeness, but it was done 
and commented upon always in a different way, in accordance with the 
philosophy of the époque and because of this by different methods. [ . . . ]
Не нaдо думать, что это что-то совсем новое, что раньше не зада-
вались подобными целями. Наоборот, великое искусство всегда 
стремилось зарисовать общее восприятие жизни в целом, но это 
делалось (толковалось ее неделимое единство) каждый раз по-раз-
ному, в согласии с философией своего времени. [ . . . ] (PSS 10:489–90)
The conclusion to the present study must offer, then, some clarification of 
this statement, for if Pasternak’s symbolism reflects reality as a category of 
philosophy, it must also echo—even as a point of contrast—the philosophical 
concerns of his younger self. For the earlier period we have the testimony of 
his student philosophical notes; no such archival data can be marshaled for his 
later work, and the dialectical materialism practiced en masse in his country 
was certainly not a philosophical school to which such a reality could testify. 
Thus, one has to start at the beginning and assess whether or not his earlier 
philosophical interests may have still served as a guide, however partial, to 
Pasternak’s later corpus in a manner reminiscent of their effect on his earlier 
work.
8.2 Metaphor and metonymy: 
  Pasternak’s philosophical studies and their role in his 
early prose
In “The Wassermann Test,” Pasternak distinguishes, as we remember, between 
association by similarity and association by contiguity, an opposition devel-
oped under the influence of David Hume and proposed as part of his literary 
credo in his negative review of Vadim Shershenevich. According to Pasternak’s 
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argument, metaphors can be developed both by contiguity and similarity, and 
he finds “association by contiguity” an essential principle in the development 
of metaphoric language. His criticism of Shershenevich is simple: Shershen-
evich’s metaphors rely only on “the fact of similarity,” not even “association 
by similarity,” and for this reason these metaphors possess no integral char-
acter; the necessary inner poetic work required for synthesis and integration 
is lacking:
A lyrical agent, call him by any name or term, is, first of all, a principle of 
integration. The elements which are submitted to such integration or, bet-
ter still, receive their life from it, are less significant than the process itself. 
[ . . . ]
 The fact of similarity, rarer the association through similarity and never 
through contiguity—this is the genesis of Shershenevich’s metaphors.
Лирический деятель, называйте его как хотите,—начало интегриру-
ющее прежде всего. Элементы, которые подвергаются такой интег-
рации или, лучше, от нее только получают свою жизнь, глубоко в 
сравнению с нею несущественны. [ . . . ]
 Факт сходства, реже ассоциативная связь по сходству и никогда 
не по смежности—вот происхождение метафор Шершеневича. (PSS 
5:9; 10)
In Roman Jakobson’s rendition, the similarity–contiguity opposition becomes 
the famous contrast between metaphor and metonymy: metaphor is an asso-
ciation by similarity between images that belong to different realities; meton-
ymy is an association by contiguity between elements in adjacent series. This 
terminology has since become the language of linguistics and poetics, its 
straightforward simplicity catapulting an unknowing David Hume into the 
enigmatic world of literary symbolism in general, and Pasternak’s symbolism 
in particular.
 In contrast to Jakobson’s view of Pasternak as a virtuoso of metonymy, this 
study has argued for the metaphoric depth and complexity of his early prose, 
while demonstrating that these qualities emerge most powerfully when his 
artistic narratives are placed alongside his philosophical interests. This study 
has shown that metaphoric relationships—association by similarity—emerge 
when Pasternak’s texts are examined not within their generic classifications, 
but rather when they are assessed across genres and disciplines, and under-
stood as infused by a philosophical understanding of selfhood. Pasternak’s 
image of the book fern in Safe Conduct (see Chapter 1) offers in this regard 
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a significant direction for inquiry, all the more so because the writer himself 
uses this image ostensibly to explain the reasons for his farewell to a profes-
sional career in philosophy, and draws instead a picture of intense philosophi-
cal involvement, albeit with specific emphasis—in bridging the transitions 
between philosophical themes and literary exempla:
[W]hen [ . . . ] I turned to books, I was drawn to them not from interest 
and knowledge but by the wish to find literary references in support for my 
idea. And despite the fact that my work was being accomplished by means 
of logic, imagination, paper and ink, I loved it most for the way in which 
in the course of the writing it became overgrown with a thicker and thicker 
ornamentation of comparisons and quotations from books. (CSP 51)
[K]огда я [ . . . ] обращался к книгам, я тянулся к ним не из беско-
рыстного интереса к знанью, а за литературными ссылками в его 
пользу. Несмотря на то, что работа моя осуществлялась с помощью 
логики, воображенья, бумаги и чернил, больше всего я любил ее 
за то, что по мере писанья она обрастала все сгущавшимся убором 
книжных цитат и сопоставлений. (PSS 3:183)
Resonating similarities and internal echoes between philosophical themes and 
literary images became, in turn, a major characteristic of the metaphoric pat-
terns of his early prose. Jakobson’s view that the early metaphoric Pasternak is 
too preoccupied with emotions to try out an epic genre (1969, 139) is based 
upon an implicit indifference to Pasternak’s engagement with philosophy. 
For this reason his approach to Pasternak’s craft—together with his assess-
ment of its stylistic technique primarily as a mastery of metonymy—cuts out 
the whole scope of the paradigms that consolidate the reality of Pasternak’s 
metaphors, namely, his highly significant evocations of major philosophical 
themes and his frequent disagreement with them. For this reason the juxta-
position of Pasternak’s student diaries and his early fictional narratives proves 
to be both puzzling and illuminating, and it demonstrates that philosophical 
themes are never superimposed as foreign objects upon a literary narrative; 
neither are they concealed in Pasternak’s prose. They are an intrinsic part of 
his early symbolic language, and the resulting tension signals a need for fur-
ther exploration and comparison. If we rephrase Pasternak’s words in “The 
Wassermann Test,” philosophical paradigms offer “a key to the ornamental 
lock” [метафору хочется сравнить с тем узорчатым замком] (PSS 5:10) 
that clarifies the principles of his metaphoric vision.
 This approach proves singularly fruitful for the analysis of his earliest pub-
lished story, “The Mark of Apelles,” written in 1914 (Chapter 3). The interplay 
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between Plato and Kant in Pasternak’s diaries and the habitual comparison 
of the two philosophers in the works of Hermann Cohen offer a new heu-
ristic pathway into the story: in this context the story’s protagonist Heinrich 
Heine assumes, and does so gracefully, the otherwise unlikely role of an atem-
poral, lyrical force. “The Black Goblet,” also written in 1914 and saturated 
with philosophical resonance, confirms such a reading; in the essay’s context, 
Heine acquires a further identity to augment his personality—in its light he 
becomes the “apriorist of lyricism,” who has stepped out of the “coffre volant” 
(see PSS 5:14–16) of cultural wealth into the autumn night of Pisa. The “asso-
ciation by similarity” also suggests in this context an implicit reference to 
Plato’s power of ideas and the Platonic topos of the sun as the physical image 
of the highest good. Since Heine appears exclusively in darkness, his own 
awareness of the danger of such “crossings” invokes Plato’s allegory of the cave 
with its emphasis on the perils associated with the deceptiveness of its shad-
ows and its pervasive parade of reflections, all promising death to the lonely 
visionary returning into the darkness. This philosophical allusion is further 
strengthened by Pasternak’s sketches of 1910, where his hero Pourvit Reliqui-
mini dies in darkness, in a street car near a child “poisoned by electric lights” 
(PSS 3:487). As he dies, Pourvit wonders at the reflections of his childhood 
that appear in his memory as if they were “negatives of a film, archiving all 
the white past as a black line” [жизнь [ . . . ] как негатив, запечатлела белое 
прошлое черной чертой] (PSS 3:488)—in other words, as copies reflected in 
quasi-cinematographic fashion on the cave-wall, echoing implicitly the prin-
ciples of Platonic mimesis.
 The juxtaposition of fictional and philosophical texts suggests, as shown in 
Chapter 3, the presence of a design that is both stunning and original, one that 
closely fits Pasternak’s interests prior to World War I. What is particularly sig-
nificant is that the discovery of this philosophical substratum in “The Mark of 
Apelles” is intrinsic to the story’s success—it is, in fact, a key to its metaphoric 
design. Without the involvement of philosophical parallels the story remains 
eccentric and puzzling, with its abrupt finale reinforcing the overall challenge 
of the narrative. In other words, the story calls for genuine inquiry: the emerg-
ing philosophical subtext, signaled by the narrative’s intentional obscurities, 
is Pasternak’s principal technique of establishing metaphoric relationships. 
Pasternak tries to say as much, albeit in his usual enigmatic manner, in “The 
Wassermann Test” when he insists that the need for metaphor must be created 
from within the text—from within the dramatic intensity of its contiguous 
series:
[T]he presence of metaphor justifies the inner tensions of the contiguous 
series in the text. An independent need for association through similar-
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ity is simply unthinkable. However, such and only such association can be 
necessitated from within.
[T]олько явлениям смежности и присуща та черта принудительно-
сти и душевного драматизма, которая может быть оправдана мета-
форически. Самостоятельная потребность в сближении по сходству 
просто немыслима. Зато такое и только такое сближение может 
быть затребовано извне. (PSS 5:11)
The need for a metaphorical solution (necessarily accompanied by philosoph-
ical parallels) emerges, therefore, from the tension created by the narrative ele-
ments of “Apelles.” The philosophical level, or the world of ideas that deepen 
and enrich the story, enters into the narrative to ease the quandary created 
by its puzzling surface, and the need to find this other relationship—to find 
the “association by similarity” that explains the puzzle—is necessitated by the 
story’s disquieting dynamism.
 These philosophical strands constituting the story’s metaphoric level are, 
one should add, by no means banal: Pasternak creates a vibrant symbolic 
interconnection with one of the major texts of world culture, proposing an 
innovative rendering of Plato’s cave allegory, as well as offering to philoso-
phy his own apologia for choosing poetry as his future path. The metaphoric 
image also speaks in this context with the formidable power of a chilling fore-
sight, as the poet, rather than the philosopher, is threatened by the darkness in 
Pasternak’s tale. Many years later, with great sadness and without any hidden 
allusions, Pasternak will describe exactly this role, mourning his own destiny 
and the destinies of so many of his contemporary artists:
It is unfortunate that in the days of the Great Soviet,
Where spaces are given to higher powers,
The vacancy of the poet is not cancelled out.
That position is dangerous when taken up.
Напрасно в дни великого совета,
Где высшей власти отданы места,
Оставлена вакансия поэта.
Она опасна, если не пуста. (PSS 2:212)
 This pattern of indicating metaphoric design—or association by similar-
ity—represented by a philosophical theme is by no means unique to the works 
written in 1914. A similar reliance on metaphoric relationships grounded in 
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philosophical questions underlies the extraordinary rich context of “Letters 
from Tula,” which develops, in fact, the patterns already suggested by “The 
Mark of Apelles.” The earlier story’s emphasis upon its protagonists’ “vitality 
of vision” in discerning reality and apprehending shadows already indicates 
an interest in different angles of perception; awareness of this theme and its 
resonance in “Letters from Tula” prove productive from the first paragraphs 
of the story (see Chapter 4), which centrally employ Plato’s parable of the 
poor eyesight of the philosopher who returns to the cave. However, the confu-
sion of the story’s poet between the immediate and the distant, deepened by 
the opposition between the moral and artistic questions raised by the narra-
tive, points not merely to Plato, but also to Pasternak’s dialogue with Kantian 
“apperception,” the a posteriori and a priori experiences of time and space, 
synthesized in “transcendental consciousness” (whose reality the story both 
investigates and problematizes). Pasternak’s student notes offer striking sup-
port for such a reading; there is no need to search far and wide for Pasternak’s 
interest in the synthetic unity of consciousness, a transcendental ego unifying 
all subjective experience, the a priori and a posteriori of all impressions, or 
the notion of open-ended and ongoing synthetic flow—these topics are sim-
ply everywhere in his Lehrjahre, Kantian apperception remaining the diary’s 
major theme.
 His later writings confirm his essential adaptation of the Kantian and 
Neo-Kantian view that personality emerges through the work of integration, a 
synthetic unity, however problematic, of all subjective experiences, realigned 
each time a new element enters the series. As late as 1956, in Sketch for an 
Autobiography, Pasternak gives one of his most powerful renditions of this 
philosophical view of selfhood when he depicts the obverse condition—the 
cessation of the synthetic work of consciousness, which necessarily results, in 
his view, in self-annihilation. The examples he gives are painful testimony to 
a century that constitutes the historical foil to his maturing art; the Kantian 
notion of the synthetic unity of subjective experience is tested for its appli-
cability against the state of consciousness during torture and preparation for 
suicide:
We have no idea of the mental agony that precedes suicide. [ . . . ] Subjected 
to torture by a hangman, a man is not yet utterly destroyed; [ . . . ] his past 
belongs to him, his memories are with him, and, if he so desires, he can 
make use of them and they may be of some use to him before he dies.
 Having arrived at the thought of suicide, one abandons all hope, one 
turns away from one’s past, one declares oneself a bankrupt and his memo-
ries non-existent. These memories are no longer capable of reaching the 
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would-be suicide to save him, to sustain him. The continuity of one’s inner 
experience is destroyed, the personality has ceased to exist. In the end, 
perhaps, one kills oneself not out of loyalty to the decision one has made, 
but because one can no longer endure the agony that does not seem to 
belong to anyone in particular, suffering in the absence of a sufferer, the 
empty suspense which is not filled up by a life that still goes on. (Remem-
ber 89)
Мы не имеем понятие о сердечном терзании, предшествующем 
самоубийству. [ . . . ] [Ч]еловек, подвергнутый палаческой распра-
вой, еще не уничтожен [  .  .  . ] его прошлое принадлежит ему, его 
воспоминания при нем, и если он захочет, может воспользоваться 
ими, перед смертью они могут помочь ему.
 Приходя к мысли о самоубийстве, ставят крест на себе, отво-
рачиваются от прошлого, объявляют себя банкротом, а свои вос-
поминания недействительными. Эти воспоминания уже не могут 
дотянуться до человека, спасти и поддержать его. Непрерывность 
внутреннего существования нарушена, личность кончилась. Может 
быть, в заключение убивают себя не из верности принятому реше-
нию, а из нестерпимости этой тоски, неведомо кому принадлежа-
щей, этого страдания в отсутствие страдающего, этого пустого, не 
заполненного продолжающейся жизнью ожидания. (PSS 3:331)
Thus, as he describes the days leading to the eventual suicides of Vladimir 
Mayakovsky, Marina Tsvetaeva, Paolo Yashvili, and Alexander Fadeeev, Pas-
ternak views their torment as deeper and more unbearable even than that of 
a tortured person because the ongoing work of synthesis has stopped. They 
reject part of their experience, and, thus, arrest the work of consciousness, 
destroying in the process any possibility of an integral self, leaving in its place 
an empty gap.
 The synthetic unity of experience, an inalienable part of Pasternak’s 
approach to the human self, finds in “Letters from Tula” its first artistic ren-
dering that will in time shape some of his most distinctive and intricate artis-
tic traits. If in Kant the synthetic unity of experience is gathered within the 
inner self—within a transcendental autonomous “spiritual substance under-
lying the fleeting succession of conscious experience [inaccessible] to direct 
introspection, but rather inferred from introspective evidence” (Runes 88)—
Pasternak, by contrast, never accepts the autonomous isolation of this integral 
process. His insistence on the “animation” spreading from a thinking self to 
the surrounding material world (and vice versa) is already present in the prose 
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pieces of 1910, including “Ordering a Drama,” with its emphasis upon “this 
sweet pain: to work; to think for inanimate objects” [сладостное страдание: 
работать, думать за неодушевленное] (PSS 3:462). Similarly, neither in his 
Lehrjahre nor in “Letters from Tula” does Pasternak regard the transcendental 
ego as an autonomous and self-dependent receptacle. I argued in Chapters 4 
and 5 that Pasternak was indebted to Hermann Cohen for the latter’s empha-
sis on the role of the “other” in the development of the self: Cohen, in fact, 
held the striking view that moral growth began when the external freedom 
of the individual was “broken down in relation to an other person” (Gibbs 
2005, 206). However, Pasternak’s own development of this vulnerable pro-
cess is highly original. The experimentation with perception in “Letters from 
Tula” does not at any level point to the possibility of the unified isolated con-
sciousness of either the story’s young poet or its elderly artist. What emerges 
instead is an insistence that artistic consciousness is renewed and integrated 
not within itself, but in its impulse towards, from, and in others. For the poet 
and the actor of the story, this means an ongoing quest for creative endeavor, a 
quest concerned not so much with self-expression and self-unification, as with 
“making the other speak through one’s lips” (CSP 126; PSS 3:32). One may 
plausibly suggest that for Pasternak it also meant that the work of art—the 
expression of selfhood—equally cannot be integrated within itself as an inde-
pendent autonomous construction. From its first moments of inception, art is 
the gift from the other. In its development it progresses into its reception, into 
its being grasped by the reader, which means that the author under no condi-
tions holds the key to the final meaning of the text.
 In Safe Conduct, Pasternak plays most openly with this conception, even 
somewhat teasing his readers by suggesting that the poet’s biography can be 
found only in the biography of others. His own memoirs, he claims in 1930, 
are not merely dedicated to Rilke. Since Rilke’s power over Pasternak is all per-
vasive, Rilke, more than Pasternak, is the memoir’s genuine, motive cause:
The poet deliberately gives the whole of his life such a steep incline that it can-
not exist in the vertical line of biography, where we expect to meet it. It cannot 
be found under its own name and has to be sought under those of others, in 
the biographical columns of those who follow him. The more the produc-
tive individuality is closed upon itself, the more collective—and this is no 
allegory—is his story. The realm of the subconscious is a genius that does 
not submit to measurement. It consists of everything that happens to his 
readers and that he does not know. I am not presenting my reminiscences 
in memory of Rilke. On the contrary, I myself received it from him as a gift. 
(CSP 30; emphasis added)
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Всей своей жизни поэт придает такой добровольно крутой наклон, 
что ее не может быть в биографической вертикали, где мы ждем 
ее встретить. Ее нельзя найти под его именем и надо искать под 
чужим, в биографическом столбце его последователей. Чем замкну-
тее производящая индивидуальность, тем коллективнее, без вся-
кого иносказания, ее повесть. Область подсознательного у гения не 
поддается обмеру. Ее составляет все, что творится с его читателями 
и чего он не знает. Я не дарю своих воспоминаний памяти Рильке. 
Наоборот, я сам получил их от него в подарок. (PSS 3:158)
Just as Pasternak insists that the poet’s biography “cannot be found under his 
own name,” he also suggests—and this theme is to play an ever-expanding role 
in his art—that the poet’s power is always in process of transference, if not 
simply to the reader, then to the poet’s “image,” while so-called “autonomous” 
expression is necessarily shut off: “In art man falls silent and the image begins 
to speak. And it turns out that only the image can keep pace with the progress 
of nature” [В искусстве человек смолкает и заговаривает образ. И оказы-
вается: только образ поспевает за успехами природы] (CSP 47; PSS 3:178). 
The image, then, has an infinite capacity for self-renewal and expansion, not 
because the poet has some autonomous transcendental self, but because the 
image, having received the integrating power of the poet’s sight, continues 
to live, synthesizing into itself an ever-growing series of approaches and per-
ceptions. As we have also seen, this thought, namely, the transference of the 
synthesizing power of vitality to the “other,” underlies the development of Pas-
ternak’s symbolic expression, in both its metaphoric and contiguous series, 
although the need for these categories is altogether minimized in his later work.
 There is, nonetheless, no more important theme in Pasternak’s oeuvre 
than that of ongoing, open-ended and living, synthetic understanding. This 
philosophical theme takes a slight adjustment of vision before one recognizes 
a similar principle operating in Safe Conduct, when Pasternak describes his 
trip to Italy immediately following his Marburg experience. Even then, how-
ever, Pasternak’s mixture of evasiveness and transparency mutes the fact that 
his accounts of Italian museums (he leaves Marburg for Italy in August 1912 
[Barnes 1989, 143]) present an opportunity to demonstrate—as if in passing—
a period of “crossing” from philosophical aesthetics (and his apprenticeship 
in Neo-Kantianism) to art, for as he points out in Safe Conduct, “This is what 
interested me at the time, this is what I then understood and loved” [Вот 
чем я тогда интересовался, вот что тогда понимал и любил] (CSP 72; 
PSS 3:207). Thus, he describes his trips to Italian museums as crystallizing 
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his understanding that the “other,” apart from the “image” or the reader, may 
also be the work’s subject matter in the moment of its being perceived. In the 
activity of being observed, the object of the artist’s perception in a poem or a 
painting begins to unfold, continuing its new integral or “synthetic” life that 
expands by accepting the glance of the “other.” Artistic perception unveils, 
then, not so much the autonomous life of the observer, as the awakened life of 
the observed:
I saw what is the first observation to strike the painter’s instinct. How one 
suddenly understands what it is like for the visible object, when it begins to 
be seen. Once noticed, nature moves aside with the obedient spaciousness 
of a story, and in this condition, like one asleep, is quietly transferred into 
the canvas. (CSP 70)
Я увидел, какое наблюдение первым поражает живописный 
инстинкт. Как вдруг постигается, каково становится видимому, 
когда его начинают видеть. Будучи запримечена, природа рассту-
пается послушным простором повести, и в этом состоянии ее, как 
сонную, тихо вносят на полотно. (PSS 3:205)
The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, transferred to an ever self-
renewing synthetic artifact, animating what initially appeared only as a mate-
rial object.
 And in what seems to be a triumphant tour de force in Safe Conduct, Pas-
ternak applies the image of the synthetic unity of consciousness in apper-
ception to cultural artifacts and to culture in general, which he visualizes as 
living and animated—as an open-ended synthetic chain of never-ending data, 
renewing itself with every genuine new insight and work of art, synchronizing 
what is distant, “everlasting” [вековечное], and immediate:
I understood that the Bible, for instance, is not so much a book with a 
definitive text as the notebook of humankind, and that everything everlast-
ing is like this. That it is vital not when it is enforced but when it is receptive 
to all the analogies by means of which the subsequent ages, issuing from it, 
look back at it. I understood that the history of culture is a chain of equa-
tions in images which link in pairs the next unknown thing with some-
thing already known, whereby the known, constant for the whole series, is 
legend, set at the base of the tradition, and the unknown, new each time, is 
the actual moment in the flow of culture. (CSP 71)
312 | Chapter 8
Я понял, что, к примеру, Библия есть не столько книга с твердым 
текстом, сколько записная тетрадь человечества, и что таково все 
вековечное. Что оно жизненно не тогда, когда оно обязательно, а 
когда оно восприимчиво ко всем уподоблениям, которыми на него 
озираются исходящие века. Я понял, что история культуры есть 
цепь уравнений в образах, попарно связывающих очередное неиз-
вестное с известным, причем этим известным, постоянным для 
всего ряда, является легенда, заложенная в основание традиции, 
неизвестным же, каждый раз новым—актуальный момент текущей 
культуры. (PSS 3:207)
As one looks at these series of images one can begin to sympathize with Pas-
ternak’s disheartened attitude to his earlier style. “Letters from Tula,” a text 
implicitly containing all these observations, but in a somewhat oblique and 
“hermetic” form, emerges as one of the most carefully conceived and intel-
lectually stimulating texts of the Russian avant-garde, and yet it remains a 
concealed puzzle, resisting interpreters and interpretations (unless the story is 
read alongside Pasternak’s philosophical notes). This is equally true of many 
passages from Safe Conduct.
 These far-reaching themes of “Letters from Tula” tend to elude the reader, 
of course, and it is ironic that Pasternak should appear almost banal and self-
indulgent in a work where he passionately espouses the need for the other in 
the creative act. There is then, as we have shown, a considerable dislocation 
between the story’s taut, ingenious design and the depth of its philosophical 
involvement, on the one hand, and the surface appearance of an eventless 
enigmatic narrative, on the other. However, once the inner vitality of the phil-
osophical context is grasped, it becomes indisputable that “Letters from Tula” 
marks a major threshold in Pasternak’s development as an artist: the story 
rejects the autobiographical pose of the poet and announces the resolve of a 
prose writer who searches to expand his understanding. The narrative also 
invokes Lev Tolstoy’s example and, thus, points to Pasternak’s reorientation to 
an epic style and to the creation of other selves. It also contains some of Pas-
ternak’s most characteristic and deeply held themes, including the opposition 
between the self, who in his/her search for inner alignment reaches (or hopes 
to reach) unparalleled moral and artistic stature, and the altogether opposed 
figure—the imitator or circulator of the most fashionable symbols, capable 
(by virtue of an imitation that bypasses the work of any deeper integration 
within the self) of a violent crudeness and cruelty.
 The story also emphasizes the “dramatic” vitality of the world that sur-
rounds artistic vision even after the writer’s death: the dance of the “magnetic” 
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needles of Tula still remembers Lev Tolstoy, many years after his death. Thus, 
“Letters from Tula” does not so much employ contiguous series as grapple 
with the depiction of the vitality of a world caught by dynamic creative per-
ception and represented within a seemingly straightforward narrative pattern. 
The metonymic series alone do not explain this complex organization. Rather, 
the text presents a metaphoric structure that already contains the principal 
outlines of a new genre—the design of an open-ended tale-within-a-tale, 
where the first frame and its first protagonist operate as a generating prin-
ciple of the story’s second half (“Letters from Tula” echoes in this the struc-
ture of Rilke’s Malte Laurids Brigge, and predates Jorge Luis Borges’s circular 
“ficciones” by many a decade). This emphasis on the transference of poetic 
intensity to the other—the passing of living energy from the story’s poet to 
the old actor, a fictional protagonist, who comes to life alongside the poet by 
overhearing the poet’s words—this structure encapsulates best what is known 
as Pasternak’s famous ability to evoke animation in the world surrounding his 
protagonists.
 Equally important, however, is that the design in question goes far beyond 
the principal characteristic of the “metonymy” that Jakobson sees as the main 
organizing principle of Pasternak’s world: “Instead of a hero it is, as often as 
not, the surrounding objects that are thrown in turmoil; the immovable out-
lines of the roofs grow inquisitive, a door swings shut with a silent reproach, 
the joy of family reconciliation is expressed by a growing warmth, zeal and 
devotion on the part of lamps” (1969, 141). My argument throughout is that 
Jakobson’s assessment is both precise and yet too severely restricted as far 
as Pasternak’s early prose is concerned. Indeed, material objects, occasional 
plants and trees get animated, but they are not the only elements in the series 
chosen for the process of animation. Pasternak’s experimentation in anima-
tion, proceeding from a person involved in a vital creative work, includes tem-
poral sequences, nature, relationships with other individuals and works of 
art, and the creative impulse of living protagonists. In other words, Paster-
nak’s understanding of the animated world strives to be more comprehensive 
and expansive, and precisely this goal will both propel his later work in prose 
and eventually demand from him a search for an altogether new style. And 
while the design—its narrative mise-en-abyme, with one character generating 
another—will not become an essential part of his fiction, Pasternak’s focus on 
the energy of the creative glance turned toward the other or others will remain 
a major characteristic of his symbolic world.
 For Pasternak, then, the creative work of perception will never stay iso-
lated within the individual: it will always flow into the world since the energy 
it generates enhances the vitality of life. Furthermore, for the rest of his life, 
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Pasternak will be convinced that creative work for the artist is the only way he 
or she can continue to integrate the catastrophically disassembled realities of 
the twentieth century. One hears this insistence in Sketch for an Autobiogra-
phy: in his tribute to Marina Tsvetaeva, Pasternak notes that her suicide was all 
but assured when she stopped working; the surrounding chaos became then 
too horrific and finally overwhelming. There was no poet’s insight to keep 
chaos at bay, to synthesize the impossible, to dispel the immovable heaps of 
stagnation:
Marina Tsvetaeva all her life shielded herself by her work against the hum-
drum affairs of everyday existence. When it seemed to her that it was an 
inadmissible luxury and that for the sake of her son she must for a time 
sacrifice her all-absorbing passion, she cast a sober look around her and 
she saw the chaos that had not been filtered through her creative work, 
immovable, stagnant, monstrous, and recoiled in panic. Not knowing how 
to protect herself from that horror, she hurriedly hid herself in death, put-
ting her head into a noose as under a pillow. (Remember 90)
Марина Цветаева всю жизнь заслонялась от повседневности рабо-
той, и, когда ей показалось, что это непозволительная роскошь и 
ради сына она должна временно пожертвовать увлекательной стра-
стью и взглянуть кругом трезво, она увидела хаос, непропущенный 
сквозь творчество, неподвижный, непривычно косный, и в испуге 
отшатнулась и, не зная, куда деться от ужаса, впопыхах спряталась 
в смерть, сунув голову в петлю, как под подушку. (PSS 3:331)
The same conviction can be discerned in one of Pasternak’s letters to Renate 
Schweitzer written in 1958, where he observes that even Rainer Maria Rilke 
could not find the reality worthy of the power of his insight while the tragedy 
of Russia—with its overwhelming heaps of cold, deadening, and heart-rend-
ing material—waits to be noticed and transformed by its artists:
[I] have simply relit the candle of Malte Laurids which had been standing 
extinguished and unused, and gone out with this light of Rilke’s into the 
darkness of the streets, into the midst of the ruins. To think that when he 
wrote his novel (like Proust) he had nothing to apply his brilliant insight to, 
but now look at the mountain of the subject matter around us . . . the ter-
rifying pretext for art begging to be used. How grimly in earnest it is, this 
reality, how tragic and stern—but it is nevertheless the reality of our earth, 
a defined poetic entity. And so we want to weep from joy and awe. (quoted 
from Ivinskaya 1978a, 221)
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[ . . . ] как будто зажег я свечу Мальте, стоявшую холодной, неи-
спользованной, и вышел со светом Рильке в руке из дома в темноту, 
во двор, на улицу, в гущу развалин. Подумай только, в своем романе 
он (как и Пруст) не находил применения для своего гениального 
проникновения,—и теперь, посмотри,—горы причин .  .  . жуткие, 
умоляющие предлоги творчества. Как действительность не для 
шуток, как трагична и строга она, и все же это—земная действи-
тельность, поэтическая определенность. И вот мы хотим плакать от 
счастья и трепета. (quoted from Ivinskaya 1978b, 242)
Forty years have passed since the poet in “Letters from Tula” observed the 
putrefying smell of the earth pervading the whole territory of conscience (CSP 
123; PSS 3:30) and acknowledged that he was unable as yet to lift or dispel this 
raw decay. The power of Tolstoy’s presence, vital even after the great writer’s 
death, explained on that occasion the nuances and responsibilities of this raw 
call of the environment. The perception of the artist, then, was understood 
as testifying only partially to the laws of Kantian apperception. The artist for 
Pasternak does not merely sift through these disparate forms of chaos in order 
to synthesize them within his or her self; the artist pierces through immobile, 
inanimate existence, and his or her power of perception grants even static 
monstrosity the vitality of life and movement. Tolstoy’s figure in this regard 
(echoing the example of Rilke’s Malte Laurids Brigge) is a brilliant develop-
ment of Pasternak’s implicit argument with the Kantian insistence upon the 
autonomy of individual consciousness: in Pasternak’s rendition, the writer’s 
search for inner alignment results not in self-understanding and inner har-
mony, but in the creation of multiple narrative worlds inhabited by many pro-
tagonists and shared with an ever-growing multitude of readers.
 While this formidable philosophical subtext of the “Letters from Tula” 
lacks the active power of projection (it operates in the story as a theme, rather 
than as a medium of delivery with actual communicative force), it signals, 
nonetheless, the range of Pasternak’s ambition. Thus, the poet promises to his 
beloved that he intends to stand utterly alone and not turn into a decadent 
actor when The Time of Troubles (that is, his own historical time) appears on 
the screen. This promise indicates both a moral conviction and an artistic 
program, even though the power of this pledge is lost somewhat in the care-
fully constructed evasiveness of the story’s political overtones. In Sketch for an 
Autobiography, Pasternak points to a similar theme in Mayakovsky. He first 
quotes the latter’s poem:
Time, I beseech you; though you be
A lame icon painter, my image paint
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In the shrine of this century’s misshapen selves!
I am alone, as the last eye
Of the man going to the blind. (Remember 93; trans. altered)
Время! Хоть ты, хромой богомаз,
Лик намалюй мой в божницу уродца века.
Я одинок, как последний глаз
у идущего к слепым человека (PSS 3:333)
He then comments on its plea: “Time obliged and did what he asked. His 
image is written in the shrine of the century” [Время послушалось и сде-
лало, о чем он просил. Лик его вписан в божницу века] (Remember 93; 
PSS 3:333). This was also Pasternak’s ambition, and it was first articulated 
somewhat covertly in “Letters from Tula.” Sensing his eventual appearance 
on a screen (as a future protagonist of a historical account), Pasternak’s lyri-
cal poet (as well as his author), however, does not long merely for fame or for 
survival in cultural memory; he longs not to lose his moral orientation among 
“the smells of putrefaction and of clay” [несло гнилoстью и глиной] (CSP 
123; PSS 3:30).
 The Childhood of Luvers, written the same year as “Letters,” demonstrates 
ever more pointedly the strength of Pasternak’s artistic ambition and his deter-
mined experimentation with metaphoric design. It was not without reason 
that for a long time Pasternak considered this story his central work (see the 
Questionnaire of Profsoyuz of 1919 [PSSCom 3:542]): the overall philosophical 
conception of the story is realized with confident, even grand strokes. As the 
development of personality is presented as a widening and deepening series 
of perceptions reintegrated within a maturing self, the transition from con-
tiguous to metaphoric series is no longer left for the reader to discern: this 
transition is presented as moral and intellectual growth, so that the emergence 
of the overall metaphoric pattern confirms and expands Zhenya’s artistic sen-
sibility and her awakening gift of clairvoyance (or her acute apprehension of 
the future, brewing all around the disquieting Urals). In contrast to previous 
stories where “association by similarity” was directed toward a philosophi-
cal text and grounded in philosophical themes, Zhenya’s encounter with “the 
abstract moment” is represented by Lermontov’s Demon, read by the child on 
an autumn afternoon when the leaves are already shriveled by cold. This met-
aphoric design—an approaching future emerging both from a literary text, the 
first cold days of the fall season, and out of an unknown stranger appearing 
on a back street2—does not diminish the philosophical context of the story. 
 2. See Pasternak’s letter to D. E. Maksimov (October 25, 1957), explaining that the “dedi-
cation to Lermontov” of My Sister Life rather than to “the memory of Lermontov” was an indi-
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In portraying the development of the child, struck in her early adolescence by 
the energy of the departed poet, Pasternak creates a paradigmatic progression 
from the first moments of awakened consciousness to the invigoration of the 
life of soul, and then to the next stage—awareness of “spirit” and a spiritual 
world—literally the daimonic world whose boundary is first signaled by Ler-
montov’s Demon. And if the first two levels of this expansion of personality, 
those of consciousness and soul, are described to some extent by means of 
association by contiguity, the clairvoyant awakening of the spiritual level is 
conceived as a metaphoric or symbolic relationship that integrates the met-
onymic series and points through them to the outlines of the child’s future, 
so that the Demon, the herald of pain and suffering, can appear only when 
the natural cycle of nature’s flourishing and growth is arrested and for a time 
reversed.
 As far as the structure of Luvers is concerned, it is not easy or desirable to 
indicate any single philosophical framework that Pasternak might have fol-
lowed while working on the story—indeed, Pasternak brings together a great 
number of approaches. The Kantian (and Neo-Kantian) tradition is clearly 
present in the portrayal of Zhenya’s growth as a process of synthetic percep-
tion that blends the finite and the immeasurable and integrates the phenome-
nal world with things named together with phenomena still unnamed and out 
of focus. Pasternak’s choice of the idea of the “third person” echoes Hermann 
Cohen’s “other,” while Luvers’s portrayal of the “animation” of the surrounding 
world, so central to Pasternak’s future writing, expands in startling fashion the 
“second state”—“movement without reality” [движение без действитель-
ности] (PSS 3:460)—or animation transfixing inanimate objects in “Ordering 
a Drama” (1910). It also clearly echoes Plato’s idea of the soul as “incessant” 
movement, conspicuously noted in his philosophical diaries:
Ψ[υχή] = the beginning of self-directing motion (The inanimate is distinct 
from the animate precisely because it contains the source of its motion. 
Ψ[υχή] (a self-generating motion) moves always, cannot arrest itself; its life 
is without cessation.
cation “not so much that Lermontov was alive, but that he was there in accidental passers-by, 
still unknown and not as yet sufficiently immortalized by their sucess and fame, as if in that 
summer it was still possible to meet him, [ . . . ] to express the feeling of something as yet very 
immediate, for instance, the remaining wetness of the night rain or the quieting echoes of a dis-
appearing sound—[ . . . ] this secretive grandeur of Lermontov’s essence” [не то что в живых, 
но в рядах случайных прохожих, еще неведомых или недостаточно увековеченных аб-
страктностью признания, точно его тем летом где-нибудь еще можно было встретить, 
[  .  .  . ] выразить это чувство чего-то совсем недавнего, непросохших следов ночного 
дождя или затихающих, неотзвучавших отголосков только что прокатившегося звука, 
—[ . . . ] это таинственное могущество Лермонтовской сущности] (PSS 10:270).
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Ψ[υχή] = начало самоопределяемого движения. (Одушевл[енное] 
отлич[ается] от неодушевл[енного] тем, что носит в себе источник 
своих движений). Ψ[υχή] (как самостоятельное движущееся) дви-
жется вегда, не может сама себя остановить ее жизнь неистребима. 
(Lehrjahre I:361)
On the whole, this philosophical subtext—the progression of awakened con-
sciousness from ensouledness to spirit—indicates here a carefully worked out 
and highly original narrative design that reflects to a considerable degree the 
ideas of Plato, Kant, Cohen, Solovyev, and, to some extent, Mikhail Gershen-
son (see 5.2).
 However, when placed in the context of Pasternak’s later writing it is pre-
cisely the carefully worked out systematic organization of the story that marks 
the beginnings of Pasternak’s dissatisfaction. If “Letters from Tula” contains 
philosophical principles that are destined to play a major part in Pasternak’s 
later work, the stylistic innovations in the organization of Luvers will be later 
reconsidered and altered in a radical manner. In Doctor Zhivago, for instance, 
it is no longer the spirit of Lermontov (or any poet for that matter) or his dai-
monic protagonist that will awaken young Yuri into his first understanding of 
the incommensurable forces of the approaching future: it will be his mother’s 
death and then the winter storm, knocking on the window, reminding him 
of the necessity of remembering and articulating something for which he, as 
a child, as yet has no language. This change of setting is just a detail upon a 
much larger canvas, but it signals a major reorientation.
 The power of the call that accesses the future creative potential of the 
child’s consciousness remains an overall theme of the novel’s opening, but 
compared to The Childhood of Luvers, the metaphoric structure of Doctor 
Zhivago appears radically simplified: realistic events, rather than complex 
schematic “abstractions,” awaken the child’s self, and it is in this context, I 
suggest, that one can begin to see the artistic principles that made Pasternak 
reconsider his earlier narrative patterns. The “schematic” organization that 
informed his early style is gone, written off in the letter to George Reavey 
(December 1959) as “those rare grains of life and truth that are intermixed 
with great quantities of deadening schematic nonsense and unreal and raw 
material” [редкие зерна жизни и правды перемешаны с огромным коли-
чеством мертвой, схематичной бессмыслицы и несуществующего 
сырья] (PSS 10:550). What could have been the cause of this change? The 
lack of critical response to his carefully executed narrative designs must have 
indicated the necessity for a new path (especially when the writer is so intent 
on reaching the other), but the change was also demanded by the new reality 
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and challenges of the post-revolutionary experience. Thus the novel, of which 
The Childhood of Luvers was to have been just a beginning, was never fin-
ished. With the exception of “Aerial Ways” in 1924, Pasternak’s future style was 
altered drastically, and the very principles and their philosophical underpin-
nings that gave Pasternak his first themes in narrative fiction appear to have 
become something of an obstacle to the vitality of his future fiction. Or was 
their earlier execution viewed as still insufficiently open-ended, too abstract 
to be thoroughly integrated into the narrative? As I conclude this study, this 
question needs a more careful analysis.
8.3 New symbolism: 
 Toward “the soul” of the later prose
In Doctor Zhivago, Pasternak depicts the visit of Nikolay Nikolayevich Ved-
enyapin to Moscow during post-Revolutionary chaos and hunger. Yuri, of 
course, is overwhelmingly happy to see his philosopher-uncle who had so 
strongly influenced his art, but he senses that his uncle’s brilliance, as well as 
his carefully coiffed image, does not live up to the weight and scale of events 
in Russia:
He was seeing the idol of his childhood, the teacher who dominated his 
youthful thoughts—alive, in the flesh, was standing in front of him.
 His gray hair was becoming to him, and his loose foreign suit fitted 
him well. He was very young and handsome by his years.
 Admittedly, he was overshadowed by the grandeur of the events; seen 
beside them, he lost in stature. But it never occurred to Yuri to measure 
him by such a yardstick.
 He was surprised at Nikolay Nikolayevich’s calm, at his light and 
detached tone in speaking of politics. He was more self-possessed than 
most Russians could be at that time. (Zhivago 178)
Кумир его детства, властитель его юношеских дум, живой во плоти 
опять стоял перед ним.
 Николаю Николаевичу очень шла седина. Заграничный широ-
кий костюм хорошо сидел на нем. Для своих лет он был еще очень 
моложав и смотрел красавцем. Конечно, он сильно терял в сосед-
стве с громадностью совершавшегося. События заслоняли его. Но 
Юрию Андреевичу и не приходило в голову мерить его таким мери-
лом.
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 Его удивило спокойствие Николая Николаевича, хладнокровно 
шутливый тон, которым он говорил на политические темы. Его уме-
ние держать себя превышало нынешние русские возможности. (PSS 
4:176)
This minor scene captures something of Pasternak’s quandary after 1918: the 
narrative style he had developed with such care and intellectual precision was 
the fruit of his youthful thought, but it was simply not commensurate with the 
overwhelming catastrophe enveloping his country. Just as he had done during 
his other re-envisionings of himself, Pasternak moved forward by reworking 
the intellectual insight of the past. This new reorientation, however, may not 
have been as abrupt and dramatic as his earlier abandonment of music and 
then philosophy, but it was a considerable personal quest—and the main artis-
tic challenge of his life.
 By 1958, during both the signs of triumph and the political scandals asso-
ciated with Doctor Zhivago, Pasternak felt oppressed by at least two painful 
realizations. First, there was the clear and painful awareness that he might 
not be able to get any closer to his readers than the narrow window of cor-
respondence with his foreign admirers, an activity permitted, but barely tol-
erated, by the State. Second, he understood vividly (and with considerable 
alarm) that the lack of readers’ comprehension had not been alleviated by 
the simplified narrative style of his later prose. Thus, Pasternak put aside his 
earlier proclamation of a reticence he shared with his reader (“I cannot con-
ceive of any correspondence with him” [1928 essay published in Chitatel’ i 
pisatel’ (CSP 267–68; PSS 5:220)]) and began to clarify the artistic goals of 
his new prose through his letters. In the letter to Jacqueline de Proyart cited 
above (dated May 20, 1959), he notes that while conceiving reality as a philo-
sophical category, he was also addressing a specific historical setting: “It por-
trayed a particular reality—a reality that also reflected a particular period of 
time. And more specifically—Russian reality of the last fifty years” [русская 
реальность последних пятидесяти лет] (PSS 10:489). This statement does 
not merely signify a dual goal, which implies a contrast between locality and 
general philosophical truth found in symbolic language. Rather, Pasternak 
also speaks about the symbolic expression of a particular reality, noting that 
the depiction of this reality as a historical phenomenon eschewed the symbol-
ism he practiced in his youth. He also insists that his adherence to “reality as 
a philosophical category” demanded from him a strong objection to narrative 
style conceived as an intellectual puzzle and that this new artistic code also 
entailed a categorical rejection of partial and autonomous symbols, as well as 
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the presence of ideas to be fitted into some crossword problem. Moreover, in 
order to explain the style of his novel, he refers to the example of the Impres-
sionists, echoing his 1914 entry into artistic debates in “The Black Goblet.” In 
1958, however, he demonstrably replaces the experience of packing and pack-
aging symbols with images of the soul and open, unrestricted air. The word 
“soul,” in fact, appears in opposition to “self-identical symbols” and to “ideas” 
as solutions to “crossword puzzles”:
I wanted to write to Hélène about false interpretations of my style which 
are becoming highly popular. [ . . . ] Critics are searching for a secret mean-
ing in every syllable of the novel, decode words, the names of the streets 
and protagonists as if these are allegories and cryptoquotes. There is noth-
ing of this in [Zhivago]. I reject even the possibility of existence of com-
plete, partial or self-identical symbols for anyone who is an artist. If the 
work of art is not fully exhausted by what is said and printed in it, if it 
contains something else—this can only be that common quality, breathing, 
movement, infinite urge forward that transfixes the whole work and makes 
it to be a particular work, not because it hides an idea, equal to the solved 
puzzle—this other is the likeness of soul, because soul, in our view, fills the 
body, and cannot be extracted from it.
 In other words, if the soul of the art of French impressionists—is air 
and light, then what is the soul of the new prose of Doctor Zhivago? In its 
appearance, its execution and its goals it was a realistic work. It portrayed 
a particular reality—a reality that also reflected a particular period of time. 
And more specifically—Russian reality of the last fifty years. When this was 
accomplished, there remained a certain residue, which deserves to be char-
acterized and described. What is this residue? Reality as such, reality itself 
as a phenomenon or a philosophical category—the very fact of existence of 
a particular reality.
Я хотел написать Элен о получившем распространение ложном тол-
ковании моего стиля. [ .  .  . ] Ищут тайный смысл в каждом слоге 
романа, расшифровывают слова, названия улиц и имена героев как 
аллегории и криптограммы. Ничего этого у меня нет. Даже возмож-
ность существования отдельных, изолированных символов я отри-
цаю у кого бы то ни было, если он художник. Если произведение не 
исчерпывается тем, что в нем сказано, если есть еще что-то сверх 
того, это может быть только его общее качество, дыхание, движе-
ние или бесконечное устремление, пронизывающее произведение 
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все целиком и делающее его тем или другим. Это не идея, которая в 
нем скрыта, как решение загадки, но подобие души, заключенной в 
теле и его наполняющей, которую нельзя из него извлечь.
 Итак, если душой живописи французской импрессионисти-
ческой живописи были воздух и свет, то какая душа у этой новой 
прозы , которую представляет собой “Д<октор> Ж<иваго>”? По 
замыслу, задаче и исполнению это были реалистическое произве-
дение. Потому что в нем была точная реальность определенного 
периода,—русская реальность последних пятидесяти лет. Когда эта 
работа была выполнена, осталось еще одно, что надо было также 
охарактеризовать и описать. Что именно? Реальность как таковую, 
реальность как явление или философскую категорию—самый факт 
бытия какой-то действительности. (PSS 10:488–89)
Thus, the concept of soul is not merely introduced: it is presented as a key to 
his philosophical view of reality (at the very same time as Pasternak restates 
his adherence to realism) and an implicit rejection of his early intellectualized 
style of prose; the philosophical rendition of reality is its breath, movement, 
impetus, unifying sweep, and new dynamic direction, which enter into all 
aspects of life, so that the artistic text becomes the ground and spectacle of 
this incarnated impulse.
 However, the echoes of Kantian and Neo-Kantian synthesis, of appercep-
tion not as personal autonomy, but as a principle in the world at large, are still 
evident as a mark of the reality he wants to capture in his novel—recreating 
something of the figure of a world soul animating all at every point. This, 
indeed, is precisely what he had written to Jacqueline de Proyart when he 
observed that great art always “attempted to communicate the unified pic-
ture of the life, life in its wholeness, but it was done and commented upon 
always in a different way, in accordance with the philosophy of the époque 
and because of this by different methods” [великое искусство всегда стре-
милось зарисовать общее восприятие жизни в целом, но это делалось 
(толковалось ее неделимое единство) кажды раз по-разному, в согла-
сии с философией своего времени] (PSS 10:489–90). In short, all the impe-
tus of his early prose is contained in this “philosophical rendering of reality,” 
but the canvas of the narrative is much larger, so that it is no longer even pos-
sible to identify philosophical echoes and to fit them into a puzzle in order to 
explain philosophical precursors of the reality in question. The tableau is both 
more unapologetic and yet more tragic, for this world and the reality that Pas-
ternak aims to capture are not permanent and secure—they are wounded and 
endangered by incarnated ideas of “iron causality” that enter the dynamism of 
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animation and arrest its freedom and flow. Having written Doctor Zhivago, he 
may, perhaps, feel that as the artist of such awakened, animated surroundings 
he has escaped the laws of iron causality at least for the time being. He clarifies 
this position to de Proyart:
I described the characters, situations, details and particulars with the single 
goal: to question the idea of iron causality and absolute necessity; to show 
reality as I always saw it and felt it: as an inspired spectacle of as yet unreal-
ized, as a reality engendered into movement by free choice, as a potential 
among potentials, as free path.
 [ . . . ] From this springs the optimism of my manner. The understand-
ing of existence not as enslaving and disappointing, but as surprising and 
freeing mystery.
Я описывал характеры, положения, подробности и частности с 
единственною целью: поколебать идею железной причинности и 
абсолютной обязательности; представить реальность такой как я 
всегда ее видел и переживал; как вдохновенное зрелище невопло-
щенного; как явление, приводимое в движение свободным выбо-
ром; как возможность среди возможностей; как произвольность.
 [ . . . ] Отсюда некоторый оптимизм этой манеры. Понимания 
бытия не как чего-то порабощающего и разочаровывающего, а как 
удивительной и освобождающей тайны. (PSS 10:488–89)
In short, if Pasternak in The Childhood of Luvers sees the moral maturation 
of personality as the progression from “soul” to “spirit” and to the world of 
“abstract ideas,” then the Pasternak of Zhivago reclaims the concept of the soul 
as his primary and most comprehensive focus, which helps to integrate on a 
much broader tableau the stylistic findings of his early narrative. Nonetheless, 
he also aims to name the conflict of his age—the carriers of the “spirit of the 
age,” or individuals sacrificing the vitality of self-renewing reality, the agents 
of ideas that bring about the eventual extirpation of life.
 The artistic realization of this tableau and its philosophical underpinnings 
needs а more sustained analysis that goes beyond the parameters of this study, 
yet it is possible to summarize at least some signposts of this artistic re-ori-
entation. Pasternak’s style no longer reflects any progression of the awakened 
consciousness from the world of soul to that of spirit. Instead, he sees the 
spirited agents of ideas attacking and destroying the dynamic spaciousness of 
soul. At the turning points of Doctor Zhivago, Pasternak seeks to clarify some 
significant elements of this opposition. Zhivago, for instance, tries to explain 
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to Liberius, who “chairs” the “forest brotherhood,” that their “ideas of social 
betterment” are not only paid by “a sea of blood,” but that they are based on 
the crudest dismissal of any animating principle. On this occasion the words 
“soul” and “spirit of life” are interchangeable:
Reshaping life! People who can say that have never understood a thing 
about life—they have never felt its breath, its heartbeat—however much 
they have seen or done. They look on it as a lump of raw material that needs 
to be processed by them, to be ennobled by their touch. But life is never a 
material, a substance to be molded. If you want to know, life is a principle 
of self-renewal, it is constantly renewing and remaking and changing and 
transfiguring itself, it is infinitely beyond your or my obtuse theories about 
it. (Zhivago 338)
Переделка жизни! Так могут рассуждать люди, хотя может быть и 
видавшие виды, но ни разу не узнавшие жизни, не почувствовав-
шие ее духа, души ее. Для них существование это комок грубого, не 
облагороженного их прикосновением материала, нуждающегося в 
их обработке. А материалом, веществом, жизнь никогда не бывает. 
Она сама, если хотите знать, непрерывно себя обновляющее, вечно 
себя перерабатывающее начало, она сама вечно себя переделывает 
и претворяет, она сама куда выше наших с вами тупоумных теорий. 
(PSS 4:336)
Or, again, in comparing his own thought to that of Lev Tolstoy in the con-
cluding chapters of Zhivago, Pasternak pushes Tolstoy’s organic philosophy 
further than even Tolstoy had done, setting up an opposition between organic 
life and the self-appointed carriers of ideas, the self-limiting agents of doom 
and idolatry:
History cannot be seen, just as one cannot see grass growing. Wars and 
revolutions, kings and Robespierres, are history’s organic agents, its yeast. 
Revolutions are made by fanatical men of action with one-track minds, 
geniuses in their ability to confine themselves to a limited field. They over-
turn the old order in a few hours or days, the whole upheaval takes a few 
weeks or at most years, but the fanatical spirit that inspired the upheavals is 
worshipped for decades thereafter, for centuries. (Zhivago 454)
Истории никто не делает, ее не видно, как нельзя увидать, как трава 
растет. Войны, революции, цари, Робеспьеры это ее органические 
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возбудители, ее бродильные дрожжи. Революции производят люди 
действенные, односторонние фанатики, гении самоограничения. 
Они в несколько часов или дней опрокидывают старый порядок. 
Перевороты длятся недели, много годы, а потом десятилетиями, 
веками поклоняются духу ограниченности, приведшей к перево-
роту, как святыне. (PSS 4:452)
These passages begin to clarify what Pasternak means by “the destruction of 
forms,” mentioned so often in those letters concerning his earlier artistic “par-
ticipation in the sins of the age.” He is least concerned with the formal appear-
ance of order, or with cultural history where, as he mockingly observes in Safe 
Conduct, “a knot of old men in chlamys and sandals, or periwigs and cami-
soles, fib up some impenetrable mumbo jumbo” [некоторая богодельня, 
где кучка стариков в хламидах и сандалиях или парках и камзолах врет 
непроглядную отсебятину] (CSP 39; PSS 3:169). He does, however, speak 
of “form [as] the key to organic life, since no living thing can exist without it” 
[форма же есть органический ключ существования, формой должно 
обладать все живое, чтобы существовать] (Zhivago 454; PSS 4:452). The 
schematic organization of his earlier prose, he suggests, was part of the overall 
dismissal of the organic power of renewal and animation that can be discerned 
as invigorating reality, releasing its still sleeping potential. At the same time, 
it is also clear that Pasternak’s early prose work (while lacking the broader 
historical tableau and the depth of the ongoing conflict depicted in the later 
work) has already experimented with many of these artistic ideas.
 It is also noteworthy that Pasternak’s early stories examined in this book 
are all centered on the spirited carriers of “ideas”: Heine, whose power com-
peted with that of the sun; Tolstoy, the force of conscience in Tula, who 
directed the dance of the compass needles [тут начинают плясать магнит-
ные стрелки] (CSP 122; PSS 3:29); Lermontov, the “spirit of living adven-
ture” who presages suffering and storms. Even Pasternak’s understanding of 
the roles of Scriabin, Cohen, and Mayakovsky (agent of the spirit of the age) 
should be understood in this context—the admired faces of his youth and 
the re-makers of his life. The striking opposition of his mature years emerges 
centrally as an opposition between the ideas that destroy the world and the 
soul of life itself [ее дух, душa ее] (Zhivago 338; PSS 4:336). In finishing his 
Sketch for an Autobiography, Pasternak thematizes his life’s work by drawing 
the portraits of two Georgian poets, Titian Tabidze and Paolo Yashvili, whose 
fate, together with that of Marina Tsvetaeva, became his “greatest sorrow.” The 
portrayal of these poets exterminated in the unequal conflicts of the century 
is centered on the centripetal and centrifugal directions of soul’s agency, the 
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poets’ inexhaustible clairvoyant potential projected into their surroundings 
and their art:
If Yashvili was turned outwards, all in a centrifugal direction, Titian Tabidze 
was turned inwards and every line he wrote and every step he took called 
you into the depths of his rich soul, so full of intuitions and forebodings. 
[ . . . ] This presence of the untouched store of spiritual reserves creates the 
background and lends depth to his poems and imparts that special mood 
with which they are imbued. [ . . . ] There is as much soul in his poems as 
there was in himself, a complex, esoteric soul, directed wholly toward good, 
capable of clairvoyance and self-sacrifice. (Remember 116; emphasis added)
Если Яшвили весь был во внешнем, центробежном проявлении, 
Тициан Табидзе был устремлен внутрь и каждою своей строкой 
и каждым шагом звал в глубину своей богатой, полной догадок и 
предчувствий души. [ . . . ] Это присутствие незатронутых душевных 
запасов создает фон и второй план его стихов и придает им то осо-
бое настроение, которым они пронизаны и которое составляет их 
главную и горькую прелесть. Души в его стихах столько же, сколько 
ее было в нем самом, души сложной, затаенной, целиком направлен-
ной к добру и способной к ясновидению и самопожертвованию. (PSS 
3:343)
This other tableau, then, of “years, circumstances, people, and destinies within 
the framework of the Russian revolution” [о годах, обстоятельствах, людях 
и судьбах, охваченных рамою революции] (Remember 122; PSS 3:345) 
was, Pasternak claims, the work of his life—and it was to be a realistic narra-
tive, which sought for new forms in order not to cheapen this living memory 
with unnecessary artistic mystification. For this reason, only the most careful 
analysis, and another study altogether, can do justice to the later stages of Pas-
ternak’s continuing artistic work.
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